Volume 5 (History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II)
BySamuel Eliot Morison★ ★ ★ ★ ★ | |
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆ | |
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ★ ☆ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ |
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Readers` Reviews
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
raghuveer
Well written. Engrossing. Incredibly detailed history down to who sunk what uboat. He faults the Navy for our total lack of preparedness for the submarine war on our shipping. He faults Navy & Army for personal power struggles that prevented coordination of our war effort. A sobering history.
★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆
mike farrell
Not only were there typographical errors but it was not proofread by anyone who knew anything about the vessel;s being pictured. The tanker on page 192 is not a Liberty ship. Tthe type XXI submarine was pictured twice when the text was describing the buildup of the German submarine fleet early in the war, The type XXI was not available until the last few months of the war.
On page 26 the the main armament of the battleship is incorrectly placed on the stern. On page 136 it incorrectly states that the Bismark was 8 miles from Brest when it was sunk. Why three almost identical pictures of the Hood? Why two pictures of the little used PB2Y and no full view of the very important B24? Why a three page photo spread of the Nelson which played almost no role in the battle of the Atlantic. Why so much about the Beaufighter when there is no record that Icould find that it ever attacked a submarine? This book was ruined by incredibly sloppy editing.
On page 26 the the main armament of the battleship is incorrectly placed on the stern. On page 136 it incorrectly states that the Bismark was 8 miles from Brest when it was sunk. Why three almost identical pictures of the Hood? Why two pictures of the little used PB2Y and no full view of the very important B24? Why a three page photo spread of the Nelson which played almost no role in the battle of the Atlantic. Why so much about the Beaufighter when there is no record that Icould find that it ever attacked a submarine? This book was ruined by incredibly sloppy editing.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
rambu
Each of Samuel Eliot Morison's histories of United States naval operations in World War are comprehensive, clear, and beautifully written. He clearly did try to get what insights he could about what had happened on the Japanese side, although I wish there were more of these. It is striking that, even though he was writing in the immediate post-war period, he always treats the Japanese with respect.
This book details the dramatic six-month struggle for the control of the waters around the island of Guadalcanal, from the Americans' landing in August 1942 through the final night evacuation of their remaining land forces by the Japanese in February 1943. It vividly conveys the horror of the initial humiliating American defeat at Savo Island, as well as the bravery, sacrifice, and skill that characterized the Americans' conduct three months later in the decisive two-day Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Throughout, the writing reflects Morison's deep familiarity with ships and the sea; the cosmopolitan outlook of a Boston Brahmin who grew up on Beacon Hill; and his conviction that the writing of history demanded art as well as accuracy, insight, and a dogged pursuit of facts.
The results are reflected throughout this book, as evidenced by the following excerpt from his description of the Battle of Cape Esperance, where the Americans first proved themselves the equal of the Japanese at night-fighting:
“In this furious night clash there were few men who could qualify as spectators only. None of our ships was air-conditioned and ventilation was nil with Condition Zed set; temperature below rose to over 150 degrees and sailors working in closed compartments heard little and saw less. Men on darkened bridges were too engrossed in keeping station on the black loom of the ships ahead – no easy task this, to apprehend a sudden speed and course change though the blinding flash and smoke of forward guns. Gun control crews, like men with tunnel vision, saw only the target under fire, viewing it down a long line of tracers. The gunners themselves kept their eyes on dial, valve or powder case; each team member had a single special function. But as the battle reached its climax two men in “San Francisco”’s scout plane saw the whole thing as a panorama. The pilot, Lieutenant John A. Thomas, flew over the antagonists where his flares and float lights could be used if requested. . . . Against an ocean glistening with a delicate sheen from star shell, he saw red ribbons of tracer fire, the white thin cones of searchlight beams, the sullen red glow of hits, the multicolored fountains raised by shell splashes, more beautiful than any grandes eaux of a princely park. Then “Boise’‘s punishment began. A massive orange blossom of flame arose from her, unfolding as it flew skyward. Goodbye “Boise,” thought Lieutenant Thomas.”
This book details the dramatic six-month struggle for the control of the waters around the island of Guadalcanal, from the Americans' landing in August 1942 through the final night evacuation of their remaining land forces by the Japanese in February 1943. It vividly conveys the horror of the initial humiliating American defeat at Savo Island, as well as the bravery, sacrifice, and skill that characterized the Americans' conduct three months later in the decisive two-day Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Throughout, the writing reflects Morison's deep familiarity with ships and the sea; the cosmopolitan outlook of a Boston Brahmin who grew up on Beacon Hill; and his conviction that the writing of history demanded art as well as accuracy, insight, and a dogged pursuit of facts.
The results are reflected throughout this book, as evidenced by the following excerpt from his description of the Battle of Cape Esperance, where the Americans first proved themselves the equal of the Japanese at night-fighting:
“In this furious night clash there were few men who could qualify as spectators only. None of our ships was air-conditioned and ventilation was nil with Condition Zed set; temperature below rose to over 150 degrees and sailors working in closed compartments heard little and saw less. Men on darkened bridges were too engrossed in keeping station on the black loom of the ships ahead – no easy task this, to apprehend a sudden speed and course change though the blinding flash and smoke of forward guns. Gun control crews, like men with tunnel vision, saw only the target under fire, viewing it down a long line of tracers. The gunners themselves kept their eyes on dial, valve or powder case; each team member had a single special function. But as the battle reached its climax two men in “San Francisco”’s scout plane saw the whole thing as a panorama. The pilot, Lieutenant John A. Thomas, flew over the antagonists where his flares and float lights could be used if requested. . . . Against an ocean glistening with a delicate sheen from star shell, he saw red ribbons of tracer fire, the white thin cones of searchlight beams, the sullen red glow of hits, the multicolored fountains raised by shell splashes, more beautiful than any grandes eaux of a princely park. Then “Boise’‘s punishment began. A massive orange blossom of flame arose from her, unfolding as it flew skyward. Goodbye “Boise,” thought Lieutenant Thomas.”
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★ ★ ★ ★ ★
peter dudley
When the US entered World War II, the nation faced an abundance of tasks, and one of them that was given some importance was the need for official histories of the conflict. American military and political leadership saw the importance of recording American achievements in the war, to explain to warriors, veterans, taxpayers, and future generations why their young men had been sent into battles and what they had done. The question was how to do it.
The First World War's official history had produced 17 volumes of trivia, only of use to the lumber and printing industries. General George Marshall's solution was the legendary "Green books" written by a team of historians, but the Navy's was a single man: Harvard maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morison. In 1942, he offered his services to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to take on the task himself. FDR gave him the job and the stripes of a lieutenant commander to give him some weight in doing so.
He had the prior record -- to research his 1942 biography of Christopher Columbus, Morison retraced the explorer's route. The Navy wasn't thrilled -- Admiral of the Fleet Ernest King wanted no part of Morison's project. King's tone was "Don't tell the public anything until after the war. Then just tell them we won." But King gave Morison full access to the Navy, and he went to sea, personally observing the invasion of French North Africa from a light cruiser.
With a crew of talented researchers, Morison worked hard. He interviewed American naval warriors as soon as possible after battles, to get their stories while they were fresh and not inflated, conflated, or tainted. He read the various logs, waded through archives, and studied the maps.
His 15 volumes of books appeared between 1947 and 1962, published by Little, Brown.They did not bear the official Navy imprimatur, but were as close as the Navy would come to having an official history. Morison aimed his books at the general reader, not the technical readers, translating Navy jargon into clear, often classic, prose.
His judgments were made of and at the time. His analysis on the disasters that led to Save Island has now been seen to be flawed. His material on intelligence is hampered by the fact that the ULTRA codebreaking material was not available to him. Certainly the tone of the writing is patriotic and respectful, particularly to the ordinary Sailors and Marines -- less so to senior officers he believed were ineffective.
However, his writing and overall research still stand up, decades later. He conveys many things about how the US Navy fought World War II, from grand strategy to the emotions of an AA gunner on an oiler in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Reviewers have agreed -- Sir John Keegan called the series the best to come out of the conflict. Volume 3, "The RIsing Sun in the Pacific," which describes the disastrous battles from Pearl Harbor and thereafter to the "First Light" of the Doolittle Raid, won the Bancroft Prize in 1949.
The prose will, however, remain timeless. To give an example, Morison's coda to the Battle of the Surigao Strait, in "Leyte," the final encounter between dreadnoughts. Other writers would merely note that the battle ended the dreadnought age. Wrote Morison: "When (the battleship) Mississippi discharged her twelve 14-inch guns at (the Japanese battleship) Yamashiro at a range of 19,790 yards, at 0408 October 25, 1944, she was not only giving that battleship the coup de grace, but firing a funeral salute to a finished era of naval warfare. One can imagine all the ghosts of all great admirals from Raleigh to Jellicoe standing at attention as (the) Battle Line went into oblivion, along with the Greek phalanx, the Spanish wall of pikemen, the English longbow, and the row-galley tactics of Salamis and Lepanto."
Just for that alone, these books should be read forever.
The First World War's official history had produced 17 volumes of trivia, only of use to the lumber and printing industries. General George Marshall's solution was the legendary "Green books" written by a team of historians, but the Navy's was a single man: Harvard maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morison. In 1942, he offered his services to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to take on the task himself. FDR gave him the job and the stripes of a lieutenant commander to give him some weight in doing so.
He had the prior record -- to research his 1942 biography of Christopher Columbus, Morison retraced the explorer's route. The Navy wasn't thrilled -- Admiral of the Fleet Ernest King wanted no part of Morison's project. King's tone was "Don't tell the public anything until after the war. Then just tell them we won." But King gave Morison full access to the Navy, and he went to sea, personally observing the invasion of French North Africa from a light cruiser.
With a crew of talented researchers, Morison worked hard. He interviewed American naval warriors as soon as possible after battles, to get their stories while they were fresh and not inflated, conflated, or tainted. He read the various logs, waded through archives, and studied the maps.
His 15 volumes of books appeared between 1947 and 1962, published by Little, Brown.They did not bear the official Navy imprimatur, but were as close as the Navy would come to having an official history. Morison aimed his books at the general reader, not the technical readers, translating Navy jargon into clear, often classic, prose.
His judgments were made of and at the time. His analysis on the disasters that led to Save Island has now been seen to be flawed. His material on intelligence is hampered by the fact that the ULTRA codebreaking material was not available to him. Certainly the tone of the writing is patriotic and respectful, particularly to the ordinary Sailors and Marines -- less so to senior officers he believed were ineffective.
However, his writing and overall research still stand up, decades later. He conveys many things about how the US Navy fought World War II, from grand strategy to the emotions of an AA gunner on an oiler in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Reviewers have agreed -- Sir John Keegan called the series the best to come out of the conflict. Volume 3, "The RIsing Sun in the Pacific," which describes the disastrous battles from Pearl Harbor and thereafter to the "First Light" of the Doolittle Raid, won the Bancroft Prize in 1949.
The prose will, however, remain timeless. To give an example, Morison's coda to the Battle of the Surigao Strait, in "Leyte," the final encounter between dreadnoughts. Other writers would merely note that the battle ended the dreadnought age. Wrote Morison: "When (the battleship) Mississippi discharged her twelve 14-inch guns at (the Japanese battleship) Yamashiro at a range of 19,790 yards, at 0408 October 25, 1944, she was not only giving that battleship the coup de grace, but firing a funeral salute to a finished era of naval warfare. One can imagine all the ghosts of all great admirals from Raleigh to Jellicoe standing at attention as (the) Battle Line went into oblivion, along with the Greek phalanx, the Spanish wall of pikemen, the English longbow, and the row-galley tactics of Salamis and Lepanto."
Just for that alone, these books should be read forever.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
diego salazar
http://www.the store.com/gp/product/B000HEDEHK?ref_=cm_cr-mr-title IF THIS DOES NOT WORK, KEEPING LOOKING, because there are listing for complete sets at the time of this writing starting at $175 elsewhere on the store.
Monumental, engrossing, well written with loving care by Morison and well researched with documented sources. One of a kind, 15 Volumes which must be purchased and read by any W.W. II buff or interested person. (Which might not be that many these days, as some of our youngsters do not even know what D-Day was,on June 6, 1944 in Normandy, France.) The broad scope of the Naval conflict is there, along with interesting details whenever possible. The U.S. Marine Corps is included with all of their guts and glory.
One caveat: There are omissions, e.g. IV CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS, re: the Battle of Midway and Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team breaking the Japanese naval code before the Battle of Midway (perhaps at the time of writing by Morison there was a security reason).
