How the Allies Won the War - The Battle of the Atlantic

Okay, I have not finished Jonathan’s book as of yet but felt I must react. I have to say Jonathan’s provides insights especially surrounding the overall British political and military aspects that shaped the “Battle of the Atlantic” as well as the impact on the “British Home Front.” However, it seems Jonathan does not provide the same situational context to his blistering comments about US Admiral King as he does for others.

To provide context, one must consider the general situation Admiral King faced during the specific period January-May, 1942 and the extended campaign through August 1942. It is clear the attack on Pearl Harbor caught the nation and the US Armed Forces unprepared and, while there had been progress moving to a wartime footing, Admiral King faced multiple challenges.
AUTHORITY: Admiral King assumed the appointment as COMINCH, US Fleet on December 20, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel. While that provided operational control of the three US Navy Fleets and coastal vessels, Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations which included responsibilities under Article 392 and Article 433, US Navy Regulations (“The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, Act of 3 Mar. 1915). ” Admiral King was not appointed to the dual role of Chief of Naval Operations until the issuance of the General Order No. 170, dated March 23, 1942.

AVAILABILITY of VESSELS (based on a variety of sources ): An analysis of the disposition of US Naval vessels in December, 1941 highlights a total of about 300 “patrol capable vessels” (DD, PG, PC, Coast Guard Cutters, PY and PYc types) including those in overhauls, major repairs and fitting out). The inventory included 171 destroyers of which over 40% were WWI era types, about 52 “Patrol Types” (PG, PY, PYc) including Spanish American War trophies and a collection of about 76 Coast Guard Cutters (not including the 10 of the 21 larger 250+’ cutters given to the British).

The US Atlantic Fleet contained 100% of the newer Sims, Benson and Gleaves destroyer classes. Of the 91 destroyers deployed in US Atlantic Fleet (leaving only 66 in the US Pacific and 13 in the US Asiatic Fleets), 52 US Atlantic Fleet destroyers were deployed either on Atlantic Convoy duty (including a squadron escorting British Troop transports to Cape Town), in Iceland or Newfoundland; only 24 were either in US Atlantic ports (including those be fit out, repairs) or serving as capital ship escorts; four were stationed in Bermuda; and the remaining 8 were stationed at the Canal Zone working convoys or in port. The US Atlantic Fleet accounted for 37 Patrol type (leaving a handful for the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets) vessels with 7 assigned to the Caribbean and the 54 of the Coast Guard Cutters with 26 assigned to Greenland/Newfoundland/Iceland Patrols were stationed with the Atlantic Fleet.

If one looks at the building programs for FY39 and FY40, the US Navy had 194 destroyers (some ordered in June and July 1940), 140 Patrol Craft (PC’s of the 110’ and 173’ classes), 78 Sub Chasers (SC’s) and 129 YMS’s (which could be utilized for anti-sub role if necessary). Of the Destroyers laid down in 1940-1 that were not commissioned on December 7, twenty-eight were commissioned between January and June of 1942 with 16 assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet or the ETO and 12 assigned to the US Pacific Fleet (and of the 12, 1/3 conducted anti-submarine/convoy duty in the Atlantic/Caribbean prior to reporting to the Pacific Fleet) and, of the remaining fifty-two of the classes of 1940-1, 35 were commissioned and assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet and/or the ETO.

