There Was a Country: A Memoir

This book is full of knowledge and little emotion. I'd hope to gain more insight to the people's plight, but all I recall are dates and politics. Perhaps I'm too far removed and unaware of Africa's troubled past and turbulent future to appreciate this novel.

Save for a few typographical errors and what appears to be post-publication "cut-and-paste" jobs, I found There Was A Country, a gripping and disturbing account of events preceding Nigeria's civil war, as well as its aftermath. I particularly enjoyed the introductory chapters which dealt with the author's childhood and education. Achebe is a master storyteller and these accounts of his early life transport the reader to a time of innocence, a world unspoiled and a nation on its way to becoming great. Sadly, it all fell apart and Nigeria finds itself today nominally prosperous but essentially still searching for its identity - an adult trapped in an adolescent's body.
Chinua Achebe writes from a participant's point of view. And although he cites many third parties to support his narrative of events, I could not escape the verdict that this is still a partisan's account. This much is clear from the subtitle of the book, his choice of words (e.g. pogrom) and the general sentiment that runs through the book, like the distinct taste of artificial sweetener runs through diet soda. This should not necessarily disqualify Achebe's book from being a useful resource for historians and others interested in the basic question: What went wrong? I suggest that this volume be read with the mental caveat that the book was written by a member, nay, champion of an aggrieved group who feels that a great injustice has been done to it for which no redress or compensation worth the name was ever given. Indeed for the Igbos, Biafra remains an open sore that continues to be scoured pretentiously, even deliberately by the rest of Nigeria. Achebe's book is an attempt to bring this yearning for justice once again into the public domain. He has done an excellent job as a spokesman for his beloved Igbos. It behooves anyone who feels that there are omissions or distortions in Achebe's account to let their voice be heard too. Such engagement can only enhance dialogue and perhaps bring about much needed healing to the once progressive and emerging powerhouse of Africa that was Nigeria. As for Achebe, the man has spoken.

Having lived in Nigeria for a couple of years in the early sixties I found this somewhat interesting. But it is far too long and he does feel terribly sorry for his Ibo clansmen, but he could have chronicled their misfortunes in about a third of the time. I purchased this from the store and do like their service for putting books on my kindle. rlm

The 1967-1970 Nigerian-Biafran war in which an estimated three million people died, most of them Achebe's Igbo people, was a tragedy. What would have been an additional tragedy was Achebe not providing for the unborn generations his pivotal view of the event, and a sharp cross-examination of the actors. In There Was A Country, Achebe does it the Achebe way.

In Part one, Achebe reveals the golden days of Nigeria and how through hard work and support from his family he positions himself to receive the baton from exiting colonialists at the dawn of Nigeria's independence. Achebe's story in this regard is the story of how the Igbo, in only 30 years, were able to bridge the educational gap that the people of the then Western Nigeria had as a result of early exposure to Western education. Achebe's early childhood story and path to success mirror the drive that has propelled the Igbo since they became part of Nigeria- a drive that came from Igbo republican society that abhors royalty, encourages competition, and rewards personal achievement. In stories of personal struggle, rugged determination and unique foresight, Achebe makes it known that there is no magic wand behind the Igbo emergence and attainment of preeminent position in the Nigerian project other than by shared industriousness. The consequence of this accomplishment was an immediate fear of Igbo domination. That fear quickly took hold in the psyche of other Nigerians and practically truncated the Nigerian dream of Achebe generation.

It was this fear of Igbo dominance that made much of Nigeria and their British cheerleaders to interpret the 1966 coup (plotted by military officers, most of whom were Igbo, including Kaduna Nzeogwu who Achebe reveals is Igbo by name only because he perceived himself as a Northerner) as another phase of Igbo domination. It accounts for the ferocity of the atrocities unleashed against the Igbo, a degree of which had never been witnessed anywhere in Africa before then. At first Achebe, ever a believer in Nigeria, wanted to stay put in Lagos until the systematic killing of Igbo in Lagos forced him to return to the East.

For those who have not read most of Achebe's essays, he discloses how the conflict between the old Igbo culture and the emerging Christian society became the source of his masterpiece, Things Fall Apart. From his mother, he learns how to bring out changes in a gentle manner without being intimidating. He narrates how his mother fought and achieved victory for Christianity and women's right and freedom by merely challenging the taboo of a woman picking up a kola nut. Ominous feelings creep through a reader as Achebe unwraps, layer after layer, how the middle class of his time were basking in the illusion of independence and the promises of a new great nation, totally missing the signs of its impending doom. I find it a timely lesson for members of today's middle class Nigerians that do not see the shaky foundation of the Nigerian nation. The similarity is very striking.

When Achebe delves into his life story, he is ever the teaser. He will, like a priest, let the wine in the cup glaze the readers' lips and then he will pull the cup away. When he tells you about how a group of vacationing students working at the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, NBC, came to his office to demand equal pay, he tells readers that their leader was Christie Okoli from Awka, his mother's hometown. He volunteers to readers that his interest in her grew after the articulate way she spoke. As you wait for more, he informs you that, "two years into our friendship, Christie and I were engaged."

The Part two of the book deals with life in Biafra. For those still wondering what happened in Biafra, this chapter is a gift from providence. Using personal stories, Achebe paints a vivid picture of what life was like in Biafra. He exposes the actors in the war and the roles each played. He quotes extensively from several sources as he presents the assessment of Ojukwu and Gowon, the primary actors in the war. He even quotes sources opposed to Ojukwu's position and point of view, like Amb. Ralph Uweche. Achebe says some questions will be debated for generations. One of such questions is security reasons behind Ojukwu's rejections of Nigeria's federal government's proposal for a road corridor for food and the federal government's rejection of Ojukwu's alternative. Every now and then, he interrupts the theories of several schools of thought to have his own say. For instance, Achebe has no doubt that following the ethnic cleansing in the North and the federal government's connivance in the drastic act, that Biafra's secession from Nigeria was inevitable whether Ojukwu was there or not.

Achebe writes with great moral authority that he often comments that "forty years later I still stand by that assessment." When Achebe makes his summations, they are as apt as his press releases. When he tells stories, they are as succinct as any of the novels that made him famous. Through the stories of his friendship with Christopher Okigbo, including their effort to run a publishing company during the war, Achebe recasts the man and educates those who hold the poet in contempt of literature due to his decision to go to the war front. Like so many surprises in the book, Achebe reveals that he, too, would have been lost during the war in several instances, including in a plane mishap while on a diplomatic mission for Biafra to Senegal.

At the 1968 Kampala, Ugandan, talks, Achebe writes that he met Aminu Kano there for the first time. Aminu Kano was part of Nigeria's delegation led by Anthony Enahoro. The Nigerian delegation, Achebe recalls, espoused total "crush of Biafra." He writes that Aminu Kano was not pleased by how the matter was being handled. "That meeting made an indelible mark on me about Aminu Kano, about his character and his intellect," Achebe writes. Achebe will later in life take a failed detour into politics, joining Aminu Kano's political party.

In Part three, Achebe makes an indisputable case against Nigeria in the way the war was prosecuted. He raises the question of genocide, makes hard-hitting arguments and levels his case against the Nigerian government. Ever unapologetic, Achebe does not spare the heroes - be it Awolowo or Gowon. As always, his moral message is "resolute." He slams Obafemi Awolowo for allowing his political ambition to diminish his humanity. He holds Awolowo responsible for "hatching up a diabolical policy to reduce the numbers of his enemies significantly through starvation- eliminating two million people, mainly members of future generations." He cites Awolowo's policies as the minister of finance during and after the war as evidence that his desire to secure permanent advantage for his Yoruba people superseded his inner good angel. Achebe does not spare Anthony Enahoro and Allison Akene Ayinda, supposedly intellectuals who backed Awolowo and, of course, the naïve Gowon who was in charge. Achebe points out the irony of it all - that all those who had hoped to benefit from the emaciation of Igbo people ended up becoming victims too. The British, through the indigenization decree lost investments; the Yoruba and Gowon's Middle Belt people are still trapped in a dysfunctional country, all suffering from its consequences.

In offering solutions, Achebe suggests a series of questions about "ethnic bigotry," corruption and pure impunity that will keep Nigeria busy for a long time. He has no problem describing characters operating in the Nigerian political arena as "bum in suit," "poorly educated," "half-baked," and "politicians with plenty of money and very low IQs."

Throughout the chapters, Achebe punctuates the stories with interludes of poetry. They stand as exhortations, as hanging tears, flags, stop signs and as asterisks. Most of the poems are from his past collections. He preserves for generations yet unborn the role played by the likes of Dick Tiger, Gordian Ezekwe and Carl Gustaf von Rosen during the Biafran war.

