The Reckoning
ByDavid Halberstam★ ★ ★ ★ ★ | |
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆ | |
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ★ ☆ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ |
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Readers` Reviews
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
aya hesham
The account is riveting and fast moving, hard to put down. If anything is missing, it is a wrap up or lessons learned. The message is certainly there, but the ending is a bit up in the air, like thee is a concluding chapter.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
david wilber
Fascinating subject and Halberstam was a great journalist. I don't consider this his best work but it's still damn good. Unfortunately it's a bit dated now. I wish he were here to carry the topic right up to the present.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
karla verdin
The late Mr. Halberstam, who ironically died while a car passenger in 2007, wrote not only a very good history of the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries but also an excellent assessment of America's decline as a manufacturer. 'The Reckoning' was published in 1986. Instead of attempting to cover the Big Three automotive giants here in the U.S., the author focused on the two countries' middle-success auto companies: Ford and Nissan. It was a wise move. There is plenty of great history to cover in both Ford's and Nissan's beginnings through to their growth into automotive behemoths. The public anger you see in today's politics has a lot to do with what unfolded during the U.S. auto industries heydays. The polarization of wealth into a small group of people and stagnant or lower wages can be laid on the doorstep of executives, Wall Street, and Washington. It's in the book if you pay attention.
Mr. Halberstam deft writing style makes for an engaging read. The book is replete with well-known and obscure but powerful individuals who came to believe in their own superiority over the masses. It is a work of immense egos clashing over important matters, petty slights, and some darned right childish feelings. It also explains the cultural differences between Japan and the United States that helped and hindered their advancements in manufacturing. On the American side, the author covers such topics as Henry Ford, Edsel Ford, Henry Ford II, Robert McNamara, Wall Street, Ralph Nader, junk bonds, the 1973 oil embargo, the United Auto Workers union, OPEC, Western neocolonialism in the Arab world, Japan's impressive rise from the ashes of World War II, Lee Iacocoa, and the internal executive battles between finance people and manufacturing men. When it came to the Japanese history, it was practically all news to me. The book is also a good example of why unions came into being, attained so much power, and then lost it.
My first car was a 1977 Ford Pinto. It was without question a total piece of junk. It was even more obvious I was driving around in a horrible car because I was able to compare it to my future wife's far-superior 1979 Honda. Fortunately, 'The Reckoning' explains why executives knew full well they were selling awful autos for decades and didn't care. After my 1980 experience with a Ford dealership and the turd of a car called a Pinto, I vowed to never buy one of their products again. The book reaffirmed my commitment. Being 55 years old, I clearly recall all the finger pointing done by the Detroit bigwigs that Japan was playing unfairly. It was total B.S. Read 'The Reckoning'. It could apply to any industry that comes to believe their feces don't stink as compared to us lesser mortals.
Mr. Halberstam deft writing style makes for an engaging read. The book is replete with well-known and obscure but powerful individuals who came to believe in their own superiority over the masses. It is a work of immense egos clashing over important matters, petty slights, and some darned right childish feelings. It also explains the cultural differences between Japan and the United States that helped and hindered their advancements in manufacturing. On the American side, the author covers such topics as Henry Ford, Edsel Ford, Henry Ford II, Robert McNamara, Wall Street, Ralph Nader, junk bonds, the 1973 oil embargo, the United Auto Workers union, OPEC, Western neocolonialism in the Arab world, Japan's impressive rise from the ashes of World War II, Lee Iacocoa, and the internal executive battles between finance people and manufacturing men. When it came to the Japanese history, it was practically all news to me. The book is also a good example of why unions came into being, attained so much power, and then lost it.
My first car was a 1977 Ford Pinto. It was without question a total piece of junk. It was even more obvious I was driving around in a horrible car because I was able to compare it to my future wife's far-superior 1979 Honda. Fortunately, 'The Reckoning' explains why executives knew full well they were selling awful autos for decades and didn't care. After my 1980 experience with a Ford dealership and the turd of a car called a Pinto, I vowed to never buy one of their products again. The book reaffirmed my commitment. Being 55 years old, I clearly recall all the finger pointing done by the Detroit bigwigs that Japan was playing unfairly. It was total B.S. Read 'The Reckoning'. It could apply to any industry that comes to believe their feces don't stink as compared to us lesser mortals.
Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War - Dead Reckoning :: The Epic Journey of Cabeza de Vaca - A Land So Strange :: Gulliver's Travels (Penguin Classics) :: Asterios Polyp (Pantheon Graphic Library) :: The Reckoning (First in a Series of Jess Williams Novels) (Volume 1)
★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆
daniella
Misses or avoids the one big elephant in the room: planned obsolescence. The automotive industry discovered during WWII that they could build junk and Americans would just replace it more often. A win-win for them. It was an epiphany that occurred when they built throw away vehicles for the military. My father spent his entire life as an auto mechanic, and his statement that American's built no good cars after the war still rings true today. And, the easiest part was that although these cars were purpose-built to fall apart, it was simpler to blame poor workmanship and the Unions for the problem - and Americans believed it (and still do!). The "don't buy a car built on a Monday" saying of my youth was an easy explanation. No one wanted to believe that the Big 3 would actually DESIGN a car to have a very finite lifespan. I mean, this is critical to understanding how the Japanese beat us (and still do) at our own game. A Toyota lasts forever, and despite their advertising, no American car does. American car owners rationalize this with the often heard saying, "well, ALL cars have little problems from time to time." Sorry that this book avoids that truth.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
alarra
Classic work of big non-fiction, taking in decades of developments from around the world and leading up to the present day ("present day" of when the book was published in the early 1980s). This book gives a thumbnail sketch of the start of the auto industry in Detroit and its growth through the Great Depression and WWII and influence on not only American culture, but especially on the workplace, unions and economic life. Then, it switches to the decades-long decline in the industry, which came through both its own arrogance and also through the relentless competition of the Japanese automakers in the 1960s and beyond.
Credit author David Halberstam with prescience, because a lot of what he was writing about 30 years ago still resonates today.We're still watching the Rust Belt decline, especially Detroit. We still have protectionist impulses. We still haven't found a better way to protect workers than unions. We still think that a few loud and aggressive business leaders can change the world, and yet we still envy the money and perks that those guys demand.
The book is set up in a way that's both dynamic and also, unfortunately, a little limiting. Every chapter focuses on an individual's experience within the giant machinery of a car company or the car industry. This grabs your attention because every chapter starts with a personal anecdote or two, and you are drawn in to the next issue that the author wants to explore. Whether it's Henry Ford insisting that he can build a workable car, and then make it better and better, or a Japanese union leader building his power base at Nissan, the stories are deeply compelling.
Also, the author is great at pivoting from those individuals to the bigger picture. He shows how one person's situation represents the larger change, whether it's a worker on an assembly line floor (once-grateful U.S. die makers becoming embittered when their jobs are eliminated, or Japanese workers who are grateful simply to be able to eat), or whether it's the titans of Ford battling over whether decisions should be made for short-term financial reasons or long-term interests in building better, more exciting cars. The level of anecdote that the author uncovers is truly amazing.
But after a while, this style wears a little thin, You feel that you're not getting enough about the technological forces and broad economic forces that drove change. For example, you don't understand how a Ford assembly plant worked, even though its innovation is what created the auto industry that is the core of the story. You don't understand how Japanese plants in the 1950s and beyond transformed that assembly line and the worker-management relationship --- except that you're assured by the author that they did change it somehow.
Basically, the book gives too much attention to the industrial leader as the force behind all change. In the case of Henry Ford, focusing on him is legitimate. Maybe, too, for a couple of the Nissan leaders. But for the others -- Lee Iacocca and his ilk -- this model breaks down. And it falls into a trap of the worst of the financial and business writing of the last 30 years, the idea that there are a bunch of business leaders who are geniuses, visionaries, etc., and they can solve the world's problems. We see it today with Elon Musk, and we've seen it in the past with Bill Gates and Steve Jobs. And before that with the heads of leveraged buyout firms. In the telling of their tales, the contributions of thousands of others have been swept under the rug. And when those visionaries, inevitably, screw up, we're left to go search for the next rock-star business person.
