Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? - Destined for War

Excellent, insightful, perceptive. Now if only we can get the politicians in DC to read, discuss, and think about the implications of dealing with a rising China then there is hope of avoiding war. I am not optimistic in view of the rampant dysfunction in the current administration and the Congress.
It should be required reading for both the President, his cabinet, and the Congress. I am sure it is a must read for our military and the Defense Department.

Insightful very Informative the clash of the Titans 2 in the ring only one Winner ! Graham shares his in depth research and
experience to enlighten. Read and draw your own conclusions We must Change with the Changes a book worth Purchasing.

Allison beautifully and graphically summarizes the remarkable rise of China in the last 30 years and makes a compelling case for his thesis based on Thucydides Trap which the current (2017) crisis over North Korea makes very relevant.

Professor Allison explores the lessons of history applying them to what may arguably be the most portentous foreign policy issue of the present, our reaction to the rise of China. Looking back in history for guidance is rarely done in politics. As foreign policy is increasingly concentrated in the White House staffed by political operatives, domestic political consideration has become the policy lodestone; history is bunk or ignored.

I have lived in China a total of twelve years, four times during two decades, and have spent thirty-five years in Asia, the balance living in China's neighboring countries, including India, Laos, Thailand, Burma and Japan. It is extremely difficult for me, having lived in both countries and appreciating each's point of view, to see America and China embarked on a potential collision course. Particularly frightening is that much of the posturing on both sides is increasingly done for domestic political benefit. Part of the problem is both countries consider themselves exceptional and are so similar in many other ways. China behaves the same way in its neighborhood as we have in ours. To counter this we have "pivoted" to Asia, a euphemism for containment. Unless both sides learn to acknowledge each other's status as great powers with respective spheres of influence, we may well ensnare ourselves in the Thucydides trap, as have so many other rival great powers in the past. The West owes history the wisdom and forbearance to ease China's way back to its former status as a great power. It would be most ironic if the US and any allies who may still care to follow ended up at war with a former WWII ally on behalf of former foes. Professor Allison has viewed the issue through the prism of history. Hopefully those who govern on both sides will heed the lessons so throughly presented in this wonderful book. On a personal note, reading this book gave me the same pleasure I experienced more than 30 years ago as a student of Professor Allison.

FMany Americans don't realize what China's transformation from Third-World to world-leader status means for the U.S. Author Allison's focus is on 'Thucydides' Trap' - first pointed out by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. When Thucydides wrote about a war that devastated by two leading city-states of Greece 2.5 millennia ago, he explained it was the RISE of Athens and the FEAR this instilled in Sparta that made (the Peloponnesian) war INEVITABLE.

The Thucydides' Trap Project at Harvard reviewed the past 500 years and found 16 cases in which a major nation's rise disrupted the position of a dominant state. The most famous example involved rising industrial Germany threatening Britain's top of the pecking order a century ago. Twelve of those 16 instances ended in war and four did not - not comforting odds for today competition between China and the U.S. The four cases that avoided this outcome did so only because of huge and painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of challenger and challenged alike. Unfortunately, the author sees Xi Jinping and Donald Trump combination as making conflict even more likely.

The U.S. accounted for half the global GDP immediately after WWII. BY 1980, that had declined to 22%, and now 16%. If current trends continue, the U.S. share of global economic output will hit 11% within three decades. Over the same period, China's share of the global economy will have risen from 2% in 1980 to 18% in 2016, and 30% by 2040. In a single generation, a nation that did not appear on any of the top nation lists has vaulted into a top spot. For every two-year period since 2008, China's incremental GDP growth has been larger than the entire economy of India. During the U.S.'s remarkable growth between 1860 and 1913, America's annual growth averaged 4% as it passed Great Britain and became the world's largest economy. Since 1980, China's economy has grown at 10%/year, doubling every seven years. Yet, during the Obama years, one participant noted that about '80% of main meetings at the National Security Council focused on the Middle East.'

China has already surpassed the U.S. on many indicators - largest producer of ships, steel, aluminum, furniture, clothing, textiles, cell phones and computers. It is also the largest automaker and auto market. In 2014, the IMF declared 'America Is Now No.2,' using purchasing power parity - the standard now used by major international institutions required to compare national economies. PPP is generally regarded as a better measure of overall wellbeing. In 2005, China's economy was less than half the size of the U.S.

China's economy has slowed, from an average of 10% in the decade prior to 2008 to the current 6 - 7% annually in 2015 and 2016. The 'recovering' U.S. has averaged just 2.1% growth/year since the Great Recession, vs. 1.3%/year in the EU and 1.2% in Japan.

What does President Xi Jinping's China want? To make China great again, to make China so rich and powerful that other nations will have no choice but to recognize its interests and give it the respect it believes is deserved. The contest between China and the U.S. will not naturally subside as China becomes a 'responsible stakeholder.' The paths to war are more varied and plausible than we want to believe. Confrontations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cyberspace, to trade conflict that spirals out of control. The unintended consequences of the assassination of the Hapsburg archduke or Khrushchev's nuclear adventure in Cuba should remind us of how narrow the gap is between 'unlikely' and 'impossible.'