As for coastal class escorts, the US Navy commissioned 126 vessels in the period January to June 1942 with 83 being assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet. The bulk of the vessels were of the new 173’ PC and 110’ SC classes. During the same period, the Coast Guard commissioned 11 vessels with 10 being assigned to the Greenland/Newfoundland Patrols. For the period July-December 1943, the Navy commissioned an additional 52 Patrol Craft and, while the data on the 110’ SC’s is a little lacking, the pattern seems to remain with the bulk of the vessels being assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet while the US Coast Guard commissioned 21 vessels with 19 going to the Greenland/Newfoundland Patrols. In addition, a number of other vessels types were being launched configured for escorts like the seven Cactus Class Lighthouse Tenders in 1942 (as well as the follow-on Cactus and Mesquite Classes); the Admirable class minesweepers; and the YMS class minesweepers. The US Coast Guard drafted almost every vessel type including sea going tugs, weather ships, icebreakers, and converted freighters into the Greenland Patrol.
Prior and during WWII, the US Navy instituted the procurement and modification of civilian/commercial vessels as it has in times of conflict since the Revolution. The effort began in earnest with the efforts to enforce the Neutrality Patrols (1940) and continued past December 1941. In fact, of the “Patrol” types available prior to December 1941 the majority of them were acquired, converted craft (PG, PY, PYc). The Navy extended the acquisitions especially of fishing vessels to fill minesweeping and harbor patrol duties (AM, AMc types). As one sailor (Ed Hickey, SK1) on the Sapphire (PYc-2) commented, "We knew we were a sitting duck for any U-Boat that we found since a converted yacht is no match even though we had some depth charges and a few other armaments." The US Coast Guard (under the command of the US Navy) continued to acquire commercial and fishing vessel types as Patrol Cutters (WPG, WYP, WYPc, WAK) into early stages of the war with 95% being utilized to the east coast but the majority assigned to the Greenland Patrol.

As to Escort Carriers, two “Escort Carriers” (AVG/CVE Types) following the general design of the USS Long Island (acquired March 1941) were built prior to December 1941 with one being siphoned-off by the UK. During the first half of 1942, four CVE’s were commissioned with two going to the UK with the other two being assigned to the US Navy with one each to the Pacific and Atlantic. In the last half of 1942, fifteen CVE’s were commissioned with six going to the UK, and all but one of the US Navy units initially assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. The US manned CVE’s carried a more robust air wing the previous UK-built/manned vessels and, obviously, the UK units were not assigned to the daunting tasks facing the US Navy.

AVAILABILITY of NAVAL PATROL AIRCRAFT (based on a variety of sources ): As to Naval aviation, a review of the “Dictionary American Naval Aviation Squadrons” and the declassified “Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft” show on February 2, 1942 the US Navy had 102 “primary” patrol aircraft (PBY-5, PV-1, PB4Y-1 (B-24), and PBM-3) deployed in nine squadrons in the US Atlantic Fleet (Gulf, Caribbean and the Atlantic) including about 33% of the squadrons deployed to Newfoundland or Iceland (and net of VP-72 and VP-71). The Navy had 110 aircraft (post the losses to the Japanese and with the US Asiatic Fleet and with the inclusion of the two transferred squadrons from the Atlantic) in fourteen squadrons in the greater Pacific. Of course, one can point to the transfer after Pearl Harbor of VP-72 and VP-71 from the Atlantic as bias, but one must consider the losses inflicted by the Japanese. In addition, 51 shorter range in-shore patrol aircraft were assigned to the US Atlantic Fleet while 42 were posted in the Pacific.
By June 25, 1942, the US Navy had 168 “primary” patrol aircraft in the “Battle for the Atlantic” zones in 15 squadrons while 176 aircraft (including the remainder of the US Asiatic Squadrons) in the greater Pacific. The US Navy assigned 148 in-shore patrol aircraft in the Atlantic Fleet while 86 were assigned in the Greater Pacific. By December 8, 1942, the US Navy increased the “primary” patrol aircraft to 174 in the Atlantic with a net of 164 in the Pacific (net of headquarters and training commands and squadrons being trained). Actually, the US Atlantic Fleet training commands which conducted anti-submarine and convoy escort missions had more aircraft than the Pacific units.