And bottom line, this book is about a screwup.
Regardless, it's a great book. It's hard for people to understand how important cars were in the 1970s, but also how bad they were. They broke down, they rusted, they spewed astounding amounts of pollution, and they were dangerous. This book explains why the system evolved as it did, and it explains some of the forces that created the change: rising oil prices, advocacy of Ralph Nader for safety, and the emergence of Japan as a consumer goods power.
Credit author David Halberstam with prescience, because a lot of what he was writing about 30 years ago still resonates today.We're still watching the Rust Belt decline, especially Detroit. We still have protectionist impulses. We still haven't found a better way to protect workers than unions. We still think that a few loud and aggressive business leaders can change the world, and yet we still envy the money and perks that those guys demand.
The book is set up in a way that's both dynamic and also, unfortunately, a little limiting. Every chapter focuses on an individual's experience within the giant machinery of a car company or the car industry. This grabs your attention because every chapter starts with a personal anecdote or two, and you are drawn in to the next issue that the author wants to explore. Whether it's Henry Ford insisting that he can build a workable car, and then make it better and better, or a Japanese union leader building his power base at Nissan, the stories are deeply compelling.
Also, the author is great at pivoting from those individuals to the bigger picture. He shows how one person's situation represents the larger change, whether it's a worker on an assembly line floor (once-grateful U.S. die makers becoming embittered when their jobs are eliminated, or Japanese workers who are grateful simply to be able to eat), or whether it's the titans of Ford battling over whether decisions should be made for short-term financial reasons or long-term interests in building better, more exciting cars. The level of anecdote that the author uncovers is truly amazing.
But after a while, this style wears a little thin, You feel that you're not getting enough about the technological forces and broad economic forces that drove change. For example, you don't understand how a Ford assembly plant worked, even though its innovation is what created the auto industry that is the core of the story. You don't understand how Japanese plants in the 1950s and beyond transformed that assembly line and the worker-management relationship --- except that you're assured by the author that they did change it somehow.
Basically, the book gives too much attention to the industrial leader as the force behind all change. In the case of Henry Ford, focusing on him is legitimate. Maybe, too, for a couple of the Nissan leaders. But for the others -- Lee Iacocca and his ilk -- this model breaks down. And it falls into a trap of the worst of the financial and business writing of the last 30 years, the idea that there are a bunch of business leaders who are geniuses, visionaries, etc., and they can solve the world's problems. We see it today with Elon Musk, and we've seen it in the past with Bill Gates and Steve Jobs. And before that with the heads of leveraged buyout firms. In the telling of their tales, the contributions of thousands of others have been swept under the rug. And when those visionaries, inevitably, screw up, we're left to go search for the next rock-star business person.
And bottom line, this book is about a screwup.
Regardless, it's a great book. It's hard for people to understand how important cars were in the 1970s, but also how bad they were. They broke down, they rusted, they spewed astounding amounts of pollution, and they were dangerous. This book explains why the system evolved as it did, and it explains some of the forces that created the change: rising oil prices, advocacy of Ralph Nader for safety, and the emergence of Japan as a consumer goods power.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
wilson
It would seem the Ford Motor Company has nine lives. No matter how financially bloodied, each time the auto maker is down for the count it manages to rise again. Someone steps in and does what’s necessary—a design makeover, a new accounting method, new leadership, or new technology. David Halberstam’s book is about the U.S. auto industry and its challenger, Japan. While the author focuses on Ford and Nissan, the nuts and bolts of the story (so to speak) is about the Ford Motor Company. If you’re familiar with the writings of David Halberstam, with, say, “The Best and the Brightest” or “The Powers That Be,” you know he is not only thorough in his research but one heck of a writer. He knows how to tell a good yarn, and “The Reckoning” is a good yarn.