By going beyond the Biafra war in this memoir Achebe shows how the fear of Igbo dominance led to the dethronement of meritocracy and the enthronement of mediocrity. In that single move, Nigeria opens the flood gate for corruption, impunity and failure that has remained the trademark of Nigeria to date. Beneath the crisis playing itself out in Nigeria's landscape today - most especially in cities like Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt- is still that fear of Igbo domination.

In Part four, Achebe performs a reappraisal of Nigeria's sordid journey. He connects the failure of the Nigerian state and the rise of terrorism to Nigeria's long history of condoning violence.

"Nigeria's federal government has always tolerated terrorism.
For over half a century the federal government has turned a
blind eye to waves of ferocious and savage massacres of its
citizens - mainly Christian Southerners; mostly Igbos or
indigenes of the Middle Belt; and others - with impunity."

Achebe finds solution in good leadership as exemplified by Nelson Mandela. In the postscript, he spotlights Mandela as the epitome of the kind of leadership that Africa needs. He urges Africans to seek "sustenance and inspiration from Mandela." No one will disagree with that. However, he does not mention the Arab Spring or the possibility of its replica in sub-Saharan Africa. He, therefore, maintains his conclusion in The Trouble With Nigeria that leadership is squarely the problem. For younger readers not conditioned to wait indefinitely for change, the question left unanswered is, if leadership fails to come, then what?

The memoir, There Was A Country, is not just an epitaph for Biafra. It is also a warning to Nigeria. If Nigeria fails to find its purpose and achieve it for all of its people, a new generation of writers may have the misfortune of writing a similar epitaph for Nigeria - There Was A Country Called Nigeria. And for Biafran babies and their upcoming generations, the idea that there was a country carries a subtle message that what was could still reincarnate.

In There Was A Country, Achebe like a priest, illustrates to Nigerians how to partake in the Biafran Communion. To be a partaker, one must drop all malicious intents and repent. In briefs, citations, exhortations and excommunications, Achebe maps out the path for Nigeria to figuratively come to the Lord's table.

Chapter by Chapter, as it is dramatized in the Book of Common Prayers, Achebe, son of a catechist, beseeches Nigerians to kneel humbly. He proclaims the sins and he guides them as they confess their sins. He pronounces absolution of sins for those who repent. In flashes of dramatic interludes, like a priest, Achebe then picks the bread; and when he has given thanks, he raises it up and breaks it and gives it to Nigerians, saying; take, eat, this is the Biafra which is given for you, do this in remembrance of Biafra. Likewise, after admonishments, he takes the cup and when he has given thanks, he gives it to Nigerians saying; drink you all for this is the blood of Biafra, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins, do this as often as you can in remembrance of Biafra.

It is not clear whether this burdened generation of Nigerians still crippled by its non-reconciled history will understand the essence of this Achebe doctrine. What is clear is that Achebe has drunk the remaining wine after communion. One gets the feeling that what is left is for him to turn to the congregation and say, go home for the mass is over. Because of what Achebe has achieved in this book, we cannot let Biafra go even if we want to. Just like Biafra, because of this personal history, centuries from now when the novel is dead and buried, the new generation that will inhabit the territory currently called Nigeria will always remember that there was a writer named Chinua Achebe.

I will be writing a more extensive critical review of this book for publication. These are my first thoughts as I have just finished reading the book in my kindle.

In classic Achebe, the story is beautifully told. The book is divided into four parts but the reader is left with figuring out how he came up with his divisions. The first part of the book which deals with his formative years gives us a lot of insights about the man, China Achebe and his family. It is the best part of the book. Part two and three deals with the war and the last part deals with the period after the war.

As a historian of West African history who has been researching on the nature of post colonial conflicts and have spent tens of hours researching the Nigerian civil war, I was excited to see that Achebe had just written a memoir on Biafra. Given his role in the Biafran government, I was looking forward to plenty of insights his book about the war would give us. At the end, it was a disappointment as Achebe does not offer us anything new about the war that we do not already know. This book falls in line with other memoirs on the war such as Obasanjo"s "My command". Most of the information contained in this book is easily available in already published books or archives.

While Achebe decries the ethnic bigotry that has become characteristic of Nigeria, a book like his does not help to end this. He accuses Awolowo of a policy of mass starvation (without evidence) of the Igbos to further his own selfish aspirations; he blames Obasanjo of meddling in Anambra politics and disrespectfully refuses to call his name even though anyone with the slightest knowledge of Nigerian history will know who he is referring to.

The primary argument in the book is that there was a Nigerian pogrom against the Igbos because the Igbos are enterpreneual, educated, successful, etc. The Igbos were forced out of Nigeria. The book is a revisionist history of the highest order, one I didn't see coming from an elder statesman like Achebe.

It is also troubling how Achebe down plays the Nzeogwu coup which has been dubbed the Igbo coup. He even tried to argue that Nzeogwu wasn't really a true Igbo because he spoke Hausa, lived in Hausaland and dressed in Hausa clothing. The same could be said of the leader of Biafra who was also born in Hausaland and spoke their language.

Toward the end of the book Achebe wonders why the Biafran war is not taught in Nigerian schools. It is for the simple reason that there is yet any historically objective text on the war and most of the major figures in the war are still alive. The greatest favor that Achebe and other figures such as Obasanjo, Gowon, etc. can do for historians studying the war is to make available their personal diaries and papers to archives to be studied. This will enable us to properly study this conflict.

Chinua Achebe is a great writer, with well thought out and concise work that is well presented and easy to read. However while his writing talent is unquestioned, I really feel his views in this book are biased and will result in the increase of tribalism, hence corruption and suffering of his beloved Igbo ethnic group as well as all Nigerians. Therefore he fails in his attempt to create unity and reduce tribalism and corruption which he so loathes.

In the Chapter "The Role of the Writer in Africa", he says that a writer should align himself with the weak and powerless against the strong. This is an agreeable point. However, he tries to cast his Igbo people as the victims in Nigeria while ignoring the sufferings of other ethnic groups brought upon by the Igbos. This is not a recipe for national reconciliation.

In the Chapter "Cradle of Nigerian Nationalism", he tries to cast the Yoruba Leader, Chief Alowolo as a tribal leader who reunited his ancient Yoruba people "with a powerful glue of resuscitated ethnic pride, hence creating the "Action Group" political party that reduced the dominance of the Igbo dominated NCDC. The irony here is that Achebe sees no problem with the NCDC being Igbo dominated while he complains about the Action Group being Yoruba dominated. This double standards is not a recipe for national reconciliation.

In the same chapter, while calling Alowolo's Action group a tribal party, he says, without any misgivings, that it also galvanized support from not only the Yoruba, but also the Riverline and minority groups in the Niger delta who "dreaded the prospects of Igbo political domination". This proves two points. That the Action Party was not an exclusive Yoruba tribal party like the NCDC was becoming. Second, that the Riverline and Minority eastern Tribes "dreaded" the prospect of Igbo domination. So the Igbo's are starting to look, not like the poor victims, but a ruthless tribe that will dominate others with impunity. Again, Mr Achebe's biased, pro-igbo views will not improve unity in Nigeria.

In the chapter "The Decline", Mr Achebe says that the original idea of a "One Nigeria" at independence was pressed by Eastern (read Igbo) leaders and intellectuals, especially Nnamdi Azikiwe. This is true because the Igbo were dominating every sector in Nigeria and they saw that a unified Nigeria would benefit them. They did not care about what other tribes felt.

Initially, the the Northerners led by the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello, resisted the idea of a "One Nigeria". Achebe tries to cast the Northerners as short sighted and not working to remove the British colonist, but their objections were based on a legitimate and true fear of dominance by the Igbo. Why would the northerners want to remove one oppressor, the British (who were actually competent and knew how to run a non-corrupt government), and bring in another oppressor, the Igbo ( who were corrupt and tribalistic)?. So Mr Achebe, your Igbo leaders should have been less greedy and less short sighted and tried to understand why the Northerners resisted a One Nigeria idea. Maybe the whole Nigerian people would be in a better position today.

Don't take my word for it. Just listen to the Sardauna in his own words here ( [...] ) explaining the legitimate fear the northerners have about the Igbo. I think the Igbo, instead of arrogantly dismissing such feelings, should have taken them into consideration and tried to live in harmony with other tribes instead of trying to dominate them.

