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★ ★ ★ ★ ☆ | |
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★ ★ ☆ ☆ ☆ | |
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Readers` Reviews
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dilara
The book is in excellent condition. This is a must read for anyone who is interested in the navel battle for Guadalcanal. A real eye opener on how the navy almost lost the battle due to failure of our navy to rely on advance technology the Japanese did not have. Book was received in the time promised. I love this book.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
julianna
This book should be required reading for World War II buffs. Hornfischer has again set the bar by which historian authors will be measured. As with his "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors," he incorporates many personal interviews and recently released archival information to weave an eminently readable tale of the more than six month struggle to capture and keep Guadalcanal. As the subtitle indicates, he concentrates almost exclusively on the naval aspects of the campaign. Telling in this emphasis is the statistic that several thousand more sailors than ground troops lost their lives in the battles on and around Guadalcanal. In his almost shot-by-shot retelling of the naval battles, I found myself frequently referring to the included area maps, plots of the ship's courses and the photographs of the ships and the damage they received.
Among the new wave of books about World War II, "Neptune's Inferno" stands out as an excellent read, providing a wealth of new information woven into an intricate chronology of the campaign that thwarted the expansion of the Japanese Empire and began the U.S. and allies' surge through the South Pacific.
Among the new wave of books about World War II, "Neptune's Inferno" stands out as an excellent read, providing a wealth of new information woven into an intricate chronology of the campaign that thwarted the expansion of the Japanese Empire and began the U.S. and allies' surge through the South Pacific.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
cassandra boykins
Having just finished "THE ADMIRALS" Walter R. Borneman, have ordered "CAN DO" the SeaBees 1945 history, following the path of my father across the Pacific, from Adak and Dutch Harbour to Guad to Siapan and Okinawa as a Blacksmiths Mate in the SeaBees--and my U.S.Navy background--I highly recommend this small and significant and largely forgotten bit of USA History.
Winter Song (Spirit of Love Book 1) :: Tales of Music and the Brain by Oliver Sacks (2008-09-23) :: Tales of Music and the Brain by Oliver Sacks (2011-09-02) :: Musicophilia by Oliver Sacks (2012-05-14) :: Inferno (The Divine Comedy)
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
silvia tjendrawasih
Great read. It covers an era and actions that are not spoken about very much in detail. We hear about the action of the Marines at Guadalcanal, and I take nothing away from their courage and sacrifice, but I did not realize just how much the Navy lost during that series of actions. Even with the blunders and losses sustained they did succeed in turning back the Japanese at a very critical time. The price they paid was high but it does reflect the courage and honor they displayed. Plus the lessons learned were used to develop the best Navy in the World.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
cameron mackinnon
Hornsfischer is a terrific writer - almost on par with Wm Manchester. This is a very well researched book, but hard to read in many ways. The Battle for Guadalcanal provided the US Navy's first opportunity for surface ship action. While USN forces were almost universally courageous, early in the war they were generally under the spell of hubris and xenophobia - the twin killers of empire. Most skippers entered combat without clear operational plans. Except for Norman Scott, US commanders completely eschewed the new-fangled hardware known as SG radar. SG revolutionized night gunnery combat accuracy. Failing to us it cost hundreds if not thousands of American lives.
I was surprised to learn that the US Navy lost three times more personnel killed in action in the Battle for Guadalcanal than the Marine Corps. The Navy had a steep learning curve in WWII but the lessons were learned. Japanese victories and territorial expansion ended at Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto thought the war was lost, and of course he was right.
Good book: Highly Recommended
I was surprised to learn that the US Navy lost three times more personnel killed in action in the Battle for Guadalcanal than the Marine Corps. The Navy had a steep learning curve in WWII but the lessons were learned. Japanese victories and territorial expansion ended at Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto thought the war was lost, and of course he was right.
Good book: Highly Recommended
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
tara cooper
This book was riveting! Nothing was held back when it came to assigning praise and blame for the US Navy's performance during this campaign. My father never talked about it. He was an Annapolis graduate of 1942 (graduated Dec 1941). He was a survivor of the USS Quincy (CA 39) that was sunk during the Battle of Savo Island on 9 August 1942. He later served on the USS Lardner (DD) during that campaign. Reading this book you could almost smell the gunpowder and feel the shells hitting metal. I finally found out the real story that my father endured.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
aphroditereads
This book does not glorify the battles of Guadalcanal but details the inexperience and arrogance of the American flag officers and commanders. Many men likely lost their lives due to friendships and seniority traditions regardless of proven skills or command experience. Human nature at its worst.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
reshmi
The opening of the book is a pretty general overview of the US Navy and its leadership at the beginning of the War in the Pacific. If you are already familiar, don't give up! The balance of the book is a detailed description of the strategy, tactics, and shipboard operations during the Guadalcanal campaign, with the most detail of course from the US point of view. The insights into Japanese thinking however were just as valuable from my point of view. The accounts of the experiences of the crews of the US ships were downright exciting and tragic. I am a Navy veteran from a much safer era, but the accounts rang true.
I was most struck by the reason given for the ultimate triumph of the US. As the book has it, and as has everything else on the subject I have read over the years, in battle the Japanese appeared to have the upper hand, again and again and again. But in the end they concluded they simply didn't have the resources to prevail.
I was most struck by the reason given for the ultimate triumph of the US. As the book has it, and as has everything else on the subject I have read over the years, in battle the Japanese appeared to have the upper hand, again and again and again. But in the end they concluded they simply didn't have the resources to prevail.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
annika barranti klein
Just the right mix of personal stories and the overall perspective. The stubbornness and sometimes outright stupidity of some of the commanding officers is shocking and maddening. The utter horror of a naval battle when told from the level of the actual participants is sometimes overwhelming.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jo ann
On December 7th, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States had seven active aircraft carriers, none were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Six of those ships would be committed to the pacific war, by the end of October, 1942, only two of those six would be afloat, neither of which was capable of combat operations.