Lee Kuan Yew, ethnically Chinese leader of Singapore's transformation from a small fishing village into a modern megalopolis was one of the first to wonder about 'What is China's strategy for becoming Number One?' 'Are China's current leaders serious about displacing the U.S. as the #1 power in Asia in the foreseeable future?' 'Is conflict between China and the U.S. inevitable?' Lee also pointed out that 'The size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. (China) is the biggest player in the history of the world')

Between 2011 and 2013, China produced and used more cement than the U.S. did in the entire 20th century. In 2011, a Chinese firm built a 30-story skyscraper in 15 days, three years later, another built a 57-story building in 19. China built the equivalent of Europe's entire housing in 15 years. In November 2015, Beijing replaced the 1,300 ton Sanyuan Bridge in 43 hours, while a bridge over the Charles River has been under reconstruction for 4 years. Over the past decade, China has constructed the world's longest high-speed rail network - 12,000 miles carrying passengers at speeds of up to 180 mph. A generation ago, 90% of Chinese lived on less than $2/day - now fewer than 3% do. Average per capita income has risen from $193 in 1980 to over $8,100 now. Families typically save over 30% of their disposable income AND bought half of the world's luxury goods sold in 2015.

In 2015, Tsinghua University passed MIT in U.S.N.W.R. rankings to become the #1 university for engineering. Among the top ten schools of engineering, China and the U.S. each had four. Today, China's defense budget of $146 billion in market exchange rates ($314 billion in PPP) is second only to that of the U.S. A 2015 RAND study found that by 2017, China will have an 'advantage' or 'approximate parity' in six of the nine areas of conventional military capability.

Background on China: Like the U.S., they believe it should tower over its geographical sphere, and have a special role. However China never espoused America's notion of universalism that it must spread around the world. China's long-term original 'foreign-policy' role was simply to control the barbarians at its Northern borders, and have Korea and Japan play subordinate roles as well as be trade partners. Expansion - simply by cultural osmosis, not our missionary zeal.

Two plus millennia of Chinese dominance of its own borders ended in the first half of the 19th century when the Qing Dynasty came face-to-face with the power of industrialized Europe. The first Opium War (1839) vs. Britain resulted in ceding Hong Kong to Britain, as well as opening up five other port cities. The Second Opium War (Britain and France - 1856) brought additional embarrassment. American gunboats cruised China's inland rivers protecting American interests from 1854 to 1941, The central government collapsed in 1912 among numerous rebellions and internal civil wars. Then Japan, previously a tributary state, attacked and took Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan in 1931, and occupying much of China in 1937. Millions of Chinese died in all these internal and external wars, along with the Japanese occupation. The Communists won the civil war in 1949, after Japan had been pushed out in 1945.

Then came the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Author Allison does not go into the details of either, though he does tell what current President Xi Jinping went through in the Cultural Revolution. His father was a trusted associate of Mao, but was imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. Xi was left to defend himself in street fights, stealing books from shuttered libraries. At the time he loved classical Chinese poetry. After two years adrift, he was sent to the countryside to be 're-educated - there he lived in a cave and worked shoveling dung for seven years.

After being released, former friends of his father were able to get him admitted to Tsinghua University in Beijing. His application to join the Party was rejected the first nine times. His first posting was to a rural province, and he then worked his way up. In 1997 he was 151st in the voting to join the Party's Central Committee. He became Party chief in 2002 Zheijing, and was not even listed in a 2005 poll of names of potential future Party leaders. During his tenure there he performed well and made a name for himself by taking actions against corruption.

Early in 2007 a high-level corruption scandal was discovered in Shanghai. Xi was chosen to put out the fire (he'd made a reputation as being honest), and his results put him at the top of the list for potential future leaders. He was elected to the 9-man Standing Committee, then as President.

His Vision was to 1)revitalize the Party by cleansing it of corruption, restoring its vision, and re-establishing its authority in the eyes of the people. 2)Revive Chinese nationalism and patriotism to instill pride in being Chinese. 3)Engineer a third economic revolution - extending into the service economy and less reliance on exports. 4)Reorganize and rebuild China's military so it could 'fight and win. Early on he was described as having a deep sense of a national mission, a clear political vision for China, and as a man in a hurry.

China's 'self-confidence' grew with the 2008 Great Recession - it had rejected the Washington Consensus, and provided $586 billion in fiscal stimulus funding, partly used to construct fast trains and major highways. Chinese people now ask 'What did the U.S. get for its $983 billion infusion? Nothing.' Xi's goal for 2021 is to double GDP/capita to around $10,000 (40% > than the U.S., measured in PPP). (China's per capital income is still less than one-third that of South Korea, or Spain, and one-fifth that of Singapore and the U.S.

Xi sees Gorbachev as having made three fatal errors: 1)Relaxing political control before reforming the economy, 2)allowing the Party to become corrupt, and therefore ultimately hollow, 3)nationalizing the Soviet military to allegiance to the nation, rather than the Party and its leader. He also told the populace to not fear the KGB anymore. Overall, corruption in Russia undermined public confidence and trust.

