Obama's Wars

Obama's WarsBob Woodward detailed description of Obama's decision process for adding 30,000 American soldiers to our force in Afghanistan can be tedious at times, but shows our military's efforts to widen the scope of the war and the President's efforts to limit our engagement there.

A great book from Woodward again, once you pick it up - very hard to put down - and as all of Bob's books are, it leaves you wanting more... So I wait till Woodward puts out his next "can't miss" book.

This book provides great insight into the dynamics of government operations. However, the almost fictional use of quotes and expression when the author was most definitely not present leads one to wonder where the truth ends and perception or bias begin.

Very disappointing book. However very telling too; Mr. President just make a DECISION. Inexperience definitely shows in this collection of information leading up to the Obama Wars. I was surprised Mr. Woodward spun the story for such an interminably long time.

For all those that think Clausewitz got it wrong or is no longer relevant; read this book and learn. War is clearly an extension of politics; thus, regardless of the merits of military operations or the willingness of military leadership to attempt to solve wicked problems around the globe, without clear political support and a clear vision of success from civilian leadership, economy of force military operations in complex environments are doomed to failure.

Woodward has crafted one of his best books yet. This book is informative and well researched. As you read it, you cannot help but realize WHY certain news stories appeared at specific times. The debate about troop numbers is captured in a clear and concise manner, yet you will shake your head as to why it had to take place in such a public forum. Woodward's portrayal of GEN McChrystal is especially useful given the bad press surrounding his departure. An insiders viewpoint of events that most of us at the time had to rely on the media to learn about. Woodward does a fine job counteracting a lot of the Washington Spin by providing unparalleled insight behind the scenes.

For those wondering if "Obamas Wars" covers both Iraq and Afghanistan, I would opine that it does not. Obama arguably inherited a war and a drawdown when he took office. As I read the book, I felt that the use of "wars" plural referred to the ongoing Afghanistan conflict, the "war" within the White House over what policy to back, the "war" within the Department of Defense over what military options to exercise, the "war" between US foreign policy and domestic political concerns as the latter seemed more important to Democrats while Republicans preferred to emphasize the former, and the "war" - percieved or not - between military and civilian authorities, in this case a President who did not feel as if his wishes were being carried out to the letter. The book ends in July 2010 around the time when Woodward interviewed President Obama.

This is journalistic historical fiction. In other words, neither good journalism nor fiction. Mind-numbingly boring. Dialogue that sounds like Woodward. And not once does Woodward question his own corrupt role in boxing in Obama on the Afghanistan troop decision with his constant leaks.

Wait for the price to drop to 25 cents.

woodward has done an excellent job of clearly defining the complexities of the afghan war. this book showed that the military brass should take as much if not more blame than obama. woodward poimts out that after 6 years of war no uniform goals had been established and no one was on the same page. it was like pulling teeth for the president to get options from his military leaders. its ironic that this war was begun with little/no planning and when obama comes in and has the military/pentagon take the time for a review, he is blasted by the public for not being decisive. its a strange dichotomy because when a war is succesful the military gets the credit but when unsuccesful the president gets the blame. cant wait for woodwards next book.

It was stated in Mr. Woodward's book, "... Obama had perhaps underestimated the extent to which he had inherited George W. Bush's presidency - the apparatus, personnel and mind-set of war making." With the exception of George Washington, no president comes into office with a clean slate to work their “magic.” While the author's work is entitled 'Obama's Wars' it is mostly about the mess in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration focused most of our military on the Iraq War and essentially left Afghanistan's problems on the back burner. We did not have the military resources to effectively address both countries. You'd think that Afghanistan, which was instrumental in our nation's 9/11 atrocities, would have been the focus but the gung-ho Bush gang had a major stiffy for taking out Saddam Hussein and naively introducing some form of Jeffersonian democracy into Iraq. By the time President Obama stepped behind the Oval Office desk he had inherited two ongoing wars with long neglected Afghanistan being a HUGE mess.

Mr. Woodward’s ‘Obama’s Wars’ focuses on the process involved in setting up a concrete objective and timetable for minimizing American’s footprint in Afghanistan. Events take place in the first eighteen months of his presidency. The book ignores the stock market collapse which was taking up a great deal of President Obama’s energy. Instead it is about wrestling with war-zone foreign policy. The author does a fine job detailing the endless meetings by the administration and the military about defining what was the mission in Afghanistan, what were our objectives, what was meant by victory, and what constitutes losing? It is about a lot of smart individuals with strong opinions as well as strong personalities trying to direct President Obama into their ideological camp. The book also shows how Alice-in-Wonderland dysfunctional the entire structures are in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is truly remarkable to me that all the people involved in the discussions didn’t eventually get placed in straight-jackets and thrown into padded cells. To heck with North Korea, people, your nightmares should revolve around nuclear-armed Pakistan.

‘Obama’s Wars’ is about the process in dealing with a complex situation without any great solutions. Egos clash, cliques thrive, and the military always pushes for more troops. It was amazing to read how meeting after meeting after meeting was a rehash of the previous meeting. Some of the “experts” declarations were clearly flights of fancy even to someone of my limited intelligence. Everyone in the book seemed to believe the angels were on their side and the nincompoops were those who did not agree with them. How Washington ever gets anything done is beyond me. The reader will likely only enjoy ‘Obama’s Wars’ if you are interested in watching sausage being made.

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Bob Woodward's reputation is such that almost no one in the US government can refuse him an interview. His method is so methodical that he can reconstruct meetings by the accounts of all (or almost all) the participants; this gives his book an air of impartiality.
The description of the creation of the `surge and withdraw' policy in Afghanistan is laid out very clearly. The tensions within the White House and between Pentagon , State and White House are well described. There is much evidence to support the fact that the Joint Chiefs would not consider realistic alternatives to their preferred 40,000 troop surge, despite the Presidents direct order to do so - they did present three options, one unrealistically low, one unrealistically large and the 40,000 option with no timetable for withdrawal. The Presidents team felt that the recommended policy would resemble the Vietnam escalation policy, which ultimately ended in failure, and worked assiduously to define alternatives. It is clear from the book that no branch of the US government had any real faith in Afghanistan's ability to govern itself, and so there is a fear by all branches that they were struggling in a quagmire.

Despite all the internal negotiations and frustrations it is clear that they teams are highly motivated and that for most of the participants, the chance to influence important policy is a the highlight of their careers.

The President is seen as a highly intelligent political player, wary of being trapped, who ultimately tones down the surge to 30,000, so as to prevent wide-scale military resignations, but who, crucially, time-limits the surge so as to show all sides that there is a US exit path. The uniformed military are seen as divided, but mostly rigid in their view of the problem, Admiral Mullen is seen as out of touch, Gen Petraeus is seen as scheming and Gen McCrystal is seen as politically clueless. Sec. Gates does not comes across is a good light, the general impression is of someone who waits to see which way the wind is blowing before declaring his hand. The National Security team in the White House is divided between political operatives who came up with Obama, and ex-Military officers. The tension between retired and current military is quite palpable.

In the end I think this is a very valuable book about policy formation. Its very clear that US Afghan policy (and perhaps US policy in the War on Terror in general) needs a development capability, which would help lift failed or failing states out of poverty. This requires not just an agency, but resources and patience, neither of which is a strong US trait. Nonetheless I think the US policy on Aids in Africa, formulated during the Clinton and GW Bush presidencies should be a template.

I think its impossible to be impartial when describing contentious policy discussions of deeply important nature and overall I think that Woodward takes the point of view of the ex-military members of the National Security team. This is not necessarily a failing of the book, but it would be better if Woodward could state this, as I think both Sec. Gates and the uniformed military are done a disservice by their descriptions in this book.

For anyone who is interested in the nitty-gritty of politics, this is an excellent read. For those who are only casually interested in politics, give this one a pass. I loved the book, but I am very involved in politics.

Obama's Wars is well-written, comprehensive, and un-biased, which is refreshing for a book about politics. Woodward has amazing access to all of the top leaders in both Congress and the White House, and takes the reader into the discussions and decisions that took place in the White House.

The fact that this book is as un-biased as is humanly possible bears repeating. Political books usually are written from a partisan point-of-view, but this one is the exception. The reader feels as if he was actually present and able to come to his own conclusions, instead of reading the author's conclusions.

the store's Kindle strategy has been so clever to date that I hesitate to question their recent changes. The simplicity of the unit itself, the availability of so much media- from a company fully versed in the book business, instant satisfaction with the Whispernet delivery system... a really well thought out package for a brand new product. But it's not a new product category anymore. I find it hard to see the cleverness of hiking up the price of Kindle books when there are so many new competitors for the Kindle system. It seems backwards.

A company that pretty much owns the market place challenges a bunch of new competitors by raising prices in financially tough times? This approach seems especially egregious when the implication of the store's advertising has been, from the beginning, that most best seller's would be priced at $10 or so. Does the store not care about their established customer base?

I know the Kindle's a very successful product but technology does change so fast... and we Americans are more than ready to follow the new and the trendy. Why offer the competition an easy point of attack? Go figure.

Personaly, I just ordered the new Bob Woodward book... in hard cover. I think it will be worth keeping on my own book shelves.

This book does an amazing job of documenting the minutiae of the political back and forth over the war in Afghanistan. It highlights civil-military (and sometimes military-military) divisions, identifies internal debate about the role of Pakistan as a central and repetitive concern, and details the more human aspects of the debate, often in the form of political infighting and backstabbing. It's hard not to be amazed by the access Woodward managed to key figures, meeting notes, classified documents, and the thoughts of those involved. If what you're interested in are close accounts of these details, this is the book for you.

The major flaws of this book are its lack of analytical interpretation. I haven't read other Woodward books, so I don't know if this is just his style, but the book lacks a bit of context. While the compendium of information he collects is laudable, history is a matter of interpretation. Given Woodward's previous publishing experience on related topics, I would have preferred he provide a little more value-added. The lack of analysis and context makes reading through seemingly interminable meetings relatively painful. Related to this, although the book is about the war in Afghanistan, it pays little attention to the actual war. This makes it hard to gauge whether the political and military recommendations seem reasonable. The book is set entirely in meetings, which while it does bring important information to light, seems to be a very limited perspective. How did strategic and tactical events in Afghanistan effect the conversation? We don't know. What the book does well is shed light on the decision-makers, but it is slightly less successful in painting a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the war in Afghanistan.

Overall, worth a read if you're interested in US foreign policy, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or Afpak.

The war in Afghanistan has brought only problems without solutions - safe havens for al-Qaeda in Pakistan, government corruption, drug-running, and the failures of the Afghan army and police.

As US General David Petraeus said, the Afghan government `is a criminal syndicate'. Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, admitted, "Our presence is the corrupting force." As long as Afghan society does not change, its corrupt institutions can't change. Whether Afghanistan achieves development and democracy is up to the Afghan people. Outsiders can never bring either.

NATO aimed to defeat the Taliban through counter-insurgency war, but this would require another 100,000 US troops. President Obama has rejected this option.

The Taliban do not advocate attacks outside Afghanistan. We should negotiate with them, to isolate and defeat al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is the real threat to Britain, not the Taliban, so we should focus on stopping al-Qaeda carrying out terrorist acts here in Britain.

NATO has had the wrong strategy, so it uses the wrong tactics. Less than one per cent of the Afghan people live in Helmand, yet 12 per cent of US troops are there. NATO forces are bombing Afghanistan every day (ignored by our media), but as Woodward points out, "The great lesson of World War II and Vietnam was that attacks from the air, even massive bombings, can't win a war." Drone attacks in Pakistan will not win the war in Afghanistan (nor will air warfare alone win in Libya).

Some US generals and politicians set conditions for withdrawal, but if withdrawal depends on achieving development and democracy there, the troops will stay forever.

Some say, if we pull out, our soldiers will have died in vain. But how would making yet more soldiers die in vain add meaning? Only if continuing the war brought victory, which it won't.

President Obama has pledged that in July this year the USA will begin withdrawing its troops, without conditions. We must do what we can to ensure that this happens, to successfully end the war.

Remember when the US military requested 40000 troops and Obama took more than 6 months to think about it? This is what is covered in the book. Nothing else, really. This brings valuable insight, but on a very, very, limited subject matter.

Basically, the military was asking for a full-blown, by the book, pacification effort (the actual term is counterinsurgency but I am avoiding it just because it is thrown around so much that it is hard to remember what is meant by it).

VP Biden, and others, were looking for kill-the-bad-guys-nothing-else. Counter-terrorism. Less troops.

And Obama was asking the military what the 40000 soldiers were going to be used for.

Plenty of personal insights. Biden is depicted as a blowhard. You understand the reason for the McChrystal Rolling Stones vent. Remembering Westmoreland, I generally came away respecting Obama's insistence on clarity, even though I felt that he was sometimes pressuring for alternatives when there were none. Yes, it was political, but I think it also shows respect for the grunts he is putting at risk. You may disagree, especially if you are military, and I understand that too.

There ARE nuggets of information. Karzai is incompetent, corrupt and feeble, as Ambassador Eikenberry constantly points out. Pakistan is a huge problem due to its love/hate relationship with the Talibans which they, somehow, see as an offset to India. My biggest takeaway: aid contractors pay protection money to the Taliban so increasing reconstruction funnels part of the funding to the enemy. My other takeaway: I had thought one reason for the delayed decision was to put pressure on Karzai. Nope, I was wrong, that is never mentioned. The coalition? Canada rates 2 minimal mentions, ditto UK. Other countries perhaps haven't done as much, but are generally ignored as well.

The problem with this book is its obsession with dissecting personal relationships between the US-only power brokers, rather than trying to give insight into the challenges of the war itself. The challenges always take second place to the arguments about them and the personalities of those who argue.

For example, at a meeting, p.222, Clinton says: "Mr. President, the dilemna _you_ face..."

Follows more than half a page of attendees' feedback about how they felt the "you" meant she was not a team player and should have been "we". Who cares? She might have instead emphasized that Obama was the final decider. Who knows? Do the troops care? Does that "you" mean anything to winning the war?

This excessive focus on the decision makers' relationships keeps me from rating this book higher. It is way too political in nature.

There is no question that this chronicle of the Obama's decision regarding the Afghanistan war is another brilliant example of Woodward's narrative art we have grown used to. Painstakingly researched, perceptive in psychological nuance and described in a matter-of-fact way, it will be a lasting historical document.

However, what the reviewer is really incited to do is an evaluation, not of the author, but of the painful struggles in the President's mind and heart. He inherited a war he wished to promptly terminate, but was obviated by political reality and was instead offered no option other than to intensify it. Not only was a Christian attitude of non-violence a characteristic of his personality, but, as everybody knew, the specter of another Vietnamese debacle was written on the wall. If my data are correct (Quo Vadis Israel?), recent history has shown the surprising fact that during the 20th century the guerrillas were defeated in only 2 out of 25 guerrilla wars. In the remainder, the insurgents either achieved outright victory (11) or were never silenced (12). Good examples are Nationalist China losing against Mao Tse Tung's fighters, the U.S. against the Viet Cong and the Soviet Union against the Mujahedins in Afghanistan. The success chances in Afghanistan were no greater for the United States now than they had been for the Soviet Union in the eighties. Thus there were good reasons for abandoning that troubled land, yet early on in the many debates in the White House Situation Room, on September 30, 2009, that possibility was ruled out from the start. That closed the door to the painful, but perhaps wisest decision. Once that was done, the inescapable conclusion was instead to accelerate the war despite the fact that the eventual outcome two or more years hence would still be defeat. Of all the contributing aspects - the Afghan government, the corruption, the illiteracy, the attrition rate of Afghan soldiers, the porous southern border, the forked-tongue Pakistani attitudes and much more - none was positive. They all predicted an unwinnable war. The President delayed his final decision time and time again, because he desperately demanded "another option", a save-our-face exit strategy. There was none. In the end he was compelled to do what he was opposed to. No other administration would have had a different choice unless it conceded victory to the Taliban from the start.

Is it reasonable to think a super power could lose a war against a motley crew of illiterate tribesmen? Yes, it is indeed, because guerrilla war is a mighty weapon in the hands of fanatical underdogs. Nonetheless, we should blame the calamity neither on our brave soldiers nor on the remarkable man who was tragically compelled to do what he hated.
The Shipwreck of a Nation: Germany: An Inside View

By this time in his career, Bob Woodward's Washington Scene has become automatic Best Seller material for the rest of America. Probably his best audience is in Washington, itself, as "insiders" closely scrutinize the texts to see how they, their political friends and their political enemies came out.
I did not read this book to see who did what to whom or whether Obama gets an A- or a D+ as compared to his immediate predecessor, nor to see whether Secretary Clinton outshines Secretary Rice. Having no political axes to grind I was not sensitive to the political implications in terms of the recent (as of this date) Midterm Elections nor of the forthcoming ones two years from now--- when the President will be reviewed by the Public. Woodward seems to me to be making no judgments either.... although he does mention election significance to the President's staff and the President, himself. Indifferent myself to the relative success of Democrats or Republicans, I may have missed a partisanship that was unrecognizable to me for that reason.
The major overt "conflict" which is central to the book, is a quite normal one impacting all Presidents and all Congressional and Military leaders in the modern era...…...the problem of line and staff, that is, how do the people who are obliged to make command decisions, deal with the advice given by those who have the technical knowledge upon which they are reliant. A crucial secondary problem is that faced by higher level commanders..... assessing how well their commands have been carried out and what the actual results in action have been.,,,, that is, did subordinates do what they were told to do, and, if not, why not; and, what happened because of the action taken.
The inability to predict social futures to any high degree and the lack of control over primary variables influencing impact, makes the job of formulating commands, assessing the degree of their conversion into action patterns, and judging the ultimate results, an enormously difficult one for leaders of the highly complex United States, in the almost infinitely complex World situation of today. When the key leader, the Commander of Chief, brings nothing to the table save a wit trained in law, his job, the job of his civilian and military staff, and that of the military line and staff, who must both inform and conform to his decisions, is fraught with potential disaster.
Woodward takes us through these difficulties with as much depth and objectivity as the journalistic enterprise allows. Even the hundreds of volumes that will follow in due time, will leave lacunae in our knowledge and understanding. For a book written about the commands ,while the ink upon them is not yet dry, to be as good as this one, is a credit to the skill of Mr. Woodward and to the sources which are said to be among the best for any journalist dealing with these matters.

Bob Woodward again strikes gold in this portrayal of Barack Obama's first year in office. Hailed as the savior of American politics at points during the 2008 election, reality would eventually strike home for the President. Woodward uses his unparalleled array of sources and investigative techniques to describe Obama's handling of the job, particularly the decisions leading to the current Afghan War policy. Woodward is the best of the best, and truly draws upon everything without bias, without politics to portray the President as clearly as possible.

For me, I like to compare this book to Woodward's earlier work "Bush at War." Both were written at similar points in the presidencies of the two men, and both were positive in nature regarding the leadership styles exhibited by the two men. Comparisons arise from reading both works:

-Barack Obama speaks less at Cabinet meetings than did George W. Bush.
-The role of Joe Biden as VP is a very vocal devil's advocate.
-Bush made his opinion known (for good or bad) at a much higher rate than Obama, with Obama withholding his opinion until the end of discussion.
-Obama being hailed for penning his own ultimate strategy, unrivaled by any modern president.
-The cooperative nature of the Presidential transition
-The stronger push in "Bush at War" towards a decision as opposed to in "Obama's Wars"

Petraeus, Gates, and Clinton are viewed in a largely positive light. Obama's Wars also explains why Obama picked Hillary and Gates in their current positions. This is the closest ANYONE can get to Cabinet meetings without actually being there. Strongly recommended. Again, Woodward hits with class and intelligence.

I've read other books on governmental policy and the interaction that occurs between elected officials, bureaucrats, and military officers. When I read Colin Powell's autobiography, I remember him mentioning that because of what he witnessed in Vietnam, he and other military officers made a vow. They said that when their time came to advise politicians on conflict and war, they would offer solutions that would increase the likelihood of victory for the United States, without the U.S. entering an endless quagmire that would be hard to exit from.

In "Obama's Wars," Bob Woodward conducted many interviews to gain first-person insight into the policy surrounding the wars - Iraq and Afghanistan - that Obama had inherited. It revealed the rationale for certain appointments, the decision making behind policy concerning the wars, and the clash of egos that hindered the implementation of policy. Although it was interesting to gain further insight into how the government operates, it was disturbing to see how people allowed their egos to prevail over the goal of doing what is in the best interest of the American people.

Despite criticisms about being unqualified for office, the book showed to the contrary that President Obama is someone who is engaged in policy, and seeks to do what is best for America. Due to the improvement of the situation in Iraq, much of the book revolved around Afghanistan, and how the U.S. could improve the security situation so that the people of Afghanistan could eventually take over. Policy with Pakistan was also included, due to the interconnectedness of the Taliban in Afghanistan with its counterparts in Pakistan, and what many officials perceived as a lack of cooperation received from the Pakistani government. Regarding Afghanistan, President Obama set goals for the increase in troops to stabilize the country, and created deadlines for the decline in the number of American troops so that America wouldn't be the primary security force into perpetuity.

With goals being set, conflict arose concerning the number of troops that were needed. Military leaders within the pentagon wanted more troops than the president and his advisers felt were necessary, which led to much debate. The thing I found troubling was that President Obama requested that the military provide several options from which he could choose, yet he was not given many options. General McChrystal wanted a particular amount, which his supporters, including Admiral Mullen, advocated for. Their additional "options" were always similar to what General McChrystal had requested, which effectively limited the options from which the president could choose. General Cartwright wanted to present different options to the president, but found resistance from Admiral Mullen, which led to him having to present them without Admiral Mullen's approval. To me, the military should have given the president a range of options so that he could make the best, well-informed decision. As the elected representative of the American people, he should be able to make the best decisions for the country without being hindered by unelected military officers.

Overall, the book was good because it was informative. When information is classified, the average citizen will never experience the truth behind how their government functions. Woodward's interviews, reviews of documentation, and presentation of them in a book, allows the citizens to learn more about the decisions being made that affect the present and future of this country. Being informed can enable citizens to make informed decisions about who they want to represent them, and hopefully remind politicians and bureaucrats that they will be held accountable for the decisions they make.

"Now I urge you, brethren, note those who cause divisions and offenses, contrary to the doctrine which you learned, and avoid them." -- Romans 16:17 (NKJV)

Every leader values having subordinates who quickly, effectively, and eagerly obey without complaining once a decision has been made. In Obama's Wars, you can see that the president's selections of top appointees mostly didn't include seeking out such people. It's not surprising that when it came to deciding whether to surge troop levels in Afghanistan that the people involved followed their own agendas, rather than the president's. Bob Woodward was able to gather so much evidence about the process from participants that they might as well have invited him into all of the meetings in the first place. It's a disturbing level of "disclosure" about what are supposed to be secret topics.

Because of concerns about increasing terrorist threats to the United States, everyone involved felt the urge to do what they knew how to do: Send more troops to Afghanistan. After reading this book, you'll wish that they spent as much time on improving ways to track down and stop terrorists on their way to North America from al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia rather than on killing as many Taliban as possible.

The ultimate decision is simply a sop to the military leaders, not a practical plan to accomplish anything. It reminded me of the methods being used to reduce unemployment: Spend trillions without having a clear idea of what the benefit is because a worse result seems unacceptable. If some "experts" with credentials can supply a rationale, run with that fig leaf and spend, spend, spend. While that's fine when it comes to money, you have to wonder about its relevance when lives and safety are at stake. It feels like Vietnam all over again to me. No one wants to "lose" a war . . . even if the war's original mission never was a very good idea.

I was particularly discouraged to see how little real thinking went on in the decision. It was just a lot of wrangling over preexisting positions that were based more on "hot air" than on facts and solid ideas.

During the Bush years, the decision would have just gone forward backing up the military. In this case, it's hard to see that such an "in-depth" policy review added much to the process. It felt more like reading about a moot court competition than good decision making by top minds.

As for the book, Bob Woodward stays a little too removed in his comments. For too much of the book, he operates more like a court reporter than as a journalist who takes the news and explains what it means.

I came away with a heightened appreciation for the sacrifices and dedication of those who put boots on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere. These brave troops deserve better leadership in government and in the Pentagon.

As a fan of Bob Woodward, I eagerly anticipated this new release. However, I believe the book falls short in several areas. Woodward continues with his traditional fast-paced writing and the reader clearly feels as if they too have the same "insider" status. The topic however made me feel as if Woodward was simply rushing to get a book out as opposed to being more thoughtful about writing something people actually want to read. In other words, I would have wanted to see Woodward write about Obama's handling of the financial crisis upon entering his presidency much more than the commitment of troops to Afghanistan. The entire book centered around one topic: How many troops to commit to the effort. 40,000, 35,000, 20,000. Up and back and up and back. I don't see a huge rush to get this book.

This is another homerun from Woodward and one that will open your eyes regardless of your political leanings. As a conservative I felt that the book detailed two important things: #1 Obama is failing to remove us from the wars that he so clearly did not like. And #2 He is listening to his military commanders.
The direction that the book seemed to take was more of a look at the war and the military commanders rather than the chief decision maker. But as you get into the book farther you see where the VP and the President come into the fold. I find that Woodward has an easy way of writing that allows one to get into the book without worrying about the hidden meanings.
Please read this book -- it is good!

This book is an extensive detailing of how Obama inherited the neglected situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan while America's "war on terror" focused on Iraq during the Bush years. As Obama takes office, he faces an unstable Afghan government and a Pakistan that is playing both sides to counterbalance India, and he must begin collecting input to determine what the US goal is and what can actually be accomplished. The book details the many meetings that Obama and his team have to determine this (in the midst of also heading off a free-falling economy and financial sector).

The book portrays Obama dealing with a military establishment that is so focused on fighting future wars that it treats Afghanistan as a passing distraction. When pressed for options, the military keeps repackaging the same one: more and more troops. The book is an interesting look into how Obama runs his administration and incisively cuts to the heart of issues with perceptive analysis. In the end, he gives the military deadlines and controversial troop limits, in operations which are still unfolding today.

OBAMA'S WARS was an interesting read and an encouraging look into Obama's avoidance of conducting "business as usual" from the previous regime, no matter how much the military wishes it were so.

Bob Woodward does a good job with interviewing key personnel to get the whole picture of Obama's inheritance. He inherited the War in Iraq & Afghanistan and boy did he inherit a mess! I'm amazed in how much power our military generals have and how they undermine Obama's authority, constanstly challenging him and not taking NO for an answer. The book revealed defiance & in my opinion, insubordination. I could not stop reflecting back on the JKF presidency with Bays of the pigs! I'm impressed in how Obama's strong leadership showed the military that he's Commander in Chief and he makes the final decisions. The only thing that concerns me is that Obama can only make decisions based on the facts he's given by the miliary, who have to rely on CIA. Who does he trust? Is he given the true picture? Sending 30,000 more troops was a difficult decision for him to make and I admired how he took his time and gathered all the facts before deciding to send more men & women in harms way. He did say in his campaign that he would end the war in Iraq and he's done that. Now he's finishing the job that the Bush administration did not do in Afghanistan! Well written Mr. Woodward!

Bob Woodward proves yet again that he is America's best political journalist, bar none. This book is a masterpiece of reporting, a first draft of history at its best. What Woodward knows how to do is ask the right questions, and he has the right access. The combination is unbeatable. He has no prose style, he is not a writer, he is not an analyst, he does not speculate or interpret or try to 'explain'. He simply collects data, the real data of history, from as many sources as possible, and then dumps his research notes into book form. It sounds like a slam to describe his work this way, but it makes for absolutely riveting reading, a sense of 'you are there' as history is made, without having to filter out the ponderous and pompous phrasemaking that passes for insight and analysis in so many contemporary books about foreign affairs. Others have written at length about the content of the book -- I leave that for people to find for themselves; what matters is that if you care at all about America's place in the world and our war in Afghanistan, this is the best single avenue into understanding it imaginable. What a dark picture it draws, but that is for you, the reader, to discover.

After skimming the reviews, I wasn't able to find any references to what stood out to me the most about this book: The President's unbelievable impotence in the war-planning process. Over and over again he expresses his desire to the military establishment for another military option with a lower troop count. Over and over again he is stonewalled by Mullen, Petraeus and Gates. The lone voice in the military establishment to draft another option is the Marine Corps General James Cartwright. And even then, Mullen refuses to provide it to the White House. The infighting and political calculations being made were very eye-opening to me. If you didn't pay close enough attention to what the President did in his first years as Commander-in-Chief, this book is a great way to catch up.

Hours after his election as the 44th president of the United States, Barack Obama learned details of the top-secret circumstances that defined the Afghanistan conflict, a war characterized by inadequate resources, incomplete planning, inchoate strategy and ongoing bloodshed. Bob Woodward of The Washington Post applied his legendary reporting skills to reams of meeting notes, classified reports and interviews to recreate the often tempestuous policy making on Afghanistan that marked Obama's first 18 months in office. Woodward's trip to Afghanistan and his unfettered access to top officials in more than 100 interviews, including more than an hour with the president, put you at the center of marathon meetings, disputes and discussions peopled by contrasting personalities and their shifting allegiances. getAbstract recommends this masterful work of reporting, an engrossing book on how the US is managing a war "with no good options."

A great account of the struggle Obama was up against with the Pentagon during his first eighteen months. Obama realizes how unpopular the wars are and doesn't want them to define his presidency at all. He's open to all strategic advice but knows the buck stops at him. He constantly wants three realistic options for what course the U.S. should take in Afghanistan, and time and again the general would only give him two, with one of the two being completely unrealistic. Obama realizes the pentagon is tying to strong arm him but won't allow it. A great book that captures the struggles that go on between the pentagon and a white house that doesn't do exactly what they want them to do. Woodward delivers another 5star book!

Woodward's latest book presents a treasure trove of information about a young presidency still in progress. Yes, it's too early for a comprehensive history or evaluation of the Obama administration, and that's not what this book purports to be. The focus of this book is the first 18 months, beginning with many of the discussions that took place while Obama was President-elect. As the title suggests, this book covers the decisions behind the war in Afghanistan and the related al Qaeda and Taliban activity into Pakistan. A September 22, 2010 Washington Post article also suggested another meaning for "war" in this book's title is the conflict among the president's national security team. Woodward has done his homework, and the results are marvelous.

Reading this book is quite educational. Woodward incorporates many characters into this book, including some that are probably unknown to those who don't regularly follow the news. Prior to reading this book I wasn't aware of the extent of Biden's influence, and I didn't fully understand the gravity of the Mumbai bombings or exactly how important Pakistan is to the war on terror. This book gave me a much better understanding of both the similarities and differences between al Qaeda and the Taliban, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Karzai and Zardari.

For those who have read recent Woodward best-sellers such as "State of Denial" or "The War Within," the feel of this book will be familiar. His writing style is far from elegant prose. Some passages are borderline robotic; this is often due to directly paraphrasing or selectively quoting sources.

Woodward successfully avoids any partisan slant, despite what some other reviewers have implied. The amount of information Woodward has here is amazing. As time goes by we will have a much more complete picture of what is currently happening, but for a present-day look at the Obama administration, this book would be very hard to beat. A page-turner!

It's a great look into the decision making process of the war in Afghanistan. The author does a good job of being politically neutral. It's disheartening to read how the sausage is made. Obama at times appears indecisive, but at the same time, is in a situation with no easy answers.

The below is a review of the unabridged CD audiobook version of the book.

Like Woodward''s trilogy on Bush's war, this book is primary composed of interviews with many of the leading figures involved in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This includes its lead, President Obama. Little is provided, unfortunately, on other fronts of the "war" on terrorism. It is these interviews that add unique insights to the wars, insights that are not available elsewhere. This is the real value of the books, the interviews.

The reader learns of some facts such as the military's attempts to get Obama to step up military involvement for example. The Defense Dept. did this before with Bush but took much longer to convince that administration to send many more troops than it did with respect to Obama. The reader also learns of the many conflicts existing with respect to military strategies regarding counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism as well as the fact that poor India-Pakistani relations did much to prevent Pakistan from adopting a very stringent anti-Taliban set of policies. The reader also learns of the worries of nearly all the interviewee's of the impact of serious corruption on the viability of the Afgan government. Most importantly the reader also learns of the lack of coherence in Obama's strategic policy. Obama followed more of a policy of try different policies to see what works instead of having a coherent policy in place throughout the wars. This was much like the Bush administration's policies that constantly changed albeit Bush tried to stay the strategic direction of "stay the course" (as Woodward's trilogy on Bush's war made clear by the end of the trilogy).

On the negative side, there is little strategic perspective presented. The book consists and is centered almost entirely of the interviews. Readers are bombarded with tons of information from these interviews in almost raw form, more so than even in in Woodward's trilogy on Bush's wars. Hence the reader, almost inevitably, finds him/her self lost in terms of perspective and the strategic picture. This is, by far, the most serious weakness of the book. It is as though one is reading the summations of a very large number of discontinuous interviews that do not, together, present a coherent picture with respect to chronology, how policy developed, driving forces behind policy, etc.

One last point that needs to be made with respect to the audiobook is that it is particularly well read. It is never monotone or lacking in energy despite the rather detailed (and what too many would be boring) serious of interviews presented.

spoiler alert- Good book...... disheartening to read. This is my first Woodward book and I found it very informative and easy to read. It's kind of shocking to the amount of detail and secret information that was shared with him, you feel as if you are actually in the meetings!! One thing is clear that Bush started the Afghanistan war with no thought as to how or what our military objective was, then he forgot about it and ran off to play warrior in Iraq.

The book reads like a comedy of errors with the same meeting happening over and over again (really different meetings, but the same subject- how many troops to send) It's clear that the military is trying to fight a traditional war (a failed policy in a failed country). There will be no "victory" in Afghanistan and at $10 Billion a month the US can't afford to be there any longer, it's bleeding us dry. The Afghan government is thoroughly corrupt and uninterested in taking control and responsibility for Afghanistan and our 'ally' Pakistan is a paranoid unwilling partner. Bottom line is no one in the middle east shares our ideals or values and you can't enforce them from the outside. The only way to protect the US is us the CIA spy network on the ground, along with any help we can get from Britain & Israel. Al Qaeda is a stateless terrorist organization that can not be defeated with armies, the best we can hope for is to contain them and keep them away from the US and our facilities.

In the years since his reporting on Watergate, Bob Woodward has become known as a careful reporter who manages to get the inside story on the workings of the highest level of government. Reading Woodward is like being a fly on the wall at Oval Office meetings or in the hallways of the Pentagon, listening in on private conversations between those who run this country. He does this, we're told, through multiple interviews with people at every level of the executive and military branches, double checking, verifying, and not publishing anything unless he has multiple sources. To a great degree we're dependent on Woodward's word for this, but it's telling that in the wake of the publication of his books it's rare if ever that someone in government will speak out to object to or refute what Woodward has written.

In "Obama's Wars" Woodward begins with a newly elected, but not yet sworn in President as he assembles his national security team and is briefed by representatives of the military and intelligence on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book ends in 2009, with the return of General Devid Petraeus to Iraq in 2009. In between we're given a close look at the planning and decisions made by executive, political, military, diplomatic, and intelligence representatives, and the picture is not always pretty. There is tension between Obama and the military, political operatives and career military, intelligence, and diplomatic personnel, between intelligence and military, and so on, Each group has a different perspective, and often very different objectives.

President Obama comes across as someone who is very engaged, with a single objective: To find a way to avoid committing any more soldiers to Afghanistan and Iraq, and to fulfill his election promises to get all US troops out as soon as possible. He questions what he sees as unreasonable demands from the military for 40,000 or more troops and feels as though it here unwilling to compromise. The military leaders themselves are divided between theater commanders like McChrystal, who is unwavering in his evaluation of the resources he needs, and members of the joint chiefs who are more willing to compromise and negotiate. CIA director Leon Panetta is a quick learner in the world of intelligence who finds himself cut out of decisions for, it appears, being unwavering in his analysis.

Joe Biden is a bit of a surprise, being an enthusiastic participant in many strategy and planning meetings. At the same time he comes across as impulsive, offering up a great many suggestions and comments on the fly during meetings rather than researching and evaluation options. The real surprise is Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State, who doesn't figure much in this book at all. Ambassador Eikenberg, who nominally reported to the Secretary, is a significant player (and an annoyance to many) but he appears to be acting entirely on his own and not presenting his bosses' policy decisions.

And then there are the political aides, the people the President brought with him from his campaign. They don't seem to have earned much respect from any of the professionals, and are typically seen as an impediment by the military and intelligence professionals as they maneuver to control the flow of information and access to the president. David Axelrod comes across as the archetype of this group, heavily involved in policy decisions but with political rather than operational considerations. His debates with Obama over the nomination of Hillary Clinton as Secretary are a case in point, with Axelrod arguing strongly that she simply cannot be trusted, (Why Obama did choose her remains a mystery that Woodward does not explore in this book.)

By the end of this narrative, General McChrystal has been fired over remarks made my his staff that appeared in Rolling Stone, Nd Director of Natuonal Intelligence Dennis Blair had been fired after losing a power struggle with the CIA. Not long after the events of this book, General Petraeus was fired, it was said, over an affair that became too public, CIA director Panetta was fired, reportedly for not endorsing the rapid withdrawal from Iraq, and Secretary Clinton resigned, perhaps to prepare for her Presidential run and to avoid becoming too strongly associated with what was becoming a failed strategy in Afghanistan. For that story we'll have to look for Woodward's next book.

This fine book takes us inside the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department and tells the story of how Obama, Clinton, Jones and the military created our current strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also provides insight into the inner workings of the foreign policy wing of the Obama administration.

Woodward does an extraordinary job of getting detailed accounts of top secret White House and Pentagon meetings, and frequently places us in the middle of discussions between the most important players in government. He takes us inside the rooms of the White House, and inside the heads of Obama, Biden, Petraeus, Jones and other key players. I'm sure this book will be read with interest by politicians, historians and policy makers.

Significant drama unfolds in this book as key players in the military and the Obama administration clash over the search for the best policy. The military thinks the best way to win is by sending many troops and accepting the inevitability of a long war; Obama wants to explore various strategies that might help us succeed while ensuring that we have a viable exit strategy. The struggle to reconcile these two views makes for many exciting scenes, and will provide ammunition for people on both sides who want to pick heroes. I enjoyed reading how Biden fought, unsuccessfully, to ensure that we did not engage in another Viet Nam. Others will probably cheer for Mullen and Petraeus, who take a hard line in their fight for more troops and an open ended engagement. Everyone will be interested to see how Obama weaves a path between these two extremes.

In most instances, the author makes a good faith effort to maintain a neutral stance. This is the right policy, and ensures both that the reader trusts the author, and that the principle players will continue to give him the interviews he needs to write the next volume in his remarkable series of books on recent Presidential administrations.

If I like the book so much, why then do I give it only 4 stars? The book is so scrupulously neutral that the author fails to ever develop any overriding themes, most likely for fear that it would begin to sort the players into "good guys" and "bad guys." Without a major theme, the book remains merely an extraordinary record of what is happening inside government, and not a commentary that provides us with a framework that serves as a means for providing insight and vision into American politics and policy.

Nevertheless, I highly recommend this book, and believe that it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how the Obama administration works, and how we developed our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A lot of nonsense from both the right and left would stop if more pundits and bloggers read this book. It would, of course, be particularly helpful if they read it with an open mind. Almost everyone who picks this book up and reads it through to the end will learn something of interest.

In the book, Obama emerges as a vacillating president, wary of making tough decisions, isolated in his White House almost like Mr. Karzai is isolated in Kabul. While the US foreign policy is shaped by powerful players: the senior senators, the DoD, the State Department, the lobbies, the Intelligence community, the role of a president has almost been reduced to a cheerleader for an pre-election masquerade. He has been led down the garden path. He emerges someone who emphasizes not the US interests, but rather: would the conditions in Afghanistan be conducive to be reelected. But there is a systemic problem with the system: needs of maintaining of a powerful US global empire clashes with democratic election cycle at home. The election cycle is a king, making strategic policy decisions difficult, particularly when the global empire is becoming more expansive (and expensive). One wonders if anyone could square this circle.

Another problem: the top diplomat position of the Secretary of State traditionally goes to a non-diplomat in the US. In this case, the appointment of politically-engaged and prone to "megaphone diplomacy" Mrs. Hilary Clinton has been disastrous in my view. Her State Department takes an unusual hard-line. She a powerful lady, no question, but one wonders if anyone is telling the truth to the "Flying Dutchman" on her non-stop missions abroad. What is Obama Grand Strategy? His policy is looking shaky because of the looming financial tsunami. Then, there is China... China declared its own indigenous aircraft-carrier program. China's first aircraft carrier group will be built by 2014-15. The 100 billion that America is spending annually on hunting down insurgents in Afghanistan in Pakistan would be more wisely spent on refitting and retraining the US Navy. Adding more money and troops to the Afghan waste basket is a strategic disaster in the making for the United Sates.

In the "Obama Wars", the President has been pitted against the powerful US defense establishment which thinks strategically only on occasion. Putting tactical anti-insurgency as a cornerstone of its policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan has been a disaster. It's an easy way out. But it is revealing: for a observer like myself, it reveals two big problems with America's otherwise well-educated and well-trained political class. First, it's its absolute obsession with winning (America has a very sports-oriented culture). We must win in Afghanistan. Second: the US is government is quintessentially a medieval patchwork of competing principalities. These two issues make strategic decision-making very difficult. There are some bad omens, both for Obama and for America, which will be revealed to a careful reader of this book.