I had believed that Guadalcanal was primarily a land battle, the naval engagements were ancillary to the land fight. Nothing could be further from the truth, Guadalcanal was first and foremost a naval campaign, naval deaths were more than three times those of the land forces, including two Rear Admirals, the losses in light combat vessels, cruisers and destroyers, were substantial, two Aircraft Carriers, sunk outright, the other two crippled, one, the Enterprise, was still of limited use. Had the Navy given up on Guadalcanal, the Marines would have found themselves in the same situation as the Army forces on Bataan.
NEPTUNE'S INFERNO does a great job in explaining the naval combat, command structure and concerns.
When it was discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield on the Island, the Navy high command saw the threat to the communications between the United States and New Zealand and Australia, the decision was promptly made to seize the Island from the Japanese. That Guadalcanal became the focal point it did was because the Japanese Navy chose to make it so, it's possession was of no real concern to them. Imperial Air, Naval and Land forces came from the area around Rabaul, the Japanese strong hold in the Southern pacific, for their land based Air forces, Guadalcanal was at the end of their range, which meant that air attacks launched in the morning were generally limited to one attack a day, usually in the early afternoon. Their land forces were diverted from their efforts against Port Moseby, and over the course of the campaign it became apparent that it was easier to land forces on Guadalcanal, than it was to land supplies. There were two Carrier battles in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, while the Americans lost their carriers, the Japanese lost their air crews.
In short order, Guadalcanal became a series of engagements between the surface forces of both fleets. The Japanese fleet had an advantage in the effectiveness of their torpedoes, the U S had a tremendous advantage in radar, an advantage which was for the most part squandered because of it's newness and lack of understanding in the Naval Officer Corps. The surface engagements were fought at night.
For the most part, the United States surface fleet got the worst part of the fight, it seems task force commands would be shuffled on the eve of an oncoming engagement. On the night of November 12th early morning November 13th, a mixed cruiser and destroyer force under the command of Rear Admiral Callaghan took on a Japanese bombardment group with two battleships. Cruisers were outclassed by battleships, Callaghan regarded it as a suicide mission, what his battle plan was, and his reasons for it are a mystery. There are valid reasons, for why he ordered his line of ships between two columns of Japanese ships, the closer a cruiser to a battleship the more effective her weaker guns were, perhaps he was hoping that by placing his forces between the Japanese lines, he would induce both their lines to fire on each other, their is no record of his reasoning, apparently there were no conferences with his subordinate commanders, where he went over their task. He and his staff were early fatalities in the battle. Once the battle was joined, it was a melee, on the American side there were friendly fire incidents with horrendous results. The positive result was it crippled one of the Japanese Battleships, so that she could be sunk by the Guadalcanal air contingent the following day, and drove the second one off.
The outcome of the November 13th fight, forced a reluctant Admiral Halsey to commit his two Battleships to the battle two nights later, apparently this was against naval doctrine, as the battle area was a confined sound. He wanted them there the next night, but their geographic position in screening of the Enterprise, made it impossible for that to happen.
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in a campaign of attrition. It's decisions, and the logistics were less wrong than the Japanese. In fighting this campaign, when it was arguably at it's weakest, it was learning hard lessons. It was weeding out officers who were not up to the command task, among those who suffered, were also some who incurred Halsey's wrath unjustly.
In the book you see Halsey at his best and his worst, Khaki becomes the uniform of the campaign, which has the effect of uniting all the services, as it blurs the distinctions among them. He forcefully, wrests the space he needs from the free french officials on Nouema, first he asked, they refused-protecting them from Japanese attack was not enough of an inducement, than he took. He didn't bury himself in administrative details, like his predecessor, Admiral Ghormerly, those were tasks best left to his staff. The survivors of the battle of November 12th - 13th, were limping back to the rear area, they were spent, the Juneau was torpedoed and exploded. There were survivors, the leader of the force, Capt Hoover concerned for the rest of his force and low on anti-submarine munitions, radioed the coordinates of the Juneau to a circling Army B-17, and continued on his way. In the confusion of war the Juneau survivors were lost in a inter service communication snafu, and not rescued til much later and many fewer. Halsey blamed Capt Hoover for not rescuing them, and effectively barred him from further future command or promotion.
That Guadalcanal ended as a US victory, was no where certain at the time. Had the Japanese, changed their emphasis, to attacking the the ships supplying and protecting the island, instead of garrisoning the island, the outcome might have been very different, in effect prolonging the Pacific war.
A very good read.
I had believed that Guadalcanal was primarily a land battle, the naval engagements were ancillary to the land fight. Nothing could be further from the truth, Guadalcanal was first and foremost a naval campaign, naval deaths were more than three times those of the land forces, including two Rear Admirals, the losses in light combat vessels, cruisers and destroyers, were substantial, two Aircraft Carriers, sunk outright, the other two crippled, one, the Enterprise, was still of limited use. Had the Navy given up on Guadalcanal, the Marines would have found themselves in the same situation as the Army forces on Bataan.
NEPTUNE'S INFERNO does a great job in explaining the naval combat, command structure and concerns.
When it was discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield on the Island, the Navy high command saw the threat to the communications between the United States and New Zealand and Australia, the decision was promptly made to seize the Island from the Japanese. That Guadalcanal became the focal point it did was because the Japanese Navy chose to make it so, it's possession was of no real concern to them. Imperial Air, Naval and Land forces came from the area around Rabaul, the Japanese strong hold in the Southern pacific, for their land based Air forces, Guadalcanal was at the end of their range, which meant that air attacks launched in the morning were generally limited to one attack a day, usually in the early afternoon. Their land forces were diverted from their efforts against Port Moseby, and over the course of the campaign it became apparent that it was easier to land forces on Guadalcanal, than it was to land supplies. There were two Carrier battles in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, while the Americans lost their carriers, the Japanese lost their air crews.