Since 2012, Xi has had over 900,000 Party members disciplined for corruption, and 40,000 expelled. They included 18 current/former members of the 150-member Central Committee, and even some from the (now) 7-member Standing Committee.

'Never forget our national humiliation' has become a mantra for China. Few in China today would say political freedoms are more important than reclaiming China's international standing and national pride. The students of Tiananmen are now irrelevant.

Maintaining 6.5% economic growth/year will involve closing zombie enterprises (technically bankrupt) and cutting four million jobs in the process. China's service sector now is over 50% of GDP. Thirteen of its 33 Five-Year-Plan goals involve the environment. Building a high-speed railroad spanning Eurasia and most countries bordering the Indian Ocean will help export its excess capacity and project soft power. Will cut the time to move freight from Rotterdam to Beijing from one month to two days.

China's message to the U.S. is now seen as 'Butt out.' It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.

While China was internally focused in the mid-20th century, Taiwan too Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands, in 1973 Vietnam took 10 others. By 6/15, China had reclaimed 2,900+ acres, Vietnam 80, the Philippines 14. China now has 1,000 anti-ship missiles, 62 submarines, and antisatellite weapons.

China's leaders and its society think in terms of a society that has existed for thousands of years - centuries and even millennia, with decision-priority to maximizing long-term gains. Americans forget the past and focus on immediate, short-term results. Core Value Comparisons: Top Value - freedom for the U.S., order for the Chinese. Government - a necessary evil, vs. a necessary good. Optimal Government - democratic republic, vs. responsive authoritarianism. Foreigners - inclusive, vs. exclusive. 'China's history shows that when there was a strong center, the country was peaceful and prosperous, but when the center was weak, the provinces and counties were run by little warlords.' - Lee Kuan Yew.

Political legitimacy in China derives from performance, not the consent of the governed. 'American principles of 'good representative government' breeds resentment among nations who are made to feel they need redemption according to American values.' - Henry Kissinger.

The Chinese seek victory not so much in a decisive battle, but through incremental moves designed to gradually improve their position. 'The highest victory is to defeat the enemy without ever fighting' - Sun Tzu, 'The Art of War.' Chinese leaders see America's strategy vs. them as the 'five to's:' 1)To isolate China, 2)to contain China, 3)to diminish China, 4)to internally divide China, and to sabotage China's leadership. They also believe the U.S. will never accept the political legitimacy of China's administrative machinery because it is not a liberal democracy. Finally, the Chinese expect the U.S. to eventually pivot back to ongoing wars in the Middle East, Russian threats in Europe, and/or problems back in the U.S.

Potential conflict accelerants - China vs. U.S.: Antisatellite weapons, cyberspace, accidental collision at sea, man-made/adjacent islands, Taiwan (moves towards independence - eg. U.N. membership, followed by Chinese blockade), North Korean action (eg. sinking South Korean ship), Japan and/or Philippines vs. China on islands, U.S. retribution for stolen intellectual property.

The spectacular rise of China’s economic and military might in the past twenty years has given rise to hope as well as anxiety and fear among diplomats and policy makers in the United States. Even the academics and historians are intrigued by what it portends for the future. Consequently, we have a plethora of books, essays and analysis in the media and from the publishing houses. This book is one more contribution to the subject, but quite an original and interesting one. It focuses on the question of whether China and the US will inevitably stumble into war with one another, as a result of China’s challenge to displace US as the primary military power in the Asia-Pacific. How does one predict a prognosis of war between two superpowers, who are separated from each other physically by ten thousand kilometers and are linked only by trade and diplomacy? Author Allison reaches far back into history, invoking the theories of Thucydides, a 5th century Athenian historian and general, to provide the framework for an answer. Thucydides analysed the Peloponnesian War of the 5th century BCE between Sparta and Athens and pronounced that severe structural stress is caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary , unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict. This is called the Thucydides Trap by the author. History has seen many instances where new rising powers have challenged ruling powers in the world . Allison enumerates sixteen such instances in the past 500 years of world history and shows that as many as twelve of them have resulted in Wars. From these sixteen instances, the author distills the clues as to when war results and when it does not. He then proceeds to apply these principles to the current US - China conflict and suggest prescriptions for how the conflict may be managed.