Henry Ford was one of the great captains of American industry, but at his core he was a farmer, and he never gave up on the idea that he was building cars for farmers—simple, rugged, dependable. Coupled with assembly-line production and the five-dollar workday, which enabled factory workers to afford the cars they were making, Henry Ford was anointed as the industrial genius who put America on wheels. By the 1920s, rival automakers caught up, and one of them—General Motors—replaced Ford as the industry leader. Americans were moving to the city and becoming affluent, and wanted cars with style and comfort--GM delivered. While Henry refused to accept this indisputable fact, his son Edsel understood implicitly. Fighting his father at every turn, he introduced style and expanded the Ford line from one to five cars, and returned Ford to the industry forefront. But he paid a terrible price battling his father, and died from an ulcer, age 49. With no one to check Henry's madness (he was reportedly senile and bent on destroying what he'd created), the Ford Motor Company was hemorrhaging $10 million a month, despite lucrative government contracts to build jeeps, trucks, tanks, and planes for Word War II combat. Something had to be done, or one of the nation’s industrial giants employing half-a-million workers would fold. The family stepped in, forced Henry into retirement, and installed Edsel’s son Henry Ford II as president and CEO.
Hank the Deuce (as he was sometimes called), followed the government’s advice and hired the Whiz Kids to modernize the company’s archaic accounting department, cut costs, and make the company profitable again. Their brutal cost-cutting coupled with a post-war economic boom, saved Ford. One of the brightest and most ambitious Whiz Kids was Robert McNamara who by 1960 was company president. While he was a world-class numbers-cruncher, he was not a car guy, and the result was a line-up of bland and boring cars that decreased market share and utterly ignored the growing youth market. Fortunately for Ford (and unfortunately for the U.S. military), McNamara became Secretary of Defense and architect of the Vietnam War debacle.
Enter Lee Iacocca, a swashbuckling ex-sales manager who was a car guy. Iacocca’s advertising slogan was aimed directly at the youth market: “Total Performance.” It meant a host of new options—bucket seats, fastback rooflines, racing stripes, high-performance engines, four-speed transmissions, and racing victories at Indy, Daytona and Le Mans. Iacocca’s greatest triumph, however, was the introduction of a new car that broke industry sales records—the sporty Mustang. While Iacocca returned the company to prominence, his relationship with Henry Ford II gradually deteriorated. In some ways, their relationship mimicked that of Henry Ford and his son Edsel, with Hank the Deuce playing the role of the senior Ford by undermining the influence of the son-figure Lee Iacocca. On the day he fired him, Henry Ford II told Iacocca, “I just don’t like you.” This was in the late 1970s, with the Ford Motor Company was once again sliding fast into a well of red ink. Another savior was called for, and Henry Ford II picked wisely—Philip Caldwell. While Caldwell lacked Iacocca’s passion, he didn’t lack his vision.
Profits hide a multitude of company sins. And now that Ford was no longer profitable, a number of sins became quickly apparent. Production costs were sky-high, and product quality was rock bottom. To resuscitate the corporation, Caldwell focused on quality improvement, manufacturing and labor-cost reductions, and new product development. Under Caldwell’s leadership, the advertising slogan was, “Quality is Job One.” Caldwell’s biggest gamble was the Taurus/Sable car line, featuring front-wheel drive and “aero” styling—and tooling costs of $3 billion. In effect, Caldwell was betting the company. Things looked grim for awhile. The company lost $3.5 billion during 1980-82. The turnaround took hold in 1983 with earnings of $1.8 billion, and in 1984 of $2.9 billion. In 1985, the Taurus/Sable cars hit the market with success on a scale that rivaled the original Mustang.
Halberstam’s book was published in 1986, and there the story ends. For those who follow the auto industry, much has happened since. The three great American auto makers—Ford, GM and Chrysler—have suffered their ups and downs, especially during the 2008 recession. Ford came out best, having earlier accepted the hard fact that the auto industry had peaked, the Japanese auto makers were here to stay, and therefore had already scaled back production and focused even more on quality. Chrysler was sold to a European auto maker, GM required a government loan, while Ford was financially solvent.
There is, of course, a second equally compelling story in Halberstam’s book, of Nissan and the Japanese auto industry. If you’re into cars, if you love a good yarn, this book is for you. Five stars.