There is even a little "humor," as such, under incredible trying circumstances. In Volume XI, page 188, Morrison describes a skipper of an American LCI (Landing Craft Infantry) on D-Day, June 6, 1944:
"After landing American troops at Utah on the afternoon of D-Day, he was sent back to the Solent, where he received orders to load British troops at one of the local hards. Having done so he awaited orders, but none came. Observing an LCI convoy making up in the Solent he decided to join it, lest his passengers run out of food while waiting. As he was passing the Isle of Wight a signal station blinked to him, 'Where do you think you are going?' to which the skipper replied, 'I don't know!' After an interval came the the answer, 'Proceed!'" (Amen) We also learn in volume X THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON, that Hitler used U-Boats in the Atlantic to forecast the weather for what is known as "The Battle of the Bulge." Hitler wanted the foul weather to stop Allied air attacks, which is what happened at the beginning of the battle.
The main titles to the volumes are (all have further sub-titles to each volume):
I THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC;
II OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICAN WATERS;
III THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC;
IV CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS;
V THE STRUGGLE FOR GUADALCANAL;
VI BREAKING THE BISMARCKS BARRIER;
VII ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS;
VIII NEW GUINEA AND THE MARIANAS;
IX SICILY - SALERNO - ANZIO;
X THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON;
XI THE INVASION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY;
XII LEYTE;
XIII THE LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LUZON, MINDANAO, THE VISAYAS;
XIV VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC;
XV SUPPLEMENT AND GENERAL INDEX (which includes in this volume the illustrations for all book dust covers with explanations- if your copy does not come with the book dust covers.)
With that said, I would have much shorter reference work handy to help steer through these 15 volumes and all the events in them, such as James L. Stokesbury's "A Short History of World War II," which really helps to put events into a succinct perspective (e.g. "The Battle of the Java Sea.")
For general reference: "O2S4 MEC:"
Objective (Simplicity);
Offensive, Sprit of;
Superiority at Point of Contact (Economy of Force);
Surprise (Security);
Security (Surprise);
Simplicity (Objective);
Movement (Mobility);
Economy of Force (Superiority at Point of Contact);
Cooperation (Unity of Command)
Monumental, engrossing, well written with loving care by Morison and well researched with documented sources. One of a kind, 15 Volumes which must be purchased and read by any W.W. II buff or interested person. (Which might not be that many these days, as some of our youngsters do not even know what D-Day was,on June 6, 1944 in Normandy, France.) The broad scope of the Naval conflict is there, along with interesting details whenever possible. The U.S. Marine Corps is included with all of their guts and glory.
One caveat: There are omissions, e.g. IV CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS, re: the Battle of Midway and Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team breaking the Japanese naval code before the Battle of Midway (perhaps at the time of writing by Morison there was a security reason).
There is even a little "humor," as such, under incredible trying circumstances. In Volume XI, page 188, Morrison describes a skipper of an American LCI (Landing Craft Infantry) on D-Day, June 6, 1944:
"After landing American troops at Utah on the afternoon of D-Day, he was sent back to the Solent, where he received orders to load British troops at one of the local hards. Having done so he awaited orders, but none came. Observing an LCI convoy making up in the Solent he decided to join it, lest his passengers run out of food while waiting. As he was passing the Isle of Wight a signal station blinked to him, 'Where do you think you are going?' to which the skipper replied, 'I don't know!' After an interval came the the answer, 'Proceed!'" (Amen) We also learn in volume X THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON, that Hitler used U-Boats in the Atlantic to forecast the weather for what is known as "The Battle of the Bulge." Hitler wanted the foul weather to stop Allied air attacks, which is what happened at the beginning of the battle.
The main titles to the volumes are (all have further sub-titles to each volume):
I THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC;
II OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICAN WATERS;
III THE RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC;
IV CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS;
V THE STRUGGLE FOR GUADALCANAL;
VI BREAKING THE BISMARCKS BARRIER;
VII ALEUTIANS, GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS;
VIII NEW GUINEA AND THE MARIANAS;
IX SICILY - SALERNO - ANZIO;
X THE ATLANTIC BATTLE WON;
XI THE INVASION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY;
XII LEYTE;
XIII THE LIBERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LUZON, MINDANAO, THE VISAYAS;
XIV VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC;
XV SUPPLEMENT AND GENERAL INDEX (which includes in this volume the illustrations for all book dust covers with explanations- if your copy does not come with the book dust covers.)
With that said, I would have much shorter reference work handy to help steer through these 15 volumes and all the events in them, such as James L. Stokesbury's "A Short History of World War II," which really helps to put events into a succinct perspective (e.g. "The Battle of the Java Sea.")
For general reference: "O2S4 MEC:"
Objective (Simplicity);
Offensive, Sprit of;
Superiority at Point of Contact (Economy of Force);
Surprise (Security);
Security (Surprise);
Simplicity (Objective);
Movement (Mobility);
Economy of Force (Superiority at Point of Contact);
Cooperation (Unity of Command)
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
josie harvey
We now rightly have difficulty conceiving the life or death struggle fought almost 70 years ago by men mostly now gone, near far-off and obscure Pacific islands, and against the once powerful Imperial Japanese Navy. Morison's description of that struggle --- the naval equivalent of hand-to-hand fighting --- inspires and awes all at once. This is a story not many Americans know --- there were more sailors than marines lost during the Guadalcanal campaign, and their sacrifice has almost been forgotten.
This volume, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal," is unquestionably the best of the entire collection. I first read the complete series when I was a teenager, living at home with my late father, who had been a naval officer "for the duration" in World War II. I remember he would at times "tear up" during his nightly reading. I gave him the entire set a few years before he passed away, and he was able to read them a second time. Now they are mine and I have made still a third passage through them, savoring and rediscovering them. I plan on at least one more journey through them in the coming years.
Morison often masterfully combines classical allusions and modern warfare; he does does his best work in this volume because he clearly intends to. It is difficult not to be moved by his description of the great naval action on the night of November 12-13, 1942. Two Admirals, Scott and Callaghan, were killed the same wild night in a naval battle in which, to paraphrase Morison, "both sides knew that no quarter would be given." The picture Morison paints of the next morning, when battered sailors in sinking ships stood by their guns and continued to fire on the enemy, is one that will always endure for me. Highly, highly recommended.
This volume, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal," is unquestionably the best of the entire collection. I first read the complete series when I was a teenager, living at home with my late father, who had been a naval officer "for the duration" in World War II. I remember he would at times "tear up" during his nightly reading. I gave him the entire set a few years before he passed away, and he was able to read them a second time. Now they are mine and I have made still a third passage through them, savoring and rediscovering them. I plan on at least one more journey through them in the coming years.
Morison often masterfully combines classical allusions and modern warfare; he does does his best work in this volume because he clearly intends to. It is difficult not to be moved by his description of the great naval action on the night of November 12-13, 1942. Two Admirals, Scott and Callaghan, were killed the same wild night in a naval battle in which, to paraphrase Morison, "both sides knew that no quarter would be given." The picture Morison paints of the next morning, when battered sailors in sinking ships stood by their guns and continued to fire on the enemy, is one that will always endure for me. Highly, highly recommended.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
j hann eir ksson
Battles for Mindoro, Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Manila, Palawan, Zamboanga, Panay, Cebu, Mindanao, Brunei, Tarakan and Balikpapan were dramatic and bloody, but waged more or less at the same moment as Iwo Jima and Okinawa, they were destined to remain in the shadow of those two latter bloodbaths. This old but still very relevant book by admiral Morison is probably the best source on those campaigns.
Admiral Morison's writing is as always very clear and his style very pleasant. The book is easy and interesting to read, even for those (like me) without any military or naval background. There is a lot of information, with the analysis reduced to what is really necessary. I learned a lot from this book and I was quite surprised by the trouble the Japanese gave to Americans in this very advanced stage of war, when the difference in military potentials betwen Japan and USA became overwhelming.
This book begins with the campaign of Mindoro island (12 December 1944 - 10 February 1945), which on the land was extended more by the dense jungle and bad weather than by Japanese resistance - but on the sea it was a different matter. Kamikazes and Japanese fast motor boats made the Mindoro fight a very difficult one for Americans and Japanese fleet made also a surprise sortie against American beachhead - almost the last offensive move of this kind on Japanese side.
The second chapter of the book describes the horrible ordeal of main force of American Pacific fleet, still commanded by admiral Halsey, during the extremely violent "Cobra" hurricane on 18 December 1944, which surprised all allied meteorologists and par consequence also skippers of Americans ships by its sudden birth from a seemingly harmless tropical storm. This tragedy remains one of the worst natural disasters which struck US Navy in all its history.
The Lingayen Gulf landing (9-13 January 1945), which was the opening move in the campaign of Luzon, was not opposed by the Japanese on land, but once again the kamikazes (and also later Japanese submarines and fast motor boats) contested strongly American offensive on the sea. The damage inflicted by the kamikazes was such that all information about it was censored - Americans didn't want the Japanese to realise too fast how succesful were their new tactics. Losses on American side included Rear-Admiral Theodore E. Chandler, who died in particularly atrocious way after a kamikaze hit the bridge of his flagship, heavy cruiser USS "Louisville".
The bloody fight for Luzon, with particularly the very costly (for both sides) urban battle in Manila, is very well described, as are the operations to clear the Manila Bay, with especially the rare (in Pacific war) combination of airborne and naval assault on Corregidor. In the same time Halsey's main force went to the South China Sea to try to locate and destroy the remaining Japanese major surface combattants, especially the battleships "Ise" and "Hiyuga" and cruisers "Ashigara" and "Oyodo". He didn't succeed in this search, but he managed to mount the first attack ever on Japanese bases and shipping in Indochina, sinking in particular a great number of precious tankers.
All other fights are also very interesting, although more one sided, as after Luzon campaign there were no more enough Japanese planes in the Philippines to mount any really dangerous attacks. Still, there were many interesting episodes in those bloody battles, including the penetration of some of American smaller ships into rivers on Mindanao to help advancing army troops. Frequently scrapping their bottoms on the sand and removing obstacles like collapsed bridges, some of those warships went almost to the center of the island...
Submarine operations in the last months of Pacific War are also superficially described, including the extremely rare kind of accident when two US submarines, operating in principle in two different sectors, collided when both submerged - and both skippers were convinced that they were rammed by a Japanese sub... Still, this is the only part of the book which is rather weak. If you want really good information about US submarines operations in Pacific War, THE book to read is Clay Blair's "Silent victory".
The book ends with the description of possibly the most unusual US Navy operation of the World War II, the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, a joint effort by US Navy, US Army, US Marine Corps and Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese military intelligence to collect information and conduct sabotages and guerilla atacks in Japanese occupied areas in China.
One of the operations of SACO included a horse riding guerilla group composed of Americans, Chinese and Mongolians, which operated in Inner Mongolia (it also doubled as mobile meteorological station) - this 1st Mongolian Cavalry Squadron, USN was the only cavalry unit of US Navy in its long history... In 1953 a movie with Richard Widmark, called "Destination Gobi", was made about this unusual operation.
Some of SACO guerillas operated also river and coastal junks armed with machine guns and bazookas and occasionally clashed with similar Japanese operated embarkations - in one occasion in August 1945 American sailors boarded a Japanese armed junk with pistols and swords (!) and captured it.
In conclusion I can only warmly recommend this book for all those interested in military or naval history - and for those interested by World War II in the Pacific, this is a very precious and quite unique position. Enjoy!
Admiral Morison's writing is as always very clear and his style very pleasant. The book is easy and interesting to read, even for those (like me) without any military or naval background. There is a lot of information, with the analysis reduced to what is really necessary. I learned a lot from this book and I was quite surprised by the trouble the Japanese gave to Americans in this very advanced stage of war, when the difference in military potentials betwen Japan and USA became overwhelming.
This book begins with the campaign of Mindoro island (12 December 1944 - 10 February 1945), which on the land was extended more by the dense jungle and bad weather than by Japanese resistance - but on the sea it was a different matter. Kamikazes and Japanese fast motor boats made the Mindoro fight a very difficult one for Americans and Japanese fleet made also a surprise sortie against American beachhead - almost the last offensive move of this kind on Japanese side.
The second chapter of the book describes the horrible ordeal of main force of American Pacific fleet, still commanded by admiral Halsey, during the extremely violent "Cobra" hurricane on 18 December 1944, which surprised all allied meteorologists and par consequence also skippers of Americans ships by its sudden birth from a seemingly harmless tropical storm. This tragedy remains one of the worst natural disasters which struck US Navy in all its history.
The Lingayen Gulf landing (9-13 January 1945), which was the opening move in the campaign of Luzon, was not opposed by the Japanese on land, but once again the kamikazes (and also later Japanese submarines and fast motor boats) contested strongly American offensive on the sea. The damage inflicted by the kamikazes was such that all information about it was censored - Americans didn't want the Japanese to realise too fast how succesful were their new tactics. Losses on American side included Rear-Admiral Theodore E. Chandler, who died in particularly atrocious way after a kamikaze hit the bridge of his flagship, heavy cruiser USS "Louisville".