First of all, is there a rational basis for the US to conclude that China, as a rising power, threatens the United States? Or is the US just demonstrating the normal ruling power syndrome of exaggerated fears, insecurities and dread of changes in the status quo? Let us look at the facts on the ground. On the one hand, Western experts, after deep engagement with China, say that China’s leaders believe that the grand strategy of the US in dealing with China is based on five ‘to’s: to isolate China, to contain China, to diminish China, to internally divide China and to sabotage China’s leadership. Such a deeply held negative view is not conducive to peace, especially when both see each other as equals. The past decade has seen the Chinese economy catch up with the US in GDP (on PPP terms), providing a lot of resources to augment its military strength. In addition, China has seen the ascendency of Xi Jinping as its leader. Xi’s vision is to reclaim the purported historical greatness of China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, before Western imperialism intruded to upset it in the 19th century. A corollary of this vision, as per Xi himself, is to re-establish control over the territories of ‘greater China’, which includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the islands in East Asia and south China sea. A further corollary is to recover the historic sphere of influence in its neighbourhood and make them defer to China as was the case in history, according to this narrative. In addition, China wants to command respect of other great Western powers of the world, to offset their century of humiliation. All this is articulated as part of the Centennial goals by Xi himself. With such a dominant vision and a strong suspicion of US motives, conflict seems a natural fall-out. However, in a world used to ideas based on Enlightenment and Reason for two centuries, there will be severe resistance to such a dominant vision, particularly from other powers in Asia, such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, not to mention the US and other Western powers. Hence, the US has good reasons to be wary of China and the Thucydides trap.

However, the Thucydides trap does not mean that war is inevitable. The book elicits twelve clues from the past four instances in history where the Thucydides trap skirted war. When I look at these clues, I find that some clues are applicable in this case but do not seem strong enough to prevent war. Some others are not applicable in this case at all. In the end, I find that only three of them are decisively applicable to the current US-China situation. They are: Nuclear weapons on both sides, the doctrine of MAD (Mutually assured destruction) and deep economic interdependence due to globalization. Seen in this light, it looks as though the author has arrived at the same conclusions that others have arrived at long ago even during the Soviet era, without having to invoke the Thucydides Trap. Even though these above mentioned clues might prevent war, the author says that it is necessary for the US to review all its strategic options, however contradictory and ugly. The strategic options are: accommodating China, undermining China, Negotiating a Long Peace and redefining the relationship. As accommodation, the US can consider curtailing its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for concessions on south China sea, withdrawing troops from S.Korea in exchange for Chinese denuclearization of N.Korea. In undermining China, the US could foment regime change or divide China against itself, question the legitimacy of the Communist Party as Ronald Reagan did with the USSR, support Taiwanese, Hong Kong and Tibetan independence, support dissidents, do substantial cyber damage and even train and support insurgents in Xinjiang. In negotiating peace, Washington could limit surveillance operations along China’s borders, especially near China’s military installations on Hainan island in return for Beijing removing anti-ship and anti-air missiles from the south China sea. China could be asked to end patrols near the Senkaku islands in return for the US stopping provocative navigations in the south China sea.

In spite of the phenomenal accomplishments of China in the past thirty years, I find that some assumptions by Western scholars are based on dubious grounds. They accept the Chinese communist line that historically China has been the dominant power in Asia, to which other countries in the neighbourhood deferred, paid tributes in return for Chinese largesse. Such a narrative is advanced by China to project a powerful image of itself, when reality is probably a few notches down. Much as the West might pay obeisance to this narrative, the rest of Asia does not really see it this way at all. It is not true that China was such a dominant power in all of Asia at any time. Many tribes in China’s periphery have harassed Chinese rulers in history and extracted tribute. The Manchus ruled China for 250 years. The Mongols conquered all of China and ruled them for over a century. Areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet are acquisitions by these invaders rather than by the Han Chinese. What happened at the hands of the British and the Japanese in the 19th and 20th centuries is well known. Elsewhere in South-East Asia, the civilization is influenced more by India than China. West Asia is influenced by Islam much more than China. China’s dominance seems to have been limited just to East Asia and Vietnam rather than all over the vast Asian continent. Still, western academics seem to toe the Chinese line that they were the dominant power in Asia in history and that other nations paid tribute to it.

Secondly, Allison seems to readily grant China an equivalence with the US and implore a need to accommodate its superpower ambitions. Except for nuclear weapons and missiles, China lags significantly behind the US in many key areas, like science, technology, per capita income, soft power and many other areas of military capabilities. The US is still a young nation with active immigration which lets it renew itself constantly. Whereas China is said to age faster than its economic growth, limiting its future possibilities. The option of a younger future population through immigration also seems unlikely due to China’s historical insularity. China’s economy is slowing down and it has mounting debt issues. All these factors might point to the daunting odds of China closing the gap between itself and the US. But, many Western scholars seem to grant an easy pass for China as a superpower on par with the US.

Thirdly, I find it odd that many scholars write approvingly of China’s navigation of international affairs and diplomacy as something based on the three pillars of ‘tian xia’ (China’s view of itself as being the center of the world), Confucian wisdom and Sun Tzu’s theories of war. If an Islamic nation conducts its world affairs today based on the Quran or a Christian nation does it based on the Bible, scholars would slam them as being fundamentalist in outlook. Confucian ethics and Sun Tzu’s works, though secular, are much older than the Quran or the Bible and they were guidelines for a world which was much different from what it is today. But China is spoken of admiringly for invoking Confucian wisdom in dealing with the world rather than being slammed as ‘fundamentalist’. I would think that this is a weakness of China rather than its strength, if it is at all true that the Chinese leadership is really guided by these principles.

Nevertheless, this is a thought provoking book, written in a fast-paced style.