In the chapter named "January 15, 1966 Coup", Mr Achebe shows his extremely biased attitude in favor of his Igbo tribe. This is the classic definition of a tribalist. He tries to minimize the January 15, 1966, coup as one led by "junior officers" protesting corruption, but he fails to accurately portray the tribal nature of that coup. The Sardauna , Sir Ahmadu Bello and Samuel Akintola, the greatest leaders of the North and West respectively were killed, along with numerous others from same regions, but there was no Igbo killed. Achebe says the coup was led by "junior officers most of them igbo" led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu from northern city of Kaduna. This is misleading. Major Nzeogwu was not a northerner. He was an Igbo born in Kaduna. Same applies to Emeka Ojukwu, Biafra's secessionist leader, an Igbo born in the North. So if he calls Nzeogwu a northerner, he should also call Ojukwu a northerner. This coup was a totally tribal affair and trying to say otherwise will not help improve the tribalism issues in Nigeria.

In the chapter "The Dark Days", Mr Achebe, having minimized the coup as "non-tribal and one led by Junior officers protesting corruption and decay", starts railing against other tribes when they took revenge, rightfully so, against the Igbos who had killed their most senior leaders. He says that in a country where tribalism is endemic, the "rumor of an Igbo Coup" began to gain acceptance. I find it unbelievable that Mr Achebe would take such a position. This January 1966 coup, WAS AN IGBO COUP, there is no doubt about it, and denying that will not further Achebe's goal of reducing tribalism in Nigeria.

In the same chapter, he says that other tribes started attacking Easterners, taking out their resentment against the Igbos who "had led the nation in every sector - politics, education, commerce and arts and had driven out the colonizing British from Nigeria". This comment brings two points to light. He tries to portray "Easterners" as one victimized group but this is not truth. As he said before, many minority Easterners "dreaded the prospect of Igbo domination", hence their joining of the Yoruba "Action Party" group.

Second point is that he tries to portray other tribes as being driven by envy at Igbo's success. Mr Achebe, remember the Igbos triggered this by launching a coup and killing people from other tribes. Second, a nation will never be united if one group dominates all the rest. This is the biggest mistake we have in Africa. One tribe tries to dominate and shut out others, the others fight back and we all end up losing, just as we see in Nigeria, and so many African nations. So Mr Achebe, please try to be far sighted and use your talent to guide your Nigerian people (all tribes) to be more unified and not celebrate the Igbos for dominating the rest, and congratulating them for being superior, or for being the "Jews of Africa" as has been said before.

Mr Achebe then describes his experience leaving Lagos. For those who don't know, Lagos is in western Nigeria, in Yoruba land and many Igbos had settled there as well as many other parts of the country. However we don't hear of other tribes settling in Igboland. This skewed migration tendencies were bound to bring problems. It is a fact that migratory tribes in Africa never assimilate with their host tribes, unlike the United States where different people integrate, learning English and adopting a common mainstream culture.

So you when people from a different tribe come to your area, they are basically "not your neighbors" but an alien people just occupying your land. When Mr Achebe says he found it "a strange and powerful experience" when his non-igbo "neighbors" whom he lived with for decades started jeering him and saying that "food will be cheaper in Lagos" when Igbos leave, he is not being genuine. I can bet that he never socialized with the locals, learned their language, or tried to integrate with their culture. Even after living in Lagos for decades, he maintained his Igbo culture and language and probably had mostly Igbo friends. Not surprising, even his "intellectual non-igbo friends" said that he should have known what was coming to him as an Igbo.

This point about Tribalism is illustrated again when Mr Achebe, fleeing to the east, arrived in Benin City in the Mid-west and he says there was a "distinct atmospheric change". There he found Igbo policemen who welcomed him as a brother, cheering him, saying "Oga, thank you". They cheered him just because he was a prominent Igbo man, even if he spent most of his life in Lagos or other regions. I bet non-igbos living in the East would never receive such treatment. So Mr Achebe should realize that tribalism goes both ways. Everyone, even the Igbos are tribalistic. So we should accept that fact and then we can start discussing how we can live together with justice for everyone.

In the Chapter "A History of Ethnic Tension and Resentment", Mr Achebe clearly illustrates that there is something about the Igbo that makes other Nigerian tribes resent them so much. He points out that in his book, "The Trouble with Nigeria", that Nigerians will "achieve consensus in no other matter than their common resentment of the Igbo". He says that while the Yoruba had a huge historical and geographical head start, the Igbo, "in one fantastic burst of energy in the 20 years between 1930 and 1950" managed to wipe out that advantage. He also illustrates from the book by J.P Clark an image of "ants filing out of the wood", how the Igbo moved out of their forest home and scattered and virtually seized the floor.

This scenario, as I said before, is a recipe for disaster in Nigeria and other African countries. When one tribe starts to invade other peoples territories and due to cultural, language and other factors, start to dominate everything there, that will definitely create resentment and conflict. The Igbo's congratulate themselves for being "superior" and "competent", and for being able to dominate other tribes in a fair competition, but they should also know they are not very smart because other tribes will resents them and drive them out, just as it happened, and they will end up losing.

If Mr. Achebe is smart and loves Nigeria, he should not be celebrating Igbo "superiority" over other tribes. He should use his talents trying to think how different tribes can work together to ensure everyone gets a fair shake so that the whole nation can utilize its talents for the good of everybody.

To his credit however, he concedes that the Igbos are prone to "hubris and overweening pride, thoughtlessness, exhibitionism and disregard for humility and quietness" which can offend others.

However, he fails again because he continues to argue that in Nigeria's context, they "get the achievers (meaning Igbos) out and replace them with less qualified individuals from the desired ethnic background to gain access to resources of the state". I have heard this argument in Kenya where I come from, but it does not hold water.

First, achieving "access to resources of the state for all tribes" is the only good and fair thing to do. There is no reason why Igbo's should to take over all jobs just because they "are more qualified" because competence is not exclusive to only one tribe. I live in the US and can tell you that you will find smart people from all backgrounds, all tribes and all races.

Mr Achebe displays his scewed and totally wrong position by saying he was "dismayed" by a 1966 publication called "The Nigerian Situation: Facts and Background", which demonstrated the complete unfairness existing in Nigeria where 45% of managers were Igbo, over 50% of the posts in Nigerian Railways, over 70% of posts in Nigeria Ports Authority and foreign service were occupied by Igbos. Remember the Igbos account for only 18% of Nigeria's total Nigerian population.

I don't know why Mr Achebe would not find such discrepancies disturbing and why he would be "dismayed" when someone reveals them. The only reason I can think of is because his Igbo people were on the benefiting end of this. This again, Mr Achebe, is not the attitude you should adopt if you want a Nigeria for everyone.

In the Chapter "The Army", Mr Achebe again tries to minimize the "Igbo Coup" led by Major Nzeogwu saying that it was actually not an "Igbo coup". He tries to deny that Major Nzeogwu was an Igbo, saying that he was born in Kaduna (north) and spoke fluent Hausa and wore northern traditional dress. That did not stop him from massacring Northern and Western leaders like Sir Ahmadu Bello. Achebe also claims that the coup was stopped by General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo. However, he continues to note that General Ironsi refused to court martial the coup plotters and transfered them East where they were eventually released by Ojukwu. So Ironsi is not as non-tribal and fair as Mr Achebe tries to portray him.

After trying to minimize the "Igbo Coup", Mr Achebe goes all the way to condemn the resulting "counter coup" by northern officers to revenge the "Igbo Coup". He says the killing of General Ironsi and Fajuyi were part of a larger and bloody coup led by the northern General Murtala Mohamed. This kind of double standard is not lost on anyone. Once again, Mr Achebe fails by trying to unfairly promote his tribe and minimize their failings while maximizing their opponents failings. This will not result in a unified Nigeria.

In the Chapter "The Pogroms", Mr Achebe again goes overboard trying to minimize the "Igbo Coup" by saying that it was an "Idealistic Coup" that proved to be a disaster for the Igbo. I find it just unbelievable that a man of Mr Achebe's intelligence would not realize that his biased views will make other tribes think of him as just another unrepentant Igbo tribalist. Here again, he fails in his stated goal of unifying Nigeria for all its people.

In the Chapter "Aburi Accord", Mr Achebe claims that majority of the Easterners had grown contemptuous of General Gowon's federal government for its failure to bring the culprits of the mass murder in the North to Justice. While this may be true, he also fails to say that his beloved Igbo General Ironsi failed to bring the "Igbo Coup" plotters to justice when he had the chance. He even transferred them to the East where they were released. This kind of double standard, again is not going to promote unity in Nigeria.

In the chapter "The Nightmare Begins", after General Ojukwu seceded Biafra from Nigeria, General Gowon responded by declaring a state of emergency and dividing the nation into 12 states based on tribe. The federal government position was that this would foster unity and stability in Nigeria. This is actually a valid point. If different tribes have control of their areas and free from domination by other tribes, this can create stability, unity, justice and eventually success. However, the Igbos, arrogantly thinking that it was their birthright to dominate other tribes, saw this as "a Machiavellian Scheme to landlock Igbos into the East Central State and isolate them from oil producing areas", areas which in truth, don't belong to them.