The bloody fight for Luzon, with particularly the very costly (for both sides) urban battle in Manila, is very well described, as are the operations to clear the Manila Bay, with especially the rare (in Pacific war) combination of airborne and naval assault on Corregidor. In the same time Halsey's main force went to the South China Sea to try to locate and destroy the remaining Japanese major surface combattants, especially the battleships "Ise" and "Hiyuga" and cruisers "Ashigara" and "Oyodo". He didn't succeed in this search, but he managed to mount the first attack ever on Japanese bases and shipping in Indochina, sinking in particular a great number of precious tankers.
All other fights are also very interesting, although more one sided, as after Luzon campaign there were no more enough Japanese planes in the Philippines to mount any really dangerous attacks. Still, there were many interesting episodes in those bloody battles, including the penetration of some of American smaller ships into rivers on Mindanao to help advancing army troops. Frequently scrapping their bottoms on the sand and removing obstacles like collapsed bridges, some of those warships went almost to the center of the island...
Submarine operations in the last months of Pacific War are also superficially described, including the extremely rare kind of accident when two US submarines, operating in principle in two different sectors, collided when both submerged - and both skippers were convinced that they were rammed by a Japanese sub... Still, this is the only part of the book which is rather weak. If you want really good information about US submarines operations in Pacific War, THE book to read is Clay Blair's "Silent victory".
The book ends with the description of possibly the most unusual US Navy operation of the World War II, the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, a joint effort by US Navy, US Army, US Marine Corps and Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese military intelligence to collect information and conduct sabotages and guerilla atacks in Japanese occupied areas in China.
One of the operations of SACO included a horse riding guerilla group composed of Americans, Chinese and Mongolians, which operated in Inner Mongolia (it also doubled as mobile meteorological station) - this 1st Mongolian Cavalry Squadron, USN was the only cavalry unit of US Navy in its long history... In 1953 a movie with Richard Widmark, called "Destination Gobi", was made about this unusual operation.
Some of SACO guerillas operated also river and coastal junks armed with machine guns and bazookas and occasionally clashed with similar Japanese operated embarkations - in one occasion in August 1945 American sailors boarded a Japanese armed junk with pistols and swords (!) and captured it.
In conclusion I can only warmly recommend this book for all those interested in military or naval history - and for those interested by World War II in the Pacific, this is a very precious and quite unique position. Enjoy!
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
kimbarly
This is a very honest account of last three years of Battle of Atlantic - but because it was kept short, it is also by necessity somehow superficial. As it is a story of US naval operations, British and Canadian participation is described very superficially - it also clearly lacks some more insight into the German and Italian point of view.
The book has however many strong points in its favor. It describes in detail and clearly all the tools the Allies used to win this mighty struggle. I was already quite familiar with most of them: the ASDIC, the convoy system, the corvettes, the escort-carriers and their killer groups, the "hedgehog", the "squid", the centimetric radar, the Liberty ships, etc. But I was myself surprised by the role played by the High Frequency Direction Finder (HF/DF), the FIDO anti-submarine torpedo and rocket armed planes. German inventions - METOX, accoustic torpedoes (GNATs), milk-cow U-Boats, flak U-Boats, midget submarines and of course the snorkel - are also described very well.
Some moments of this great confrontation are described in more detail and they are a very pleasant read:
- the battle of the ONS-5 convoy, between 29 April and 6 May 1943; this large convoy of 46 transports and tankers, escorted by 19 different warships (7 destroyers, 4 frigates, 4 corvettes, 2 sloops and 2 armed trawlers), was attacked by a grand total of 51 (fifty one) U-Boats! This was the largest number of U-Boats launched against one convoy during the whole Battle of Atlantic and also the greatest number of submarines ever used in one battle. In this fierce battle 13 merchantmen were lost (9 British, 3 American and 1 Norwegian), but Kriegsmarine payed a heavy price, losing 6 submarines.
- the Bay of Biscay offensive (March-December 1943), in which allied aviation hunted mercilessly the U-Boats leaving or coming back to their lairs in occupied France - and also kept a careful watch for Axis blockade runners. This operation inflicted heavy losses to Germans, causing the destruction of 32 U-Boats, as well as one German blocade-runner and three small destroyers. The price paid by the allies was hefty - in average ten planes were lost in Bay of Biscay every month, although mostly because of mechanical problems, with only a minority being shot down by the U-Boats and long-range JU-88 fighter-bombers.
- the "Snorkel Blitz" in European waters (December 1944-April 1945) - this unexpected revival of U-Boat menace caused a considerable shock to allied high command, especially in the first two months - this is also an episode in Battle of Atlantic which is rather little known and therefore very interesting.
- Operation "Teardrop" (April-May 1945) - this exceptional fight was the result of a last effort made by Doenitz and a succesful bluff and intoxication by III Reich secret services; allied high command was convinced by intelligence planted by Axis agents that a pack of six U-Boats, named "Seewolf", would hit the East Coast of United States with some new, unconventionnal weapons. To intercept those submarines US Navy deployed an exceptionnally strong naval force in two interception lines in the middle of Atlantic. Trying to find just six elusive, snorkel-equipped submarines in the ocean was a mighty challenge indeed - but surprisingly US Navy managed to destroy five of them well before they even reached US territorial waters, and paid for it just with the loss of one destroyer-escort, USS "Frederick S. Davis", which on 24 April 1945 was hit by a GNAT launched by "U-546" and went down with 115 hands, as the last US warship lost in Atlantic theatre in WWII (U-546 was sunk later the same day).
Admiral Morison's writing is as always excellent, passionate and a pleasure to read, especially when he describes with real comitment some of the most dramatic individual fights. I think that the best moment in the book is the epic fight on 22 April 1944 between USS "Buckley" and U-66, concluded by the hand-to-hand combat, which included probably the only naval casualty in WWII caused by the throwing of a Bowie knife... The capture of U-505 by USS "Guadalcanal" killer group on 4 June 1944 is of course also described in detail, as is the sinking on 24 December 1944 at Cherbourg of Belgian troop transport "Leopoldville" filled with GIs, and also many, many other dramatic fights.
Being Polish I very much appreciated that the efforts of smaller allied navy forces (Free French, Dutch, Norwegian and Polish) were mentioned. The tragic loss of our destroyer ORP "Orkan", sunk by "U-378" with a GNAT torpedo on 8 October 1943 and the success of our another destroyer, ORP "Garland", which on 19 September 1944 sunk "U-407" in Mediterranean were not forgotten.
The one thing I liked maybe a little bit less was a kind of violent animosity author feels against Doenitz, when in the same time greatly complementing Raeder... Also, it must be said, that this book is quite old and author got some details clearly wrong - with a better knowledge of German and Italian sources the history of Battle of Atlantic is currently better known than in the 50s. A much larger and more complete study exists: "Hitler's U-Boat war" by Clive Blair (but at 2000 pages in two volumes this thing is a monster!).
Still, this is a very honest, very clearly and very well written account of US Navy operations against U-Boats, Italian submarines and Axis blocade-runners in the Atlantic (and also Indian Ocean). Even after almost 60 years, this is probably the best thing available on the market as an introduction to more thorough studies on the topic. Enjoy!
The book has however many strong points in its favor. It describes in detail and clearly all the tools the Allies used to win this mighty struggle. I was already quite familiar with most of them: the ASDIC, the convoy system, the corvettes, the escort-carriers and their killer groups, the "hedgehog", the "squid", the centimetric radar, the Liberty ships, etc. But I was myself surprised by the role played by the High Frequency Direction Finder (HF/DF), the FIDO anti-submarine torpedo and rocket armed planes. German inventions - METOX, accoustic torpedoes (GNATs), milk-cow U-Boats, flak U-Boats, midget submarines and of course the snorkel - are also described very well.
Some moments of this great confrontation are described in more detail and they are a very pleasant read:
- the battle of the ONS-5 convoy, between 29 April and 6 May 1943; this large convoy of 46 transports and tankers, escorted by 19 different warships (7 destroyers, 4 frigates, 4 corvettes, 2 sloops and 2 armed trawlers), was attacked by a grand total of 51 (fifty one) U-Boats! This was the largest number of U-Boats launched against one convoy during the whole Battle of Atlantic and also the greatest number of submarines ever used in one battle. In this fierce battle 13 merchantmen were lost (9 British, 3 American and 1 Norwegian), but Kriegsmarine payed a heavy price, losing 6 submarines.
- the Bay of Biscay offensive (March-December 1943), in which allied aviation hunted mercilessly the U-Boats leaving or coming back to their lairs in occupied France - and also kept a careful watch for Axis blockade runners. This operation inflicted heavy losses to Germans, causing the destruction of 32 U-Boats, as well as one German blocade-runner and three small destroyers. The price paid by the allies was hefty - in average ten planes were lost in Bay of Biscay every month, although mostly because of mechanical problems, with only a minority being shot down by the U-Boats and long-range JU-88 fighter-bombers.
- the "Snorkel Blitz" in European waters (December 1944-April 1945) - this unexpected revival of U-Boat menace caused a considerable shock to allied high command, especially in the first two months - this is also an episode in Battle of Atlantic which is rather little known and therefore very interesting.
- Operation "Teardrop" (April-May 1945) - this exceptional fight was the result of a last effort made by Doenitz and a succesful bluff and intoxication by III Reich secret services; allied high command was convinced by intelligence planted by Axis agents that a pack of six U-Boats, named "Seewolf", would hit the East Coast of United States with some new, unconventionnal weapons. To intercept those submarines US Navy deployed an exceptionnally strong naval force in two interception lines in the middle of Atlantic. Trying to find just six elusive, snorkel-equipped submarines in the ocean was a mighty challenge indeed - but surprisingly US Navy managed to destroy five of them well before they even reached US territorial waters, and paid for it just with the loss of one destroyer-escort, USS "Frederick S. Davis", which on 24 April 1945 was hit by a GNAT launched by "U-546" and went down with 115 hands, as the last US warship lost in Atlantic theatre in WWII (U-546 was sunk later the same day).
Admiral Morison's writing is as always excellent, passionate and a pleasure to read, especially when he describes with real comitment some of the most dramatic individual fights. I think that the best moment in the book is the epic fight on 22 April 1944 between USS "Buckley" and U-66, concluded by the hand-to-hand combat, which included probably the only naval casualty in WWII caused by the throwing of a Bowie knife... The capture of U-505 by USS "Guadalcanal" killer group on 4 June 1944 is of course also described in detail, as is the sinking on 24 December 1944 at Cherbourg of Belgian troop transport "Leopoldville" filled with GIs, and also many, many other dramatic fights.
Being Polish I very much appreciated that the efforts of smaller allied navy forces (Free French, Dutch, Norwegian and Polish) were mentioned. The tragic loss of our destroyer ORP "Orkan", sunk by "U-378" with a GNAT torpedo on 8 October 1943 and the success of our another destroyer, ORP "Garland", which on 19 September 1944 sunk "U-407" in Mediterranean were not forgotten.
The one thing I liked maybe a little bit less was a kind of violent animosity author feels against Doenitz, when in the same time greatly complementing Raeder... Also, it must be said, that this book is quite old and author got some details clearly wrong - with a better knowledge of German and Italian sources the history of Battle of Atlantic is currently better known than in the 50s. A much larger and more complete study exists: "Hitler's U-Boat war" by Clive Blair (but at 2000 pages in two volumes this thing is a monster!).
Still, this is a very honest, very clearly and very well written account of US Navy operations against U-Boats, Italian submarines and Axis blocade-runners in the Atlantic (and also Indian Ocean). Even after almost 60 years, this is probably the best thing available on the market as an introduction to more thorough studies on the topic. Enjoy!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
ahmed asar
This fifth volume of the monumental work by Admiral S.E. Morison is the best yet (although I admit that I still have six more parts to read). Morison's writing is as always excellent and his research flawless but for this book the subject itself gave him the opportunity to use his talent to tell a first rate story in a first rate way.
The struggle for Guadalcanal was a very special and unique moment in the Pacific War, when allies (in this campaign USA, Australia and New Zealand) and Japan were evenly matched. Before Guadalcanal the Japanese dominated the battlefield (the defeat at Midway non obstant) and after this campaign the allies quickly acquired a superiority which Japan could not match. But during the six months of Gudalacanal epic struggle, both sides were equally strong - and that kind of strategic situation always produces extremely violent and deadly fights.