Henry Ford was one of the great captains of American industry, but at his core he was a farmer, and he never gave up on the idea that he was building cars for farmers—simple, rugged, dependable. Coupled with assembly-line production and the five-dollar workday, which enabled factory workers to afford the cars they were making, Henry Ford was anointed as the industrial genius who put America on wheels. By the 1920s, rival automakers caught up, and one of them—General Motors—replaced Ford as the industry leader. Americans were moving to the city and becoming affluent, and wanted cars with style and comfort--GM delivered. While Henry refused to accept this indisputable fact, his son Edsel understood implicitly. Fighting his father at every turn, he introduced style and expanded the Ford line from one to five cars, and returned Ford to the industry forefront. But he paid a terrible price battling his father, and died from an ulcer, age 49. With no one to check Henry's madness (he was reportedly senile and bent on destroying what he'd created), the Ford Motor Company was hemorrhaging $10 million a month, despite lucrative government contracts to build jeeps, trucks, tanks, and planes for Word War II combat. Something had to be done, or one of the nation’s industrial giants employing half-a-million workers would fold. The family stepped in, forced Henry into retirement, and installed Edsel’s son Henry Ford II as president and CEO.
Hank the Deuce (as he was sometimes called), followed the government’s advice and hired the Whiz Kids to modernize the company’s archaic accounting department, cut costs, and make the company profitable again. Their brutal cost-cutting coupled with a post-war economic boom, saved Ford. One of the brightest and most ambitious Whiz Kids was Robert McNamara who by 1960 was company president. While he was a world-class numbers-cruncher, he was not a car guy, and the result was a line-up of bland and boring cars that decreased market share and utterly ignored the growing youth market. Fortunately for Ford (and unfortunately for the U.S. military), McNamara became Secretary of Defense and architect of the Vietnam War debacle.
Enter Lee Iacocca, a swashbuckling ex-sales manager who was a car guy. Iacocca’s advertising slogan was aimed directly at the youth market: “Total Performance.” It meant a host of new options—bucket seats, fastback rooflines, racing stripes, high-performance engines, four-speed transmissions, and racing victories at Indy, Daytona and Le Mans. Iacocca’s greatest triumph, however, was the introduction of a new car that broke industry sales records—the sporty Mustang. While Iacocca returned the company to prominence, his relationship with Henry Ford II gradually deteriorated. In some ways, their relationship mimicked that of Henry Ford and his son Edsel, with Hank the Deuce playing the role of the senior Ford by undermining the influence of the son-figure Lee Iacocca. On the day he fired him, Henry Ford II told Iacocca, “I just don’t like you.” This was in the late 1970s, with the Ford Motor Company was once again sliding fast into a well of red ink. Another savior was called for, and Henry Ford II picked wisely—Philip Caldwell. While Caldwell lacked Iacocca’s passion, he didn’t lack his vision.
Profits hide a multitude of company sins. And now that Ford was no longer profitable, a number of sins became quickly apparent. Production costs were sky-high, and product quality was rock bottom. To resuscitate the corporation, Caldwell focused on quality improvement, manufacturing and labor-cost reductions, and new product development. Under Caldwell’s leadership, the advertising slogan was, “Quality is Job One.” Caldwell’s biggest gamble was the Taurus/Sable car line, featuring front-wheel drive and “aero” styling—and tooling costs of $3 billion. In effect, Caldwell was betting the company. Things looked grim for awhile. The company lost $3.5 billion during 1980-82. The turnaround took hold in 1983 with earnings of $1.8 billion, and in 1984 of $2.9 billion. In 1985, the Taurus/Sable cars hit the market with success on a scale that rivaled the original Mustang.
Halberstam’s book was published in 1986, and there the story ends. For those who follow the auto industry, much has happened since. The three great American auto makers—Ford, GM and Chrysler—have suffered their ups and downs, especially during the 2008 recession. Ford came out best, having earlier accepted the hard fact that the auto industry had peaked, the Japanese auto makers were here to stay, and therefore had already scaled back production and focused even more on quality. Chrysler was sold to a European auto maker, GM required a government loan, while Ford was financially solvent.