Mr Achebe seems sympathetic to this Igbo view although he inadvertently validates the Federal government's point by saying that the Non-Igbo minority easterners "dreaded for years - the prospect of Igbo domination". So again, Mr Achebe fails by aligning himself with the Igbo desire to dominate others, which eventually led to the destruction of Nigeria, Igbos included.

In the Chapter "The Republic of Biafra", Mr Achebe shows his support for the secessionist nation of Birafra by defining the intellectual foundation of the new nation as one "which the supreme power lay with the citizens and respected the freedoms of all mankind". However he fails to mention the plight of more that 5 million minority Easterners in Biafra who "dreaded the prospect of Igbo domination for years".

He also mentions his admiration for president Nyerere of Tanzania who supported the new State of Biafra by standing for equality, self determination and respect for human values. The Biafra leaders would have been well served if they followed Nyerere's example. Nyerere succeeded in creating the only non-tribal country in Africa where there is no tribalism, unlike Biafra, which was founded as a result of extreme tribalism.

In the Chapter "Death of the Poet , Daddy don't let him die", Mr Achebe reveals a great irony. While he earlier described the "Igbo Coup" leader Major Nzeogwu as an "idealistic junior officer" whose thoughtless actions brought disaster to the Igbos, and while he earlier said that Major Nzeogwu was "an Igbo only by name", he now says that Nzeogwu's death in the war was a big blow to Biafra because he was a "darling and enigmatic hero who had risen from anonymity to legendary heights in a short period".

This reveals two things. That Mr Achebe was not too upset about the "Igbo Coup" itself, and the resulting massacre of people from other tribes, but was upset it eventually turned out badly for the Igbo, when other tribes took revenge. He also reveals that Major Nzeogwu, whom he earlier tried to dissociate with the Igbo on account of his being born in Kaduna (north), was actually regarded as a hero by his Igbo tribesmen. Again, Mr. Achebe reveals he is a tribalist and fails in his stated goal of uniting all Nigerians.

Mr Achebe tries to cast blame to everybody else other than the Igbo themselves. In the Chapter "The Silence of the United Nations", he bemoans how in October 1969, on the losing side, General Ojukwu desperately pleaded with the United Nations for mediation to no avail. His Opponent, General Gowon insisted on Biafra's surrender and rightly noted that "the rebel leaders had made it clear that it was a fight to the finish and no concessions will ever satisfy them". The Biafra Igbo rebels, in their "hubris, overweening pride, confidence and thoughtlessness" provoked a war and were not able to finish it. So they blame everybody else except themselves. Again, Mr Achebe fails. He is not interested in justice and truth, but in the welfare of only his Igbo people and not all Nigerians.

Nothing demonstrates the folly of tribalism better than the case of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's first president, an Igbo. At independence, he campaigned against the British colonialists under a "One Nigeria" mantra, when it was beneficial for the Igbos because they were dominating other Nigerian tribes and taking over all resources. When things turned awry for the Igbos and they seceded, he suddenly forgot his earlier principles of "One Nigeria" and supported the new Igbo secessionist state of Biafra. However, he could not defend a challenge to his new position and had to turn back like a coward.

So in the Chapter "Azikiwe Withdraws Support for Biafra" Mr Achebe tries to blame British intellectuals in northern universities and the Nigerian Army for challenging Azikiwe to explain why he suddenly changed his lifelong beliefs of a "One Nigeria" and now supported the breaking of Nigeria. Azikiwe was unable to explain that and decided to withdraw his support for his tribesmen's new state. Again, Mr Achebe fails. He is not interested in fairness and principles to benefit all Nigerians, but will support whatever benefits the Igbo at that particular time.

The chapter named "1970 and the Fall" reveals the hypocrisy of Mr Achebe. He says that in the end, Biafra collapsed and there were thousands of children dying every day of starvation. He goes on to say that the "Notoriously incompetent Nigerian Government was not responding to those needs, and that with ill-advised Bravado, General Gowon was busy banning relief agencies that helped Biafra". I find this level of hypocrisy amazing. Where is Ojukwu in all this mess. He started the war, he was responsible for the death and starvation of millions of Biafrans. Remember Biafrans were fighting General Gowon and inflicted heavy casualties on his soldiers. So, to blame Gowon and completely forget the other responsible person, Ojukwu, is just unbelievable.

Some other points I wish to note are in the chapter named "Gowon Responds". He was asked about Igbo property being taken over by the Government of New Rivers State. Something was said to the effect that the people of that state "felt like tenants in their own state" because the Igbos owned everything there. Again I want to reiterate that there will be no united Nigeria (or other African countries) when some tribes start dominating others with impunity, and in their own territory no less.

In the Chapter "Nigeria's Painful Transitions: A Reappraisal" , Mr Achebe talks about the crime happening in his beloved, Igbo state of Anambra. He says it was encouraged by the federal government and by an unnamed former president of Nigeria, "whose attitude to this part of Nigeria, which he and some like him consider responsible for the troubles of Nigeria's Civil war".

Mr Achebe, I have news for you. This part of Nigeria IS RESPONSIBLE for the Nigerian Civil war. That is the truth and trying to deny it is folly. Again, you fail because this denial will not endear you to Nigerians of other tribes, hence will not help to create a unified Nigeria.

In one of your last chapters "State Resuscitation and Recovery" you ask how Nigeria can be salvaged and "bring all the human and material resources to bear on its development", how to end "organized ethnic bigotry" and "corruption". I am encouraged that you are thinking in this direction.

I am no expert in nation development and reconciliation, but I can tell you that TRIBALISM, like the one exhibited by the Igbo, is one of the main causes of our backwardness in Africa.

We have to deal with tribalism, ensure that no ethnic group moves to other ethnic group areas and try to dominate their resources. I believe the formation of states based on tribal lines will help. Or at least grouping together tribes that are in friendly terms and can live together in harmony. Then every tribe will control the resources in their state and ensure justice and welfare for their people and remove the danger of domination by other supposedly "more competent" tribes.

In conclusion, Mr Achebe is a great author, with superior talent. But he is also biased and is a tribalist. Here he fails like a majority of our other brilliant, (or not-so-brilliant) Africans leaders and intellectuals.

Chinua Achebe is one of the most celebrated African writers. The reverence for his books has been in part due to excellence of his writings, but mostly for being an excellent narrator and poet of his beliefs.

Chinua Achebe begins the story with his early years, and lovingly describes the parents who raised him, and the society that nurtured him. He describes his schooling, and the inherent conflicts between his traditions and Christianity.

His views on African education are illustrated by an incident that occurred at his school where his teacher, with drawings on the blackboard, was giving a lesson on the geography of Great Britain.

Then the village 'madman', from nowhere, snatched the chalk from the teacher and proceeded to give an extended lesson on Ogidi, Achebe's hometown. It was the 'madman', according to Chinua Achebe, who had the 'clarity of perspective' that Nigerian children would not only benefit from colonial education but also from 'instruction in their own history and civilisation'.

However the focus of the book is his first-hand observation of the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, otherwise known as the Biafran War. The prelude to the Civil War was Nigeria's march to Independence, and the great promise of a young country recently freed from the yoke of colonial rule. But within six years of independence, Nigeria had become of a 'cesspool of corruption and misrule.'

The climax was the coup, led by an Igbo senior army officer, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu. This was followed by a counter-coup staged by Northern Nigerian soldiers, leading to the brutal slaughter of one hundred and eighty five Igbo army officers, and in the next four months the massacre of over thirty thousand Igbos.

The Biafran War had started in earnest, with many Igbos terrified and fleeing home to Eastern Nigeria, a territory that would, with secession, be called Biafra.

With failed peace talks between the Biafran and Nigerian leaders, the civil war that flared left, in the end, over three million dead Nigerians. The vast majority of these casualties were sadly children.

The major Nigerian actors in the conflict were British trained soldiers Odumegwa Ojukwu (an Igbo from a highly priviledged background), and the head of state of Nigeria, Yakubu Gowon. The rivalry and the intense hatred between the two were to become a subplot in the fighting that followed.

With neither side prepared to compromise a Biafran state was declared with its own capital, government, constitution, provinces, flag, anthem, national bank and currency. The new country took its name from the Bight of Biafra, an expanse of water into which the Niger River empties.

With the Nigerian government intent on restoring its authority over all of its territory, the army was mobilised and quickly the capital of Biafra, Enugu, fell. The odds were heavily stacked against the new state, with only two thousand trained soldiers arrayed against the overwhelming might of the state army.

This was no just war between two armies. According to some Biafrans, the Nigerian army wasn't just fighting a war; they wanted to wipe out all Igbos from the face of the earth. The Biafrans were soon completely outgunned, and in no time completely surrounded. The net then slowly closed in on the infant state.