Allison does not know his Thucydides as well as he pretends to. It is not true, as he writes, that Sparta was "the dominant Greek power of the day," Athens was.

Much worse, Thucycides never wrote that war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable. The correct translation of the famous sentence Allison quotes should run as follows: "The real cause (aitia) of the war was the Spartans' fear of the Athenians' growing power." Thucydides deliberately uses the term aitia, as opposed to aphourme, excuse, of which there were plenty.

For purposefully misleading his readers to make his case, I give Allison one star.

I’ve given Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? three stars, but, I’ll be frank, I may be penalizing Graham Allison for my misperceptions. Most reviews appear glowing. But I expected a book that would be more centered around the current position of China and the USA on the political chessboard, our current policies toward China, and how they might be improved or managed. This isn’t really what the book’s about. My bad. Still, the title did influence this misperception, and as many editors select titles for marketing purposes, maybe I should give the editor the three stars. As I bought my copy second hand, I bear no deep grudge.

What’s this book really about? Graham Allison has a pet project over at Harvard University called The Thucydides’s Trap Project which has a real philosophy of history feel to it. At least inasmuch as to interpreting how certain superpowers end up going to war against one another, and why others don’t. Thucydides, the chronological second of the great ancient Greek historians, fits in all of this as the original author who outlined within his History of the Peloponnesian War the theory that powerful states try to get away with as much as they can, using the muscle they believe they have, if they think that they can, while weaker states are mostly left to suffer from the consequences. Political Darwinism pre-dates Charles by millennia, not years, it would seem. Whereas most states feel more comfortable playing the bully than the victim they’re understandably covetous of their king of the hill status. Another country experiencing its own economic and/or martial growth may cause the big bully on the geopolitical block to fluster at the perceived menace to its own status, causing the bully to react by threatening or feigning a submission from the up-comer, which may in the end lead to much International fustigation. This slide can be interpreted by both parties as an outcome neither sought nor desired. The bully just wants to be reassured by an appeasing, deferential submission. The up-and-coming nation often only wants to claim its new deserved place in the worldly order of things. Neither may really want war. But neither will allow the other its imagined advantage. Allison’s point which he stresses throughout this book, using numerous examples drawn from a wide swath of history, is that the trigger starting the steady march toward war can seem fairly insignificant, or even nonexistent (as in the second Tonkin Gulf incident which directly lead to the Vietnam War). Fear can obscure the facts of life and politics perhaps worse than a wounded vaulting pride, until a nation gambles with death by anteing up into national warfare. The historical examples underpinning that philosophy of history of the Thucydides’s Trap takes up the first third of the book.

The middle section examines China’s past and present position in the world with frequent references to Kissinger’s recent book On China and the author’s own book on Lee Kuan Yew. And I do mean frequent. When not quoting from the above, Allison unabashedly plumps on China. The Chinese save 30% of their income on average; Americans remain mired in debt. China invests heavily in research and development, while maintaining a morally plastic position on intellectual property rights that always favors the Middle Kingdom. China builds its infrastructure quickly, and does much more of it than we. The author cites as specific example of American sluggishness the construction the Charles River Bridge which has been under way in Massachusetts since 2015, before the author’s own watchful eye from his nearby office. Allison notes that China managed to build a larger bridge than the Charles in just under two days(in fairness, I passed by the Charles a couple of days ago and work seems “almost” wrapped up). Xi contrasts with Trump, according to Allison, less than one might expect as the political goal of China now is to “Make China Great Again”. Deja vu, huh? Allison claims that this bond extends beyond mere border politics: the Chinese have a common racial sensibility which creates a cohesion that perhaps provides advantages over other countries possessing less imagined commonality from which to draw from. Allison pokes around at the interesting dynamic between the nation of Chinese masses who support Xi and his promises of prosperity; the army pledging oath to him and party; the communist party which he presently heads which is reliant for its current stability and wealth on the open market system of the rest of the world; and an obsession with domestic performance that somehow seems to keep so many these different balls in the air. One gets the feeling that reading between these lines will be a must for American diplomats dealing with China in the future. In the end and after a cursory assessment, China matches up to be a formidable, powerful political opponent to be respected. Allison points out that a nation of China’s size won’t idly submit to being handed by western powers an honorary status as a world “responsible stakeholder” among others with the right to occasionally clear its throat on global issues—especially concerning their own direct sphere of influence.