There is, of course, a second equally compelling story in Halberstam’s book, of Nissan and the Japanese auto industry. If you’re into cars, if you love a good yarn, this book is for you. Five stars.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
mary kelly
Read decades ago. However, the book is timeless. It demonstrates that both brilliant and stupid thinking gets passed on to successive generations. Everyone responsible for creating organizational success should be required to read this book. Far too many people that are employed by a top company instantly think they are the top thinkers, as opposed to the people who came before them and actually made the company #1, and in their arrogance and lack of questioning themselves, start the march towards decline. Reading this book will show the signs and reveal those pitfalls that nabbed not just car companies, but all companies who thought their top position was going to go on forever.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
megan baxter
I work in manufacturing but not in automotive. This book does a great job of explaining how we came to be something less than the best and most prolific exporters of manufactured goods. Spoiler alert - we aren't going to return to our former glory by closing borders or throwing up tariffs. Manufacturing at a large scale is hard and we've become soft in comparison to nations on the rise. Whether in business or sports, it's nearly impossible to remain young, healthy, and hungry forever.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jillian
Halberstam performed tremendous research of the US auto industry beginning with the early days of Henry Ford up to the present. We discover that the "shared monopoly" of the Big Three were run much of the time by self-centered ego-maniacs who really did not care about the wants or needs of the American consumer...and didn't begin the weigh US public opinion until they became threatened by foreign manufacturers. The author provides detailed biographies of the central players which allows the reader to better understand (1) how America changed with the discovery and acceptance of the automobile and (2) how greed and ego nearly brought Detroit to its knees.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jenifer
David Halberstam wrote in 1986 his view of the history of the carmaking industry. He focuses on Ford and Nissan. Other players get mentions here and there, but no more than that. While a broader look at the whole carmaking industry might seem better, Halberstam's approach works.
Few people seem to write this kind of history any more. Rather than lecture, Halberstam brings out details that tell the story themselves. He picks people and follows their careers, mistakes and successes, as they make their contribution to carmaking.
Halberstam does not do everything perfectly. His approach has its flaws. He will boil down someone's life to a few pages, or even paragraphs, which makes the complex more simple than it should be. And much of what he writes can only be speculation -- how is he to know what Henry Ford was thinking back in the early 1900s?
That said, this book captured my interest. Most books like this written 20 years ago are hard to get through. They are way past their shelf life.
Not so with this one. I picked it up because I'm interested in carmaking. I put it down admiring it not just for how it treats carmaking, but for how it treats history. Well worth reading.
Few people seem to write this kind of history any more. Rather than lecture, Halberstam brings out details that tell the story themselves. He picks people and follows their careers, mistakes and successes, as they make their contribution to carmaking.
Halberstam does not do everything perfectly. His approach has its flaws. He will boil down someone's life to a few pages, or even paragraphs, which makes the complex more simple than it should be. And much of what he writes can only be speculation -- how is he to know what Henry Ford was thinking back in the early 1900s?
That said, this book captured my interest. Most books like this written 20 years ago are hard to get through. They are way past their shelf life.
Not so with this one. I picked it up because I'm interested in carmaking. I put it down admiring it not just for how it treats carmaking, but for how it treats history. Well worth reading.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
perri
This book will educate you if you want to understand why Detroit is collapsing today. It explains why bail-outs cannot save THE BIG THREE.
Americans love land-yachts. The bigger they are, the better! We dont care how much they cost, we want them.
But the deal-killer is gasoline prices. When gasoline costs too much Americans stop buying land-yachts. It happened in 1973 and in 1980 after OPEC strapped a rocket to the gas pumps and sent gas prices into orbit. Detroit was caught with an inventory of large vehicles roomy enough to house a family of Mexicans in comfort. Chrysler almost failed. GM started building Sprints & Geo's, FORD built Fiesta's, CHRYSLER built K Cars. And then the gas prices dropped, and it was business as usual.
Detroit makes very little profit off econo-cars and forfeited the Tree Hugger Whacko market to Japan.
Detroit believes that a fat bailout will help it weather the present storm until you can afford a land yacht again.
Americans love land-yachts. The bigger they are, the better! We dont care how much they cost, we want them.