With humanitarian aid to the civilian victims blocked, death by hunger and disease quickly became the symbol of the Biafran War. The brief and courageous resistance of the Biafrans soon crumbled, and was supplanted by a desperate struggle for survival.

In 1970, with Ojukwu having fled the country, the inevitable fall came, and Biafra was reduced to smouldering rubble. 'The cost in human lives made it one of the bloodiest wars in human history.'

Chinua Achebe was no innocent bystander in this conflict but unashamedly served the Biafran, cause. Throughout the book are his scattered confessions of missed opportunities for peace by both sides. The horror and the pain he endured during the thirty months of bloody conflict were both profound and personal. He spent the next forty years of his life living and teaching abroad.

It seems he spent most of those years pondering the dashed expectations that many had for the new Nigerian state. All the optimism they once shared, he states, had to be re-thought. Also, as former Biafrans they had to contend and adjust to realities of a country that no longer appealed to them.

As with a dying parent talking to his children, THERE WAS A COUNTRY is Chinua Achebe's last word to his country and continent. Corruption and the roguery of African leaders, according to him, have turned Africa into a pit of despair. He significantly concludes that we can no longer pass of the continent's 'problems to our complicated past and the cold war, however significant these factors are'.

THERE WAS A COUNTRY is his swansong, a memoir, and his disappointment with the political problems of his country. Perhaps in time, it will be regarded as Chinua Achebe's finest literary achievement.

For me, it towers even above Things Fall Apart. Far from being polemical, it is a book written with prudence, skill and dignity. Chinua Achebe's immense wisdom is stamped on every sentence and chapter. His style cannot be compared to any of the past great writers. He always depicts human experience in simple human language.

The book is an opportunity to conference with a unique writer of singular skill. If there is any lamentation on his part, it is from leaving this world without seeing any diminution of human misery, in a continent where the most abundant riches and most delirious possibilities still exist.

In all his works, Chinua Achebe's mode of writing was the same. Though he gladdened and depressed us at same time, he never failed to instruct and to steer us. Even from his valedictory words one can still hear hope, despite the mangled remains of our societies, of a continent not only rising but soaring from the abyss.

In the late 1960s, for a very short span, there was an episode that gripped much of the world's conscience. A small bit of land holding millions of people was surrounded. The populace was being starved to death. By early 1970 the war that precipitated the catastrophe was all over. Without any orders from an Orwellian ministry, for most of the world the struggle was consigned to the "Memory Hole."

If one should ask today who remembers Biafra, it is doubtful one in ten living during the period could answer affirmatively. Probably no one born after 1970 has ever heard of it.
I am part of the first TV generation and yield to no one in shortness of attention span. Yet the war between the secessionist state of Biafra and Nigeria is etched in my mind. How is it that an average American thinks often about what is now an obscure moment in time?

When the events in question were happening, I was a college student. Well, in truth, not much of one. I did my best not to over exert myself, but had a weakness for a good lecturer. Justin Vojtek, professor of history, was an artist and in spite of the required effort I would be in his class.

The course would be a departure from the regular curriculum. Colleges were beginning to take up African history. The assigned reading included four novels by a man from the eastern region of Nigeria, Chinua Achebe. He would be intimately involved in the events of the war.

Achebe was an Igbo. Of all the various ethnic groups the British met as they patched together Nigeria, the Igbo were the most enthusiastic about taking up what the colonial regime offered. This does not mean they forgot who and what they were, but they were changed by the experience. The assigned novels reflected that change and its impact on his people.

Two of the novels, Things Fall Apart and Arrow of God concern themselves with how two important men are done in by geopolitical forces they do not understand. Ezeulu is a priest in the traditional religion, an arrow of god. He is steadfast in his service to his deity. His interaction with the colonial administration upsets the schedule that will signal the harvest. Despite his faithfulness, the people turn to Christianity, as it will offer a dispensation.

Things Fall Apart is the story of a strong man also done in by the arrival of the English. Okonkwo is a man of status among his people. He wishes to face the colonialists fairly and with honor. The cold machine that is the new regime does not understand him and his people. His dignity taken, he ends his life.

The third novel is the story of a young man of promise, Obi, who has obtained a smart university education and yet that does not prepare him for all the perils of the greater world. Nor is he able to escape the problems of the old as he falls in love with an Osu or outcaste women.

The last book of the assigned quartet, A Man of the People, may be his most known work. This is because of his famous "prediction" of the first coup d'état. The book chronicles the corruption that led to the military takeover. It did not foresee the breakup of the country.

There Was A Country is not only the story of Biafra, as one cannot tell that tale without consideration of all that preceded it. He describes the colonial regime and the Igbo's enthusiasm for learning and achievement. Also, the independence struggle and his people's part in it are chronicled. The leadership of the men of his ethnic group was integral, if not the sine qua non.
Unfortunately, the Igbo success in the independence movement as well as business, education and the arts bred resentment. The envy of the other ethnic groups led to pogroms and an exodus of his people from non-Igbo regions. Achebe documents the resulting decline in relations leading to the declaration of a Biafran republic.

"And the war came," as Lincoln put it in his second inaugural. Whether or not he intended it, Achebe's account has the flavor of horrible inevitability. With international collusion, Nigeria had overwhelming force. They surrounded Biafra and squeezed it to the end. Yet, despite bombardment and blockade and starvation, the Igbo built a republic that functioned as complete state until the surrender.

Poignant is Achebe's account of the life and death of Christopher Okigbo. An accomplished poet, among other qualities, he set up a publishing house with Achebe. When the war started, he enlisted and yet continued to work with the publishing business when time and duty permitted. Made a major, Okigbo was always in the thick of battle. Though not a callow youth when killed, neither was he an old man. Still, Yeat's line about the death of a young friend comes to mind, "What made us dream he could comb grey hair?"

The war ended, but the suffering continued for a time. Eventually, the author rejoined the political process to no great success. The final part of the book outlines the situation as it is.

As a reader, the conclusion I draw is my own. The suppression of Biafra was one of the great crimes of the last century and that is saying something. Nigeria and Africa are mired in corruption and the plethora of resources makes it worse. Maybe the Igbo would not have made Port Harcourt a banking center or another Singapore. Certainly, they would have managed the oil wealth more efficiently and with less corruption than the Nigerian state does now, to the benefit of the whole continent.

Achebe is a fine stylist and his treatment of the subject matter is valuable, yet I suspect this book will be soon forgotten by an incurious public.

The title: "There was a Country" could easily refer to Biafra, or given the state of Nigeria as described by Achebe, could be to Nigeria itself. The tragedy of the 1970's war continues to this day.

This book is part memoir, part history of the Biafran War and part a survey of Nigerian literature. It also has a sampling of the poetry of the author... something rarely found in a war history.

In the memoir part Achebe describes how he and many other Igbos benefited from the educational system put in place by the British. As the war began, his writing makes him a target and he fled to "Biafra". His life there briefly had some semblance of normalcy: He and a friend start a publishing enterprise for children's books. Then his apartment was bombed. He moved in with relatives. Achebe moved several times again. (Like a 1950's dad, he says very little about the three (?) children he is moving about.) The publishing enterprise is later bombed out and the friend goes on to perish in the war. The memoir also includes his involvement in peace negotiations.

How the war began and continued are what makes this book most valuable for the general reader. Achebe is non-technical in his approach. He minces no words. The murder of Igbos in the north (after the suspicious killing of military officers) is ethnic cleansing. Achebe feels that the secession that followed was inevitable. The resulting genocide was committed by "uneducated" Nigerians who like subsequent politicians had "low IQs".

It is Achebe's belief that had an independent Biafra been achieved, it would have been a model for the continent. He provides support for this argument by describing the many accomplishments of the Igbo people. He also shows how Igbo culture supports achievement (rejection of superstition and kings, embrace of education and democracy) compared to the other cultures of Nigeria.

Nigeria's vast oil reserves are making fortunes for the victors of the Biafran war. Achebe shows how these winners have no concept as to what a government is or what it should do for the people. He compares them to Eyadema of Togo, who sees his leadership as a family business and not a governing unit. Nigeria, unlike Togo, is a large country that once had an infrastructure, has something of a democracy and is rich in resources.

Achebe ends the book with proposals to deal with the corruption and poverty that has evolved since and from the war. The most overriding issue is that of money in politics. Large sums of money are needed to run for office which precludes real competition. This is true in the US and elsewhere, but in Nigeria the problem is deeply entrenched because there are no institutions to counteract its effect and violence goes unpunished. Achebe calls for international awareness, oversight and help.

This is an informative book and will be of interest to anyone interested in Nigeria and Africa.

