The Problems of Philosophy (Classical Books)

A good introduction to what the objective and obstacles are in becoming familiar with the study of philosophy. This book is clearly written and tries its best to avoid complicating a matter which self-admitted can be quite convoluted. If I can sum up in one phrase is that it tries to use the principle of "Ockham's Razor" to shed light on a matter that though very broad is not easy to address. It is as enlightening to a beginner as well as one well versed in the subject.

When one considers that the great philosophers of the twentieth century stand on the shoulders of Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, A. J. Ayer, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, one has to place Russell in the foreground as the philosophers' philosopher. He writes with clarity and lucidity. His concerns are largely logical and epistemological. And this book centers around his principal concerns.
I doubt that Russell would write this same book today, but I also doubt that he would fundamentally alter the positions he takes, if he were writing today. There is something neat, eloquent, and elegant about his epistemological premises that make this work (well beyond its 17th printing and more than eighty years old) such a venerable treasure trove. Could his positions be better articulated? Yes, but not by much. Would he delve more deeply into logic? Almost certainly. And he does, in other books written during his lifetime.
This book is really for the novice. My only complaint is that the novice will probably remain lost if his readings did not encompass more logic and criticism of rational and empirical epistemology. What makes Russell a true "modern" in contemporary philosophy is his bridge to resolving both the rationalist and empiricist schools of thought. One not knowing these dichotomies might find Russell's resolution difficult to follow. Elsewhere in the book, Russell identifies "three" rules of thought, when these rules are no longer considered all that are extent. Generally, there are seven, sometimes nine, taught in most symbolic logic courses, and this discrepancy may needlessly cause confusion. So while the book is written for the novice, it bears re-reading after covering other contemporary writers.
Russell and the others mentioned above are often associated with logical atomism, either directly or indirectly. Reading Russell or Ayer gives the student the best opportunity to do philosophy whilst learning it first hand. Both are explicit writers with Ayer perhaps having the upper hand. But, as with any philosophical school, such as logical atomism, there is always a counter reaction, and A. L. Austin's "Sense and Sensibility" is just such a reproach. Russell, like Ayer, uses the construct of "sense data" to explain the theory of knowledge; Austin and Gilbert Ryle redress both author's use of such "metaphysical" interpolations, which makes for an interesting contrast. Any reader of Russell or Ayer should counterbalance his reading with Austin's work.
"The Problems of Philosophy" is not without gaps that may leave the reader puzzled by the omissions. Perhaps they weren't as obvious when Russell wrote this book, but they are clearer now in hindsight. An egregious omission is the absence of anything to do with ethics or moral theory. Since ethics is one of the few domains particular to philosophy alone, this omission is particularly troublesome in a book of this name. If I were to title the book, it would be "The Problems of Epistemology."

An excellent introduction by Bertrand Russell on broad issues such as knowledge and truth. For those not familiar with philosophy this is an easily understood work. I would recommend this as a starter for more in depth study.

I like about everything Russell writes. He was a great thinker. After reading him I am reminded of an on-line philosophy prof. who stated to his new students that after reading ideas of philosophers- they would look off into space. Then they would re-read the material and again stare into space. Their expression would be that of Homer Simpson saying, "Duh...?" Soon they would be overcome with an intense desire to go to sleep. I can't remember that prof's name but he should be easy to find. At one point he announces to the class that one of their sessions next week is canceled due to a meeting he has to attend. At that point, the class cheers loudly; and he says that that was the exact response he had expected. Gary Gentry

B Russell, under a very clear fashion as usual, adresses the main problems in philosophy. The logical mind set provides a full analysis of some concepts misconceived in the past, purging the confusion in the traditional legacy. If you cannot solve a problem at least clarify it states Russell in some place else.
This is not really a review, but a invitation to read one of the greatest of all times.

Three stars because Betrand Russell is entertaining and I enjoy his writing style. Only three stars because, despite my best efforts, I just cannot get excited by the subject. That's entirely my problem, but I fail to see how most casual readers would enjoy reading this book. And those interested in philosophy have probably already read this book. For the .0005% of the population who might be inclined to enjoy philosophy and have need of a primer, I think this book would be a perfect introduction.

I'll try some of Mr. Russell's other writings and I hope I will find them more productive.

I generally agree with everything other favorable reviewers have said about what you will find in this book, especially regarding the fact that it is written as much for the lay reader as for the professional. But, the book, at least the Kindle edition, has one glaring omission. The blurb published by the store advocating the book says that it includes Russell's famous 1905 artice in "Mind" entitled "On Denoting". It is considered the most important philosophical article of the 20th century. It is NOT in this book. I checked the Table of Contents before buying and did not find it, but I bought it anyway, thinking that it may have been renamed.It is simply not there. For the non-professional, the book still has value, but as an inexpensive source for this famous article, the book misses the mark.

B. Russel strikes again: the book already pertains to the perennial sophia of the species. It portrays a critic of the language or in other words how to approach knowledge through the calculus of algorithms.

Flow of the Argument

How do we know what is real? There is a disjunct between appearance and reality. In other words, the “real” is not always the obvious. Russell’s main sparring partner is Bishop Berkeley, and so Russell treats us to a fine display of Idealism (with following refutations). Berkeley says that if things exist independently of us, they cannot be the immediate objects of sensation. Idealists, therefore, place the existence of objects within the mind (or rather, say such existence is mental). What is known in the senses is not the immediate object of the senses.

For Berkeley an idea is what is immediately known (sense-data). This means x is “in” the mind. This raises a problem. What does it mean to be “in” the mind? It’s better to say an object is “before” the mind. Berkeley equivocates on “in.” All he has a right to say is the thought of x is within the mind. Berkeley did not distinguish between the thought of something and the act of thinking that thought. The latter is certainly mental, but we are not justified in saying the former is.

Different Types of Knowledge

Knowledge by acquaintance is “foundational” knowledge. It is immediate and direct (Russell 48).

Universals

Russell correctly calls “universals” “ideas.” This way there is no confusion on what Plato meant by ideas and what Berkeley and Locke mean by ideas. We are aware of universals by “conceiving.” As conceived, the universals are now “concepts.”

A universal is the opposite of that which causes sensation. A universal is that which is shared by many particulars. Proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives stand for universals.

Other examples of universals are “qualities” and “relations.” Many relations do not exist in space or time, yet they are real and can be known to be real. Take the phrase, “North of London.” “North of” is not physical, yet it is a real something. The implications of this for Christianity, which presumably Russell didn’t explore, are staggering.

The Problem of Induction

When two things have been found to be associated together, and no instance is known of one occurring without the other, does the occurrence of one give me any ground for expecting the other?

No.

Experience only tells us about past futures. It cannot tell us what to expect of future futures.

Conclusion

I think Russell does a successful job in showing that we can have legitimate knowledge that isn’t derived from sensations. Further, this work has a number of semi-legendary chapters along with a fine bibliography.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was an influential British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and political activist. In 1950, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, in recognition of his many books such as A History of Western Philosophy,The Problems of Philosophy,The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,The Analysis of Mind,Our Knowledge of the External World,Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits,Mysticism and Logic, etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1910 book, "In the following pages, I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all."