But the deal-killer is gasoline prices. When gasoline costs too much Americans stop buying land-yachts. It happened in 1973 and in 1980 after OPEC strapped a rocket to the gas pumps and sent gas prices into orbit. Detroit was caught with an inventory of large vehicles roomy enough to house a family of Mexicans in comfort. Chrysler almost failed. GM started building Sprints & Geo's, FORD built Fiesta's, CHRYSLER built K Cars. And then the gas prices dropped, and it was business as usual.
Detroit makes very little profit off econo-cars and forfeited the Tree Hugger Whacko market to Japan.
Detroit believes that a fat bailout will help it weather the present storm until you can afford a land yacht again.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
patty bessmer
This is more than the story and comparison of two companies (Ford and Nissan, respectively the second-largest auto companies in America and Japan) intertwined into a particular period of global history. It is also an insight into the cultures of the corporate mentality in both countries, and the personalities within provide some interesting parallels; from the overbearing Katsuji Kawamata and Lee Iacocca, to the overshadowed visionaries Yutaka Katayama and Don Frey (who, despite Iacocca's claims to that title, was probably the REAL father of the Ford Mustang).
The author's intent was probably to show how Ford prospered in the 1940s to the early 1970s, then fell as it became too large and slow to react to changing economic times, and how Nissan (and the other upstart Japanese companies) in that period rose at Ford's (and General Motor's and Chrysler's) expense. But as the book was ending, in the mid 80s, Ford was on a major upward swing with the then-new Taurus and Sable; for the first time in decades, it would overtake GM in passenger car sales. Meanwhile, Nissan was about to be overtaken as the second-largest Japanese company by Honda. Halberstam also covers the burgeoning threat of the Korean auto industry, whose infancy has since paralleled Japan's to a startling degree. Even if events have made some of this book obsolete (Ford has had several upward- and downward spirals since the mid-1980's, and has since been passed as the world's No. 2 automaker--by Toyota; Nissan flirted with bankrupcy, and has since been purchased by Renault), this is a very fascinating book.
The author's intent was probably to show how Ford prospered in the 1940s to the early 1970s, then fell as it became too large and slow to react to changing economic times, and how Nissan (and the other upstart Japanese companies) in that period rose at Ford's (and General Motor's and Chrysler's) expense. But as the book was ending, in the mid 80s, Ford was on a major upward swing with the then-new Taurus and Sable; for the first time in decades, it would overtake GM in passenger car sales. Meanwhile, Nissan was about to be overtaken as the second-largest Japanese company by Honda. Halberstam also covers the burgeoning threat of the Korean auto industry, whose infancy has since paralleled Japan's to a startling degree. Even if events have made some of this book obsolete (Ford has had several upward- and downward spirals since the mid-1980's, and has since been passed as the world's No. 2 automaker--by Toyota; Nissan flirted with bankrupcy, and has since been purchased by Renault), this is a very fascinating book.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
aarron
The Reckoning is a wonderful book that shows how the United States lost its dominance in the automobile industry. In true Halberstam fashion MacNamara is one of the main villains but through stunning research Halberstam paints a very clear picture of what happened. Japans attention to detail and innovation overshadow America's downfall. The big three are unable to respond and those who are running the Japanese business in the United States who were far more inventive. This book is still relevant even in today's world.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
rachel lubert
If you are interested in how the Japanese and then the Korean auto industries secured such a powerful place in America, this book tells it all brilliantly. A tour de force of contemporary American industrial (and equally important, cultural) history.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
palak
This books works on several levels. It's more than just, Detroit vs. Tokyo, or even, the automotive industry. It's, how to suceed in business by really, really trying. It's also, personalities and quotes, up-by-the-bootstraps business accumen. It's history come alive. It's also, American hubris and where it will get us, it's how can a country with no discernable resources kick our butt, and how a monopoly contains within it the seeds of distruction.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
d s moses
A detailed history of two major auto makers from the beginning until about 1985. Well researched in all aspects of the history and the issues at play and well written. Informative and a pleasure to read.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
ashley blake