Chinua Achebe, the Nigeria-born writer of the Things Fall Apart fame, pulled off another captivating blockbuster just months before he died. The latest book, There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra, is arguably the most consequential nonfiction work of his illustrious career. Its delivery reeks of such suave flow that the reader could easily forget that he meant it to document his recollections about the tragic war in Nigeria in the late 60's, that saw the end of so many soldiers and civilians, mostly from the Eastern region of the country.

The legendary writer decidedly hit the ground running with an apt Igbo proverb to elucidate his raison-d'etre for the book. The reader was at the onset thus presented with the zeitgeist of the period in a sharp relief on his literary canvas. He then went on to serve up the main entre in delectable morsels that are luscious and tart in turns: stories in luminous prose interspersed with well-appointed poetry. He then bookended this epic with supportive bibliographical notes. The effect is quite a filling literary motherlode that should delight the taste bud of even the fastidious reader.

The book successfully shows a masterly deployment of different literary genres in the author's quiver, a treat that would make his passing the more of a loss to Nigerians; indeed he would be missed by civilized individuals with his kindred spirit of decency, as well as by connoisseurs of sinew proses everywhere. For those not even into the rhetorical flourishes of poetry, the bard's accessible pieces that garnish this narrative would only not bore, but would palpably enliven the thrust of his narrative. I for one could hardly get his piece, Mango Seedling, out of my mind for quite a while. The powerful poem pulsates with so vivid imagery on the unfolding tragedy and pointlessness of war that it haunts.

As a collection of short stories, his form here is taut, seamless and yet suffused with a Hemingwayesque kind of sophisticated simplicity. He treated each topic or event as an issue on which he narrated and opinionated to let the reader in on what happened--his interpretation, that is. Yet each story manages to stand on its own as an independent read, while it still manages to blend fittingly with the others like a jigsaw. Thus the book would easily pass as a work of short stories, to be enjoyed piecemeal by those with appetite for a good story but no stomach for serious reading.

On the other hand, running through the book from the get-go, is a surprising lack of serious editing. In addition to a handful of typos, which could be forgiven, there are consequential contradictions that make one wishes the great man was better served by his publisher pointing out the bloopers prior to rushing the manuscripts into a book for public consumption. Exhibit A: one quickly feels inundated with the author's alluded but over-harped sentimental preference of Igbo name-form, rather than Ibo, for his tribe. This looks like something he could have simply clarified in a preface to the book once and for all. But instead, the entire volume is sprinkled with that scholarly appellation: [sic] wherever his references include the latter name-form--even when the sources being quoted were his fellow tribesmen.
In another chapter he described a fellow committee member as "an emeritus professor... a rising intellectual star." Really? One would associate such oxymoron with those 99-cent booklets of riddles on the supermarket checkout shelves. Committing such gaffes on an editor's watch simply does not speak well for such a big publishing house.

There are yet other errors of omission for which the editor could be absolved. The author failed to elaborate on important aspects of Igbo traditions when he had the opportunity to do so. For example, he spoke of some Nri philosophy. Expanding a bit on this curiously pacific concept would have served nicely as a welcome counterpoint to the martial tone that runs through this book. Likewise, the knowledge of Nsibidi ancient system of writing got a short shrift when he had a golden opportunity to explain it to the world. Mentioned but uncharted also was Ezebuelo, a sentiment which properly introduced, may have explained the Igbo character far better than all the ethnocentric arguments in this volume put together.

Moreover, the book surprisingly lacks relevant maps. A reader is naturally curious about important towns and villages that were germane to the war stories. Nnokwa village (with its myth of Igbo origin) comes to mind, so were the battleground towns of Abakaliki, Afikpo, etc.

Another instance of dropping the ball in the Biafra saga was the loss of the manuscripts written by Major Ifeajuna, one of the plotters of the Nigerian coup that -for lack of a better phrase-drew the first blood. The missing document, despite the controversy he said surrounded its veracity, had untold historical and intellectual significance recognized by the author and his co-publishers even in those days. Yet he tersely declared that it "seemed to have disappeared." And no further helpful comments here by the master story-teller on the much-needed how, when, and why of the disappearance.

As a scholarly work his citation may have been a tad too self-referential. It seems more a rule than the exception for the author, in an apparent sort of petitio principii to buttress his point with a bibliographical note that in turn points to his say on the same subject in some previous interview or lecture, thus furtively begging the question. Conversely, many a note has several sources cited in a lump without specifying how each of them adds to the point he was making.

As a serious account about the civil war, truth must be told, this book is anything but. Its decidedly jaundiced commentary on the most cataclysmic event in the history of the young nation quickly falls flat. Perhaps the master storyteller's own memory was too seared by the specter of atrocities that occurred around him in that traumatic period to be able to write evenhandedly about it. Who could blame him? In war, it is said, the first casualty is innocence. In his defense though his aptly chosen subtitle, A Personal History, somewhat absolves him on this issue. Still, for a serious writer and world-class intellectual of his stature, it would not have been too much to expect something that gives the other side's viewpoint some semblance of serious consideration, which this narrative blatantly lacks. Disregarding the case of the other party of a conflict (no matter how seemingly egregious), one could argue, is indicative of the cause and the course of such a tragic civil war in the first place.

Then, there is the crucial contradiction in the book on the role and position ascribed to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the erstwhile president of Nigeria, and the most prominent man of Igbo stock in the Biafran saga. In the chapter, The Nightmare Begins, Mr. Achebe maintained that, "Ojukwu's special Advisory Committee" had the consensus "that secession was the only viable path," in response to the atrocity suffered by so many innocent Easterners following the coups. The following day, he continued, "the Consultative Assembly [no word on its composition and its charter, or on how it differed from that of the Committee] mandated Colonel Ojukwu to declare [the secession], at the earliest practicable date." The author emphasized that it was "the decision of an entire people, the Igbo people, to leave Nigeria," and assured his readers that the responsibility for that sober decision involved "some of the most distinguished Nigerians in history: Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe.., Dr Michael I. Okpara and Sir Francis Ibiam..."

However, later in the chapter titled, Azikiwe Withdraws Support For Biafra, he cited ranking war-time Biafra officials in Ojukwu's inner circle go on record with views like:

"His [Azikiwe's] feeling was that when a leader wants to go to war, he should consult people. Primarily Ojukwu should have consulted Zik. Secondly, he should have consulted [Michael] Opara [premier of Eastern region]. Thirdly, he should have consulted other leaders...It was a great mistake. I told Ojukwu to invite these people [and inform them]. He told me they would compromise... That's not how to lead."

Heady stuff. The history-minded reader needs to pause and seriously reflect on these mordant claims and counter-claims, and on their implications, especially the tragic consequences of the subsequent war on the destiny of countless innocents afterwards. How was such a momentous decision made? The author, a leading light and apologist for the Biafra cause, failed to say with conviction. Instead, he immediately followed the latter citation with a remark on the "irony" of the actions of the British and the Nigerian Army--who no doubt did not play saints in that horrific theater of war. The far greater irony here may be the error of commission (and omission) by the war leadership, and perhaps the purport of the book itself as a serious work of reference on the subject.

In its scholarly iteration however, the bibliographical notes are generally a welcome supplement to the text. They clarify as to be expected, a lot of events cursorily referred to in the main body. There is even an illuminating Appendix, in the radio address of Victor Banjo, the Nigerian Army officer trapped behind enemy line (as it were) who Ojukwu promptly conscripted to lead his fight all the way to Lagos, the then Nigerian capital, geographically at the extreme end of a formidable gauntlet. A mission adjudged by an observer quoted later in the book as suicidal.

The book notably has another foreign correspondent characterized the campaign commanded by Major Banjo military (which ironically was the only one in which Biafra was not on the defense), as comprising nothing more than "at most 1000 men, the majority poorly trained and armed...." With such a rag-tag motley-crue, Ojukwu invaded the sleepy Midwest Region of Nigeria, and installed his own de facto military administrator, in disregard of the one appointed by the Nigerian federal government. The objective of the strategy, he argued, was "purely in an effort to seize the serpent by the head." Seriously?

From the point of pragmatism, this saga leaves the impression that the goals and objectives of the Biafran movement, justified or not, was not thought through, prior to the declaration of secession that led to the atrocious war.

Moreover, the author seemed to imply that the rest of the country so hated the hard-working Igbo people, that they conspired to deal the hapless tribe pogrom. Perhaps. But be that as it may, it is a weighty charge. As a principal argument of the book, it seems rather to beg to be aired as a proposition for debate in serious academic forums and in the Nigerian political space proper, rather than as a categorical assertion memorialized directly in a book as the final word. Exactly what conclusion the reader (who is Igbo, or another tribal Nigerian for that matter) was to draw from the laden claim would only be anyone's guess. Such categorical declaration, by an influential figure no less, could be so effectively rife with the seed of troubling long-term implications that the specter should make the thoughtful shudder.