He begins the first chapter by stating, "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man would doubt it?... philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas." (Pg. 9-10) He continues, "let us concentrate attention on the table... Although I believe that the table is `really' of the same color all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts... if several people are looking at the table ... no two of them will see exactly the same... Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy---the distinction between `appearance' and `reality,' between what things seem to be and what they are... [the philosopher] is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question." (Pg. 11-13)

He concludes, "Thus our familiar table... has become a problem of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems... Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot ANSWER so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of ASKING questions which ... show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life." (Pg. 24-25)

He notes, "It is of course POSSIBLE that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have REASON to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence... we can arrive... at an orderly systematic organization of our knowledge, in which, though the POSSIBILITY of error remains, its likelihood is diminished by the interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has preceded acquiescence." (Ch. II, pg. 39-40)

He states, "The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted... This chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." (Ch. V, pg. 91-92)

He admits, "The ONLY reason for believing that the laws of motion will remain in operation is that they have operated hitherto, so far as our knowledge of the past enables us to judge... But the real question is: Do ANY number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? If not... we have no ground whatever for expecting the sun to rise tomorrow... all such expectations are only PROBABLE; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they MUST be fulfilled, but only for some reason in favor of the view that they are LIKELY to be fulfilled." (Ch. 6, pg. 96)

He acknowledges, "The fact... that things often fail to fulfill our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not PROBABLY be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is ... not capable of being DISPROVED by an appeal to experience. The inductive principle, however, is equally incapable of being PROVED by an appeal to experience... All such general principles are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth, and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless t. he inductive principle is assumed." (Ch. VI, pg. 105-107)

He asserts, "Perhaps the most important example of non-logical a priori knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value... I am speaking of judgments as to the intrinsic desirability of things... all judgments as to what is useful depend upon judgments as to what has value on its own account. We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery, knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such judgments must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori... they may be ELICITED by experience... But it is fairly obvious that they cannot be PROVED by experience... In the present connection, it is only important to realize that knowledge as to what is intrinsically of value is a priori, namely in the sense that the truth of such knowledge can neither be proved nor disproved by experience." (Ch. VII, pg. 118-119)

He observes, "We have first to distinguish between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths... Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by DESCRIPTION, always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called INTUITIVE knowledge, and the truths so known may be called SELF-EVIDENT truths... If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends upon our intuitive knowledge." (Ch. X, pg. 171-172)

He points out, "if the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it to be false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. Thus the laws of logic supply the skeleton or framework within which the test of coherence applies, and they themselves cannot be established by this test... [Therefore] coherence cannot be accepted as giving the MEANING of truth, though it is often a most important TEST of truth... Hence we are driven back to correspondence with fact as constituting the nature of truth..." (Ch. XII, pg. 192-193) Later, he adds, "It will be seen that minds do not CREATE truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are within the power of the person believing... What makes a belief true is a FACT, and this fact does not...in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief." (Ch. XII, pg. 202-203)

He summarizes, "if we assume that intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in proportion to the degree of its self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness... What we firmly believe, if it is true, is called KNOWLEDGE, provided it is either intuitive or inferred... from intuitive knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it is not true, is called ERROR. What we firmly believe, if it is neither knowledge nor error, and also what we believe hesitatingly... may be called PROBABLE OPINION. Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more of less probable opinion. In regard to probable opinion, we can derive great assistance from COHERENCE, which we rejected as the definition of truth, but may often use as a CRITERION. A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually." (Ch. XIII, pg. 217-218)

He concludes, "The true philosophic contemplation... finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the no-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating... The free intellect will see as God might see... knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter... The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all... Thus contemplation ... makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears... Philosophy is to be studied... for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because... the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good." (Ch. XV, pg. 247-250)

Although this book is more than 100 years old, its arguments and analysis still seem quite "fresh"; and Russell's writing is, as always, clear and pertinent. This book will reward nearly ALL readers, regardless of their level of philosophical background and interest.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was an influential British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and political activist. In 1950, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, in recognition of his many books such as A History of Western Philosophy,The Problems of Philosophy,The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,The Analysis of Mind,Our Knowledge of the External World,Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits,Mysticism and Logic, etc.

He wrote in the Preface to this 1910 book, "In the following pages, I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all."

He begins the first chapter by stating, "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man would doubt it?... philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas." (Pg. 9-10) He continues, "let us concentrate attention on the table... Although I believe that the table is `really' of the same color all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts... if several people are looking at the table ... no two of them will see exactly the same... Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy---the distinction between `appearance' and `reality,' between what things seem to be and what they are... [the philosopher] is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question." (Pg. 11-13)

He concludes, "Thus our familiar table... has become a problem of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems... Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot ANSWER so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of ASKING questions which ... show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life." (Pg. 24-25)

He notes, "It is of course POSSIBLE that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have REASON to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence... we can arrive... at an orderly systematic organization of our knowledge, in which, though the POSSIBILITY of error remains, its likelihood is diminished by the interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has preceded acquiescence." (Ch. II, pg. 39-40)

He states, "The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted... This chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." (Ch. V, pg. 91-92)

He admits, "The ONLY reason for believing that the laws of motion will remain in operation is that they have operated hitherto, so far as our knowledge of the past enables us to judge... But the real question is: Do ANY number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? If not... we have no ground whatever for expecting the sun to rise tomorrow... all such expectations are only PROBABLE; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they MUST be fulfilled, but only for some reason in favor of the view that they are LIKELY to be fulfilled." (Ch. 6, pg. 96)

He acknowledges, "The fact... that things often fail to fulfill our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not PROBABLY be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is ... not capable of being DISPROVED by an appeal to experience. The inductive principle, however, is equally incapable of being PROVED by an appeal to experience... All such general principles are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth, and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless t. he inductive principle is assumed." (Ch. VI, pg. 105-107)

He asserts, "Perhaps the most important example of non-logical a priori knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value... I am speaking of judgments as to the intrinsic desirability of things... all judgments as to what is useful depend upon judgments as to what has value on its own account. We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery, knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such judgments must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori... they may be ELICITED by experience... But it is fairly obvious that they cannot be PROVED by experience... In the present connection, it is only important to realize that knowledge as to what is intrinsically of value is a priori, namely in the sense that the truth of such knowledge can neither be proved nor disproved by experience." (Ch. VII, pg. 118-119)

He observes, "We have first to distinguish between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths... Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by DESCRIPTION, always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called INTUITIVE knowledge, and the truths so known may be called SELF-EVIDENT truths... If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends upon our intuitive knowledge." (Ch. X, pg. 171-172)

He points out, "if the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it to be false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. Thus the laws of logic supply the skeleton or framework within which the test of coherence applies, and they themselves cannot be established by this test... [Therefore] coherence cannot be accepted as giving the MEANING of truth, though it is often a most important TEST of truth... Hence we are driven back to correspondence with fact as constituting the nature of truth..." (Ch. XII, pg. 192-193) Later, he adds, "It will be seen that minds do not CREATE truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are within the power of the person believing... What makes a belief true is a FACT, and this fact does not...in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief." (Ch. XII, pg. 202-203)

He summarizes, "if we assume that intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in proportion to the degree of its self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness... What we firmly believe, if it is true, is called KNOWLEDGE, provided it is either intuitive or inferred... from intuitive knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it is not true, is called ERROR. What we firmly believe, if it is neither knowledge nor error, and also what we believe hesitatingly... may be called PROBABLE OPINION. Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more of less probable opinion. In regard to probable opinion, we can derive great assistance from COHERENCE, which we rejected as the definition of truth, but may often use as a CRITERION. A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually." (Ch. XIII, pg. 217-218)

He concludes, "The true philosophic contemplation... finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the no-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating... The free intellect will see as God might see... knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter... The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all... Thus contemplation ... makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears... Philosophy is to be studied... for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because... the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good." (Ch. XV, pg. 247-250)

Although this book is more than 100 years old, its arguments and analysis still seem quite "fresh"; and Russell's writing is, as always, clear and pertinent. This book will reward nearly ALL readers, regardless of their level of philosophical background and interest.

** Review of Audio Format **

And not for me. I wanted to see if this was something I would find interesting. Unfortunately for me, I didn’t find it interesting. When I found myself tuning it out, I turned the book off. This is unusual for me as I stubbornly tend to finish everything I start. I think this may actually be a good philosophy discussion, it just wasn’t for me.

The narration was perfect in tone and cadence for this material. It sounded just like you would think a philosophy discussion should sound like.

I received this audiobook for free through Audiobook Boom! in exchange for an honest review.

Bertrand Russell is an excellent writer and a clear thinker. This book serves as a great, short introduction to Russell's approach to the problems of philosophy. The problems Russell addresses are primarily epistemological. Russell's primary questions revolve around the question: what do we know, and how do we know it? Russell first argues for the appearance/reality distinction and offers a sense-datum theory of the foundations of knowledge (for a very interesting critique of sense datum theories I recommend Sense and Sensibilia by J.L. Austin).