The last section of the book offers analysis and approaches in thought that the author believe might help America develop a diplomatic strategy concerning China’s “rise” in the world. This begins with a chapter on Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”. Hints abound hereafter. China is timeless(posing the question: who is the true upstart?); America makes much of its recent origins. China views international law as a recent novelty that has yet to receive its all-important Mandarin imprimatur; America espouses rule of law as the only true legitimate governmental order. China can wait out negotiations for generations(in contrast to their building modus, apparently), and America likes frequent big political gestures(every four years or so). Allison clearly views an antagonistic relationship with China devoid of serious negotiations based on mutual benefits as primitive and likely to lead to a certain Thucydides Trap. Allison makes a very reasonable assertion that America should stop throwing all its wants into a large bag, then emptying them out on the negotiating table. Needs require preferencing over wants and these should be prioritized as well. The stereotype of the “inscrutable Asian” should be abandoned in favor of a politics of the possible, as westerns often reflect their silly xenophobic myths back upon themselves to their detriment. Perhaps Allison’s last couple pages exhorting our government to get back to “do(ing) strategy” instead of merely avoiding “stupid” stuff might have been the best part of the book for me. Playing chess with the Chinese may take generations, but diplomacy may require a deep search for a win-win solutions, rather than an adversarial approach. Cyber-espionage could be very negotiable as a foreign matter less important to China’s political core and quickly resolved if the USA were prepared to offer a win for China, say in the South China Seas. Almost certainly getting China to respect intellectual property rights will be a more difficult haggle demanding great patient and creativity. When President Bill Clinton attempted to address this dilemma back in the mid 90s, China responded by demurring, but acknowledged that they’d be happy to purchase all of the USA government’s surplus grain at a discount to keep their own internal prices below the world market rate. Had we taken them up on this offer then, would we be further down the road toward diplomatic understanding? Maybe not. But the key to even mediocre diplomacy is to keep the other side somewhat interested in what you have to say. Trade war threats and ultimatums against a nation accustomed to taking naps for centuries can be less than productive. Especially as the trade gap widens in their favor and the interest on their foreign (American) investments pay out...

I was disappointed with this book. Putting aside the author's credentials and pedigree, the book did not have any creditable or realistic answers or suggestions for avoiding war between USA and China. I do not recommend this book. Jack Kushner

Allison’s book is timely and relevant. It appears to be thoroughly researched and referenced. The author managed to discuss the geopolitical concepts without offending political inclinations. By that I mean that whether one is Republican or Democrat, liberal or conservative, the challenge of China is common ground. The idea of applied history is compelling. And applying it when considering China, North Korea, jihadist ideology, Russia and the like is bound to be beneficial. I’m glad to have the perspective offered by this book when contemplating the news of the day. I can say that I hope our leaders on both sides of the aisle are students of applied history somewhere along the line and recognize a threat greater than their personal ideologies and animosities.

Excellent book by Graham Allison about the rise of China and whether their growing influence will push the United States into war.

As a recent transplant to California, I've been disappointed by the state's housing shortage and crumbling infrastructure. Therefore, the following struck me hard:

"Over the past decade, China has constructed the world’s longest high-speed rail network: 12,000 miles of rail lines that carry passengers between cities at speeds of up to 180 miles per hour. In the US, that much new track would stretch from New York to California and back, twice. At 180 mph, one could go from Grand Central Terminal in New York City to Union Station in DC in just over an hour; from Boston to Washington in two. Indeed, China now has more high-speed rail tracks than the rest of the world combined."

"During this same decade, California has been struggling mightily to build a single 520-mile high-speed connection between Los Angeles and San Francisco. Voters approved the project in 2008, but the state recently admitted it will not be finished until 2029, at a cost of $68 billion—9 years later and $35 billion more than was originally promised."

So much good literature has been written about China’s ascension and you can read the author’s central thesis at The Atlantic. Highly recommend.

Graham Allison's new book, Destined for War, is an alarming study showing that war between the United States and China is more likely than commonly supposed. Using a number of historical case studies, from the Ancient Greek world to those closer to our own times, it explores how and why armed conflict between world powers has occurred in the past— and why, if history is a guide, it is likely to happen again between America and China. Allison's book is a prime example of a new kind of historical scholarship, that of Applied History: it uses the past expressly to understand world affairs today. This book should be read by anyone interested in US-China relations, and also, more broadly, those interested in war and postwar international relations. It is not only pioneering, but also a good read-- a book of, and for, our times.

Calder Walton
Cambridge PhD, former Barrister (England & Wales)

Masterful presentation of broad economic and human drives toward international standing that have driven conflict in the past. Extensive notations that impress.
Most frightening, is the realization that China isn’t “catching up”. Rather, it has already supplanted the USA in many economic and infrastructure initiatives. Did you know that One Belt One Road is equivalent to a dozen Marshall Plans? After accounting for inflation?
This book is the best evidence that America must fix its political process so the one thing we have - free, liberal democracy - is not lost as China rises. As the author notes, a 5,000 year old culture with 1.4 billion people and world’s largest economy isn’t a ‘problem’ to be ‘fixed’. It is a condition we must live with. That demands leadership not evident in the USA, today.

The book addresses an important issue: the possibility of war with China. Unfortunately, the author's right-wing viewpoint causes him to miss the solutions to this problem. We should join with Russia, China, the UK, and France and get the UN to ban nuclear weapons. Such a ban would protect hundreds of millions of people from the risk of nuclear war. It also would mean that a war with China would be fought with conventional weapons, which our DOD would rightly reject as hopeless. The US also should invest more in education, science, infrastructure, and health and far less in weapons. This change would mean that China would pass us by in science and technology much more slowly which would ease the transition, making war less likely.