INTER-SERVICE CHALLENGES: As put forward in the Army Antisubmarine Command History, there were “conflicts” between the Navy and the Army addressing defense from seaborne treats along the coasts. Under the Joint Action of the Army and Navy (FTP-155, 1935), the Navy had responsibility for seaborne coastal patrols and there was no debate over the Navy operating seaplanes and carrier-class aircraft. General Arnold was opposed to the Navy operating land-based bombers and to Admiral King’s request of 200 B-24’s and 400 B-25’s for long range patrol. On the Army Air Forces side, little was done to provide the necessary air assets when the US Navy requested the US Army Air Force (AAF) assign I Bomber Command. The Command was thrown into the gap stripped of most of its long-range aircraft. If fact by January 1943, the two AAF commands tasked to support the US Navy’s effort could put together only 139 operational aircraft (given strains of the build-up in the ETO).

STAFFING: The US Navy had about 160,000 personnel in 1940 building to 640,570 plus 56,716 USCG in 1942 to over 3.3 million by the end of the war. Thus in 1941 into early 1942, the meager availability of trained officers and NCOs had to be metered out to crews for new capital ships, supply operations, medical operations, repair and maintenance operations, air wings, etc. Patrol craft and Destroyers assignments were some of the most challenging non-flight assignments given the reliance on junior officers.

BLACK-OUTS/DIM-OUTS: There is some support for Admiral King’s reliance on FDR to order blackouts/dim-outs along the coasts. The order could have very quickly come from FDR (as an Executive Order); FDR could have expedited a request Congress to enact emergency legislation; or quickly contacted the Governors of the relevant states to address the situation.

THREATS IN THE PACIFIC: In the first six months to a year of 1942, the Japanese could have utilized their 65 (63 ocean-going submarines) submarines to conduct anti-shipping campaign either to cut-off Hawaii or Australia/New Zealand (remember, Japanese subs were present at Pearl Harbor and sited in the Philippines) especially from their newly won bases.

SUMMARY: By the time Admiral King was operational in his role in the Navy Department, pressure descended from the President to not only increase support for the Atlantic operations but to build forces to strike-back in the Pacific; prepare to support Allied land operations “somewhere in Europe;” and to deal with Operation Drumbeat.

There is no statistical evidence Admiral King stripped the Atlantic Fleet to fill the gaps in the Pacific nor is the evidence the US Navy had neglected the preparation for anti-submarine warfare or ignored the learnings from WWI, the Neutrality Patrols or the early Battle of the Atlantic. The attack on Pearl Harbor caught the US Navy in the early stages of operationalization. If the war for the US had started six months later, the Germans would have been facing a very different US Navy.
On could theorize the results of attempting to quickly organize convoys in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of war without adequate escort vessels and/or patrol aircraft. On the other hand, one can praise the US Navy for its ability to implement convoys so quickly with a bevy of essentially “green” crews, new vessels and new aircraft coming “on line.” If the war had started six months later the Germans would have been facing a very different US Navy.

A lesser leader could have pointed to the intense commitment to the Atlantic convoys system to the UK and Russia and/or the abandonment of Australia and New Zealand (as the British Navy had) and would have demanded relocation of experienced crews and vessels back to US waters (as well as fought to eliminate any further lead-lease deployment of naval escort-grade vessels). Admiral King stayed the course and the US Navy reasserted itself both in the “Battle of the Atlantic” and, with no help from the British, in a string of great victories in the Pacific. The bottom line is if FDR thought Admiral King was incompetent Admiral King would have been fired. The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War

Jonathan Dimbleby, in The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War, argues quite effectively that this theater was most crucial to the success of the Allies. He makes this argument while also providing a very readable and well-researched volume contextualizing the events here within the overall war effort.

Dimbleby's ability to both personalize the events, whether from the view of war leaders or the people aboard the ships, while never losing sight of the larger picture of how these events affected the war effort makes this a particularly enjoyable read for both the historian and the general reader.

In questioning some accepted opinions he introduces little new information but rather views much of what is known from a different perspective. That perspective is no doubt influenced by what he does bring to the discussion that was not previously included.

I would highly recommend this to both professional historians and the general reader with an interest in World War II, military history or history in general.