In short order, Guadalcanal became a series of engagements between the surface forces of both fleets. The Japanese fleet had an advantage in the effectiveness of their torpedoes, the U S had a tremendous advantage in radar, an advantage which was for the most part squandered because of it's newness and lack of understanding in the Naval Officer Corps. The surface engagements were fought at night.
For the most part, the United States surface fleet got the worst part of the fight, it seems task force commands would be shuffled on the eve of an oncoming engagement. On the night of November 12th early morning November 13th, a mixed cruiser and destroyer force under the command of Rear Admiral Callaghan took on a Japanese bombardment group with two battleships. Cruisers were outclassed by battleships, Callaghan regarded it as a suicide mission, what his battle plan was, and his reasons for it are a mystery. There are valid reasons, for why he ordered his line of ships between two columns of Japanese ships, the closer a cruiser to a battleship the more effective her weaker guns were, perhaps he was hoping that by placing his forces between the Japanese lines, he would induce both their lines to fire on each other, their is no record of his reasoning, apparently there were no conferences with his subordinate commanders, where he went over their task. He and his staff were early fatalities in the battle. Once the battle was joined, it was a melee, on the American side there were friendly fire incidents with horrendous results. The positive result was it crippled one of the Japanese Battleships, so that she could be sunk by the Guadalcanal air contingent the following day, and drove the second one off.
The outcome of the November 13th fight, forced a reluctant Admiral Halsey to commit his two Battleships to the battle two nights later, apparently this was against naval doctrine, as the battle area was a confined sound. He wanted them there the next night, but their geographic position in screening of the Enterprise, made it impossible for that to happen.
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in a campaign of attrition. It's decisions, and the logistics were less wrong than the Japanese. In fighting this campaign, when it was arguably at it's weakest, it was learning hard lessons. It was weeding out officers who were not up to the command task, among those who suffered, were also some who incurred Halsey's wrath unjustly.
In the book you see Halsey at his best and his worst, Khaki becomes the uniform of the campaign, which has the effect of uniting all the services, as it blurs the distinctions among them. He forcefully, wrests the space he needs from the free french officials on Nouema, first he asked, they refused-protecting them from Japanese attack was not enough of an inducement, than he took. He didn't bury himself in administrative details, like his predecessor, Admiral Ghormerly, those were tasks best left to his staff. The survivors of the battle of November 12th - 13th, were limping back to the rear area, they were spent, the Juneau was torpedoed and exploded. There were survivors, the leader of the force, Capt Hoover concerned for the rest of his force and low on anti-submarine munitions, radioed the coordinates of the Juneau to a circling Army B-17, and continued on his way. In the confusion of war the Juneau survivors were lost in a inter service communication snafu, and not rescued til much later and many fewer. Halsey blamed Capt Hoover for not rescuing them, and effectively barred him from further future command or promotion.
That Guadalcanal ended as a US victory, was no where certain at the time. Had the Japanese, changed their emphasis, to attacking the the ships supplying and protecting the island, instead of garrisoning the island, the outcome might have been very different, in effect prolonging the Pacific war.
A very good read.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
alvin rogers
Hornfischer's book is largely focused on the naval surface action during the Guadalcanal campaign of late 1942. The land and air action is touched upon only where it directly pertains to the central theme of the U.S. Navy's trial by fire during successive night-time engagements involving destroyers, cruisers and battleships in the contested waters surrounding the island. Control of those waters was essential for victory in the campaign. The book details the strategies and tactics of the various actions and uses first person accounts to good advantage in bringing to life the terror, violence and uncertaincy endured by those who were there.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
yohanes dimas
Enjoying the book. Good insight regarding strategies(or lack of), tactics, politics, Igoes, mistakes, and heroics.
Liked author’s “Fleet at Flood Tide” much better, maybe because I read it first.
Liked author’s “Fleet at Flood Tide” much better, maybe because I read it first.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
summer dansie
Just the right mix of personal stories and the overall perspective. The stubbornness and sometimes outright stupidity of some of the commanding officers is shocking and maddening. The utter horror of a naval battle when told from the level of the actual participants is sometimes overwhelming.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jake goretzki
On December 7th, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States had seven active aircraft carriers, none were at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Six of those ships would be committed to the pacific war, by the end of October, 1942, only two of those six would be afloat, neither of which was capable of combat operations.
I had believed that Guadalcanal was primarily a land battle, the naval engagements were ancillary to the land fight. Nothing could be further from the truth, Guadalcanal was first and foremost a naval campaign, naval deaths were more than three times those of the land forces, including two Rear Admirals, the losses in light combat vessels, cruisers and destroyers, were substantial, two Aircraft Carriers, sunk outright, the other two crippled, one, the Enterprise, was still of limited use. Had the Navy given up on Guadalcanal, the Marines would have found themselves in the same situation as the Army forces on Bataan.
NEPTUNE'S INFERNO does a great job in explaining the naval combat, command structure and concerns.
When it was discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield on the Island, the Navy high command saw the threat to the communications between the United States and New Zealand and Australia, the decision was promptly made to seize the Island from the Japanese. That Guadalcanal became the focal point it did was because the Japanese Navy chose to make it so, it's possession was of no real concern to them. Imperial Air, Naval and Land forces came from the area around Rabaul, the Japanese strong hold in the Southern pacific, for their land based Air forces, Guadalcanal was at the end of their range, which meant that air attacks launched in the morning were generally limited to one attack a day, usually in the early afternoon. Their land forces were diverted from their efforts against Port Moseby, and over the course of the campaign it became apparent that it was easier to land forces on Guadalcanal, than it was to land supplies. There were two Carrier battles in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, while the Americans lost their carriers, the Japanese lost their air crews.