This excruciating pushing and shoving contest around Henderson Field airfield (on the land and in the air) and the waters surrounding Guadalcanal, Savo, Tulagi and Santa Cruz islands (on the sea) took a heavy toll on both sides. The list of major warships both sides lost between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 can give a good idea about the intensity of the fight:
USA and allies: two big aircraft carriers (USS "Wasp", USS "Hornet"), six heavy cruisers (USS "Quincy", USS "Vincennes", USS "Astoria", USS "Northampton", USS "Chicago" and HMAS "Canberra"), two light cruisers (USS "Atlanta", USS "Juneau"), fourteen destroyers (USS "Blue", USS "Cushing", USS "Laffey", USS "Barton", USS "Monssen", USS "Walke", USS "Preston", USS "Benham", USS "Porter", USS "O'Brien", USS "Duncan", USS "Jarvis", USS "Meredith", USS "De Haven") and two fast armed troop transports (converted destroyers, USS "Colhoun" and USS "Gregory")
Japan: two battleships ("Hiei", "Kirishima"), one light aircraft carrier ("Ryujo"), three heavy cruisers ("Kako", "Kinugasa", "Furutaka"), one light cruiser ("Yura") and eleven destroyers ("Mutsuki", "Fubuki", "Murakumo", "Asagiri", "Natsugumo", "Akatsuki", "Yudachi", "Ayanami", "Takanami", "Makigumo", "Yayoi").
Looking at this list it is easy to understand why the waters between Guadalcanal and Savo, where most of the engagements took place, were from this time on called Ironbottom Sound...
Morison's book describes well the fast changing fortunes of war, when one day victory was erased be the next day defeat. Admiral Goto, who was the second in command at the battle of Savo (8-9 August 1942), which was a great Japanese victory, was killed two months later in the battle of Cape Esperance (11-12 October 1942), which was a great American victory. Admiral Scott, who won at Cape Esperance, was himself killed one month later on the first day of the great four day long Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-15 November).
Many great events are described in this book like the greatest naval defeat in history of US Navy (Americans consider Pearl Harbour as a great defeat but do not count it as a naval battle), the only battle in which US Navy lost two admirals in one day and also the death of all five Sullivan brothers in one battle (an event which is a distant background to "Saving Private Ryan"). There is also the dark mystery surrounding the fate of one of US destroyers which, badly damaged, sailed in the night and was never seen again - the story of the final moments of this valiant ship and the 233 sailors from her crew will probably for ever remain untold...
I read this book very fast, as if it was a novel. It is an incredible account, accessible even to those (like me) who do not have any military or naval background. If you want to give a try to at least on of the 15 volumes of Morison' great history, it should be that one.
The struggle for Guadalcanal was a very special and unique moment in the Pacific War, when allies (in this campaign USA, Australia and New Zealand) and Japan were evenly matched. Before Guadalcanal the Japanese dominated the battlefield (the defeat at Midway non obstant) and after this campaign the allies quickly acquired a superiority which Japan could not match. But during the six months of Gudalacanal epic struggle, both sides were equally strong - and that kind of strategic situation always produces extremely violent and deadly fights.
This excruciating pushing and shoving contest around Henderson Field airfield (on the land and in the air) and the waters surrounding Guadalcanal, Savo, Tulagi and Santa Cruz islands (on the sea) took a heavy toll on both sides. The list of major warships both sides lost between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 can give a good idea about the intensity of the fight:
USA and allies: two big aircraft carriers (USS "Wasp", USS "Hornet"), six heavy cruisers (USS "Quincy", USS "Vincennes", USS "Astoria", USS "Northampton", USS "Chicago" and HMAS "Canberra"), two light cruisers (USS "Atlanta", USS "Juneau"), fourteen destroyers (USS "Blue", USS "Cushing", USS "Laffey", USS "Barton", USS "Monssen", USS "Walke", USS "Preston", USS "Benham", USS "Porter", USS "O'Brien", USS "Duncan", USS "Jarvis", USS "Meredith", USS "De Haven") and two fast armed troop transports (converted destroyers, USS "Colhoun" and USS "Gregory")
Japan: two battleships ("Hiei", "Kirishima"), one light aircraft carrier ("Ryujo"), three heavy cruisers ("Kako", "Kinugasa", "Furutaka"), one light cruiser ("Yura") and eleven destroyers ("Mutsuki", "Fubuki", "Murakumo", "Asagiri", "Natsugumo", "Akatsuki", "Yudachi", "Ayanami", "Takanami", "Makigumo", "Yayoi").
Looking at this list it is easy to understand why the waters between Guadalcanal and Savo, where most of the engagements took place, were from this time on called Ironbottom Sound...
Morison's book describes well the fast changing fortunes of war, when one day victory was erased be the next day defeat. Admiral Goto, who was the second in command at the battle of Savo (8-9 August 1942), which was a great Japanese victory, was killed two months later in the battle of Cape Esperance (11-12 October 1942), which was a great American victory. Admiral Scott, who won at Cape Esperance, was himself killed one month later on the first day of the great four day long Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (12-15 November).
Many great events are described in this book like the greatest naval defeat in history of US Navy (Americans consider Pearl Harbour as a great defeat but do not count it as a naval battle), the only battle in which US Navy lost two admirals in one day and also the death of all five Sullivan brothers in one battle (an event which is a distant background to "Saving Private Ryan"). There is also the dark mystery surrounding the fate of one of US destroyers which, badly damaged, sailed in the night and was never seen again - the story of the final moments of this valiant ship and the 233 sailors from her crew will probably for ever remain untold...
I read this book very fast, as if it was a novel. It is an incredible account, accessible even to those (like me) who do not have any military or naval background. If you want to give a try to at least on of the 15 volumes of Morison' great history, it should be that one.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
bequi
This is volume XII of Samuel E. Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the seventh of nine on the Pacific theater. In it, Morison recounts the merging of Macarthur's southern Pacific drive up from New Guinea with Nimitz's central Pacific thrust coming from the Marianas by way of the Marshalls and Gilberts. The confluence of these two pincers results in the amphibious assault on Leyte (MacArthur's famous return) and the attempt by the Japanese navy to intervene in that operation which resulted in what is known to history as the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Morison displays his customary delight over amphibious operations in his description of the Leyte beach assaults. He even compares the sounds of the different naval guns pounding the beach to the different instruments of an orchestra.
The Japanese attempt to intervene consists of three parts: First, the southern force, which makes a suicidal attempt to enter Leyte Gulf via the Surigao Strait the night of October 24-25, 1944. Second, the central force, which passes through the central Philippines and debouches undetected from the San Bernardino Strait off Samar on the morning of October 25. Third, the northern force which consists of carriers ostensibly coming south to menace U.S. ships east of Luzon, but really to lure Halsey into uncovering the eastern approach to Leyte Gulf for the benefit of the central force. The southern force is pounded into oblivion by combined attacks from waiting PT boats, destroyers and an old-fashioned battle line of several cruisers and battleships. The northern force draws Halsey north and is decimated, but accomplishes its mission in causing the uncovering of the route of approach of the central force.
The collision of the central force of battleships and cruisers, commanded by Admiral Kurita, and the U.S. escort carrier groups known as Taffies, presents the central drama of this volume. The Taffies are caught by surprise and spring into action even though outnumbered, outgunned and out-armored. It is one of the few times American forces have to fight this way during WWII. Other rare examples are Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Bulge. Here U.S. forces acquit themselves gallantly, but unlike almost all other operations in the war, it is without the air of inevitable victory hanging over the engagement. It is desperate battle against long odds, with the outcome anything but certain.
Morison spreads the blame around for the surprise off Samar. Unlike many later assessments, Halsey only gets partial blame. Morison says that "Even the stationing of one destroyer off San Bernardino Strait to give warning would have helped the escort carriers." It is unclear whether this hypothetical destroyer should have come from Halsey's group, or one of the Taffies.
Morison displays his customary delight over amphibious operations in his description of the Leyte beach assaults. He even compares the sounds of the different naval guns pounding the beach to the different instruments of an orchestra.
The Japanese attempt to intervene consists of three parts: First, the southern force, which makes a suicidal attempt to enter Leyte Gulf via the Surigao Strait the night of October 24-25, 1944. Second, the central force, which passes through the central Philippines and debouches undetected from the San Bernardino Strait off Samar on the morning of October 25. Third, the northern force which consists of carriers ostensibly coming south to menace U.S. ships east of Luzon, but really to lure Halsey into uncovering the eastern approach to Leyte Gulf for the benefit of the central force. The southern force is pounded into oblivion by combined attacks from waiting PT boats, destroyers and an old-fashioned battle line of several cruisers and battleships. The northern force draws Halsey north and is decimated, but accomplishes its mission in causing the uncovering of the route of approach of the central force.
The collision of the central force of battleships and cruisers, commanded by Admiral Kurita, and the U.S. escort carrier groups known as Taffies, presents the central drama of this volume. The Taffies are caught by surprise and spring into action even though outnumbered, outgunned and out-armored. It is one of the few times American forces have to fight this way during WWII. Other rare examples are Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Bulge. Here U.S. forces acquit themselves gallantly, but unlike almost all other operations in the war, it is without the air of inevitable victory hanging over the engagement. It is desperate battle against long odds, with the outcome anything but certain.
Morison spreads the blame around for the surprise off Samar. Unlike many later assessments, Halsey only gets partial blame. Morison says that "Even the stationing of one destroyer off San Bernardino Strait to give warning would have helped the escort carriers." It is unclear whether this hypothetical destroyer should have come from Halsey's group, or one of the Taffies.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
harriet m
Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier is volume VI of Morison's fifteen volume History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the fourth of nine on the Pacific theater. In it Morison tells the story of how the Bismarck Islands, and most prominently the great Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain, were finally rendered impotent and then bypassed, leaving the garrison of more than 100,000 Japanese to wither on the vine.
Three main trends emerge in the advance up MacArthur's New Guinea-Mindanao axis. These are land based air power, bypassing or leapfrogging of Japanese strong points, and vast improvements in U.S. surface tactics.
The first of these, the dominance of land based air power, is highlighted by what is known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, where in early March 1943, General Kenney's land based planes assaulted and destroyed a Japanese convoy out of Rabaul that was attempting to reinforce Lae in New Guinea. Unlike Nimitz's central Pacific thrust which depended exclusively on carrier air forces, the New Guinea-Mindanao axis was within reach of land based air power, with telling effect.
The second trend, that of leapfrogging Japanese strong points, begins in the advance up the Solomon chain, where New Georgia and Bougainville are invaded, but other islands like Kolombangara are bypassed. The bypassing climaxes with the encirclement of Rabaul itself, and the establishment of U.S. bases on the Admiralty Islands beyond the Bismarcks, while never attempting to actually take Rabaul, which would have been wasteful of men, time and resources.
The last shows the vast improvements in U.S. surface destroyer tactics, thanks to improvements in radar and torpedo technology and lessons learned the hard way in the Guadalcanal campaign. These improvements can be no better demonstrated than by the Battle of Vella Gulf the night of August 6-7, 1943 where Commander Moosbrugger's squadron of six destroyers met four Japanese destroyers of the "Tokyo Express" from Rabaul, sending three to the bottom with torpedoes, with no losses of their own.
Morison demonstrates at the end of this volume the merging of the trends, when U.S. destroyers actually get close enough to the formerly dreaded Rabaul to bombard it, without fear of Japanese air power intervening. The war itself then bypasses Rabaul, and the frustrated garrison remains there for the remainder of the conflict, cut off from logistical support and forced to remain passive spectators.
Three main trends emerge in the advance up MacArthur's New Guinea-Mindanao axis. These are land based air power, bypassing or leapfrogging of Japanese strong points, and vast improvements in U.S. surface tactics.
The first of these, the dominance of land based air power, is highlighted by what is known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, where in early March 1943, General Kenney's land based planes assaulted and destroyed a Japanese convoy out of Rabaul that was attempting to reinforce Lae in New Guinea. Unlike Nimitz's central Pacific thrust which depended exclusively on carrier air forces, the New Guinea-Mindanao axis was within reach of land based air power, with telling effect.
The second trend, that of leapfrogging Japanese strong points, begins in the advance up the Solomon chain, where New Georgia and Bougainville are invaded, but other islands like Kolombangara are bypassed. The bypassing climaxes with the encirclement of Rabaul itself, and the establishment of U.S. bases on the Admiralty Islands beyond the Bismarcks, while never attempting to actually take Rabaul, which would have been wasteful of men, time and resources.
The last shows the vast improvements in U.S. surface destroyer tactics, thanks to improvements in radar and torpedo technology and lessons learned the hard way in the Guadalcanal campaign. These improvements can be no better demonstrated than by the Battle of Vella Gulf the night of August 6-7, 1943 where Commander Moosbrugger's squadron of six destroyers met four Japanese destroyers of the "Tokyo Express" from Rabaul, sending three to the bottom with torpedoes, with no losses of their own.
Morison demonstrates at the end of this volume the merging of the trends, when U.S. destroyers actually get close enough to the formerly dreaded Rabaul to bombard it, without fear of Japanese air power intervening. The war itself then bypasses Rabaul, and the frustrated garrison remains there for the remainder of the conflict, cut off from logistical support and forced to remain passive spectators.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
anilda
Victory in the Pacific is volume XIV of Samuel E. Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the final of nine on the Pacific theater. The Philippines were recaptured in the previous volume and now the final steps toward Japan are taken in this volume with the assaults on first Iwo Jima and then Okinawa.