Reviewed from an ARC made available by the publisher via NetGalley.

Although well written, I found this book sometimes text book dull. Filled with historical facts, it seemed to grind to a halt in mid-war, when the allies began to get the upper hand as well as give most of its attention to the British Royal Navy. Although they did "their bit" they often used ships and aircraft lent to them by us to do the job. It was largely American naval vessels and primarily mobile escort carriers that finally closed the "air gap" and allowed the Allies to stem the slaughter by the U boat menace. The war against the U-boats did not end in 1943, but continued to the final days of the conflict. American carriers and their planes played a major role in halting the horrendous destruction of allied merchant vessels and their crews. Once we got the upper hand, things may prove less interesting to some, but this author seems to overlook the fact that Our navy never ceased to seek out and destroy the dwindling horde of German submarines prowling the Atlantic. These Hunter-Killers continued to patrol the seas throughout WWII doing yeoman duty training pilots and hunting U boats.

Clearly written and deeply-researched history of the WW2 U-boat attacks on shipping, primarily from North America to Britain, the lifeline of the UK, which required huge imports (including food) to carry on the war effort. Dimbleby (and other historians) recognize the slow response to the submarine attacks as Churchill's biggest strategic blunder in WW2. The most effective weapons against the U-boats were long-range bombers. These were owned by the RAF and used for massive bombing raids into Germany, largely targeting cities (and civilians), under the direction of "Bomber" Harris, a strategy later discredited. The Royal Navy was unable to get bombers for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and Churchill did not intervene. Massive losses of shipping (and lives) continued from early 1940 into 1942.

Even more shocking (for an American) were the large-scale U-boat attacks on American shipping off the East Coast in 1942. German submarines sank over 600 merchant ships, with the loss of thousands of lives, with no effective American defense. Even simple measures, such as blacking-out coastal cities, weren't done -- U-boats could easily target ships outlined by city lights. Dimbleby (and others) blame this poor response on Admiral Ernest King, then the Commander in Chief of the US Navy. King inexplicably resisted learning from the British ASW experience. Effective American response began later in 1942, with the loan of British anti-submarine trawlers and corvettes to the US Navy.

For both countries, it's striking how bad decisions (Adm. King, Bomber Harris ) and inter-service rivalries (Air Force vs Navy) damaged the war effort -- particularly in the UK, which was literally fighting for its life in the early years of WW2.

Recommended reading for those interested in WW2 and naval history. Don't be put off by the bulk (650 pp) -- it's a pretty fast read. Link to the WSJ review that led me to read it at first comment.

Happy reading--
Peter D. Tillman

Jonathan Dimbleby's "The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War" explores the war at sea against Germany during WW II and makes a strong case for its importance. Dimbleby, a British writer and broadcaster, has written several popular studies of WW II and its aftermath. He explains the goal of his book in his Preface, titled "A Momentous Victory":

"I have sought to weave the themes outlined above into a narrative about a sustained drama in which the motives and actions of every combatant -- from the most senior members of the competing high commands in London, Washington, Berlin and Moscow to the individuals who fought and died in the Battle of the Atlantic-- are crucial to a full appreciation of the epic scale of the campaign. To place the stories of those who fought and died at sea for either side against the background of the momentous dilemmas and decisions of those who sent them there is not to diminish but to illuminate the epic scale of their endeavor. I hope I have been able to establish that the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was a precondition for the defeat of Nazism and therefore as important as any other struggle on any other front between 1939 and 1945."

The book focuses upon the war in the Atlantic and the German U-boats. Dimbleby shows this conflict at both broad and specific levels. Dimbleby explains how Germany tried to win the war by cutting off food and materials to Britain from the United States and elsewhere by control of the ocean and how it came dangerously close to success. He follows the changing course of the Battle of the Atlantic from 1939 through the end of the War with many specific depictions of sea battles. He makes excellent use of the words of the combatants in the ships to the extent they are available. The battle depictions are graphic and exciting and capture the danger of the war at sea for the German U-boats and for the allied merchant fleets and combat vessels. The book shows the many changes of fortune in the sea war. Through early 1943, Germany held the upper hand and appeared to be increasing its advantage. British and American technology, including more sophisticated forms of radar detection, an increased mass-production of ships, and a better understanding of the use of convoys dealt a blow to the U-boats from which they could not recover. British control of the Atlantic led ultimately to D-day and to the winning of the War.