But, Russell argues, sense data on their own cannot account for our knowledge. We must have some knowledge of general principles, and some kind of inductive principle, if we are going to derive any knowledge from sense data to arrive at knowledge that is not immediate (Russell also includes memory in immediate forms of knowledge). Russell examines the meaning of truth and falsehood and determines three criteria that any theory of the truth must meet, and then, in the last two chapters, Russell attempts to determine the limits and the value of philosophy.

Russell is really a joy to read. I admit that my own training is in Continental philosophy, but I always enjoy the straight forward clarity of analytic philosophers, and Russell is one of the best. Just so that people do not think that is merely my own personal opinion I should point out that Bertrand Russell won the Nobel prize for literature in 1950. I am not aware of any other philosopher who was ever awarded that honor. All in all, I would highly recommend this book to either, 1) lay people who are interested in getting a short introduction to the kinds of epistemological problems philosophers deal with, or 2) anyone interested in analytic philosophy.

This is a review of this very influential “little” book by an author, who was one of my early heroes but who now fails to deliver convincing argumentation in this (therefore) disappointing book.

Professional philosophers like to define philosophy as “thinking about thinking” [see “The Oxford Companion to Philosophy” p. 666 – referred to later as ‘Oxon’] but the practice of philosophy has been an extended attempt by western intellectuals to construct verbal models of the world we live in. Historically, philosophy has focused on three key areas: the nature of the world (metaphysics especially the theory of existence – ontology), the justification of belief (theory of knowledge – epistemology) and the conduct of human affairs (the theory of value – ethics).

The aristocratic Russell, along with Ludwig Wittgenstein (then a new Viennese student at Cambridge) were the founders of the latest attempt to consolidate the first two areas of philosophy into a single, unitary approach, now called analytical philosophy. Their ideas were amplified in the 1930s by the Logical Positivists of the so-called Viennese Circle that had a devastating effect on the evolution of theoretical physics.

This book does a convincing ‘hatchet-job’ on the earlier metaphysical theories known as Idealism, which reduced reality to only what could be formulated in our own minds; an old Platonic view that reappeared with DesCartes and Berkeley {“to be is to be perceived”}. Russell tries to quash the widely popular Idealism by building on the British tradition of Empiricism that limits concepts to those that originate with our five physical senses, something that Russell calls “sense-data”. In contrast, many scientists (and most people, including me) accept the existence of real “things” out there, independent of human minds – a philosophy known as realism. Most philosophers are attracted to some form of epistemology as this puts the human mind (including their own) at the centre of their universe; the study of material reality has been delegated to physicists (or Natural Philosophers like me) for quite a long time.

Russell was too strongly influenced by his early obsession with mathematics, when he and his senior colleague, Alfred North Whitehead authored Principia Mathematica in 1913. Russell fell into three major (usually unstated) assumptions: 1) Mathematics is real 2) Mathematical symbolism is more powerful than words [it’s briefer] 3) Logic is more fundamental than mathematics. However, Russell makes an even greater assumption when he defines philosophy as “the attempt to answer ultimate questions” e.g. Does God exist? – thus: words responding to words. In fact, most people only consider these types of questions occasionally but each of us must make decisions at all times throughout our lives. This is because our personal existence (and that of all animate creatures) is not guaranteed; i.e. our ongoing existence is contingent on good responses to reality – that can never be ignored. Thus, existence must be our primary concern – philosophers need to return to the study of ontology, leaving epistemology as a secondary luxury.

Unfortunately, Russell never gives us here an adequate treatment of the concept of existence; he tries to rely on appeals to “sense-data” or worse, views it only through his ‘epistemological microscope’ (“Nothing can be known to exist except by the help of experience.” p. 51). Russell tries to solve the problem of the material existence but cannot get beyond the old distinction between our observations (or ‘acquaintances’) and the unknowable reality, as raised by Kant. Failing to recognize that he is talking about differences in scale, he is still enough of a materialist to believe in the existence of the ‘infamous table’ by appealing to our ‘instinctive beliefs’, without acknowledging that all animals must negotiate reality without the benefit of a socially constructed symbology (i.e. language). Russell’s own theory of logical atomism is hinted at without extensive description (as this is a popular book, after all). It must still be noted that his approach is not very different from phenomenalism, except he takes his sense-data to not be purely in the mind. Philosophers are fighting a vigorous rearguard action against the discoveries of neuro-science. Russell returned to this 'matter' problem several times later in his life but came no further than the common man’s conclusion that humans can know the structure of matter (at the macroscopic scale) but not its intrinsic nature – an arrow, if true, through the heart of fundamental physics, as he concluded elsewhere: “science is moonshine” [Oxon. p.784]

Russell obsesses on how we can prove something of which we have no direct experience; again falling back on the ancient illusory mathematical model of proof, based on the timeless subject of geometry but this has no relevance to invisible real threats like viruses. Russell does give a hint of the nature of reality when he writes that: “We shall find it convenient [?] only to speak of things existing when they are in time.” [p. 69]. However, he immediately loses it when he then goes on to declare that thoughts and feelings exist even though their occurrence is ephemeral. He does admit that universals [abstract ideas p. 32] do not exist in this sense but only “subsist” or “have being”, where being is opposed to existence as being timeless. Once again, demonstrating that the verb “to be” must be used with great care, even though Russell himself declared that it was “a disgrace that this word was used so loosely” [Oxon. p. 876]. In fact, it was critical to Russell that he ignores the temporal implications of ‘being’ so that he could build on the reality of mathematics, particularly its equivalence features (A=B). Interestingly, Whitehead avoided this error when he developed his own Process Philosophy, recognizing the centrality of time, including its implicit use in algebra. As Russell goes on to say: “The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems and all who love perfection more than life.” This is quite a religious statement from one of the world’s most famous atheists but actually betraying the religious grounding of mathematics, going back to Pythagoras. This rejection of time is one of the commonest errors in both philosophy and physics (where it is also too often spatialized and reduced to a single scalar parameter that is integrated away over all time or just averaged over periodic activity. In contrast, Aristotle, with his focus on living beings, took a more dynamic and asymmetric view of time, which he recognized as the fundamental driver of intrinsic change across all of reality. Russell builds on his philosophical logic foundations of pure mathematics to create a critical separation of knowledge of things (never defined), ‘by acquaintance’ [p.34] and human knowledge of truths (by ‘description’), such as his favorite example that “two and two makes four”. All his examples imply the paramount importance of existence that lie beneath his Laws of Thought [p. 50]. Since Russell’s arithmetic examples are divorced from the human act of counting he is forced to assign reality to the abstraction known as numbers that are no more than the results of counting certain types of objects that have very specific properties such as clear boundaries, identifiable characteristics, persistent existence, absence of transformable interactions etc. Again, Russell turns to geometry to make intuitive claims for certain shapes that are no more than idealizations complying with certain class-defining definitions [p. 53].

Even his use of logic has hidden assumptions, such as the famous syllogism that begins with: “All men are mortal” when the empirical evidence is self-defining: “All men who have died are mortal” as we cannot constrain the future to exclude near miraculous medical innovations. This demonstrates the danger of using the key logical idea of ALL beyond small finite sets. This also points to the use of concepts as timeless definitions whose usage cannot be allowed to change; a problem with using our verbal toolset for a reality grounded in change. For example, Russell recalls the infamous “Law of the Excluded Middle” where something cannot have some property and not have the same property (including existence) without introducing the key qualification: “at the same moment of time”.

Although all life forms must contend with reality to maintain their own existence, intellectuals have over-emphasized the role of reason (logical verbalization) in human affairs. A good contrast to these hubristic views can be found in “Language and Species” by linguist, Derek Bickerton (1990). Russell also wishes to put himself in Plato’s camp and affirm that ‘universals exist’ and wants to accept the reasonableness of the Principle of Induction [p. 40] where the future is believed will resemble the past. In fact, it is much easier for us to seek out some distinguishing characteristics and rename the class of exceptions, exploiting our ability to undertake another act of generalization. Remembering class-rules (‘patterns’) is a far more efficient use of memory than storing lists of particulars. The continuing existence of broad classes of animate creatures interacting with diverse environments indicates that this is good strategy for knowledge acquisition, even when symbolic languages are not employed.