Napoleon Bonaparte, himself no stranger to the theater of wars, at the end of his career declared that the one thing that is more important than all the conquests of war, is the idea you leave behind in the minds of men. One only hopes that the legacy of this "historical" work would somehow leave an uplifting idea in the minds of the readers. Indeed, it is incumbent on the Nigerian elite, especially the intellectual class, to exercise leadership responsibly, for the sake of the brotherhood of man and of nation-building. This could only be accomplished through individual deliberately rising above base and tribal instincts with transcendent humanist ideas.

Another point that begs for logic in this saga was the improbable hardline Biafran position at the Kampala peace conference of 1968. By now the war-weary Igbo people, innocent civilians no less, were dying by the thousands from bullets, bombs and empty bellies. Yet the Biafran delegation stuck to the script that their independence was not negotiable. The caveat the author proposed to explain this travesty was that, should they have chosen to surrender, the belief then was that it would lead to genocide for the entire tribe. The scenario must have been alarming indeed--except that the argument failed to rationalize that there were Igbo people in areas of the East already captured by the Federal soldiers.

Following this "non-negotiable" position, we are apprised with point-scoring specter of mutual savagery.
That the Biafran leadership chose to embark on such blood-cuddling jack-a-lope while, as the author described it, "overwhelmingly outgunned," and steadily and agonizingly losing the war is, well, for history to judge. Though cynics may rush to intone here that the intransigence was to buy time to save the skin of the leaders of the rebellion rather than the people. How many hundreds of thousands more died from that point until the surrender on January 15, 1970, we may never know--statistics was not the forte of the players of that franticidal bloodletting anyway.

If the purpose of studying history is not to repeat the mistakes of the past, then the lessons of this axiom deserves somber reflection here by Nigerians, especially the Igbo intellectuals. The pressing necessity to take the time to ponder the political and strategic significance of each decision point of the event, without sentiment, is indispensable as a part of the process of moving forward.

It is obvious how necessary it is for all sides to state the case for their individual role in the civil war. But many prominent figures in it are now dead. But dead or alive, the cadre unfortunately never comprised men of letters in the first place. Given that on one hand, and their continuing military governance presiding over the spontaneous gush of petrodollars immediately afterwards, who would have the time for such mundane task as putting the pen to paper to provide a counter argument to an oblique account anyway? The tedium of being desk-bound as a necessary service to posterity was just not that important to most of the big men.

A matter of intrigue was also in the author's nomenclature. The master of letters seemed to elicit a consistent preference for "Nigeria-Biafra" war, rather than "Nigerian Civil War." Does such crucial choice of words allude to a devil in the details? Perhaps this again evinces why African thought leaders should reflect on the referred Napoleonic axiom at the cusp of rallying their peoples to one cause or another. The question should be whether the plot, the conclusion and even what is gleaned between the lines would necessarily spur their audience to higher virtue, and noble goodwill toward their neighbors.

Mr. Achebe was no doubt a decent man as well as a devoted husband, who spoke of his abhorrence of violence. Toward the end of what he later labeled "Ojukwu's war", he "...felt that the best way to deal with this tremendous disaster was to not prolong the agony but bring it to a close." Quite a welcome relief.

After coursing through the litany of pathologies still afflicting the nascent nation of Nigeria, he then wrote some veritable suggestions to correct them. These were made with a broad-brush, so to speak, and therefore not specific enough to be readily actionable. But they are usefully to the point all the same, and deserves commendation and consideration.

The one incontrovertible good coming out of this consequential work then, is that it at least adds to the embarrassingly slim body of work on that unfortunate bloody chapter in Nigeria's history. This addition, like it or loathe it, is now out there for all to peruse, contemplate, and even criticize. Hopefully it would serve as a useful backdrop for an ever healthier discourse on the Nigerian project.

There Was A Country is a beautiful eclectic account in the hands of an avant-garde writer. The History of Ethnic Tension and Resentment as aptly summarized on page
74-78 of the book can be analyzed philosophically and poli-economically. Put briefly, philosophically, any human being who possesses a head (ori) in Yoruba, according to Yoruba folk philosophy must work hard--Jewishly. Studies have shown that many immigrants working in Africa, Asia, Americas and Europe are a very determined people--once you leave your territory--village or town, your objective is to bring honor and credit to where you belong. Everyone of them worked hard--Jewishly to feed him/herself and was able to send money to his/her family back home. Often times, the host country would ask, "Why did you have to leave your country? The best of our land, we want to keep for our children yet un-born." The common answers are, "Our government has not lived up to its promises. The economic situation is so bad that we just have to leave in order to secure a sure livelihood." These are some of the answers comming from the immigrants (you and I, included) who work hard, making use of their heads (ori) like the Jews, and who know how to find their ways from the bottom to the crest of the Kilimanjaro Mountain.(In Nigeria, as observed by the author, the situation is similar, for the Westerners going to the East would work hard to prove that their presence in the East is meaningful. Those going to the North would do the same. Those leaving the East for the West would do the same. And the West, bearing the ivy institutions in the country, and which is humorously said to be flowing with milk and honey, has never disappointed you and I. Credit and honor must always be brought home--from the foreign land to one's native home. There is no room for a brawler, pauper and slanderer, as per the title of Amos Tutuola's novel.)