Dimbleby's book integrates the Battle of the Atlantic with other theaters of the War and explores the various ways the high commands of the combatants viewed the Battle. Dimbleby is critical of Churchill for not responding to the seriousness of the U-boat threat until it was nearly too late and concentrating instead on the heavy bombing of Germany and civilians. Dimbleby argues that this bombing was both ethically questionable and militarily ineffective. For its part, Germany missed an opportunity to inflict even more damage than it did with the U-boats early in the War. The German high command had its own internal disagreements about the emphasis to be given the U-boats as opposed to a large surface fleet and about the emphasis to be given to the war at sea as compared to the air war.

Dimbleby also offers a good, basic account of the diplomacy among Britain, the United States, and the USSR and how it related to the conduct of the war at sea. He shows the extensive disagreements in the Allied high command. Although high level contact between Britain and America and Stalin receives much attention, some of the best writing in the book is at the more specific level involving the treacherous voyages in the north Atlantic in which the Allies tried to send badly needed supplies to the USSR in furtherance of its resistance to the German invasion.

The book argues that the Allies might have won the Battle of the Atlantic and the War earlier than they did if they had properly focused on using convoys and on meeting the U-boat threat. Conversely, Germany, in hindsight, also had its chances early in the war to intensify its use of the U-boat before the Allies responded. Dimbleby offers good portraits of the high commands on both sides, particularly of Germany's Grand Admiral Karl Donitz who, he argues, had a better understanding of U-boat warfare than any other commander on either side. The book discusses the breaking of the German Enigma code and concludes that the importance of this factor to the Battle of the Atlantic frequently is overstated. It was neutralized in part by Germany's own breaking of the Allies code. Throughout the book, Dimbleby emphasis the courage and the valor shown by seafarers in the War on both sides and the extraordinarily high level of casualties they sustained.

Dimbleby writes well and eloquently. The book is absorbing and a pleasure to read. It is written for a non-specialist audience. I learned a great deal from this book about the Battle of the Atlantic and its importance to WW II and its aftermath. The book brings home the scope and the significance of the War.

Robin Friedman

This is a five star book because the author provided a gripping and very informative account of the battle of the North Atlantic in superb detail; it kept my full attention throughout. I never realized how significant this battle was until I read this book; especially submarine warfare. Allied losses were very heavy and the sea battles were bitter, tragic, and devastating.

Since the beginning of WWII, the Germans had full control of the North Atlantic including the East Coast of the US. The leader of the German U-boat Wolf-packs-Admiral Karl Donitz-was an outstanding, cunning, and effective commander and kept allied shipping at bay for much of the war. His impact severely limited badly needed US shipping of war material to Britain and the Soviet Union buying Hitler's army time. Losses in men, material, and ships were huge.

It was not until 1943 that U-boat activity started dwendeling mainly due to allied technological developments and a change in sea war strategy; we began sinking German U-boats on a substantial scale. In addition, under the very able leadership of shipping entrepreneur Henry Kaiser, the US began making transport ships faster than the Germans could sink them. There is much more to this book than I can provide here.

This is a captivating book describing an enormous human struggle at sea and well worth the read.

Rich

Interesting enough but lots of "Brit=ism's" and inside jokes and comments that meant nothing to me.

Plows through ground covered by others better. He does introduce some new info or has a knack
of introducing "old" info and making it seem new

A very readable account of the WWII battle in the Atlantic Ocean. I've found the U-boat conflict to be very interesting. Forty or so men get inside a metal can and hunt for prey at great peril to themselves. This book definitely captures some of the drama involved with that.