As can be seen, the focus on existence (ontology) becomes the ‘golden sword’ to cut through the over intellectualization that can result from excessive abstraction arising from an obsession with knowledge. The reality is that we must make life-or-death decisions, so it is useful to ask for advice and to ‘know the odds’. It is a safer strategy to build on empirical patterns than on a priori propositions. The search for certainty is an old siren that will sink anyone’s ship of knowledge. In summary, ontology is a more powerful investigation of reality than epistemology as the metaphysicians proposed before the modern triumph of the verbalists.

As an aristocrat, Russell updates the ancient Greek intellectuals’ preference for mental activity over the practical (and unproblematic) skills of the artisans and engineers that provide the foundations of our civilization. The luxury of philosophy is only made possible by the labors of thousands of less fortunate humans.

A brief tour of epistemology and metaphysics. This book is directed at at those who are curious about the discipline of philosophy; it's only about 150 or so pages, but navigating through may not be easy. Russell starts of by wondering whether material objects seen in the world of sense data really exist and takes the reader through a brief analysis of the differing view points regarding the existence and the nature of matter. The view points of the idealists and empiricists are compared and contrasted as Russell tries to take his position. What one gets out of this is the way the topic is analyzed and how seemingly obvious and self-evident points are dissected and a question mark put on them; the opinion he arrives at (ex. why the idealists & Berkeley were in the wrong) is irrelevant. In any case, given the brief nature of the discussion here, you will have to supplement your reading with other materials to get a genuine and more than a verbal understanding of these various schools of thought; the objective here is merely to give you a broad outline. Russell then moves on to the process by which we acquire knowledge, our reliance on inductive reasoning and proceeds to talk about a priori knowledge, contribution of Kant and the debate surrounding the feasibility of a priori knowledge. Plato's Universals is covered in two chapters. If and once you get to the end of it, questions whether all of this is merely hairsplitting and devoid of any practical utility is addressed by Russell in the final chapter where he says that the role of philosophy is to keep alive the "speculative interest in the universe" otherwise which we would be confined to verifiable and ascertainable knowledge.

A well written introduction and if the flame still burns there is a list of books in the bibliographical note to take your interest further.

I was somewhat worried about reading philosophy as an audiobook, but the clarity of Russell's written style make it work out just fine. I had no issues following his arguments, though I should clarify that I do have a lot of experience with philosophy after years of prior reading. Still, this is introductory material, and a few pauses here and there won't prevent the reader from enjoying the experience. The topics covered in 'The Problems' are quite broad, but their treatment is shallow. This is a good Philosophy 101 companion to anyone interested in the modern analytical tradition. -Ryan Mease

** Review of Audio Format **

And not for me. I wanted to see if this was something I would find interesting. Unfortunately for me, I didn’t find it interesting. When I found myself tuning it out, I turned the book off. This is unusual for me as I stubbornly tend to finish everything I start. I think this may actually be a good philosophy discussion, it just wasn’t for me.

The narration was perfect in tone and cadence for this material. It sounded just like you would think a philosophy discussion should sound like.

I received this audiobook for free through Audiobook Boom! in exchange for an honest review.

Bertrand Russell is an excellent writer and a clear thinker. This book serves as a great, short introduction to Russell's approach to the problems of philosophy. The problems Russell addresses are primarily epistemological. Russell's primary questions revolve around the question: what do we know, and how do we know it? Russell first argues for the appearance/reality distinction and offers a sense-datum theory of the foundations of knowledge (for a very interesting critique of sense datum theories I recommend Sense and Sensibilia by J.L. Austin).

But, Russell argues, sense data on their own cannot account for our knowledge. We must have some knowledge of general principles, and some kind of inductive principle, if we are going to derive any knowledge from sense data to arrive at knowledge that is not immediate (Russell also includes memory in immediate forms of knowledge). Russell examines the meaning of truth and falsehood and determines three criteria that any theory of the truth must meet, and then, in the last two chapters, Russell attempts to determine the limits and the value of philosophy.

Russell is really a joy to read. I admit that my own training is in Continental philosophy, but I always enjoy the straight forward clarity of analytic philosophers, and Russell is one of the best. Just so that people do not think that is merely my own personal opinion I should point out that Bertrand Russell won the Nobel prize for literature in 1950. I am not aware of any other philosopher who was ever awarded that honor. All in all, I would highly recommend this book to either, 1) lay people who are interested in getting a short introduction to the kinds of epistemological problems philosophers deal with, or 2) anyone interested in analytic philosophy.

This is a review of this very influential “little” book by an author, who was one of my early heroes but who now fails to deliver convincing argumentation in this (therefore) disappointing book.

Professional philosophers like to define philosophy as “thinking about thinking” [see “The Oxford Companion to Philosophy” p. 666 – referred to later as ‘Oxon’] but the practice of philosophy has been an extended attempt by western intellectuals to construct verbal models of the world we live in. Historically, philosophy has focused on three key areas: the nature of the world (metaphysics especially the theory of existence – ontology), the justification of belief (theory of knowledge – epistemology) and the conduct of human affairs (the theory of value – ethics).

The aristocratic Russell, along with Ludwig Wittgenstein (then a new Viennese student at Cambridge) were the founders of the latest attempt to consolidate the first two areas of philosophy into a single, unitary approach, now called analytical philosophy. Their ideas were amplified in the 1930s by the Logical Positivists of the so-called Viennese Circle that had a devastating effect on the evolution of theoretical physics.

This book does a convincing ‘hatchet-job’ on the earlier metaphysical theories known as Idealism, which reduced reality to only what could be formulated in our own minds; an old Platonic view that reappeared with DesCartes and Berkeley {“to be is to be perceived”}. Russell tries to quash the widely popular Idealism by building on the British tradition of Empiricism that limits concepts to those that originate with our five physical senses, something that Russell calls “sense-data”. In contrast, many scientists (and most people, including me) accept the existence of real “things” out there, independent of human minds – a philosophy known as realism. Most philosophers are attracted to some form of epistemology as this puts the human mind (including their own) at the centre of their universe; the study of material reality has been delegated to physicists (or Natural Philosophers like me) for quite a long time.

Russell was too strongly influenced by his early obsession with mathematics, when he and his senior colleague, Alfred North Whitehead authored Principia Mathematica in 1913. Russell fell into three major (usually unstated) assumptions: 1) Mathematics is real 2) Mathematical symbolism is more powerful than words [it’s briefer] 3) Logic is more fundamental than mathematics. However, Russell makes an even greater assumption when he defines philosophy as “the attempt to answer ultimate questions” e.g. Does God exist? – thus: words responding to words. In fact, most people only consider these types of questions occasionally but each of us must make decisions at all times throughout our lives. This is because our personal existence (and that of all animate creatures) is not guaranteed; i.e. our ongoing existence is contingent on good responses to reality – that can never be ignored. Thus, existence must be our primary concern – philosophers need to return to the study of ontology, leaving epistemology as a secondary luxury.