I work in the automotive industry and I find Halberstam's work to be absolute required reading. The book chronicles the history of the Ford Motor Company and the Nissan Motor Company, comparing and contrasting their vastly different methods for reaching the same goals. In his typical style, Halberstam writes this history like a novel, spinning fascinating stories about Ford Motor Company's infamous union-busting "Service Department" and the effects of American occupation in Japan follwing World War II. Some reviewers have negatively commented on Halberstam's implication that Ford was near death in 1986, but he was right on the money. We have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and know that Ford is once again successful and Nissan was very near complete failure. But, if Ford had not succeeded with the Taurus (which at the time of publication was an unnamed concept) there is a good possiblity the lights in Dearborn may have been turned out forever. An outstanding chronicle of American and Japanese business in the dark days.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
viridiana
As always with David Halberstam, this book is a monument to relentless reporting - he must surely be the most energetic reporter of our times. It presents vivid pictures of the insides of Ford and Nissan, with an eye toward developing his main theme: that America really blew it, that the Japanese are gonna take over, that the American economy is going down the tubes. Too bad that entire theme is ridiculously wrong. The book came out in 1986, just as the American economy was gearing up to reinvent itself, as it had many times before, and as it will many times again. As a history of the car industry, the book is dandy; as another of Halberstam's attempts to explain the world, it's an exercise in hubris.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
ben batsch
It describes what happened when the liberal "bean counters" took over the American industry, A 90 day mentality took over and long term investment disappeared. A staunch return over investment attitude pervaded that was good for Wall Street but bad for Main street.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
julie chickering
Even though the book is very well researched, it is utterly out of date. It was written when many people though that all the Japanese made in industry was correct and every American manager was a bozo. Well, now it is reckoning time for the Japanese. Today, Ford Motor is a very successful company and Nissan Motors is in deep trouble. If the book had been written about GM and Toyota maybe it might still be interesting, but as it stands, it is only history.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
stephen booth
David Halberstam's history of the Japanese and American automobile industries is worth rereading. The seeds of the Big Four automakers troubles are well documented, but the eventual triumph of Japan's manufacturers was by no means guaranteed.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
karen lapuk
This book is in three parts - firstly a history of Ford as number 2 in American automotive manufacturing, secondly a history of Nissan as number 2 in Japan and thirdly the clash between American and Japan after 1975. The author does an excellent job using anecdotes and world events to describe what happened and why. This book explains why I bought a japanese car and over seven years later I am extremely happy with it. It also explains why I am a keen supporter of TQM! Perhaps someone could write a similar book on the colour television industry. Highly recommended for anybody with an interest in cars, modern history, economics and/or TQM.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
bj rn
As always, David Halbestam's reporting does not disappoint. It's true that the world has turned upside down since 1986 --- but that's partly because the hubris is now on the other foot, so to speak. Ford is enjoying record profits, while Nissan suffers through Japan's continuing economic doldrums.
That said, the book is often annoying and even more often comical in its display of Halberstam's ignorance of the automobile world. Just three examples --- He uses the term "sticker price" in connection with the Mustang. The government had not yet ordained stickers in 1964. He calls a rare old make the G0-Go-Mobile; it's Gogomobile, even in its topless version. He tells us the cost of Kaiser's engine assembly line. Kaiser never built any engines; it bought them from Continental.
Still, a remarkable history that reads like a novel. Non-auto buffs won't even notice the gaffes.
That said, the book is often annoying and even more often comical in its display of Halberstam's ignorance of the automobile world. Just three examples --- He uses the term "sticker price" in connection with the Mustang. The government had not yet ordained stickers in 1964. He calls a rare old make the G0-Go-Mobile; it's Gogomobile, even in its topless version. He tells us the cost of Kaiser's engine assembly line. Kaiser never built any engines; it bought them from Continental.
Still, a remarkable history that reads like a novel. Non-auto buffs won't even notice the gaffes.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
buratino ho
Having grown up in the suburbs of Detroit, where most of my neighbors worked for the big 3, I found it very interesting. I worked for AMC for a couple of years, so I could relate to a lot of it. There was a lot of things he talks about which I was absolutely clueless about. Anyone who grew up in the Detroit area, would find it very interesting.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
naheda alkazemi
Was somewhat difficult to follow the chronology as the author jumped around a bit in time. There were also some repetitious sections. Overall extremely interesting and very insightful with practical application to current industrial trends.
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