The book mixed personal accounts of certain battles with geopolitical discussion in between. It did get a bit dry at times with lots of description.

The only negative is the numerous typos. There's a lot. Really bad ones too.

Recommend.

This book describes the Battle of the Atlantic during WWII. The book is episodic switching between high level discussions, internal conflicts, convoy battles and personal accounts. The main argument is that the Allies failed to provide enough air support to the Atlantic early in the war and that this came close to resulting in defeat. On the German side, the lack of emphasis on producing U-boats early in the war; caused the Germans to miss their best chance of victory.

Initially did not care for the authors approach and was put off by technical mistakes he made, i.e. in the text referring to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as battleships rather than battle cruisers (the index was correct). By the end of the book as more positive. Particularly good were the important convoy battles.

Terrific book! …based on my own years of biographical research for “Good-Bye, Lord, I’m Going To New York” (the store.com & the store.uk.com) about WW-II from the American viewpoint – author Jonathan Dimbleby has written an extremely well researched work that flows – is vivid – and painstakingly well documented. I couldn’t put it down! – mostly because it is accurate! It should be noted that, simultaneously, in 1942 New York at the Anti-Submarine Command HQ at 90 Church Street, a Wall Street lawyer and then US Army-Air Force intelligence officer, William Harding Jackson, devised a plan for Americans to attack U-boats at their source. As described by Central Intelligence Agency historian, Ludwell Lee Montague, a former strategist in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) “…Captain Jackson had the temerity to produce an analysis of the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare as it was then being conducted off the US East Coast. He showed that it was a dismal failure – and urged that the Army units involved be sent to reinforce the RAF Air Coastal Command for a concerted attack on the German submarines at their source – in the Bay of Biscay. Captain Jackson’s [intelligence estimate] paper infuriated the US Navy from Admiral King on down, but it delighted the Army-Air Force. Jackson was reassigned to be Assistant Military Air Attaché in London, in liaison with the Coastal Command. His recommendation was eventually carried out, although it took the personal intervention of the Secretary of War (Stimson) to overcome the bitter opposition of the Navy (King).” Jackson was elevated to the position of War Department chief of secret intelligence and later headed the 650-man super secret OSS ‘X-2’ in the US portion of the Ultra program on the war front for General Marshall and General Eisenhower. The detail and graphic life descriptions offered by Mr. Dimbleby are right up there with Rick Atkinson’s trilogy about the war and the observations (air and naval) of former RAF Air Marshal, Sir John Cotesworth Slessor in “The Central Blue” (Fredrick Praeger; 1957). Many Americans have not read about nor do we fully understand the British history on the matter. Dimbleby’s book is definitive. John Slessor and William Harding Jackson became close, lifetime friends because they shared the same view of adding more B-24 ‘Liberator’ bombers to the RAF Coastal Command – which resulted in the joint Allied Casa Blanca doctrine (14-24 January 1943), ultimately putting an end to the U-boat reign of terror in the Atlantic and English Channel. More than 600 U-boats and each of their forty man crews were dispatched to the bottom of the Bay – one of the heaviest losses of the Third Reich. Kudos to Mr. Dimbleby. This book is an excellent read – and if you are looking for outstanding documentation on the subject, you need look no further than “The Battle of the Atlantic” (2016) by Dimbleby. Excellent!

Fascinating story, brilliantly told and with the most intensive use of a thesaurus I've ever come across!
Above all, a painful reminder of the sheer stupidity of war, the senselessness of the lives it cost, and the terror that so many faced as they met their, oftentimes horrific, end.
Brilliant expose on just how close the Allies came to losing the war, if only German high command had appreciated the true value of the U-boats.

A must read for anyone seriously interested WWII. Well researched and detailed. Even though you know the outcome, the suspense is palpable. A sea story of the Atlantic comparable to Hornfischer's classics on the Pacific war.