Unfortunately, Russell never gives us here an adequate treatment of the concept of existence; he tries to rely on appeals to “sense-data” or worse, views it only through his ‘epistemological microscope’ (“Nothing can be known to exist except by the help of experience.” p. 51). Russell tries to solve the problem of the material existence but cannot get beyond the old distinction between our observations (or ‘acquaintances’) and the unknowable reality, as raised by Kant. Failing to recognize that he is talking about differences in scale, he is still enough of a materialist to believe in the existence of the ‘infamous table’ by appealing to our ‘instinctive beliefs’, without acknowledging that all animals must negotiate reality without the benefit of a socially constructed symbology (i.e. language). Russell’s own theory of logical atomism is hinted at without extensive description (as this is a popular book, after all). It must still be noted that his approach is not very different from phenomenalism, except he takes his sense-data to not be purely in the mind. Philosophers are fighting a vigorous rearguard action against the discoveries of neuro-science. Russell returned to this 'matter' problem several times later in his life but came no further than the common man’s conclusion that humans can know the structure of matter (at the macroscopic scale) but not its intrinsic nature – an arrow, if true, through the heart of fundamental physics, as he concluded elsewhere: “science is moonshine” [Oxon. p.784]

Russell obsesses on how we can prove something of which we have no direct experience; again falling back on the ancient illusory mathematical model of proof, based on the timeless subject of geometry but this has no relevance to invisible real threats like viruses. Russell does give a hint of the nature of reality when he writes that: “We shall find it convenient [?] only to speak of things existing when they are in time.” [p. 69]. However, he immediately loses it when he then goes on to declare that thoughts and feelings exist even though their occurrence is ephemeral. He does admit that universals [abstract ideas p. 32] do not exist in this sense but only “subsist” or “have being”, where being is opposed to existence as being timeless. Once again, demonstrating that the verb “to be” must be used with great care, even though Russell himself declared that it was “a disgrace that this word was used so loosely” [Oxon. p. 876]. In fact, it was critical to Russell that he ignores the temporal implications of ‘being’ so that he could build on the reality of mathematics, particularly its equivalence features (A=B). Interestingly, Whitehead avoided this error when he developed his own Process Philosophy, recognizing the centrality of time, including its implicit use in algebra. As Russell goes on to say: “The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems and all who love perfection more than life.” This is quite a religious statement from one of the world’s most famous atheists but actually betraying the religious grounding of mathematics, going back to Pythagoras. This rejection of time is one of the commonest errors in both philosophy and physics (where it is also too often spatialized and reduced to a single scalar parameter that is integrated away over all time or just averaged over periodic activity. In contrast, Aristotle, with his focus on living beings, took a more dynamic and asymmetric view of time, which he recognized as the fundamental driver of intrinsic change across all of reality. Russell builds on his philosophical logic foundations of pure mathematics to create a critical separation of knowledge of things (never defined), ‘by acquaintance’ [p.34] and human knowledge of truths (by ‘description’), such as his favorite example that “two and two makes four”. All his examples imply the paramount importance of existence that lie beneath his Laws of Thought [p. 50]. Since Russell’s arithmetic examples are divorced from the human act of counting he is forced to assign reality to the abstraction known as numbers that are no more than the results of counting certain types of objects that have very specific properties such as clear boundaries, identifiable characteristics, persistent existence, absence of transformable interactions etc. Again, Russell turns to geometry to make intuitive claims for certain shapes that are no more than idealizations complying with certain class-defining definitions [p. 53].

Even his use of logic has hidden assumptions, such as the famous syllogism that begins with: “All men are mortal” when the empirical evidence is self-defining: “All men who have died are mortal” as we cannot constrain the future to exclude near miraculous medical innovations. This demonstrates the danger of using the key logical idea of ALL beyond small finite sets. This also points to the use of concepts as timeless definitions whose usage cannot be allowed to change; a problem with using our verbal toolset for a reality grounded in change. For example, Russell recalls the infamous “Law of the Excluded Middle” where something cannot have some property and not have the same property (including existence) without introducing the key qualification: “at the same moment of time”.

Although all life forms must contend with reality to maintain their own existence, intellectuals have over-emphasized the role of reason (logical verbalization) in human affairs. A good contrast to these hubristic views can be found in “Language and Species” by linguist, Derek Bickerton (1990). Russell also wishes to put himself in Plato’s camp and affirm that ‘universals exist’ and wants to accept the reasonableness of the Principle of Induction [p. 40] where the future is believed will resemble the past. In fact, it is much easier for us to seek out some distinguishing characteristics and rename the class of exceptions, exploiting our ability to undertake another act of generalization. Remembering class-rules (‘patterns’) is a far more efficient use of memory than storing lists of particulars. The continuing existence of broad classes of animate creatures interacting with diverse environments indicates that this is good strategy for knowledge acquisition, even when symbolic languages are not employed.

As can be seen, the focus on existence (ontology) becomes the ‘golden sword’ to cut through the over intellectualization that can result from excessive abstraction arising from an obsession with knowledge. The reality is that we must make life-or-death decisions, so it is useful to ask for advice and to ‘know the odds’. It is a safer strategy to build on empirical patterns than on a priori propositions. The search for certainty is an old siren that will sink anyone’s ship of knowledge. In summary, ontology is a more powerful investigation of reality than epistemology as the metaphysicians proposed before the modern triumph of the verbalists.

As an aristocrat, Russell updates the ancient Greek intellectuals’ preference for mental activity over the practical (and unproblematic) skills of the artisans and engineers that provide the foundations of our civilization. The luxury of philosophy is only made possible by the labors of thousands of less fortunate humans.

A brief tour of epistemology and metaphysics. This book is directed at at those who are curious about the discipline of philosophy; it's only about 150 or so pages, but navigating through may not be easy. Russell starts of by wondering whether material objects seen in the world of sense data really exist and takes the reader through a brief analysis of the differing view points regarding the existence and the nature of matter. The view points of the idealists and empiricists are compared and contrasted as Russell tries to take his position. What one gets out of this is the way the topic is analyzed and how seemingly obvious and self-evident points are dissected and a question mark put on them; the opinion he arrives at (ex. why the idealists & Berkeley were in the wrong) is irrelevant. In any case, given the brief nature of the discussion here, you will have to supplement your reading with other materials to get a genuine and more than a verbal understanding of these various schools of thought; the objective here is merely to give you a broad outline. Russell then moves on to the process by which we acquire knowledge, our reliance on inductive reasoning and proceeds to talk about a priori knowledge, contribution of Kant and the debate surrounding the feasibility of a priori knowledge. Plato's Universals is covered in two chapters. If and once you get to the end of it, questions whether all of this is merely hairsplitting and devoid of any practical utility is addressed by Russell in the final chapter where he says that the role of philosophy is to keep alive the "speculative interest in the universe" otherwise which we would be confined to verifiable and ascertainable knowledge.

A well written introduction and if the flame still burns there is a list of books in the bibliographical note to take your interest further.

I was somewhat worried about reading philosophy as an audiobook, but the clarity of Russell's written style make it work out just fine. I had no issues following his arguments, though I should clarify that I do have a lot of experience with philosophy after years of prior reading. Still, this is introductory material, and a few pauses here and there won't prevent the reader from enjoying the experience. The topics covered in 'The Problems' are quite broad, but their treatment is shallow. This is a good Philosophy 101 companion to anyone interested in the modern analytical tradition. -Ryan Mease

This was the set text for my first term tutorials in a three year philosophy degree at UCL. Each week, we discussed one of the brief chapters, and by the end of the discussion each session, what had seemed simple on first reading was now less so, but mysterious and fascinating. Sometimes Russell writes with admirable concision and clarity. This is such a work. For example, he handles the existence of matter in six pages. Highly recommended as an introduction to some fascinating questions.

First off, I am nowhere near qualified to comment on the philosophical arguments posited by Russell about knowledge. However, as someone who has rediscovered philosophy in middle-age, having taken it in college and abandoned it shortly thereafter, I found Russell's writing eminently readable. Some of the concepts discussed are appropriately challenging and I was surprised at how clearly and engagingly Russell writes. I incorrectly assumed that a great philosophical mind like his would wrap his prose in incomprehensible philosophical jargon. Fortunately, I was wrong. The highlight for me was a passage in the concluding chapter, where Russell explains the purpose of the philosophical discipline, which is to bring a person outside their immediate world of daily concerns and crises, to the larger world around them of thoughts and ideas, and thereby enlarge their world to their benefit. My favorite sentence: "Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal." Highly recommended as an introduction to some of the fundamental questions addressed by philosophy.