There also are some factual errors. Japan colonized Korea (with US approval) in 1910, not 1905. The easier target for a North Korean missile is AK not HI. The unit of Chinese currency is the yuan not the renminbi, which is their word for currency.

The author emphasizes his study of Greek as an undergraduate at Harvard. This cuts little ice with students who attended Regis High School and studied Greek for three years and Latin for four. Some of Allison's prose is cement.

Another version of Huntingtonian Clash of Civilizations (see the neat classification on p. 141), however, when a don cries out "Destined for War" much more factual, not counter-factual, evidences have to be produced to support his bold claim: e.g. how does China attempt to sinicize the world stage, and how could Pax Sinica override Pax Mongolica, and how could the Chinese adroitly sinicize the Q'ing culture. Never mind Xi's forced demand for ideological conformity that stands in such a stark contrast to Gorbachev's miserable glasnost. It doesn't appear that Allison has succeeded in supporting his Shakespearean thesis that our destiny lies in ourselves, not in our stars.

Excellent perspective on trends and issues confronting US/China relation in the future. Clear and highly accessible writing: feels like a well conceived and presented undergraduate class. Essential historical and conceptual background is provided as needed. Should be required reading for legislators who will be engaged in military and economic policy regarding China. The focus is on providing perspective rather than attempting to provide policy prescriptions.

I have just finished Graham Allison’s book Destined for War. My expectations were low given the plethora of books purporting to break new ground but in fact are only an echo chamber of the NYT. But I must say I am impressed with the depth and breadth of Allisonh’s analysis of the US’s current strategic political and military situation with respect to China. He brought home for me the great challenge that the emerging behemoth of China presents to us and the deep cultural differences that divide us. I had thought Alison would be a standard Harvard liberal but in fact he comes through as quite hard-headed about our options, none very attractive, and politically more centered than I expected. The concept of MAED (mutual assured economic destruction) is intriguing. His analysis of the limitations of armed intervention, say in the China Sea, is very sobering and penetrating. The book is lively and lucid and well written. Allison is plugged in with all the power centers – Kissinger was his teacher, for example. The book is not billed as such but may be thought of an indictment of the US’s naïve and incoherent foreign policy compared with China’s. Much use is make of Thucydides History of the Peloponnese War and other classical references, to great effect.

If there is one book everyone should read this year, this is the one. Dr. Allison lays out a serious analysis of the rise of China and its challenge to the United States as the reining hegemon inside an historical framework of similar challenges to the existing hegemon over the last 500 years. Over that period there have been 16 similar challengers with twelve of them resulting in war. A disturbing percentage.

His analysis that China is intent on driving the American Navy out of the South China Sea by building and fortifying reefs and shoals in the area is one of the most disturbing points Dr. Allison makes. By fortifying the islands with ship killing missiles intent on overwhelming fleet defense systems, they want to force the Navy to move their carriers farther from the China mainland, thereby diminishing the power of their Air Wings.

Dr. Allison does lay out how the rising tensions between China and the US may be defused and settled short of war. Perhaps the most important part of the book.

Again, if you read one book this year, this is that must read.

Michael McShane
Charlottesville, VA

I have known Graham Allison through his work on the Cuban Missile Crisis. So when i came across this book in the store suggestion list i blindly purchased it. As a person who is already interested in the Asia-Pacific region, this book gave a prediction on what to expect from the ongoing rivalry between the the two superpowers. Allison compares this present scenario with 16 previous cases, wherein a rising superpower challenged an already existing superpower.

Thucydides argues Allison was never deterministic about the outcome of this rivalry. He says that war in such cases is not inevitable but rather possible. Four out of the above mentioned sixteen cases ended without a war. Allison finds out the reason why such an outcome was possible i.e. how they were able to escape the 'Thucydides Trap'.

History gives compelling lessons to every statesman on what to do and what not to do. The author recommends thorough reading of the Thucydides 'History of the Peloponnesian War' for every statesman who are at the helm of affairs in their respective nations. Even though each of the 16 cases are quite unique in the historical circumstances, each could give a valuable lesson based on which individual statesman could steer their respective nations so as to avoid catastrophic collision.

Great book.
I recommend the readers of this book take a look of my book Can China Say No?. It will answer my questions how China rises, the impacts to us and the world and how we should deal with it. It has 290 pages (6*9) updated on 06/2018 and printed version is also available.

Graham Allison's new book reaffirms his reputation of one of the few political scientists who can cut through the daily noise of distractions to capture trend lines that have potential to impact the course of history. A war between currently rising China and currently floundering U.S. would have a devastating impact on the emerging new global order and, must be avoided. Skeptics can, of course, point out that the probability of such a war is low and they are right. But risk equals probability times consequences. And, while the American-Chinese war is unlikely, it is not impossible, and its consequences would be profound. The author rightly reminds us all that history matters and that if it is any guide, it'd take a lot of effortto ensure China's rise (if it continues) to the top of the evolving global order remains peaceful.