In short order, Guadalcanal became a series of engagements between the surface forces of both fleets. The Japanese fleet had an advantage in the effectiveness of their torpedoes, the U S had a tremendous advantage in radar, an advantage which was for the most part squandered because of it's newness and lack of understanding in the Naval Officer Corps. The surface engagements were fought at night.
For the most part, the United States surface fleet got the worst part of the fight, it seems task force commands would be shuffled on the eve of an oncoming engagement. On the night of November 12th early morning November 13th, a mixed cruiser and destroyer force under the command of Rear Admiral Callaghan took on a Japanese bombardment group with two battleships. Cruisers were outclassed by battleships, Callaghan regarded it as a suicide mission, what his battle plan was, and his reasons for it are a mystery. There are valid reasons, for why he ordered his line of ships between two columns of Japanese ships, the closer a cruiser to a battleship the more effective her weaker guns were, perhaps he was hoping that by placing his forces between the Japanese lines, he would induce both their lines to fire on each other, their is no record of his reasoning, apparently there were no conferences with his subordinate commanders, where he went over their task. He and his staff were early fatalities in the battle. Once the battle was joined, it was a melee, on the American side there were friendly fire incidents with horrendous results. The positive result was it crippled one of the Japanese Battleships, so that she could be sunk by the Guadalcanal air contingent the following day, and drove the second one off.
The outcome of the November 13th fight, forced a reluctant Admiral Halsey to commit his two Battleships to the battle two nights later, apparently this was against naval doctrine, as the battle area was a confined sound. He wanted them there the next night, but their geographic position in screening of the Enterprise, made it impossible for that to happen.
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in a campaign of attrition. It's decisions, and the logistics were less wrong than the Japanese. In fighting this campaign, when it was arguably at it's weakest, it was learning hard lessons. It was weeding out officers who were not up to the command task, among those who suffered, were also some who incurred Halsey's wrath unjustly.
In the book you see Halsey at his best and his worst, Khaki becomes the uniform of the campaign, which has the effect of uniting all the services, as it blurs the distinctions among them. He forcefully, wrests the space he needs from the free french officials on Nouema, first he asked, they refused-protecting them from Japanese attack was not enough of an inducement, than he took. He didn't bury himself in administrative details, like his predecessor, Admiral Ghormerly, those were tasks best left to his staff. The survivors of the battle of November 12th - 13th, were limping back to the rear area, they were spent, the Juneau was torpedoed and exploded. There were survivors, the leader of the force, Capt Hoover concerned for the rest of his force and low on anti-submarine munitions, radioed the coordinates of the Juneau to a circling Army B-17, and continued on his way. In the confusion of war the Juneau survivors were lost in a inter service communication snafu, and not rescued til much later and many fewer. Halsey blamed Capt Hoover for not rescuing them, and effectively barred him from further future command or promotion.
That Guadalcanal ended as a US victory, was no where certain at the time. Had the Japanese, changed their emphasis, to attacking the the ships supplying and protecting the island, instead of garrisoning the island, the outcome might have been very different, in effect prolonging the Pacific war.
A very good read.
I had believed that Guadalcanal was primarily a land battle, the naval engagements were ancillary to the land fight. Nothing could be further from the truth, Guadalcanal was first and foremost a naval campaign, naval deaths were more than three times those of the land forces, including two Rear Admirals, the losses in light combat vessels, cruisers and destroyers, were substantial, two Aircraft Carriers, sunk outright, the other two crippled, one, the Enterprise, was still of limited use. Had the Navy given up on Guadalcanal, the Marines would have found themselves in the same situation as the Army forces on Bataan.
NEPTUNE'S INFERNO does a great job in explaining the naval combat, command structure and concerns.
When it was discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield on the Island, the Navy high command saw the threat to the communications between the United States and New Zealand and Australia, the decision was promptly made to seize the Island from the Japanese. That Guadalcanal became the focal point it did was because the Japanese Navy chose to make it so, it's possession was of no real concern to them. Imperial Air, Naval and Land forces came from the area around Rabaul, the Japanese strong hold in the Southern pacific, for their land based Air forces, Guadalcanal was at the end of their range, which meant that air attacks launched in the morning were generally limited to one attack a day, usually in the early afternoon. Their land forces were diverted from their efforts against Port Moseby, and over the course of the campaign it became apparent that it was easier to land forces on Guadalcanal, than it was to land supplies. There were two Carrier battles in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, while the Americans lost their carriers, the Japanese lost their air crews.
In short order, Guadalcanal became a series of engagements between the surface forces of both fleets. The Japanese fleet had an advantage in the effectiveness of their torpedoes, the U S had a tremendous advantage in radar, an advantage which was for the most part squandered because of it's newness and lack of understanding in the Naval Officer Corps. The surface engagements were fought at night.
For the most part, the United States surface fleet got the worst part of the fight, it seems task force commands would be shuffled on the eve of an oncoming engagement. On the night of November 12th early morning November 13th, a mixed cruiser and destroyer force under the command of Rear Admiral Callaghan took on a Japanese bombardment group with two battleships. Cruisers were outclassed by battleships, Callaghan regarded it as a suicide mission, what his battle plan was, and his reasons for it are a mystery. There are valid reasons, for why he ordered his line of ships between two columns of Japanese ships, the closer a cruiser to a battleship the more effective her weaker guns were, perhaps he was hoping that by placing his forces between the Japanese lines, he would induce both their lines to fire on each other, their is no record of his reasoning, apparently there were no conferences with his subordinate commanders, where he went over their task. He and his staff were early fatalities in the battle. Once the battle was joined, it was a melee, on the American side there were friendly fire incidents with horrendous results. The positive result was it crippled one of the Japanese Battleships, so that she could be sunk by the Guadalcanal air contingent the following day, and drove the second one off.