The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell:

I suppose a classical review would begin with a plot overview, an analysis of characters, language and themes, but this book, being structured more like a collection of essays than anything else we will need an atypical review structure. Let me first start by saying that Russell is a very good writer, especially for a philosopher who never wrote any piece of fiction. I don't find his prose as riveting as some but it is admittedly 'good.' My favorite part of The Problems of Philosophy(perhaps the only part which I thoroughly enjoyed) was Russell's treatment of Plato's Theory of the Forms, which "awoke me from my dogmatic slumbers" to quote Kant. Russell gives the theory new life by dusting away the ancient, mystical aura often surrounding it and replacing it with an analysis of Universals through language which is important even in the present day. Russell's ability to see past and to treat theories which are ancient or merely old is remarkable and one of the things that makes his book so interesting. I struggled to truly enjoy the book because I was often clashing with Russell in my opinions and theories. The main purpose of The Problems of Philosophy was to rid philosophy of Skepticism and Idealism(something which I believe to be impossible). Russell's arguments were too brief and too scarce, he seemed to walk the line between non-fiction teaching and proposition of theories which at times felt awkward(though I'm sure many enjoyed the general brevity). Russell in the end, failed to destroy either Skepticism or Idealism(well, he briefly broke apart George Berkeley's Idealism but this is not exactly groundbreaking, I had already assumed Berkeley's philosophy to be fallacious) but rather he focuses on the fact that Skeptic arguments do not make 'sense'(sense being common sense and not logical sense in this case) which I suppose is an attempt to make us consider that reality is ultimately as it appears. But of course, common sense has no place in philosophy. The book was good, interesting, but I was confronted with a man who I struggled to agree with on anything.
7.2/10

"Philosophy aims primarily at knowledge," says Bertrand Russell. "But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions."

With that caveat, which comes in the last chapter of The Problems of Philosophy, Russell defines in part what philosophy is and what it can accomplish. The definition casts a rather dim light over the field of philosophy, calling into questions its value as a discipline worthy of our attention. But Russell goes on to say that philosophy's value won't be found in its ability to provide answers ("since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true"). Instead, philosophy is valuable "for the sake of the questions themselves."

"These questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation," notes Russell. He says our minds are "rendered great" when we contemplate "the greatness of the universe." This enables our minds to form a "union with the universe which constitutes its highest good."

In the pages that precede this final chapter on the value of philosophy, Russell highlights the questions he considers to be most "positive" and "constructive." In his view, philosophy's most important questions relate to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. As a result, most of this book deals with questions like these:

What is the difference between appearance and reality?
What is a belief? What is the relationship between beliefs and facts?
What, if anything, can we know for certain?
What is the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning?
What is intuitive knowledge?
What is truth? How can we distinguish between truth and falsehood?

Russell doesn't always provide "definite answers" to these questions. Yet he does a marvelous job of helping us to think through them in creative and logically sound ways.

The Problems of Philosophy is a brief book that packs a nice punch. It is easy to read, smoothly written, and will likely appeal almost anyone interested in philosophy. Perhaps the biggest problem with the Problems of Philosophy is its narrow scope. The book fails completely to address many of the problems that people often associate with philosophy. Because of this, I would give the book four stars, not the five shown above. Russell makes almost no mention of ethics or morality. He also avoids God, religion, evil, value, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and the list goes on. But this is a flaw that can be forgiven - for what Russell sacrifices in scope, he makes up for in clarity and style. He often attaches practical examples to more abstract ideas, and this makes the problems of philosophy more understandable for everyone.

One may agree or not with Russell's assertions, but most will appreciate his ability to take some of philosophy's classic problems and make them digestible, almost entertaining to the average reader. This is an enjoyable book that is just as relevant today as when it was first published in 1912.

I first bought this book several years ago, after having left college to study independently after doing poorly my first semester. I had always been interested in philosophy ever since I discovered it on accident in high-school. Since then, I have abused my copy beyond belief, highlighted pretty much every page in the book at some point. Through this, it has helped me get to where I am now: about to take my final class for my philosophy degree.

When I first received the book, I thought it was more about "the problems WITH philosophy" but would soon realize it was literally an overview about the problems which philosophy tries to address. This book was my first glimpse at real epistemology and metaphysics, covering the ideas of what it means to know anything and what might lie beyond our knowledge of the physical world. That being said, it has also become my primary resource for college essays. Over the course of a dozen philosophy classes, I have probably cited this book on at least 9/10 essays. Part of this is because of how Russell writes the book as an overview of epistemology and metaphysics, which makes it quite easy to use to emphasize a point.

I think the key of this book is its simplicity and objectivity. Russell does occasionally have his obvious opinions (some of which I disagree with, especially when it comes to Kant and mathematics), but for the most part he does an excellent job of covering the very foundation of philosophy itself. The simplicity comes essentially from his language, which is far from obscure or dry. It is partly for this reason that it is one of the books I recommend most to friends and relatives: it is exceptionally accessible and is essentially its own introduction to philosophy. Another good point to be made is that it is short, which means that it is both: 1) useful to people who don't like to read very much and 2)useful for people who don't like when philosophers go off on tangents or talk about obscure and oblique ideas with seemingly no real reason (philosophy is plagued with using too many words to explain to little).

As a final point, I will simply make a tl;dr for why I think this book is amazing:

TL;DR: This might be one of the best and well written introductions to philosophy, particularly when it comes to epistemology (knowledge) and metaphysics (the non-physical). It is short, easy to read, and extremely useful for anyone who is even remotely interested in the subject of philosophy.

This is my favorite book of Bertrand Russell's, both as an introductory and technical work, and it is probably so because he wrote it before he went too deeply into analytical and empiricist philosophy to remember his rationalist roots. ...His summaries of Rationalism vs. Empiricism are also excellent, though 20th century rationalism is probably today what he describes as the middle ground position between both views in his book. Most 20th century rationalists accept the *causal* importance of sensory perception in forming many *a priori* beliefs, so the new term is not *a priori* knowledge, but *a priori* justification. Empiricism is the dominant school in philosophy today, but I think that will change in time because empiricism cannot justify many of its epistemological conclusions in any way that do not undermine the justificatory role of thought.
Some of the accounts of "sense data" and "knowledge by description" are a bit tortured, partly because Russell tried to avoid metaphysics as much as possible, and I personally do not believe that they are ultimately correct. However, the discussions are still good introductions. People who read more rationalist philosophy from the likes of Brand Blanshard and Laurence Bonjour as well as analytic philosophers like David Armstrong will get a better insignt into where the real debates about some of these issues lie.
On the whole, a good introduction to philosophy, even though it doesn't touch upon ethics and politics. However, philosophy is a difficult subject and one book, even the best introduction, cannot make clear all the problems that some of the best minds in history have wrestled over...

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was of course one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (1912) is a classic introduction to the perennial questions of philosophy (although it focuses mainly on epistemology and metaphysics). It is an engaging book that can be read by both the beginner in philosophy as well as the more advanced student. (For example, Russell described much of what is considered the "Gettier problem" in this book.)

Russell had an amazingly long and productive life. He was a key figure in the school known as analytic philosophy (which has one of its earliest appearances in book form here) and was the founder of logical atomism (which can be dated from his 1914 work OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD). His last major work of technical philosophy (HUMAN KNOWLEDGE) appeared in 1948 and after that time was largely known for his social and political activism.

In reading Russell, there are a couple things to remember. First, Russell wasn't always the most accurate expositor on the history of philosophy and religion (you can skip his HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY if you are interested in learning about the subject matter of the book). Second, just because he is often considered an empiricist, it is a mistake to consider him a consistent empiricist, much less a logical positivist. Russell's logical atomism had a metaphysics, albeit a rather pared down one. During large parts of his career, Russell was keenly aware that strict empiricism was a dead end. Indeed, in THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY he sets forth a famous defense of universals that put him in the realist, as opposed to nominalist camp (where most empiricists are). There is also a good defense of a priori insight, which shows Russell's rationalist roots.

The title of Bertrand Russell's book is "The Problems of Philosophy." He was too careful with his language to have called it "The Problems with Philosophy." I enjoyed this audio book and was satisfied with the narrator. How could this "Harmonic Waves" company be so careless with the title? Frightening. Just frightening.