The Iwo Jima campaign, so prominent in the popular American mind due to the book and movie, Flag of Our Fathers, is covered in Part I. Morison gives the details of the planning, logistics and execution of this massive operation. His conclusion on the Iwo Jima operation is slightly apologetic in tone. First he gives the stock opinion that Iwo was necessary to ensure the safety of B-29 bomber crews who couldn't make it back to the Marianas and it was important to the fliers' morale. But he also equivocates by stating "Not all would have been lost without the island's facilities."
In Part II, Morison details the Okinawa operation, which was more complicated than Iwo Jima due to its proximity to Japan and the menacing presence of Kamikazes. Previously, my personal knowledge of Okinawa was gained through the two outstanding memoirs Goodbye, Darkness by William Manchester and With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa by Eugene Sledge. Morison's account provides an ideal way to broaden one's perspective on Okinawa by describing overall strategy and the progress of the entire operation that can not be gained from memoirs. As another reviewer has mentioned, particularly poignant is the plight of the radar picket destroyers who were constantly harried by Kamikazes. On a trip to Charleston, SC I had the opportunity to visit the destroyer Laffey which had served as a radar picket at Okinawa and whose ordeal of being struck by multiple Kamikazes and still staying afloat is dramatically recounted by Morison in this volume.
The Iwo Jima campaign, so prominent in the popular American mind due to the book and movie, Flag of Our Fathers, is covered in Part I. Morison gives the details of the planning, logistics and execution of this massive operation. His conclusion on the Iwo Jima operation is slightly apologetic in tone. First he gives the stock opinion that Iwo was necessary to ensure the safety of B-29 bomber crews who couldn't make it back to the Marianas and it was important to the fliers' morale. But he also equivocates by stating "Not all would have been lost without the island's facilities."
In Part II, Morison details the Okinawa operation, which was more complicated than Iwo Jima due to its proximity to Japan and the menacing presence of Kamikazes. Previously, my personal knowledge of Okinawa was gained through the two outstanding memoirs Goodbye, Darkness by William Manchester and With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa by Eugene Sledge. Morison's account provides an ideal way to broaden one's perspective on Okinawa by describing overall strategy and the progress of the entire operation that can not be gained from memoirs. As another reviewer has mentioned, particularly poignant is the plight of the radar picket destroyers who were constantly harried by Kamikazes. On a trip to Charleston, SC I had the opportunity to visit the destroyer Laffey which had served as a radar picket at Okinawa and whose ordeal of being struck by multiple Kamikazes and still staying afloat is dramatically recounted by Morison in this volume.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jessi
We now rightly have difficulty conceiving the life or death struggle fought almost 70 years ago by men mostly now gone, near far-off and obscure Pacific islands, and against the once powerful Imperial Japanese Navy. Morison's description of that struggle --- the naval equivalent of hand-to-hand fighting --- inspires and awes all at once. This is a story not many Americans know --- there were more sailors than marines lost during the Guadalcanal campaign, and their sacrifice has almost been forgotten.
This volume, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal," is unquestionably the best of the entire collection. I first read the complete series when I was a teenager, living at home with my late father, who had been a naval officer "for the duration" in World War II. I remember he would at times "tear up" during his nightly reading. I gave him the entire set a few years before he passed away, and he was able to read them a second time. Now they are mine and I have made still a third passage through them, savoring and rediscovering them. I plan on at least one more journey through them in the coming years.
Morison often masterfully combines classical allusions and modern warfare; he does does his best work in this volume because he clearly intends to. It is difficult not to be moved by his description of the great naval action on the night of November 12-13, 1942. Two Admirals, Scott and Callaghan, were killed the same wild night in a naval battle in which, to paraphrase Morison, "both sides knew that no quarter would be given." The picture Morison paints of the next morning, when battered sailors in sinking ships stood by their guns and continued to fire on the enemy, is one that will always endure for me. Highly, highly recommended.
This volume, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal," is unquestionably the best of the entire collection. I first read the complete series when I was a teenager, living at home with my late father, who had been a naval officer "for the duration" in World War II. I remember he would at times "tear up" during his nightly reading. I gave him the entire set a few years before he passed away, and he was able to read them a second time. Now they are mine and I have made still a third passage through them, savoring and rediscovering them. I plan on at least one more journey through them in the coming years.
Morison often masterfully combines classical allusions and modern warfare; he does does his best work in this volume because he clearly intends to. It is difficult not to be moved by his description of the great naval action on the night of November 12-13, 1942. Two Admirals, Scott and Callaghan, were killed the same wild night in a naval battle in which, to paraphrase Morison, "both sides knew that no quarter would be given." The picture Morison paints of the next morning, when battered sailors in sinking ships stood by their guns and continued to fire on the enemy, is one that will always endure for me. Highly, highly recommended.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
rachna
This is the eighth of Morison's fifteen volumes on the U.S. naval operations in WWII, and the sixth of nine on the Pacific theater. This particular volume covers the clearing of New Guinea by the MacArthur branch of operations, and the subjugation and capture of the Marianas by the Nimitz arm, including the famous "Marianas Turkey Shoot" during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which was the last time Japanese carrier based air power posed any significant obstacle to the U.S. advance toward Japan. Thereafter, the two pincers were to join at Leyte and the invasion of the Philippines, which are covered in volumes XII and XIII.
By March, 1944 the great Japanese anchorage at Truk, and their naval and air bases at Rabaul had been pounded into submission by U.S. air power and were to be bypassed. MacArthur was then able to proceed along the northern New Guinea coast, subduing the Japanese forces there in a series of actions including Biak, Hollandia and Noemfoor. Although not as well known in the popular mind as the action at the Marianas, I was interested nevertheless because my uncle was in the 503rd PIR, which participated in the Hollandia and Noemfoor operations.
Meanwhile, Nimitz, having secured the Gilberts and Marshalls, proceeded in force to the Marianas. There, not only was Guam, Saipan and Tinian taken from the Japanese, but their carrier air forces were dealt a fatal blow in a two day battle where Japanese planes came at the U.S. carriers one day, and U.S. planes at the Japanese carriers the next day. The order to launch U.S. planes came late on the second day and consequently many returned after dark. In a dramatic decision, Admiral Mitscher ordered the lights of the carriers turned on, even at the risk of exposure to Japanese submarines.
Morison is most enthusiastic when describing amphibious landings. The lessons learned the hard way at Tarawa and improved somewhat in the Marshalls were improved upon yet again in the Marianas and Morison spares no detail in explaining the intricacies of the planning and execution of the beach assaults. Also, Morison is supportive of Spruance's decision to stay back and not uncover the Marianas instead of going full bore after the Japanese carriers.
By March, 1944 the great Japanese anchorage at Truk, and their naval and air bases at Rabaul had been pounded into submission by U.S. air power and were to be bypassed. MacArthur was then able to proceed along the northern New Guinea coast, subduing the Japanese forces there in a series of actions including Biak, Hollandia and Noemfoor. Although not as well known in the popular mind as the action at the Marianas, I was interested nevertheless because my uncle was in the 503rd PIR, which participated in the Hollandia and Noemfoor operations.
Meanwhile, Nimitz, having secured the Gilberts and Marshalls, proceeded in force to the Marianas. There, not only was Guam, Saipan and Tinian taken from the Japanese, but their carrier air forces were dealt a fatal blow in a two day battle where Japanese planes came at the U.S. carriers one day, and U.S. planes at the Japanese carriers the next day. The order to launch U.S. planes came late on the second day and consequently many returned after dark. In a dramatic decision, Admiral Mitscher ordered the lights of the carriers turned on, even at the risk of exposure to Japanese submarines.
Morison is most enthusiastic when describing amphibious landings. The lessons learned the hard way at Tarawa and improved somewhat in the Marshalls were improved upon yet again in the Marianas and Morison spares no detail in explaining the intricacies of the planning and execution of the beach assaults. Also, Morison is supportive of Spruance's decision to stay back and not uncover the Marianas instead of going full bore after the Japanese carriers.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
joy ferguson
Finally finish reading all 15 books with my fading eyesight and continuous and constant reminders from my wife thatI have a lot of 'other' things to do......
Mr. Morison wrote this book based on official history, personal observations and combat reports from US Navy in very early days after WW2. So many facts are not really matching what later learned.
I would state that this entire set of books is a must read who like to understand how US Navy struggle from a 2nd class naval power (inferior to IJN and RN prior WW2) to the only superpower of navy of today (no country can and dare challenge it), and all the sacrifices of 'The Great Generation' to fight for global freedom we enjoy today.
Mr. Morison wrote this book based on official history, personal observations and combat reports from US Navy in very early days after WW2. So many facts are not really matching what later learned.
I would state that this entire set of books is a must read who like to understand how US Navy struggle from a 2nd class naval power (inferior to IJN and RN prior WW2) to the only superpower of navy of today (no country can and dare challenge it), and all the sacrifices of 'The Great Generation' to fight for global freedom we enjoy today.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
justin henri
I have read the entire series History of United States Naval Operations in World War II by Morison. Guadalcanal remains the most epic of all modern battles fought by the US Navy and it is difficult to suppress emotion once an understanding is achieved concerning the scale of bravery and sacrifice offered by Americans and Japanese in the series of conflicts fought over six months on land, at sea and in the air. Morison brings it all alive, especially the tenacity of both sides that held back nothing in going after each other's naval forces in a series of major surface and carrier battles in waters around Guadalcanal that had to be the most dangerous places to put a ship. There is one other book that I recommend on this topic,The campaign for Guadalcanal;: A battle that made history, that offers a lot of detail and beautiful drawings to fill out the experience.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
agatha venters
Few people had such an opportunity to view the events of WWII at sea as did Samuel Eliot Morison. Since it was Morison's own idea, the credit must surely go to him as well as to FDR. The visit between Roosevelt and Morison which set the stage for Morison's role as the official WWII naval historian was probably not so much a meeting between a lofty president and a lowly Harvard professor as it was a friendly get-together between two fellow preppies and Harvard grads of approximately the same age. I have assumed that this bond did not unduly influence Morison's evaluation of FDR's performance as Commander-In-Chief.
The introduction to THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-1943 gives a good account of the state of U.S. Navy preparedness between the two World Wars. The appencices help the reader to appreciate the relative strength of the combatants. It is important to realize that the Navy was already making its weight felt in various parts of the world before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States Navy was forced into this situation by the rapidly evolving predicament of Great Britain and her allies. The Nazis had overrun Greece and Crete and had put Russia deep in a hole. It appeared possible that Germany and Italy would soon control all three entrances of the Mediterranean - The Straits, The Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. Much of this book describes in great detail how the tide of war turned from this low beginning to a much brighter picture for the Allies by April 1943. By then Germany had lost the strategic initiative when it failed to capture Stalingrad. The German Black Sea Fleet was fighting a losing battle and Germany was forced to evacuate its remaining troops from North Africa. In addition, the Allies were organizing an invasion of the European Continent while Japan was on the defensive in the Pacific.
The story is a wide-ranging one because the area involved in the Battle of the Atlantic is so vast. At one end we have the supply run to North Russia to give that beleagured country the essential means to continue to fight. At the other end there is the important contribution of Brazil to the ultimate victory by the Allies. In between there is the very dangerous threat of the German submarine offensive and our paralyzingly slow response to it. The tragedy of our substantial merchant marine losses in the early part of hostilities is described in some detail by Morison but the explanation of exactly how this situation developed is one of the more disappointing aspects of the book. The responsibility for the calamity is still being debated and explored. Morison does not go much below the surface in his account of this sordid affair although the author is not necessarily an unqualified fan of Admiral Ernest J. King.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-1943 is a very detailed historical record in spite of the book's few shortcomings. My respect for Samuel Eliot Morison is increased by reading it and I highly recommend the volume to anyone interested in the history of WWII.
The introduction to THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-1943 gives a good account of the state of U.S. Navy preparedness between the two World Wars. The appencices help the reader to appreciate the relative strength of the combatants. It is important to realize that the Navy was already making its weight felt in various parts of the world before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States Navy was forced into this situation by the rapidly evolving predicament of Great Britain and her allies. The Nazis had overrun Greece and Crete and had put Russia deep in a hole. It appeared possible that Germany and Italy would soon control all three entrances of the Mediterranean - The Straits, The Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. Much of this book describes in great detail how the tide of war turned from this low beginning to a much brighter picture for the Allies by April 1943. By then Germany had lost the strategic initiative when it failed to capture Stalingrad. The German Black Sea Fleet was fighting a losing battle and Germany was forced to evacuate its remaining troops from North Africa. In addition, the Allies were organizing an invasion of the European Continent while Japan was on the defensive in the Pacific.