The outcome of the November 13th fight, forced a reluctant Admiral Halsey to commit his two Battleships to the battle two nights later, apparently this was against naval doctrine, as the battle area was a confined sound. He wanted them there the next night, but their geographic position in screening of the Enterprise, made it impossible for that to happen.
Ultimately, the United States prevailed in a campaign of attrition. It's decisions, and the logistics were less wrong than the Japanese. In fighting this campaign, when it was arguably at it's weakest, it was learning hard lessons. It was weeding out officers who were not up to the command task, among those who suffered, were also some who incurred Halsey's wrath unjustly.
In the book you see Halsey at his best and his worst, Khaki becomes the uniform of the campaign, which has the effect of uniting all the services, as it blurs the distinctions among them. He forcefully, wrests the space he needs from the free french officials on Nouema, first he asked, they refused-protecting them from Japanese attack was not enough of an inducement, than he took. He didn't bury himself in administrative details, like his predecessor, Admiral Ghormerly, those were tasks best left to his staff. The survivors of the battle of November 12th - 13th, were limping back to the rear area, they were spent, the Juneau was torpedoed and exploded. There were survivors, the leader of the force, Capt Hoover concerned for the rest of his force and low on anti-submarine munitions, radioed the coordinates of the Juneau to a circling Army B-17, and continued on his way. In the confusion of war the Juneau survivors were lost in a inter service communication snafu, and not rescued til much later and many fewer. Halsey blamed Capt Hoover for not rescuing them, and effectively barred him from further future command or promotion.
That Guadalcanal ended as a US victory, was no where certain at the time. Had the Japanese, changed their emphasis, to attacking the the ships supplying and protecting the island, instead of garrisoning the island, the outcome might have been very different, in effect prolonging the Pacific war.
A very good read.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
harold ogle
Hornfischer's book is largely focused on the naval surface action during the Guadalcanal campaign of late 1942. The land and air action is touched upon only where it directly pertains to the central theme of the U.S. Navy's trial by fire during successive night-time engagements involving destroyers, cruisers and battleships in the contested waters surrounding the island. Control of those waters was essential for victory in the campaign. The book details the strategies and tactics of the various actions and uses first person accounts to good advantage in bringing to life the terror, violence and uncertaincy endured by those who were there.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
kate winkler dawson
Enjoying the book. Good insight regarding strategies(or lack of), tactics, politics, Igoes, mistakes, and heroics.
Liked author’s “Fleet at Flood Tide” much better, maybe because I read it first.
Liked author’s “Fleet at Flood Tide” much better, maybe because I read it first.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
anne heiles
Gripping novel context for the best possible accuracy in a major historical event, one of the milestones that marked the turning point of WW II in the South Pacific. Extensive references and notes sections at the end.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
daniel gonzalez
A new appreciation for the Guadalcanal struggle has been given to me after reading ( and re-reading) this book, even though the author uses ten words when two would do!! It seems the author was intent on obfuscating the battles that took place with unnecessary verbiage!! The enjoyment I got out of this book was limited by the author's bombastic tone used throughout the narrative! The research undertaken by the author was, undoubtedly, comprehensive it seemed like he "talked down" to the reader by his extraneous use of obtuse adjectives and adverbs not normally associated with the subject matter. Still, in all, I would recommend this book!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
shadan
This history of US Navy surface operations during the Guadalcanal Campaign of August 1942 till January 1943 provides new insights into the US Navy's initial inability to use its shipborne radar to its advantage against the Japanese Navy's night-time attacks on US Marines desperately hanging onto their foothold in the Solomon Islands. By January 1943, the Japanese Navy gave up its efforts to reinforce their garrison on Guadalcanal because the human and military cost of doing so was too great to sustain. Although we lost more ships & tonnage than the Japanese in the Solomon's Campaign, the US Navy finally achieved strategic victory by placing more aggressive commanders in charge of allied surface operations.
Hornfischer continues to provide new details that personalize the campaign and give the reader insights into why we suffered such humiliating defeats early in this pivotal campaign in the Pacific Theater of WW II.
Hornfischer continues to provide new details that personalize the campaign and give the reader insights into why we suffered such humiliating defeats early in this pivotal campaign in the Pacific Theater of WW II.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
aya hesham
Clearly well researched, this one is on par with "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors".The photographs and illustrations are top notch. I literally couldn't put it down. You can almost smell the cordite.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
hamza mousa
This book, like others I have read by this author, is comprehensive, and well researched. The writer writes about a difficult topic in a clear, easily understood style. I will read other books by this author.If a person is interested in WW2 history, this is a good place to start.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
cipriano
Neptune's Inferno is a well documented and vivid historical review of all U.S. Navy events, as well as including the Japanese Navy events, that transpired in the Guadalcanal area of conflict. It was the worst and best of times for both sides of the surface fleets and the loss of life on all sides was tremendous.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
derek martin
I have studied the many Naval Battles at Guadalcanal since I was 16 years old and it never really made sense to me until now at age 62 . Hornfischer has pulled together a never ending series of battles into a comprehensible narrative. Halsey's actions make total sense. By ordering Callahan and Scotts suicide mission, cruisers against battleships at rock throwing ranges, Halsey prevented another battleship bombardment of Henderson Field, thereby facilitating air attacks against Tanaka's troop transports and sinking of the near mortally wounded Hiei the next day. Two nights later the South Dakota and Washington engaged the Kirishima, during which engagement the South Dakota suffered damage similar to the Hiei, but the Washington sank the Kirishima and knife fighting range. Halsey had broken every rule of the book by committing the South Dakota and Washington to the fight when he knew we were near the end of our rope. Yamamoto held his remaining battleships in reserve and did not commit them to subsequent fights when Halsey had no remaining battleships other than the Washington. By defying convention, Halsey defeated Yamamoto. Halsey bet that Yamamoto would not expend his remaining battleships at Guadalcanal and won the bet.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
burnee
I have James' other book Last stand of the tincan sailors. One of the guys in this book lived here until death. Sam Blue was blown off of the Samuel B. Roberts. He told me the book was accurate. This book is as real as well he last one. Ralph G.