I recommend the book and this reading of it. Russell's prose is clear even when the ideas he is describing are complex.

Am I right about this? Did they get the title wrong on the cover of the product? Yikes!!!

This book was my first foray into philosophy, and surprisingly, it proved to be very enjoyable. For many, just the word "philosophy" evokes images of ancient thinkers, yet not in a very appealing light: old men sitting around, absent-mindedly stroking their chins as they ponder the meaning of life.
Yet, philosophy does not deserve this reputation. It is not just some hobby for stodgy elders, or those with nothing better to do. Rather, it is quite the opposite; it is an endlessly intriguing subject, one which causes you to consider things you may have never thought of before. Survive the test, and the reaffirmation that results will be worth it.
Philosophy contains no easy answers. It poses a myriad of questions which can force one to doubt, and even reexamine, one's beliefs -- even those which previously seemed so resolute. This may at first be difficult or discombobulating, but persistance is rewarded with an even stronger foundation than before.
I will not attempt to summarize this book, as people before me have already explained it sufficiently. However, I will say that this book was a great influence, and a wonderful introduction to the world of philosophy. For such an abstruse and "deep" matter, one would think that most would be intimidated; however, Russell handles it splendidly. He writes in a lucid, unpretentious manner, and spares the reader any unnecessary confusion.
Even to this day, my friends tease me about "philosophy of a table." It is impossible for me to adequately describe this book, but let me say that it is brilliant and refreshing. For me, philosophy is not meant to give an individual a headache. It is simply for those who wish to gain a better understanding of themselves and their surroundings. And this book, exceptional in its quality, is an excellent choice to get you started on that interminable journey towards the ever so elusive Truth.

I remember reading this little book over and over again in order to understand what philosophers truly think about. I am not sure that I understand most of it then, and I am sure that I do not remember most of it now. But I know one of the topics was the 'reality' or non- reality of what the visible world gives. Appearance and reality. Another topic if I remember rightly is the mind-body problem. And Russell I believe here takes on the Descartian cogito and tells us that it does not mean that Descartes has proved that there is an 'I thinking' but rather only that there is ' thinking'. Russell in this seems to be something like a very strange kind of Buddhist. In any case it is these hard problems of epistemology that are at the center of this small work.

The other kinds of big problems, moral and aesthetic, religious also which are at the heart of a good share of human experience are perhaps not quantifiable enough for Russell's kind of philosophical consideration here. The man that tried to reduce all of mathematics to logic did take on these other kinds of more 'human ' questions in other works though not I might say to the satisfaction of many of us old religious believers.

This little book is however a clear and challenging introduction to major epistemological questions.

As others have commented, this is a very good introduction to the basic topics of philosophy from a great 20th century philosopher. Russell focuses almost entirely on epistemology in this book, offering a thorough grounding of the most fundamental issues of human knowledge. The writing is very clear and straightforward in a way that is good for both the philosopher and general public. I couldn't have dreamed of a better writing style for such a book topic.
I gave the book 4 stars instead of 5 because the focus is pretty much entirely on epistemology and I feel Russell does not discuss metaphysics or ethics as much as he could have. But don't let that discourage you...this book is valuable to the philosophical newcomer.

The Problems of Philosophy is a great cornerstone philosophy text. By that I mean, it covers those issues which are essential for building a coherent worldview - what exists, how can we know anything, what is the basis of logic, why is philosophy useful, and so on. And though this is not a history book, Russell does managed to provide a rather clear, if not altogether evenhanded, outline of how certain schools of thought came to be.

If you are interested in philosophy, socially, academically, or otherwise, this is a great little book. Russell fully explains the trickier concepts and ties everything together very well in one complete package.

In "The Problems of Philosophy", Russell attacks old problems with new logic; he introduces a number of schools of thought that preceded him and philosophic problems common to all philosophy such as: public and private experience, personal identity, self-consciousness and consciousness of other minds, relations of space and time, and knowledge itself.

Russell examines our judgments about reality with an analytic approach. He uses a table, a simple physical object, and he follows Descartes' practice of radical doubt to analyze our knowledge of the physical world through sense data, which are the impressions that the appearance of reality offers our senses.
While establishing a theory of knowledge, Russell makes the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell also discusses priori knowledge with a Platonic attitude toward universals, considering the possibility of having acquaintance with a universal without knowing of a single instance of that universal.
Through opposing idealism, discussing other philosophers' faults and discussing ideas and universals, Russell completely lost me and fell into the trap other philosophers couldn't avoid: going in endless circles to explain a simple aspect.

I enjoy reading Russell's anti war ideas, his scientific work especially in Math, but when it comes to philosophy, Russell is not a straight shooter.

Russel confines himself in epistemology. He discuss the problem of knowledge and the conditions by with it can be achieved. The concept of truth is examined, with emphasis in the realist position. Truth as coerency is also mentioned. The author exposes his ideas about the meaning and purpose of philosophy. Good work that deals with importants philosophical problems.

This book is a model of exposition, covering an amazing amount of ground in just over 150 pages - and the excellent writing makes it seem even shorter than that. It is not really a standard introduction to all of philosophy, however, since it deals mainly with questions of epistemology. But as an introduction to that branch of philosophy, it is definitely one of the best. Among other things, it includes Russell's famous chapter "On Induction", criticisms of idealism, of Kant, and (perhaps surprisingly) of empiricism, and a defense of the correspondence theory of truth.

The five star rating does not mean that I agree with everything in it, however. Russell himself came to disagree with much of what he said in this book (e.g., with respect to his views on universals). But in spite of being somewhat dated, it is definitely worthwhile, especially for the beginning student.

I think Dr. Russell, like many of his generation, is confused about the relationship between science and philosophy. I am not sure whether he thinks science is a branch of philosophy or that philosophy is a kind of proto-science. It is clear that he thinks one or the other. But science and philosophy have little or nothing to do with one another. Science may even be said to be anti-philosophical, even more than it is anti-religion.

This book may be of interest to historians, but for the rest of us who are interested in what really is philosophy about, we should look elsewhere.

The problems of philosophy is a book that deals with questions that philosophers ask themselves frequently but ordinary people have no idea about. Although it is written in a very simple way, considering the complexity of the subjects described, it is not for everybody.

Russell does an amazing job of dissecting philosophy and getting to squishy center and practical basis that let's us attempt to understand the world. It's very easy to read and enjoyable. And despite being written in 1912, it reads like it was written yesterday (other then a few anachronisms, here and there).

The only downside is that, obviously, it doesn't say much about philosophical developments in the 20th century.

Still, it's a fantastic and easy to understand book, and everyone who can read should read it.

Bertrand Russell at his best.

He is discussing different aspects of philosophy and
why you need philosophy. This is a very good starting point
for further philosophical readings.
This book is a must in every human beings bookshelf who
are intrested in the way we people think.

In this book review, Bertrand Russell argues several points as to why he feels there are problems with philosophy, which I feel are pretty strong arguments. Some of Russell's arguments can be summarized as:

1) The appearance and reality of an object's existence differ based on individual point of view.

2) Whether or not the matter exists independent of an individual's presence.

3) The origin of matter, and distinguishing it from physical science and physical experience.

4) Idealism and its inability to prove credibility

5) Induction: A, so therefore B.

6) Philosophy's value

Russell's "The Problems with Philosophy" begins with his view of a table's existence. It was very interesting to read about Russell's belief that there is difference between our physical view of an object and the `reality' of whether or not an object is actually there. This particular analysis is the basis of the first chapter. According to Russell, every aspect of an object's appearance and feel is based on an individual's point of view. The main example he uses is that of a table, and someone else may interpret how the shade of color I see another way; the texture that I feel may feel different to someone else; another person may describe the shape I see as I walk around the table as a different shape. This same explanation is used for sight, sound, and touches whereas there are no fixed choices in reality; and in the end, our senses that we use for the appearance of things is how we become `acquainted' with `reality'.