The story is a wide-ranging one because the area involved in the Battle of the Atlantic is so vast. At one end we have the supply run to North Russia to give that beleagured country the essential means to continue to fight. At the other end there is the important contribution of Brazil to the ultimate victory by the Allies. In between there is the very dangerous threat of the German submarine offensive and our paralyzingly slow response to it. The tragedy of our substantial merchant marine losses in the early part of hostilities is described in some detail by Morison but the explanation of exactly how this situation developed is one of the more disappointing aspects of the book. The responsibility for the calamity is still being debated and explored. Morison does not go much below the surface in his account of this sordid affair although the author is not necessarily an unqualified fan of Admiral Ernest J. King.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-1943 is a very detailed historical record in spite of the book's few shortcomings. My respect for Samuel Eliot Morison is increased by reading it and I highly recommend the volume to anyone interested in the history of WWII.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
amirah
...
For a multitude of reasons, this book can be considered the best of the 15 volumes in this series - and that's high praise considering the quality of research and writing throughout Morison's masterpiece. A prior reviewer stated a number of sound reasons why such an assessment should be accepted, and I will not reiterate them.
If the student of military history is interested in understanding why the war in the Pacific has been correctly described as having been fought "on a shoestring" in terms of men and materiel, however, no single text in my memory brings the subject home with greater eloquence, or provides such a wealth of depth and detail, than does this volume of Morison's.
Before the Pacific Fleet could roll across the watery eastern boundaries of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and stand on the Japanese doorstep with Operation Downfall in train, the enemy's offensive operations had to be decisively broken. Here we see a superb and economical detailing of the ways in which limited resources were matched against strategic exigencies by commanders whose work can only be described as plain damned operational genius.
Here you will find the turning point of World War II in the Pacific. The battles of Coral Sea and Midway were wholly defensive in nature, as was the Guadalcanal campaign. It was only in the breaking of the Bismarks Barrier that the United States and our allies truly went over to the offensive, ensuring not only that Imperial Japan could not win the war but that the Empire's defeat was absolutely inevitable.
No one has yet done a better job of making this picture plain than has Morison's research and writing team, and here you will find the finest single example of their work.
For a multitude of reasons, this book can be considered the best of the 15 volumes in this series - and that's high praise considering the quality of research and writing throughout Morison's masterpiece. A prior reviewer stated a number of sound reasons why such an assessment should be accepted, and I will not reiterate them.
If the student of military history is interested in understanding why the war in the Pacific has been correctly described as having been fought "on a shoestring" in terms of men and materiel, however, no single text in my memory brings the subject home with greater eloquence, or provides such a wealth of depth and detail, than does this volume of Morison's.
Before the Pacific Fleet could roll across the watery eastern boundaries of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and stand on the Japanese doorstep with Operation Downfall in train, the enemy's offensive operations had to be decisively broken. Here we see a superb and economical detailing of the ways in which limited resources were matched against strategic exigencies by commanders whose work can only be described as plain damned operational genius.
Here you will find the turning point of World War II in the Pacific. The battles of Coral Sea and Midway were wholly defensive in nature, as was the Guadalcanal campaign. It was only in the breaking of the Bismarks Barrier that the United States and our allies truly went over to the offensive, ensuring not only that Imperial Japan could not win the war but that the Empire's defeat was absolutely inevitable.
No one has yet done a better job of making this picture plain than has Morison's research and writing team, and here you will find the finest single example of their work.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
adel al harthi
This is volume XIII of Samuel E. Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the eighth of nine on the Pacific theater. In it, Morison relates the recapture of the remainder of the Philippine islands after the Battle of Leyte Gulf in volume XII. Mindoro, Luzon, Mindanao and others are recaptured from the Japanese, who now have practically no navy to speak of. However, the Japanese Kamikazes emerge in force, and quickly prove a daunting hazard to U.S. naval and amphibious forces.
As always, Morison spares no details on the specifics of the amphibious landings. This time, however, the beach assaults have to deal with Kamikazes targeting not only regular surface ships but LSTs as well.
Of special interest in this volume is the typhoon of mid-December, 1944, which damaged Halsey's task force to the tune of three destroyers, eight hundred lives and many aircraft. The same admiral who let Kurita pass unmolested through the San Bernardino Strait on October 25 is now investigated for neglect in allowing his task force to be battered by a typhoon east of the southern Philippines on December 17-18. Morison lists Halsey's "commendable zeal" for supporting the Luzon landings as one of the reasons for the typhoon disaster.
As always, Morison spares no details on the specifics of the amphibious landings. This time, however, the beach assaults have to deal with Kamikazes targeting not only regular surface ships but LSTs as well.
Of special interest in this volume is the typhoon of mid-December, 1944, which damaged Halsey's task force to the tune of three destroyers, eight hundred lives and many aircraft. The same admiral who let Kurita pass unmolested through the San Bernardino Strait on October 25 is now investigated for neglect in allowing his task force to be battered by a typhoon east of the southern Philippines on December 17-18. Morison lists Halsey's "commendable zeal" for supporting the Luzon landings as one of the reasons for the typhoon disaster.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
cynthia franks
After the successful capture of Guadalcanal, the United States forces began to drive up the Solomon chain and into the Bismarcks. Rather than attacking each island individually, it became the policy of the United States to "hop" over some of the islands, thus leaving the defending Japanese to "wither on the vine". In effect, they were completely cut off from reinforcement and resupply. An excellent example of this tactic was employed against the great Japanese base at Rabaul. With over 100,000 Japanese troops defending the area, the Americans simply captured the islands surrounding Rabaul and strangled it to death.
This excellent work by Samuel Eliot Morison tells the heroic tale of the battles fought in and around the Bismarcks. Some of these battles included the battle of the Bismarck Sea, where the Japanese lost a dozen ships, thousands of men, and a large amount of aircraft, while the Americans lost only 5 planes. Admiral Yamamoto's last flight is told in vivid detail, and the other invasions are brought to life, as well. Interestingly, this campaign was fought largely without aircraft carriers. Destroyers, Cruisers, and PT boats helped win the day for the Americans.
As with other volumes in this series, this book contains helpful charts and maps to help the reader. I knew very little about this particular area of the Pacific campaign, but Morison's book opened a new chapter in the Pacific for me. I highly recommend this book. Its very helpful in describing the beginning of the long road toward Tokyo and final victory.
This excellent work by Samuel Eliot Morison tells the heroic tale of the battles fought in and around the Bismarcks. Some of these battles included the battle of the Bismarck Sea, where the Japanese lost a dozen ships, thousands of men, and a large amount of aircraft, while the Americans lost only 5 planes. Admiral Yamamoto's last flight is told in vivid detail, and the other invasions are brought to life, as well. Interestingly, this campaign was fought largely without aircraft carriers. Destroyers, Cruisers, and PT boats helped win the day for the Americans.
As with other volumes in this series, this book contains helpful charts and maps to help the reader. I knew very little about this particular area of the Pacific campaign, but Morison's book opened a new chapter in the Pacific for me. I highly recommend this book. Its very helpful in describing the beginning of the long road toward Tokyo and final victory.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
frederick
Morison is the place to start for learning what happened on and around Guadalcanal. The atmosphere of inevitable Japanese defeat is not present, unlike the later volumes that describe island garrisons, cut off from any air and sea resupply, who simply await annihilation by U.S. forces.
The eventual logistical, technological, air and naval supremacy of the United States, combined with the excellent strategy of the pincer movements of Macarthur on one hand, and Nimitz on the other, led to the inexorable rolling up of the Japanese Empire. What makes studying the campaign for Guadalcanal so interesting is that it occurred before this supremacy was achieved, where U.S. and Japanese forces were on more or less equal footing. The Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal, unlike their later island garrisons were not cut off from air and sea support and were able throughout much of the campaign to bring in reinforcements via the "Tokyo Express."
What started out quite incidentally, after Japanese troops were observed building an airstrip, grew into a six month ordeal where Marines and Japanese troops squared off on the island, while U.S. air power ruled the day and the Japanese navy ruled the night. The most poignant of Morison's accounts are of the nighttime surface engagements in and around Savo Island and Iron Bottom Sound.
The eventual logistical, technological, air and naval supremacy of the United States, combined with the excellent strategy of the pincer movements of Macarthur on one hand, and Nimitz on the other, led to the inexorable rolling up of the Japanese Empire. What makes studying the campaign for Guadalcanal so interesting is that it occurred before this supremacy was achieved, where U.S. and Japanese forces were on more or less equal footing. The Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal, unlike their later island garrisons were not cut off from air and sea support and were able throughout much of the campaign to bring in reinforcements via the "Tokyo Express."
What started out quite incidentally, after Japanese troops were observed building an airstrip, grew into a six month ordeal where Marines and Japanese troops squared off on the island, while U.S. air power ruled the day and the Japanese navy ruled the night. The most poignant of Morison's accounts are of the nighttime surface engagements in and around Savo Island and Iron Bottom Sound.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
huong
I bought this book more on the author's reputation than a burning interest in content. Morison was a fine historian, and this book tells a vital chapter of the history of WW II that is almost forgotten today, midst accounts of more dramatic sea battles like Midway, Leyte Gulf, and of course, Pearl Harbor. This theater of the war is also eclipsed by dramatic land and air battles in Europe, especially D-Day, and The Battle of the Bulge with the seige of Bastogne. Yet the war in Europe could not have been won without this vital piece of the war effort---no troops, no supplies, no victory!
I gave this book five stars because I have been completely absorbed by it. Morison has woven this complex, and potentially boring chapter of WW II history into a tremendously interesting narrative. I am especially impressed because this book really hooks me each time I begin a new chapter, and recently my WW II history diet has consisted of oral history material like the fine works of Steven Ambrose and Cornelius Ryan. Morison holds his own, and I can't wait to start the next book in the series. Well worth the modest price, I have purchased the entire series. Highly recommended if you are interested in the big picture of World War II.
I gave this book five stars because I have been completely absorbed by it. Morison has woven this complex, and potentially boring chapter of WW II history into a tremendously interesting narrative. I am especially impressed because this book really hooks me each time I begin a new chapter, and recently my WW II history diet has consisted of oral history material like the fine works of Steven Ambrose and Cornelius Ryan. Morison holds his own, and I can't wait to start the next book in the series. Well worth the modest price, I have purchased the entire series. Highly recommended if you are interested in the big picture of World War II.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
meera
The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II is a 15-volume account of the United States Navy in World War II, written by eminent historian Samuel Eliot Morison[1] and published by Little, Brown and Company between 1947 and 1962.
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Morison, already convinced of the value of personal involvement as a result of sailing experience while writing his biography of Christopher Columbus, wrote to President Roosevelt suggesting the preparation of an official history of the Navy in the war, and volunteering for the task. Both President Roosevelt and the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed, and in May 1942 Morison was commissioned as a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, and assigned a staff of assistants, with permission to go anywhere and to see all official records. Morison's reputation as a knowledgeable sailor (based on his analysis in the biography of Christopher Columbus) preceded him, and he was welcomed on a number of ships, eleven of them in all by the end of the war.[2]
The result was a normal historical work, not a prescribed official history. Limitations of the History of U.S. Naval Operations are mostly due to its shortened period of publication. some material, especially related to codebreaking, was still classified, and later in-depth research into particular occurrences in the war did clarify points that had been passed over rather lightly. Some rewriting was incorporated in the later printings of this series. This History of U.S. Naval Operations also intentionally avoided a certain amount of analysis, for instance deferring to other works for the causes of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. The intended audience for the work, to quote from the preface, "the general reader rather than the professional sailor".
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Morison, already convinced of the value of personal involvement as a result of sailing experience while writing his biography of Christopher Columbus, wrote to President Roosevelt suggesting the preparation of an official history of the Navy in the war, and volunteering for the task. Both President Roosevelt and the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed, and in May 1942 Morison was commissioned as a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Reserve, and assigned a staff of assistants, with permission to go anywhere and to see all official records. Morison's reputation as a knowledgeable sailor (based on his analysis in the biography of Christopher Columbus) preceded him, and he was welcomed on a number of ships, eleven of them in all by the end of the war.[2]
The result was a normal historical work, not a prescribed official history. Limitations of the History of U.S. Naval Operations are mostly due to its shortened period of publication. some material, especially related to codebreaking, was still classified, and later in-depth research into particular occurrences in the war did clarify points that had been passed over rather lightly. Some rewriting was incorporated in the later printings of this series. This History of U.S. Naval Operations also intentionally avoided a certain amount of analysis, for instance deferring to other works for the causes of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. The intended audience for the work, to quote from the preface, "the general reader rather than the professional sailor".