me the book was accurate
me the book was accurate
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
menna allah
A very readable, well researched account of a little appreciated naval battle of WW II. I have read many histories of the Pacific war and this is one of the best. Most histories of Guadalcanal focus on the land and air battles, but Hornfischer's focus is the Navy. He clarifies why the Marines were sent and why the battleships were not. Why the Navy withdrew and why the fleet returned when it did. His research on the strengths, weaknesses, objectives and motivation of the Admirals makes the whole battle much more understandable. Highly recommended to WW II history buffs.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
liviu duta
Like all of Hornfischer's books it is meticulously researched and incredibly detailed in narration. Reading it one can almost feel the explosions and gun flashes. He brings out the heroism of the naval crew members and their commanders. He does not exclude poor decisions by naval leaders which led to serious casualties. The horror of night naval actions is vividly brought home to the reader of Hornfischer's fine writing. Great book. It joins "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" as two of the finest detailed histories of Naval battles of World War II.
Ray F. Broussard
Ray F. Broussard
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
denise gaboy
Many details about USN command experience and decisions. Also good description of activity by individual sailors. Progress of US Navy’s battle hardening of its men, methods and equipment was described and shown to be uneven over time and from ship to ship. Japanese plans, capabilities and commanders are covered.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
mary ellen
A geat "read," well edited, gives blow-by-blow accounts with background and well-researched information, including comments on the (often strange) actions of the US Navy individual commanding officers, and the assignments of experienced and inexperienced people for key leadership jobs.
A must read for understanding the real events and their background as they took place - not a simple narrative of dates & events.
Highly recommended
A must read for understanding the real events and their background as they took place - not a simple narrative of dates & events.
Highly recommended
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
lazaro
Those interested in the US naval campaigns in and around Guadalcanal in 1942, this book is a must read. This period of the war is so important as critical technologies such as radar were introduced which proved essential in night battles together with improvement in strategies and maneuvers set the stage for successes in future naval engagements of the Pacific war. It all started during this early period in the south Pacific which Hornfischer expertly articulates.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
chachi
A readable but detailed account of the naval and amphibious action at Guadalcanal. This is focused on the surface action in “The Slot” during the relatively limited carrier-carrier action post Midway and pre-Marianas.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
emma miss print
Excellent, very detailed account of the U.S Navy's struggles and perseverance against the Japanese Navy early in WWWII during the numerous engagements in and around Guadalcanal. This sobering account of the gruesome fighting and personal losses is a remarkable reminder that our Freedom is indeed not FREE! God bless the many young Americans who perished at Guadalcanal!
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
vadhan vadhan
I read the USMC account which dealt almost entirely with land battles. This account shows how critical were the naval battles and how they did in fact support the Corps even at great loss of life and ships.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
nitrorockets
Enjoyed this read tremendously. A lot of information presented in a straight forward and easily understood manner. Though I have read numerous WW II Pacific theater books over the years, Neptune's Inferno stands out. Recommend without reservation.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
kosta harlan
First class account of the naval war for Guadalcanal. Fascinating insight into the logistic problems of modern war, the resiliency of U.S. sailors, and the survivability of ships. My second outing with this book; the first as as an audio book.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
sandra penney
Hornfischer's telling of the series of naval battles around Guadalcanal is unparalleled. While Eric Hammel goes in depth in his books Carrier Strike, Carrier Clash, and Decision at Sea, this is the 'must have' chronicle of the sea campaign in its entirety. The opening paragraph in the prologue sets the tone for the book, and lets you know you're in for a great read. The narrative was very compelling, and Jim Hornfischer continued the excellent standard he set with "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors".
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
finley david daniel
Excellent well documented history of a very hard fought naval campaign where the US Navy learned some hard lessons at very high cost.
For example, after the battle(s), the crew of one cruiser had a "body parts detail" that removed remains -- arms, legs, torsos, etc -- of dead crewmen from topside area of the ship and threw them into the sea. By the time the campaign ended, 4000 sailors were killed..... 3000 more than Marine casualties.
For example, after the battle(s), the crew of one cruiser had a "body parts detail" that removed remains -- arms, legs, torsos, etc -- of dead crewmen from topside area of the ship and threw them into the sea. By the time the campaign ended, 4000 sailors were killed..... 3000 more than Marine casualties.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
muna cullivan
Well written history of important surface naval battles in the early stages of WWII. The difference between victor and vanquished was slim, and the courage of American sailors extraordinary. The author brought the details into focus, as if the events just occurred. Well Done!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
tracy robinson
I have been something of a student of Guadalcanal and the campaign to capture the airfield that became the focus of the Pacific campaign. As Churchill said of El Alamein, "Before that victory there was never a win and after it, there was never a loss." That is a slight exaggeration but not by much. The Marines were landed on August 7, 1942, before they were ready but it was a critical moment and they were equal to the challenge. The best account of the land campaign is Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle and it is referred to in this book.
A legend has grown since the campaign that the Marines were abandoned by the Navy, which sailed off with supplies and men because of the timidity of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. They were eating Japanese food and using Japanese bulldozers to build the critical airfield, Henderson Field. I knew a man who flew Corsairs for the Marines from Henderson Field although it was after the campaign had been won. I gave him a history of the Cactus Air Force, The Cactus Air Force: The Story of the Handful of Fliers Who Saved Guadalcanal, as he lay bedridden in his last illness.