Chinua Achebe's "There was a country: A personal history of Biafra," is one of those anomalies of literature which tends to defy genre typology. It is a medicine man's alchemic concoction made up of potions steeped in memoir, political commentary, history written in things-fall-apartese, episodic jeremiad interspersed with poems, and an elder griot's attempt at recollection. All this is decocted in a book that draws vivid descriptions of the people he met and the events he has witnessed--effectively juxtaposing Nigerian ethos with the pathos in Biafran history. Achebe, Africa's easily-recognized and widely-read writer, takes us to the past and then back to the present.
Dragged along in his time travel, we can see the Nigeria of decades ago fighting as one nation against the colonizing British Empire; matching purposefully towards independence; bungling the independence; degenerating to anarchy; killing each other by the droves; becoming puns in the hands of the superpowers; and finally elevating mediocrity to the level it is today. We learn of the politicization of ethnicity using the Nigerians' fear of tribal domination through history as a foundation to sic one tribe against the other.
We also learn how, with our many human and material resources, the good-intentioned ideal for transforming Nigeria into a democratic success did not succeed. Finally, we are challenged to comprehend why Nigeria continues to be backward on account of the Igbo tribal peoples, so often the perpetual victims of massacres, pogroms, and jihadist cleansing, are "not and continue not to be reintegrated into Nigeria."
Apart from a brief rundown of his precocious childhood, his schooling, and his open challenge to a remark by a white teacher by writing the critically acclaimed Things Fall Apart--a book that forcibly threw African literature out there for all to see--Achebe's account of the Nigerian-Biafran war is enthralling and well-documented.
This stimulating, but even-handed history of Biafra explores the participation of the Igbo people as they spearhead the efforts to wrest independence from Britain in order to build a Nigerian state devoid of rank corruption and tribal rancor. This did not sit well; not for the other Nigerians who regard the Igbo as out to dominate; and certainly not for the colonialists who were smarting with anger and licking their wounds for being unceremoniously booted out.
It began, he explains, in January 15, 1966. Barely six years after Nigeria's independence from Britain's colonial government, and as regional political players played to the sentiments and fears of their constituencies by using the fear of domination of one region by another as a boogeyman to drum up votes, a group of army majors in a protest of the unpopularity of the government, killed some top government officials in a coup. The coup makers, who had an Igbo as their de facto leader, killed all the name-brand Hausa-Fulani politicians. Somehow they conveniently did not kill any Igbo politician. That was when the Igbo retaliatory massacres began. Within days, thousands of people of Igbo extraction were variously maimed, decapitated, or slaughtered. All over Nigeria, no Igbo person was safe; not even in Lagos where the likes of Achebe had to leave in a hurry.
And so "following the pogroms, or rather, the ethnic cleansing in the North that occurred over the four months starting in May 1966, which was compounded by the involvement, even connivance, of the federal government ... secession from Nigeria and the war that followed became an inevitability." The Governor of Eastern region - Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu - declared the region an independent republic country of Biafra, since the Igbo could no longer live safely in other parts of Nigeria. At the urging of the British, who never did trust the Igbo for spearheading the clamor for Nigeria's independence, the Nigerian Army invaded the Igbo Biafra country. Led by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon - the governor of Northern Region who promoted himself General after the coup and became commander-in-chief of the Nigeria Army - the Nigerian army attacked. The war--the darkest chapter in Nigeria's checkered history--was on.
Led by General Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Biafrans resisted all that was thrown at them and even made some advances into the Nigeria Army's territory. When the Nigeria Army discovered that attacking the determined Biafrans frontally was suicidal, they surrounded the coastal areas around the Niger delta and effectively discouraged merchant ship going into Biafra. This blocked Biafra's supply route and with it, all food shipments. The Nigerians sat back and gloatingly watched Igbo children starve and die by the numbers.
The Nigeria Army got outside help in the form of Russian Ilyushin 28s, British MiG-17s, and mercenary pilots who did not fight fare, as they dropped slow-burning napalm bombs on fleeing civilians, and on open-air markets and church services. With a total blockade of every route leading in or out of Biafra, the Igbo had no food, no ammunition and certainly no fuel with which to continue to prosecute the war. Finally, after an estimated one to three million--mostly Igbo people--had been shot or starved to death, Ojukwu went into exile as Biafra surrendered. The Igbo went back into the Nigerian fold angrily silent. More than forty years after, the Igbo are "not and continue not to be reintegrated into Nigeria, one of the main reasons for the country's continued backwardness."
For Achebe, the ethnic cleansing to which the federal Nigerian government subjected the Igbo people during the atrocities was the formative experience of the Igbo people's consciousness and, rather convincingly, he makes it the leitmotif of his book. People of Achebe's ilk who believed in the cause, took sides. Since he was not the warrior type like his friend, the obscurantist poet Christopher Okigbo who died trying, Achebe served in other capacities. He used his pen, his name, his intellect, and his being to support the cause. He served Biafra as a roving cultural ambassador, and from the dangerous safety of his heights, absorbed the war's full horror. Achebe is not only skilled at describing the Biafra-Nigeria war. He is also adept at explaining the diplomacy of Biafra during the war, dragging you episode by episode, and the book becoming meaningful as it gains momentum such that you feel as if you were pulled along by an undercurrent moving in one direction.
Written with verve, full of heart-rending stories and vital insights, "There was a country," though genuinely disturbing, is a must read--but with a little detachment. Things Fall Apart it isn't, but Achebe makes less effort to be impartial, and uses predominantly Biafran and pro-Biafran sources. Thus, his book is not entirely free of tribal romanticism, and he approaches the pantheon of Biafran national heroes with excessive reverence.
Demonstrating an impressive mastery of a vast range of material, Achebe--an octogenarian--lays out the case for Nigeria's failure as a country: corruption, indiscipline, and the rise of terrorism. This material while not exactly riveting, is presented clearly and convincingly enough to qualify as refresher course in what ails Nigeria. Then he points out, in his subtle way, how his usual suspects: the hounding away of intellectuals, and the celebration of mediocrity, have pushed the country where it is now tottering precariously at the brink where a sneeze could send it plummeting into an abyss of no return. Overall "There was a country" will not cease to amaze. Splotches of deftly sculptured writing sit next to many sentences that are not only short, but also remind us of the absurd man in one of Achebe's books who came back from Britain and could only speak "is and was" sentences.
Achebe's story may very well be without a conclusion, but at least his diagnoses are right. He said something intelligent about the inequities and impenetrability of the Nigerian system which has vowed to crush the Igbo idiosyncrasies of competitive individualism and adventurous spirit--a faux pas that is "one of the fundamental reasons the country has not developed as it should and has emerged as a laughingstock." In sum, the book is a fair attempt at an immensely difficult topic, covering a large amount of material which Achebe goes through with commendable passion. He also continues to write well, which is remarkable, considering that he is over eighty years old. His great strength--evidenced by his earlier writings--is that he has a way of communicating his thoughts and ideas rather convincingly
The book is strongest, and most useful in its narration, dripping with a poignancy that can rub you the wrong way. The book--an unnervingly disturbing memoir--will undoubtedly irk you in a very profound way; even if it doesn't help you channel the anger to any purpose.

Emeaba Emeaba is the publisher of The Drum Magazine [...]. His novel, "A Woman To Die For" will be published in December.

The word `genocide' is used several times in this book. Alas, it had to be used often in the 20th century for programmes of extermination inflicted on various classes of people, whether the classification was defined ethnically (the usual reason) or in some other way, as in, say, Cambodia. A word that is never used at all is `holocaust', which is by general consensus reserved for one particular policy of this type, one that was implemented right in the heart of soi-disant civilised Europe. A word can be powerful. We are always being reminded of the need for vigilance to prevent any second holocaust, and indeed none has happened nor (hopefully) looks likely. Genocides have been another matter entirely. They have been occurring regularly over the past few decades, and they are not obviously less horrible than the officially-designated holocaust. It could be that at the very least our perspective on recent history will be improved if we apply this effective term where it can be applied with equal propriety. Perhaps we might even succeed in preventing such events from happening as often as they have been.

I remember the Biafra war very well. One particular Nigerian tribe, the Igbo or as we used to call them Ibo, attempted secession from its parent nation because of perceived racial persecution, setting up an independent state in eastern Nigeria to which the secessionist leader General Ojukwu gave the name Biafra. The truth about secessions and revolutions seems to me very simple - if they fail they are treason, if they succeed they are glorious revolution. It would not have been otherwise in Russia, or indeed in America. Biafra failed, and the manner of its defeat was by common consent an exercise in atrocity. The case argued in this gripping book is that winning was so overwhelmingly important for the Nigerian government that anything was deemed legitimate to achieve that. This case is not universally accepted, of course. General Gowon, military President of Nigeria at the time, has stated that Chinua Achebe does not know what he is talking about. Well, he would say that I suppose, which is not to imply that his point of view can be dismissed unexamined. However, to be going on with, it seems to be a matter of undisputed record that one Nigerian general said that if children had to be slaughtered to achieve victory that was just too bad; that another refused to associate himself with Gowon's apology for one particular massacre of civilians; and that Chief Awolowo said that in war anything goes and that starvation of civilians is a legitimate tactic in war.

Chinua Achebe is himself an Igbo. However the tone of the book is not what you would call obviously partisan. Far from it: as I was reading his account of the British exit from their former colony, and then of the coup and counter-coup I was thinking that I had found a modern Thucydides, so dispassionate did the author seem. The impression was reinforced as I read his more general reflections on the nature of colonialism and in particular its legacy after the colonial masters have folded their tents. At one point Achebe says `I am not a sociologist, a political scientist...' Maybe not, but he is a genuine historian and no mere chronicler, and I think his book will be reread often, as Thucydides wanted his own great work to be reread. The narrative is not all at this level, some of the descriptive parts are like documentary, and some of his admiring comments on other intellectuals are downright wide-eyed and childlike. However the above-it-all tone comes back towards the end, and of course his poetry raises the entire book to a special level.

You can't escape the issue of ethnicity here, whether we are to call the Igbo a race or a tribe. There is no doubt (and I remember this from the coverage at the time) that the Igbo dominated the Nigerian economic administrative and cultural scene, and that they were widely resented. This was, simply, the root of the whole trouble and it went deep. It will not do to object to stereotyping by way of avoiding the topic and go on our way rejoicing, because stereotypes can be valid and political correctness can on occasions be stupid and perverse. Simply - are the Igbo a cut above their fellow-Nigerians or are they not? There is not much doubt that Achebe thinks they are. On the issue of ethnic stereotyping there is one unintentionally funny bit in the book, related to an incident that is not funny in the slightest and that is plausibly identified by Achebe as being pivotal in leading to Biafra's downfall. Biafran forces took control of an oil-rig at Kwale, and we are led to believe that they released their hostages on being threatened with military intervention by, er, Italy. Sometime read the deadpan account that Rory Stewart gives in The Prince of the Marshes about the performance of the Italian troops when he was acting as vice-governor in one province of Iraq.

That the whole godawful war was racially/tribally motivated is something that it's impossible to deny. What responsibility the Brits bear I'm not competent at the moment to evaluate, but I feel a lot better educated regarding this whole chapter of history, which of course is still with us, as you will be left in no doubt from the final chapters. It was a 5-year wonder in the western media, that is not as it should be, and as it possibly might be if we called it a holocaust, the thing we seek so determinedly to avoid, even to the extent of conniving at some very dubious policies and actions in other contexts. What indignation this proliferation of the term would arouse might be interesting to see. It will doubtless be lively and vociferous, but it might open an overdue new chapter in our way of thinking.

Chinua Achebe has shown remarkable courage as a writer to lay open the underlying current of distrust which has always existed between the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. This distrust became excerbated at independence as the fear of domination by one tribe over another reached its climax. The indiscriminate slaughter of the Igbos after the first military Coup d'Etat in 1966 bears testimony to that.

Achebe's book is remarkable because it shows a renowned international writer putting his reputation on the line by writing about what he saw and denouncing the inhumanity and atrocities of the Biafran War. It is a very sad and remarkable book.