Another interesting argument Russell discusses is the object of matter, and whether or not an object remains to be present when one is physically absent from the object. Going back to the table, if we find it to not exist then "the whole outer world is a dream". Everything we have ever known to be our reality does not exist independently of ourselves. Numerous times throughout the book Russell's theory of sense-data is mentioned; and in this context, when one doubts the physical presence of an object it does not mean that they doubt their sense-data which initially "...made us think there was a table". Here Russell begins to compare his theory with that which is found in Descartes' book Meditations. Descartes believed in the possibility of a false reality and did not believe in anything that could not be proven to be true. Thus Descartes committed the appeal to ignorance fallacy, until he realized a flaw because he did not doubt his own existence. Continuing into this chapter, people may experience similar occurrences that vary, but even assuming that the other person exists makes the mistake of begging the question. Outside of what we experience for ourselves, anyone else's experience independent of our own should not be considered. Furthermore, Russell shows the error in committing the appeal to ignorance fallacy, as he believes that, "[t] here can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with the others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance." Therefore, if a particular reasoning or belief does not inhibit the possibility of other beliefs, they should all be recognized respectively.

Russell then begins to investigate the nature of matter once we are able to conclude that it exists independently of us individually. Hypothetically, the nature of something from a scientific standpoint opposed to a human's physical point of view, are of course different. Using a blind man and a light source as an example, it is extremely difficult to explain the effect light has on a blind man's senses, because it is something he cannot experience directly. This example shows how things such as light, which is actually composed of waves, appeal to certain senses that exist in a `world' independent of us. Another example used is the understanding of time. Just as time seems to go slowly when we are bored or in pain, it seems to go quickly when we have something to do or having a good time. It is considered inaccurate to measure time using these instances.

There is then the subject of idealism that states, "[w] hatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental." To believe as an idealist is perceived to be far more difficult than someone who believes based on his or her common sense. Here Russell talks about how idealism derived, using arguments made by Bishop Berkeley. Berkeley believed that the idea of sense data could not be possible if our senses were not present, and that if something did not exist in a `mind', then it could not exist at all. Russell agrees with Berkeley's point of view up until a `mind' being absolutely necessary for something's existence. According to Berkeley, something is because it is perceived. Russell argues that Berkeley uses the word idea to help people accept idealistic beliefs, because common knowledge has us to believe that ideas originate in the mind. Therefore anything we perceive in our minds to exist can do so. However in the end, Russell completely rejects Berkeley's theory of sense-data by feeling it is contradictory, and does not prove what he claims it to prove.

In order to gain knowledge about what is beyond our acquaintance, Russell uses inferences in a theory called induction. With inferences, an A, so therefore, B method is used. For example lightning has struck, therefore thunder will occur next, shows the use of induction that can help us with what is beyond our realm of thinking. Russell also shows how occurrences we often take for granted are relevant to this theory, as the example of the sun rising each day can be used. Just because the sun has risen each day in the past, is no reason to assume that it will therefore rise each day in the future, according to Russell. He goes on to conclude that our assumptions about the future should be probable and not definite, whereas the more accurate form of the argument should be "that the more A is found to be associated with B, "the more probable it is (if no cases of failure of association are known) that A is always associated with B."

Russell once again brings science into the picture as he contrasts the structure of philosophy with science. Science is more likely to focus on the physical needs of the body, while philosophy is more vital in a mental sense. And yet with these differences, even though philosophy does not contain the amount of definite evidence that science or other disciplines can, philosophy is able to bring order to the physical sciences. Philosophy allows us to be open-minded, and free from "arrogant dogmatism". To Russell, this sense of open-mindedness is a virtue that can let our lives be "great and free" if we escape from the prison of our private lives. He believes that "through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great," but if we remain in our own little worlds, it can hinder us from the possibilities of exploration where the intellect and object meet. Russell feels concluding that "truth is man-made...space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind it is unknowable," puts an "impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond", and diminishes the value of philosophy.

Although it took some for me to get `acquainted' with Russell's point of view on philosophy, in the end I was able to understand where he has found flaws in the way it is used or interpreted. Russell is able to make strong arguments and support each claim with validity.

This book is a classic introduction to the subject matter of philosophy. It's not by my experience essential, but can prove resourceful in helping one practice more rational thinking by accurately analyzing empirical reality in a more effective manner.

This book is compulsory reading to anyone studying Philosphy, it is written in such a style as to take away the mysteke normally associated with the subject. Anyone can read this book and gain an understanding.

Dr. Wallace Devlin, Ph.D

His ignorance of what has been learned since his time makes his points irrelevant. His logic and thinking are admirable, considering what he does not know.

That should be a lesson for all of us who would try to predict the future with the tools of the present.

I am just an occaisional, informal reader of philosophy. I would rate this book two stars, less because of it's content and perhaps more because of my own shortcomings. I found many of the chapters verbose and hard to follow. To be honest, I've found that I am more interested in short snippets of what major philosophers had to say rather than delve into their thoughts myself. When I try, I often find I don't have the attention span to follow what an author is saying, and that is what I found here. Having said that, I will add that I found the last two chapters more interesting. All in all, I would say this book is more tuned to serious lovers of philosophical questions than a casual reader such as myself.

Russell is brilliant in this short essay. This book is one of best short introductions philosophy in the empirical tradition. It follows naturally from the tradition laid down by Locke, Hume and Berkeley from that which we are pleased to call analytical philosophy later follows and initiated in large measure by Russell.

I found especially enlightening the discussion of logical principles and in particular that pertaining to induction. The analysis of Aristotle’s syllogism and the proper application of deductive versus inductive reasoning is insightful but seems to have been forgotten when one looks at introductory texts on logic and still finds Aristotle’s syllogism presented as the model of deductive reasoning without taking into account Russell’s powerful criticism of this mode of argumentation.

The following argument is still presented as an example of deductive reasoning. It is known as Aristotle’s syllogism and is included in many introductory texts on logic.

Premise 1: All men are mortal
Premise 2: Socrates is a man
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal

There is an unsound argument. An argument must have both: true premises and valid logic to be sound. The problem was pointed out by Bertrand Russell early in the book What follows is my interpretation of the Russell’s analysis.

This is technically a valid argument in that the truth of the premises is included in the truth of conclusion. That is, the conclusion is necessarily true if the premises are true.

However, the argument is unsound because the first premise is not true, and it cannot be proven to be true. The first premise is really an empirical generalization and should not be used as a premise in a deductive argument as shown by the use of ‘All’ which is a universal quantifier.

General rule:
When the premises are known a priori, deduction is the correct mode of argument. When the premises are based on empirical knowledge, induction is the correct mode of argument. An example of a priori knowledge is 2 + 2 = 4. This proposition does not need to be tested with observations to conclude that it is always true. Empirical knowledge is that which is gained through observation and testing. The statement “all men are mortal” is really a generalization made about all men based on observations.

For example, I have observed many men or people and all of them have turned out to be mortal. In fact, I also have good reason to believe that every single human being who was born has died, I know of no examples to the contrary. If Socrates is a man, then I can infer that he is probably mortal. This is actually a stronger argument because I do not have to defend the proposition that “all men are mortal”. I have not observed all men or people. I do not know what the longevity of a person might be in the future. It does not logically follow that just because every person has died that every person born in the future will die. I cannot defend “all men are mortal” as a priori knowledge nor can I defend it based on empirical grounds due to my limited number of observations. However, I can defend the conclusion that Socrates is probably mortal based on the inference that I can make based on my observations. In fact, the probability that Socrates is mortal is actually higher than the probability that “all men are mortal”. Any empirical generalization is less certain than the actual individual observations because each of the individual observations can be verified, the generalizations cannot be verified. Put another way, we can say that the probability that Socrates is mortal is actually higher than the probability that “all men are mortal” because it is obvious that if “all men are mortal”, so is Socrates but if Socrates is mortal it does not follow that “all men are mortal.”

Argument Restated:
Premise 1: All observed people have been found to be mortal
Premise 2: Socrates is a person
Conclusion: Socrates is probably mortal