This book tells the story and redeems the Navy's reputation although not that of Admiral Fletcher. It is one fact among many that more sailors died at Guadalcanal than Marines. The battles were all at night, a specialty of the Imperial Japanese Navy for years. The US Navy had RADAR, the technology to overcome the experience of the Japanese, if only the admirals knew how to use it. Here, as in so many other examples, the peace time Navy came face to face with war and was not equal to the task until younger men had the hard lessons of combat drilled into them. The furious First Battle of Guadalcanal, fought by Dan Callaghan's task force, in which the inexperienced admiral lost his life but proved his courage, is told in great detail. More detail than I have yet seen in spite of an interest in the campaign since I was a boy 60 years ago. Imagine the fury of a battle in which heavy cruisers fought Japanese battleships at a range of less than a mile and sometimes at the range of 450 yards ! The account of that battle is riveting. Some of the lessons learned were applied by Willis Lee, grandson of Robert E Lee and commander of the two fast battleships that fought the second night of the battle with victory resulting. Unlike Callaghan, Lee was a student of RADAR and "knew more than the technicians" about it. The Japanese quickly realized that they had lost the advantage of night and did not again challenge US surface ships until Leyte Gulf when it was hopeless.
The book is highly recommended and I intend to order the author's other books. I think I will read those on Kindle as the narrative reads like a novel.
A legend has grown since the campaign that the Marines were abandoned by the Navy, which sailed off with supplies and men because of the timidity of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. They were eating Japanese food and using Japanese bulldozers to build the critical airfield, Henderson Field. I knew a man who flew Corsairs for the Marines from Henderson Field although it was after the campaign had been won. I gave him a history of the Cactus Air Force, The Cactus Air Force: The Story of the Handful of Fliers Who Saved Guadalcanal, as he lay bedridden in his last illness.
This book tells the story and redeems the Navy's reputation although not that of Admiral Fletcher. It is one fact among many that more sailors died at Guadalcanal than Marines. The battles were all at night, a specialty of the Imperial Japanese Navy for years. The US Navy had RADAR, the technology to overcome the experience of the Japanese, if only the admirals knew how to use it. Here, as in so many other examples, the peace time Navy came face to face with war and was not equal to the task until younger men had the hard lessons of combat drilled into them. The furious First Battle of Guadalcanal, fought by Dan Callaghan's task force, in which the inexperienced admiral lost his life but proved his courage, is told in great detail. More detail than I have yet seen in spite of an interest in the campaign since I was a boy 60 years ago. Imagine the fury of a battle in which heavy cruisers fought Japanese battleships at a range of less than a mile and sometimes at the range of 450 yards ! The account of that battle is riveting. Some of the lessons learned were applied by Willis Lee, grandson of Robert E Lee and commander of the two fast battleships that fought the second night of the battle with victory resulting. Unlike Callaghan, Lee was a student of RADAR and "knew more than the technicians" about it. The Japanese quickly realized that they had lost the advantage of night and did not again challenge US surface ships until Leyte Gulf when it was hopeless.
The book is highly recommended and I intend to order the author's other books. I think I will read those on Kindle as the narrative reads like a novel.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
ophira
Elegantly written narrative of the U.S. Navy's part in the lengthy Guadalcanal campaign of 1942-43, with emphasis on the surface battles. Very good on the often prickly personalities involved. Admiral Chester Nimitz emerges as the indispensible man.
Good melding of personal experiences into the battle narrative. Also very good on how the Navy learned to use what was then new technology (radar directed gunfire, surface search radar, etc.) on the fly, a costly trial by fire in both ships and lives. Graphic battle descriptions (the cruiser night action of 11/13/42 - with the heavy cruiser San Francisco almost muzzle-to-muzzle with the massive Japanese battleship Hiei - is particularly harrowing).
More tactical battle maps would have been "nice to have" (at least one each for the carrier battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz), but in fairness to Mr. Hornfischer, he is describing multiple engagements here, not one (as in Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors), so there may have been space limitations. I have read many books on this campaign, but I still learned a few things - I did not know about the U.S. Navy's gunnery exercises using "offsets".
Neptune's Inferno makes the point that no amount of training could entirely prepare these men for combat, but through costly defeats and hard-won victories, the U.S. Navy learned to beat the Imperial Japanese Navy at its own game - night fighting. The Battle of Tassafaronga, for some reason, gets less coverage than the other battles. That quibble aside, this is a fine tribute to the sailors who turned the tide and well deserving of five stars.
Where will Mr. Hornfischer steam next at 31 knots? The battles of Arleigh Burke in the northern Solomons, perhaps?
Good melding of personal experiences into the battle narrative. Also very good on how the Navy learned to use what was then new technology (radar directed gunfire, surface search radar, etc.) on the fly, a costly trial by fire in both ships and lives. Graphic battle descriptions (the cruiser night action of 11/13/42 - with the heavy cruiser San Francisco almost muzzle-to-muzzle with the massive Japanese battleship Hiei - is particularly harrowing).
More tactical battle maps would have been "nice to have" (at least one each for the carrier battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz), but in fairness to Mr. Hornfischer, he is describing multiple engagements here, not one (as in Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors), so there may have been space limitations. I have read many books on this campaign, but I still learned a few things - I did not know about the U.S. Navy's gunnery exercises using "offsets".
Neptune's Inferno makes the point that no amount of training could entirely prepare these men for combat, but through costly defeats and hard-won victories, the U.S. Navy learned to beat the Imperial Japanese Navy at its own game - night fighting. The Battle of Tassafaronga, for some reason, gets less coverage than the other battles. That quibble aside, this is a fine tribute to the sailors who turned the tide and well deserving of five stars.
Where will Mr. Hornfischer steam next at 31 knots? The battles of Arleigh Burke in the northern Solomons, perhaps?