Graham Allison's book directly confronts the most important issue of our day, whether the US and China are bound to collide violently. Unlike a lot of political commentary (and political science) today, it is rich in its historical awareness and engages those historical case studies as a way to illuminate and inform the current debate. A lot of people like to compare the US-China to US-UK or other relationships over the past several centuries -- it's great to see someone engage them all.

As for digestibility, Allison has a natural and flowing prose that is easy to understand and very readable. Equally recommend for those ensconced in the field as for casual followers of foreign policy.

"Destined for War" makes a clear case for the dangerous trajectory, determined as much by the trends of history as by any specific choices of leaders or statesman, that the United States and China find themselves on. While certainly not inevitable, Dr. Allison shows that in similar situations, war has all too often been the result, even when leaders desire a different outcome. The book draws on a wide range of historical scholarship and interpretation, covering a series of different cases in great detail and demonstrating how continuities in each case apply to our present situation. For understanding the trends in global power dynamics, the historical forces shaping today's world, and what measures must be taken in order to avoid the most dire of outcomes, there is no better text.

A highly compelling and well-written book. I had always had a vague idea about China perhaps overtaking the US at some point, but it was not until I read Allison's book that I truly grasped the scale of the challenge. Apparently they are already way ahead of us in numerous metrics. I'd been looking forward to this book since his article a couple of years ago on the Thucydides trap, and his more recent work about "Applied History." This is a great example of applied history: Allison walks us through cases ranging from ancient Greece till the 1990s. I particularly enjoyed the chapter on the build-up to WW1.

I was expecting this book to be interesting, but not the page-turner it is. Highly recommended.

Allison has brought it all together in this wonderful book on a rising China and the consequences of that rise for US policy: the facts about Chinese growth, its modernization of the military, its surge forward in technology and the development of new infrastructure that broadens its influence west to Europe and east to the Pacific, and the clash of cultural differences that potentially point to war with a threatened United States. The concluding chapter on US policy alternatives to avoid war offers solutions that are not simple but they are essential. The book is well-written, never boring, with great historical references, starting with Thucydides and the Greek states through to cases of modern global conflicts in which war could have been avoided and some in which it actually was.

In this new book, Graham Allison addresses the relationship between the United States and China in a way that is intriguing, entertaining and thought-provoking. By drawing on examples from some 500 years of history, Allison situates the complexities of the U.S.-China relationship in a broad context that offers lessons and insights on how to approach and diffuse tensions. Allison’s work comes at an important time in both U.S. and world history.

This book is essential reading for the most important geopolitical challenge of our time. Understanding where the US and China stand, what the path to conflict might look like, and how to avoid it, is vital for the thinks, policymakers, and citizens who will need to grapple with this issue. Professor Allison has produced a must-read, well worth the time.

Mixed feelings... dry and very pedantic written in academic or consultant's position paper style; however delivers insightful and important information regarding most important standoff for years to come.

Prof. Allison’s (“Destined For War”) initial scholarly review of historical precedents is followed by the most brazen “Apologist” acquiescence for a brutal regime (and “Napoleon the Pig”, Xi Jinping) since President Roosevelt’s Russian ambassador, (Joseph Davis) gush for Stalin’s terror enterprise. Prof. Allison’s arguments – that China simply wishes to have its historical excusatory role in determining the fate of the Pacific realm – have ominous Sirens’ calls. Prof. Allison infers it’s their way or ‘the highway’ (war). Notably, in his review of historical “challengers of the balance of power”, he has recognized what is the only recourse for Democratic powers vs Despotic despoilers; Germany and Japan met their correct fates as well as the Soviet Empire imploding (albeit, a missed opportunity for the West).

Prof. Allison postulates that China never “exports its revolution”; I would argue that is exactly what is happening vis-a-vis N. Korea where China uses a proxy to destabilize S. Korea – a threat to its Maoist Revolution. He cherry-picks his history; on China’s military excursions, he lavishes prowess in the Korean War and the ’69 Russian-Chinese Border conflict but neatly avoids discussion of little Vietnam’s inflection of a bloody nose on its neighbor in the post-Vietnam War era.

Napoleon and the piglets have moved into the house (a play on Orwell); the two-legged “farmers” also sit at the table, negotiating trade with them (their greed blinding them to danger). The “animals” stare through the window from outside having bartered some wheat and fruit for the Pig’s thought-control. Their “milk” disappears into the house every day. No, the “five TO’s” (which Prof. Allison derisively refers almost aghast) are the exact path forward – IF America prepares now; to isolate China (i.e, CCP), to contain the CCP, to diminish the CCP, to divide China, to sabotage the CCP leadership. Hopefully, we will not be called upon to have Prof. Allison write a post-mortem – “Why America Slept”.

In Destined for War, Graham Allison applies a Thucydidean framework to the current rise of China and its challenge to the ruling US. He considers 16 historical cases of rise versus rule in order to extract lessons to prevent a superpower war today. The book is a must read, as it covers one of the most important foreign policy challenges in a manner digestible to scholar and interested citizen alike. Allisons's description of the China's rise is astounding: I was shocked by some of the well-chosen statistics documenting growth. And, the application of history to modern day is done with great care. A practice that Allison is leading with this 5/5 book.