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
kimberly lambright
In August of 1942, The Americans discovered that the Japanese were building an airstrip on the island of Guadalcanal. If completed, the Japanese would have access to vital American supply lines, as well as Australia and New Guinea. In response to this threat, the United States launched thier first major offensive of the Pacific war. Samuel Eliot Morison was commissioned by President Roosevelt to write the official naval history of World War II, and he does an excellent job of telling the story of Guadalcanal, where, according to the author, "the navy saw more fighting than in any three previous wars". From the opening shots of the debacle of Savo Island, where the Allies lost four heavy cruisers, to the Japanese withdrawl in February of 1943, Morison covers every major battle of the Guadalcanal campaign. Notable engagements covered include The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, The Battle of Cape Esperance, The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. He also includes a breakdown of forces involved in each battle, as well as numerous maps and photographs which I found very helpful as a reader. This battle was deemed the turning point of the Pacific war, and Morison does a good job of covering the major aspects of the battle. For further reading, I would also recommend "Guadalcanal" by Richard B. Frank.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
fryderyk
Morrison is to World War II Naval history what Herodotus was to The Persian Wars. He covers a majestic sweep of events in considerable detail and gives multitudes of trivia. He also tells a good story. He has a love of the sea and nautical history which communicates to the reader.
He talks in a professorial air that some will find attractive and others will find annoying. He sounds like a New England Brahmin of the fifties which is of course what he is. But Morrison is not without a human touch giving occasional bits of feeling or even irony. Most of it is analytical though and if you are looking for the personal side, this is not really the place to be. That is not a fault; it is just not what it is about. What it does give is a grand insight into the craft of naval war, and information to warm the heart of any pursurer of trivia. For better or for worse it is a fifties series with a fifties attitude and displays neither the virtues nor the faults of later historical writting. It is however a classic and is still referenced by modern naval historians.
He talks in a professorial air that some will find attractive and others will find annoying. He sounds like a New England Brahmin of the fifties which is of course what he is. But Morrison is not without a human touch giving occasional bits of feeling or even irony. Most of it is analytical though and if you are looking for the personal side, this is not really the place to be. That is not a fault; it is just not what it is about. What it does give is a grand insight into the craft of naval war, and information to warm the heart of any pursurer of trivia. For better or for worse it is a fifties series with a fifties attitude and displays neither the virtues nor the faults of later historical writting. It is however a classic and is still referenced by modern naval historians.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
beth ng
This is the first volume in Morison's monumental history of the U.S. Navy in World War II, but it is hardly the most interesting. It covers submarine warfare in the Atlantic for the first years of the war. American losses were terrible during much of this period. As we now know, most of the damage was done by a few German U Boats that were successful because of inept tactics by the Americans. While Morison is an honest historian, and this book was not edited by the Navy, he still (in my judgment) fails to criticize sufficiently the Navy for its failings during this period. After all, the Navy knew that the major danger posed by the German Navy was the latter's submarine fleet; most of its small surface fleet having been sunk by the British Navy in 1940. Moreover, the American Navy had the advantage of access to British experience in fighting U Boats. However, despite having identified the threat years before facing it, and being able to learn from the British successes and failures, the opening of the submarine war in the Atlantic was a disaster for the U.S. Navy. It seems to me that Morison goes too easy on the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, Ernest King, who was well know for his loathing of the British.
Another necessary aspect of this book that makes it less interesting than others in the series is that antisubmarine operations are necessarily small unit actions, unlike the great battles fought in the Pacific. It was a war of attrition, and was eventually won by improved tactics and equipment that caused the Germans to take unacceptable losses.
Having made these criticisms, Morison's series is essential for anyone interested in the details of the U.S. Navy's role in World War II. While later historians have questioned some of his judgments, no one will ever assemble so much so source material on the subject again.
Another necessary aspect of this book that makes it less interesting than others in the series is that antisubmarine operations are necessarily small unit actions, unlike the great battles fought in the Pacific. It was a war of attrition, and was eventually won by improved tactics and equipment that caused the Germans to take unacceptable losses.
Having made these criticisms, Morison's series is essential for anyone interested in the details of the U.S. Navy's role in World War II. While later historians have questioned some of his judgments, no one will ever assemble so much so source material on the subject again.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
christy halstead
Morison was the last historian to write with exclamation points. Noting that the Japanese had already picked a new name for Midway Island--"Glorious Fourth of June"--he adds, "And so it was, but not for them!"
Despite its length, this history is a survey; many entire books have been written about events (Coral Sea, Midway, Leyte Gulf) that are of necessity only chapters in Morison's narrative. And the author wrote at a time when many of the most salient facts, in particular that the Allies had broken the German and Japanese codes, were still closely-held secrets. Still, this is a great story, told by someone who was there--not everywhere, of course, but close enough to events that the author wrote with authenticity as well as authority.
And, amazingly, still in print.
Despite its length, this history is a survey; many entire books have been written about events (Coral Sea, Midway, Leyte Gulf) that are of necessity only chapters in Morison's narrative. And the author wrote at a time when many of the most salient facts, in particular that the Allies had broken the German and Japanese codes, were still closely-held secrets. Still, this is a great story, told by someone who was there--not everywhere, of course, but close enough to events that the author wrote with authenticity as well as authority.
And, amazingly, still in print.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
gaurang tank
If newspapers are the first draft of history, the History of the United States Naval Operations of World War II in a good second draft. While these volumes contain some errors or misinterpretations compared to later works, they form the foundation on which those later works were built. These books contain many details which are missing from other works. Being written only a few years after the war, gives a favor to the writing that is more connect to the war than later works. For example, the Japanese are often referred to as "Japs".
Yes, these books have some flaws, but they are enjoyable to read and have a wealth of information. I recommend all the volumes of in this series to anyone who interested in World War II or in naval actions in general, but especially in the U.S. Navy.
Yes, these books have some flaws, but they are enjoyable to read and have a wealth of information. I recommend all the volumes of in this series to anyone who interested in World War II or in naval actions in general, but especially in the U.S. Navy.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
rakesh nath
Morison's entire "History" is an amazingly complete account of the US Navy's operations in WW II, but this volume, the story of the six month Guadalcanal campaign, is simply outstanding.
Like Midway before it, Guadalcanal provided ample material for an engrossing story: the ease of the initial landings, the shock of Savo Island, the desperate land battles, the brutal naval engagements. Maybe because it is one of the earlier volumes in the set, maybe because the story is so compelling: whatever the reason, the writing in Volume 5 is the best of the entire series. It is engaging and informative and written with noticeably more "color" than some of the later volumes.
As with any work of history, there are a few conclusions here that haven't aged well: e.g., Morison's assessment of Frank "Jack" Fletcher's withdrawal of the carriers after the initial landings. But anyone reading this book will come away with a very servicable understanding of the campaign, and will be well-prepared to evaluate other accounts fairly.
If you want to pick and choose from the set, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal" should be your first choice.
Like Midway before it, Guadalcanal provided ample material for an engrossing story: the ease of the initial landings, the shock of Savo Island, the desperate land battles, the brutal naval engagements. Maybe because it is one of the earlier volumes in the set, maybe because the story is so compelling: whatever the reason, the writing in Volume 5 is the best of the entire series. It is engaging and informative and written with noticeably more "color" than some of the later volumes.
As with any work of history, there are a few conclusions here that haven't aged well: e.g., Morison's assessment of Frank "Jack" Fletcher's withdrawal of the carriers after the initial landings. But anyone reading this book will come away with a very servicable understanding of the campaign, and will be well-prepared to evaluate other accounts fairly.
If you want to pick and choose from the set, "The Struggle For Guadalcanal" should be your first choice.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
hilary
A ton of information, but a little bit biased from the US side. Was honest about snafus and incompetence, but did not really dig into them much. Also, the language is a little outdated, naturally, at times. But it was a worthwhile read and certainly a valuable book for the military and historians. A lot of good pictures and maps
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
emjay
The Guadalcanal campaign was the most dramatic and at times the most desparate naval campaign of the war. In addition, Morison spent considerable time on board ships in the area, participating in some of the actions he describes. The result, in this volume, is the most personal, the most vivid, and the best of Morison's 15 volume history.
The naval battles in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal were some of the bloodiest and hardest fought actions in World War II. Both sides entered the campaign with strengths and deficits, which were ultimately exploited by the other. The Japanese entered the campaign with superiority in surface craft, torpedoes, and night fighting technique. The Americans had more carriers, better submarines, and air superiority derived from control of Henderson field. During the campaign, American and Japanese naval forces suffered nearly equivalent and horrific losses, which by virtue of its superior resources, the United States was better able overcome and proceed to victory.
The waters around Guadalcanal saw many of the most significant -- and decisive -- surface actions of the war, which resulted in many ships of both combatants giving meaning to the name of "Iron Bottom Sound" which attended the approaching waters to Guadalcanal. The volume begins with the battle of Savo Island, and the resulting disintegration of Allied plans, and proceeds through each of the hard-fought battles which followed. With such epic material, as gifted a historian and writer as Morison absolutely cannot fail, nor does he disappoint.
Among Morison's history, this volume contains the most vivid descriptions of the island terrain, the tropical seascape, and the violent actions to which they were witness. Charts and pictures compliment Morison's descriptions of salvo chasing, and shells slamming into wildly manuevering warships. No other history of the battles surrounding these waters has both the perspective and immediacy which render Morison's history so compelling.
Each of the volumes of Morison's history is well worth reading; this particular volume is worth reading over and over.
The naval battles in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal were some of the bloodiest and hardest fought actions in World War II. Both sides entered the campaign with strengths and deficits, which were ultimately exploited by the other. The Japanese entered the campaign with superiority in surface craft, torpedoes, and night fighting technique. The Americans had more carriers, better submarines, and air superiority derived from control of Henderson field. During the campaign, American and Japanese naval forces suffered nearly equivalent and horrific losses, which by virtue of its superior resources, the United States was better able overcome and proceed to victory.
The waters around Guadalcanal saw many of the most significant -- and decisive -- surface actions of the war, which resulted in many ships of both combatants giving meaning to the name of "Iron Bottom Sound" which attended the approaching waters to Guadalcanal. The volume begins with the battle of Savo Island, and the resulting disintegration of Allied plans, and proceeds through each of the hard-fought battles which followed. With such epic material, as gifted a historian and writer as Morison absolutely cannot fail, nor does he disappoint.
Among Morison's history, this volume contains the most vivid descriptions of the island terrain, the tropical seascape, and the violent actions to which they were witness. Charts and pictures compliment Morison's descriptions of salvo chasing, and shells slamming into wildly manuevering warships. No other history of the battles surrounding these waters has both the perspective and immediacy which render Morison's history so compelling.
Each of the volumes of Morison's history is well worth reading; this particular volume is worth reading over and over.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
catherine
This monumental work is the standard against which all other history of WW II in the Pacific Theater is measured. Morison, a Harvard history professor, was actually there. He offered to write this sweeping history, and FDR saw that he received a comission in the Navy. That status as a naval officer allowed Morison to be on shipboard for many engagements. Morison's work is comprehensive, well written, and will give you details about major naval engagements as well as those now ignored in favor of major battles. This series is never boring, but like all things academic, this work does occasionally have a political agenda. Once in a while, the author is a masterful apologist for the Roosevelt administration. Having said that, you will never find a more accurate and engaging history of the seaborne portion of this monumental conflict. Some information has since been superceded by declassification of top secret material (Ultra and Magic most notably), but those details are easily detectable to the discerning reader. I typically read Morison first, and then read more modern accounts of the same battles/campaigns. Because of the comprehensiveness you always have a balanced perspective of the battle/campaign/etc. This was the best money I have spent in years!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
elizabeth edwards
The volumes in this entire series are all highly readable and present a picture of our nation starting from a dismal reality in the Pacific to ultimate victory by virtue of the courage and sacrifice of men of the US Navy, as well as of the British and Dutch. The Naval battles of Coral Sea and Midway and the subsequent invasion of Guadalcanal and establishment of the "Cactus Air Force" made up of whatever American planes that were available to fly on any given day turned the tide in the Pacific, though with 3 more years of fighting to come. The loss of the Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes on the night following the invasion hastened departure of much of the supply train and of the carrier covering group which left 2 days earlier than planned due to the loss of Cruiser protection, those 3 of the Northern Group as well as the Australian Navy Canberra of the Southern group. Our 2 radar pickett destroyers, Talbot and Blue, were positioned in their cross channel watch so as to miss seeing the Japanese Cruiser fleet enter the harbor and surprise was complete. The IJN suffered no losses during the action, but I believe they subsequently lost the Furutaka on their return to Rabaul. This bears historical checking for accuracy.
The remaining 6 month struggle for Guadalcanal is inspiring and very tragic for the conditions and imminent threat of death endured by those brave men. I was deeply moved by the courage and sacrifices of the US Navy and US Marines. 59 years after the fact I also feel (grudging) admiration for the men and weapons of the IJN.
The "Arsenal of Democracy" had agreed with the European allies that European victory was the priority issue, and that men and materiels for the Pacific war were scant for the first year or so and in many instances outmoded.
The entire series is excellent reading for those interested in history and their American heritage. I have had the entire series for about 50 years. The current pricing scheme at the store is a true bargain, and I recommend the series without reservation. The sadness is that such an event ever occured to generate this excellent historical writing.
The remaining 6 month struggle for Guadalcanal is inspiring and very tragic for the conditions and imminent threat of death endured by those brave men. I was deeply moved by the courage and sacrifices of the US Navy and US Marines. 59 years after the fact I also feel (grudging) admiration for the men and weapons of the IJN.
The "Arsenal of Democracy" had agreed with the European allies that European victory was the priority issue, and that men and materiels for the Pacific war were scant for the first year or so and in many instances outmoded.
The entire series is excellent reading for those interested in history and their American heritage. I have had the entire series for about 50 years. The current pricing scheme at the store is a true bargain, and I recommend the series without reservation. The sadness is that such an event ever occured to generate this excellent historical writing.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
r joy helvie
I just completed Rear Admiral Morison's Volume X of his remarkable series "The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II," "The Atlantic Battle Won." For all subsequent scholarship that has transpired since the initial publication of this volume, one must notice not a single reference to "ULTRA." The Battle for the Atlantic was won in no small measure by the decyphering of the naval "ENIGMA" Cypher at Bletchly Park that finally turned the tide against the U-Boat menace in the late-spring of 1943.
I do not fault Admiral Morison for this oversight. . .the revelations about "ULTRA" were not made public by the British government until thirty-some-odd years later. So, Morison was left with the material available, and still produced a work that remains in the forefront of books on this most critical of battles in this most devestating of wars.
I do not fault Admiral Morison for this oversight. . .the revelations about "ULTRA" were not made public by the British government until thirty-some-odd years later. So, Morison was left with the material available, and still produced a work that remains in the forefront of books on this most critical of battles in this most devestating of wars.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
denice sanchez
FDR personally selected Morison to write the history of the U. S. navy in World War II. Commissioned into the Naval Reserve, Morison personally travelled to all theaters during the war.
The result is tremendous history. While the official Army history of the war is the series of "Green Books", many of them dry as dust, Morsion's Navy history is a thrilling acount. The Pacific battles are especially thrilling, but Morsion covers the entire war on all oceans.
This is a super deal -- ten years ago, this set was going for $599!
The result is tremendous history. While the official Army history of the war is the series of "Green Books", many of them dry as dust, Morsion's Navy history is a thrilling acount. The Pacific battles are especially thrilling, but Morsion covers the entire war on all oceans.
This is a super deal -- ten years ago, this set was going for $599!
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
marsha jones
This series is a true classic work. It is written in an easy-to-read style that lets the reader hear the sea and smell the salt spray. It is the starting point for anyone who really wants to know about the war at sea. Some parts, like the account of the Battle of Midway are masterly. I have read every volume many times over and would recommend it.
However, the reader should be aware that Morison is no dispassionate, detached historian. He is here to praise the Navy and to defend its record. So he shies away from some unpleasant incidents. The sea story about the Hudson pilot (V:25) has been shown to be false; the horror of the loss of USS Juneau (V:257) is passed over all too lightly; the near loss of two LSTs off the Tami Islands, far from dispelling the fear of land based attack, led to a timid response to the crisis at Finschhafen, which is glossed over (VI:274-5); Commander Loughlin may have been court-martialled and found guilty of negligence (XIV:291) but Morison knew that he had been subsequently promoted to admiral and doesn't tell the reader.
However, the reader should be aware that Morison is no dispassionate, detached historian. He is here to praise the Navy and to defend its record. So he shies away from some unpleasant incidents. The sea story about the Hudson pilot (V:25) has been shown to be false; the horror of the loss of USS Juneau (V:257) is passed over all too lightly; the near loss of two LSTs off the Tami Islands, far from dispelling the fear of land based attack, led to a timid response to the crisis at Finschhafen, which is glossed over (VI:274-5); Commander Loughlin may have been court-martialled and found guilty of negligence (XIV:291) but Morison knew that he had been subsequently promoted to admiral and doesn't tell the reader.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
max preston
No doubt naval operations are obscure and technical to the average reader. Samuel Eliot Morison's breezy, near first person account of WWII naval activities with emphasis on Pacific operations certainly brings hostory to life. One can hardly question his sources. He participated in many of the engagements he wrote about and frequently interviewed the officers present immediately after the operations. His work generated the TV series "Victory At Sea", whose episode names often mirror chapter or volume names of the set.
I am sure Morison's chummy relationship with Roosevelt, Stark and Leahy color his opinion of some of the more flamboyant (or Republican) officers. Morison's work is also firmly rooted in the 1930s-1940s egalitarian belief that the guy at the "pointy end" deserved praise equal to his superiors.
This reader believes it is now time for a more dispassionate analysis of the strategy, tactics, and materiel which won the naval war for America. These titanic battles have never been quantitatively analyzed and technical summaries available in archives have seldom been included in a public offering on the war.
This criticism does not detract from Morison's titanic work. It places a human face on war in a way not seen before.
I am sure Morison's chummy relationship with Roosevelt, Stark and Leahy color his opinion of some of the more flamboyant (or Republican) officers. Morison's work is also firmly rooted in the 1930s-1940s egalitarian belief that the guy at the "pointy end" deserved praise equal to his superiors.
This reader believes it is now time for a more dispassionate analysis of the strategy, tactics, and materiel which won the naval war for America. These titanic battles have never been quantitatively analyzed and technical summaries available in archives have seldom been included in a public offering on the war.
This criticism does not detract from Morison's titanic work. It places a human face on war in a way not seen before.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
asanka
In August 1942 the United States invaded Guadalcanal, setting up a six month series of naval battles that taught the U.S. how to defeat the Japanese Navy in Wourld War II. This book discribes in detail these battles. If the reader is at all interested in this war, I can highly recommend this volume.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
netalie
Dr. Morison was an outstanding historian and a wonderful writer. I think all of the series 14 history books (and 1 book given as a general index) are intimate and readable and bring the tragedies and victories and good and bad happenings with an intensity that brings WW II back to life. Americans who want to learn about sacrifices made by the men of our Navy should read at a minimum book V,"The Struggle for Guadalcanal". Between August 9 and November 30 there were 6 full scale naval actions, and we got the worst of several of them. But somehow our men held on and ultimately won the campaign. These books have my strongest recommendation!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
daniel alfi
I discovered this set in my high school library (1965) and devoured them. Yes Morison could be jingoistic and opinionated, yet they remain unsurpassed as a comprehensive view of an entire war's naval operations. It was a staggering achievement. Not only that, they were very well written and always interesting.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
tyler wilson
Having read this volume some years ago, THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC is as thorough as could be expected save from the critical contribution by ULTRA. The compromise of the German ENIGMA cypher by British intelligence was instrumental in ultimately identifying U-Boat locations and movements. As the release of ULTRA was not till the 1970's, so Morison's work would not include this information upon publication.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
anna roth
Morison' works are priceless.
The maps are Very good. This is a wonderfull lead in to Frank's work, "Guadalcanal".
Morison's books are perfect for entrees into more specific books regarding the landings and land action of the island campaigns.
Highly recommended.
The maps are Very good. This is a wonderfull lead in to Frank's work, "Guadalcanal".
Morison's books are perfect for entrees into more specific books regarding the landings and land action of the island campaigns.
Highly recommended.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
thelonious
When the great narratives of World War II are collected in an archive for future generations, this should be the first set of books added to the library. Morison is one of the finest historical writers of all time and any book of his is worth reading. I have read 8 different volumes in this series and always feel that I am in the middle of each conflict (as well I should, since the author was there). I hope, when I retire, to acquire the entire 15-volume set and read it from cover to cover. It makes me hope for early retirement!!!
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
brigitte
This book is as well written and researched as the rest of the author's series on the US Navy during World War II. It is as informative and entertaining as any in the collection and well worth the price.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
gita jo
For anyone interested in the History of the Us Navy or in World War 2, this is the set to read. No battle is left out. His Writing style is in deoth and entertaining. Also it is a great resource for facts and figueres. You can't be a WW2 buff without these volumes on your shelf.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dahlia clarke
For the serious student who will learn the magnitude of what the USA acomplished thousands of miles from America.This account was the basis for the TV Series "Victory at Sea"I was flying patrols out of Okinawa;VPB 27.PBM`aircraft,when war ended in Aug.1945.No BS in this series.Suitable as a single read.Truly,George Croly
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
tonjia
This is S.E. Morrison and his ordinary self. Read it as a back ground to the big battles on Guadalcanal. But, also accept that it is merely Morrison selecting various battle reports and making them seem readable. He interjects a tremendous amount of his personal view into the report, which, in my mind, poisons the water of hard cold factual reporting. So many writers take Morrison at face value and forget the was first an all Pro navy man and second, an incredible bigot, giving unwarranted disdain for both the Yellow men in Japanese uniform and the black men in navy uniform. That said, you should know this is quite acceptable writing post WWII. You get many facts that are otherwise unattainable to the oridnary amture historian. But, also be aware, you should cross check him on many important matters. He leaves out many errors made by the US Navy in the battles...glossing them over or omitting them entirely. Disgraceful actions can be completely ignored. Also, he is a vindictive writer. People who offended him or were non-helpful to his satisfaction while he was gathering material are mistreated in my option. He was a personal friend of Roosevelts and given the sole mission as Naval War Historian....no one else had the access he had. And, sadly, I think he abused it terribly.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
pixie orvis
This is S.E. Morrison and his ordinary self. Read it as a back ground to the big battles on Guadalcanal. But, also accept that it is merely Morrison selecting various battle reports and making them seem readable. He interjects a tremendous amount of his personal view into the report, which, in my mind, poisons the water of hard cold factual reporting. So many writers take Morrison at face value and forget the was first an all Pro navy man and second, an incredible bigot, giving unwarranted disdain for both the Yellow men in Japanese uniform and the black men in navy uniform. That said, you should know this is quite acceptable writing post WWII. You get many facts that are otherwise unattainable to the oridnary amture historian. But, also be aware, you should cross check him on many important matters. He leaves out many errors made by the US Navy in the battles...glossing them over or omitting them entirely. Disgraceful actions can be completely ignored. Also, he is a vindictive writer. People who offended him or were non-helpful to his satisfaction while he was gathering material are mistreated in my option. He was a personal friend of Roosevelts and given the sole mission as Naval War Historian....no one else had the access he had. And, sadly, I think he abused it terribly.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
yassir al wali
While rated good like new would have been more accurate. Dust covers were pristine, books were absolutely immaculate, price great. Looks great in my book case. Will read this 15 volume set over the next several years.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jaaja
I like this book because each chapter shows you a battle from a different perspective. The beginning of the book tells about the history going into these battles. There's a good glossary, but no maps.
The first is excellent because you get to be inside two German U-boats. You can see the tension and the fear. The submariners are aware of their danger. One U-boat got rammed and the captain lost his legs. Try not to faint. The U-99 was scuttled -- that was really interesting. The survivors were taken prisoner.
The next chapter is a sea battle about hunting for the Bismarck (a German heavily armed battleship). Bismarck was capable of destroying HMS Hood, the pride of the British fleet, leaving only 3 surviviors. Churchill wanted to avenge the Hood. The British sent in a squadron of Fairy Swordfish bi-planes. The drawings are excellent! This chapter puts you right in the action. You get to see the Bismarck's captain, Ernest Lindemann, as he faces his doom.
The next chapter takes place in the Arctic ocean -- the massacre of a convoy! The German Heinkel planes surprised the convoy and attacked. The convoy split up. Almost half of the resupply ships headed to Archangel, Russia sank -- 16 out of 41.
The battles in this book were important because the resupply convoys in the Atlantic were vital to the war effort for the Allies. This was a really good book with minimum gore. It's good for kids to learn about this because we need to know about the bravery that happened in WWII. This book shows the Germans side, too. They were honorable enemies.
The first is excellent because you get to be inside two German U-boats. You can see the tension and the fear. The submariners are aware of their danger. One U-boat got rammed and the captain lost his legs. Try not to faint. The U-99 was scuttled -- that was really interesting. The survivors were taken prisoner.
The next chapter is a sea battle about hunting for the Bismarck (a German heavily armed battleship). Bismarck was capable of destroying HMS Hood, the pride of the British fleet, leaving only 3 surviviors. Churchill wanted to avenge the Hood. The British sent in a squadron of Fairy Swordfish bi-planes. The drawings are excellent! This chapter puts you right in the action. You get to see the Bismarck's captain, Ernest Lindemann, as he faces his doom.
The next chapter takes place in the Arctic ocean -- the massacre of a convoy! The German Heinkel planes surprised the convoy and attacked. The convoy split up. Almost half of the resupply ships headed to Archangel, Russia sank -- 16 out of 41.
The battles in this book were important because the resupply convoys in the Atlantic were vital to the war effort for the Allies. This was a really good book with minimum gore. It's good for kids to learn about this because we need to know about the bravery that happened in WWII. This book shows the Germans side, too. They were honorable enemies.
Please RateVolume 5 (History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II)