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dieu tram
This is a fantastic read if you are interested in the naval warfare at Guadalcanal in WWII. Hornfischer presents the information in an easily digestible fashion, highlighting the decisive actions on both the US and Japanese sides. Highly recommended for both research and pleasure.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
leesa
This belated but thorough history of heroic but sometimes shameful US Navy surface actions in The Battle for Guadalcanal is an eye-opener as to how ill-prepared the US Navy was after the victory by the carriers and pilots in the four hour battle of Midway. The extensive research is remarkable considering 60 years has passed and the records were available that exposed all. You will be thrilled by how the American spirit prevailed and overcame seemingly impossible odds by shear determination. Interviews of the participants added vivid detail that made you feel you were a part of the action.
the store is to be congratulated in bring this marvelous story to many of us who remember the news of the day and could only wonder what life was like for our fine soldiers and sailors. Little did we know that three times more navy personnel were lost than surface military! It is the perfect follow-up read after "Last of the Tin Can Sailors" that like "Netune's Inferno" has first hand history from interviews of those who served so well.
the store is to be congratulated in bring this marvelous story to many of us who remember the news of the day and could only wonder what life was like for our fine soldiers and sailors. Little did we know that three times more navy personnel were lost than surface military! It is the perfect follow-up read after "Last of the Tin Can Sailors" that like "Netune's Inferno" has first hand history from interviews of those who served so well.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
micayla lally
Quite simply the best account of the struggle for the Solomons ever written. Mr. Hornfischer will have you standing on the decks and bridges of both American and Japanese warships as starshells any searchlights illuminate the night skies and armor piercing shells rain down mayhem around you. He also pulls no punches in both describing the heroism of the sailors and the utter incompetence of some of the leaders involved on both sides. Highly recommended, if not required reading for anyone interested in WWII at any level.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
coffcat
This is an outstanding book and I highly recommend it. It give an excellent overview of the naval activities off Gaudalcanal, with descriptions of the battles, and information of the men who fought them, from Admiral to common sailors.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
melissa adelman
Having spent nearly all my life reading, studying, compiling and recording facts regarding the South Pacific and Pacific from Alaska to Australia even to the areas of the Indian Ocean regarding the era of the Japanese peoples and its military from Admiral Perry's arrival of America's "Great White Fleet" to it's capitulation to all the allied powers in 1945, without question this is one of the most intense writings of that period of human conflict know to me. More ! More ! More !
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
sara jones
Very interesting and informative. I learned a lot about the naval battles during the Guadalcanal campaign. The author, however, frequently jumps back and forth in time which is occasionally a bit confusing.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
kbass
The drama of naval battles and the devastation upon the ships and men involved. Realistic accounts of strategies, miscommunications, and analysis of the naval battles involving theUS victory at Guadalcanal.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
amy tate
This book provides one of sources of pride possessed by the US Navy. The detailed accounts of the actions off Guadalcanal are both chilling and heart wrenching. This a book that I could hardly put down.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
jeremy sierra
The author has a excellent Grasp on the subject matter. The courage taken to battle at night with a more experienced enemy is unimaginable as shells rained down from above and torpedoes chased them from below. it is amazing how the U.S. Navy learned on the job and used radar to fight the Japanese.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
richa kaul
This is an outstanding book and I highly recommend it. It give an excellent overview of the naval activities off Gaudalcanal, with descriptions of the battles, and information of the men who fought them, from Admiral to common sailors.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
mihika
Having spent nearly all my life reading, studying, compiling and recording facts regarding the South Pacific and Pacific from Alaska to Australia even to the areas of the Indian Ocean regarding the era of the Japanese peoples and its military from Admiral Perry's arrival of America's "Great White Fleet" to it's capitulation to all the allied powers in 1945, without question this is one of the most intense writings of that period of human conflict know to me. More ! More ! More !
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
nikki golden
Very interesting and informative. I learned a lot about the naval battles during the Guadalcanal campaign. The author, however, frequently jumps back and forth in time which is occasionally a bit confusing.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
markwoods
The drama of naval battles and the devastation upon the ships and men involved. Realistic accounts of strategies, miscommunications, and analysis of the naval battles involving theUS victory at Guadalcanal.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
joleen huber
This book provides one of sources of pride possessed by the US Navy. The detailed accounts of the actions off Guadalcanal are both chilling and heart wrenching. This a book that I could hardly put down.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
gustaf alstromer
I have read several books About tthe naval campaigns in the Solomon Islands, but Hornfischer's book is unsurpassed in detail, depth and readability. His accounts of battles are gripping, his critiques of command (both American and Japanese) are fair, and his understanding of the details of operations very impressive. I regretted when the book came to an end.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
luisa
Dispelled the notion that the marines were abandoned by the navy. Looked at the loses on both sides and how the Japanese had suffered in battles on land and the lack of supplies and ammunitions. The brutal sea battles in astounding detail. I couldn't imagine a 16 inch shell weighing in at one ton crashing into ship and the damage it did . The effort it took to keep the ships afloat and the loss of life. I was disappointed at the way politics played on with the treatment of the Admirals and other leaders. But it shows how it really happened. I really enjoyed this book and want to learn more about the pacific world war 2
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
edmundo
The author is becvoming one of the premier historians of naval battles of World War II. He does the homework and legwork to reach people who were in the fight, and finds the records to back them up. He takes the reader to the ships' decks, where they can almost smell the cordite of battle between big ships. He isn't afraid to place blame in addition to handing out the laurels.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
varadia
Hornfischer is simply superb! Just like the rest of his books, Neptune's Inferno is accurate and spellbinding. One of the truly great naval historians, better than Samuel Eliot Morison which says tons!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
boston salama
This is a very well written book and historically accurate. My neighbor is quoted in this book (a Marine who was there) ... I had him sign the page in the interest of preserving a piece of history. So good that I bought the author's other books.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dan el sveinsson
America at its fighting finest. Sensational courage and awful sacrifice during a desperate time in our country's history. Carried out against experienced and determined foe where the odds were not in our favor. We could have lost this thing and that war would have gone on much longer and taken more resources from European Theater.
Please RateNeptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal