American Military Command from World War II to Today

Having had extended debates about the state of the U.S, military with a graduate of the Air Force Academy; I purchased this book as a gift. I heard Ricks' perspective in radio interview and he voiced my position. I sent it to my friend to bolster my position.

The author explains the actions of the US Army since WW2 through the decision making process of its uniformed leaders. His value add is that he explains how the Army chooses the types of people that become generals (and this changes over eras) and why they have not chosen the best (in his opinion) since WW2, and this has harmed the interests of the US.

Discusses the good, the bad and the ugly aspects of American Generals who have become too politicalized since WW II. Provides great information to the veteran and civilian alike. Having served under many of these Generals during my Army career from1958 -1979, the book provides insight to many high level decisions made during that era. Well researched and easy to read.

This is a superb book
Very well done - packed full of interesting facts and concepts.
Even if u have read other books like it, u will learn much about strategy, tactics and character.
Can't say enough good about this book
u will not be disappointed.

Altho not a particular fan of Tom Ricks, and knowing most of the characters personally in this book, I think it portrays fairly accurately the performance of the main players. He has a tendency to beat to death his thesis that more Generals should be relieved of command by the military, not civilians. Overlooks some really good Generals who made a difference, like Generals Shy Meyer and Jack Vessey. JkM

Thomas Rick's latest book is informative on an issue of great importance to national security, entertaining and easy to read, and is well worth the purchase price.

However, the book is also deeply flawed, and so anyone who wants to seriously consider how to fix the problems raised in the book must understand the book's shortcomings.

"The Generals" traces the history of American generalship from World War II to today. Given that the Army is the largest service and historically dominated the command structures of most major land campaigns, the book primarily concentrates on Army generals. The book contends that since the Army stopped firing failing generals at war after World War II, incompetent generals without strategic vision have been promoted and left in power, resulting in lost (or indecisive) wars and unnecessary American casualties. It has also resulted in an environment in which the only firings of Army generals is done at the hands of civilian leadership.

The book's focus on the strategic shortcomings of Army generals is particularly relevant today, when the USMC (the smallest of the services) somehow has 6 four-star generals, with some assigned to land-locked commands that have traditionally been purviews of the Army (USA Today, 24 February, 2013).

The author advances this case through chronicling many of the powerful generals in history and their influence on the current state of American generalship. A prominent theme is that the personality of senior generals set the stage for the future state of generalship. The author holds up GEN George C. Marshall as the ideal for his ability to select promising officers for advancement and his willingness to quickly fire failing generals. The author posits that Army generals tend to be good tacticians but poor strategists. He claims that senior level competence has declined as a result of the unwillingness of senior generals to fire failing subordinate generals, and backs up his position with many interesting vignettes from history.

The sections on the Vietnam War were particularly interesting to me, as the author provides good narratives about the very real impacts of strategic incompetence on losing the war, the impact of general officer credibility with civilian leaders such as the president, and the impacts of the aftermath of the war. One vignette recounted how GEN Westmoreland pulled his commanders into a conference to discuss how to prosecute the Vietnam war, and lectured them on ensuring that their Soldiers change their socks regularly - a general lecturing other generals and colonels on how to be sergeants.

This is very useful stuff, as far as it goes.

My main criticisms are that the author seems to mistake symptoms for root causes and hence proposes some superficial suggestions on how to improve the state of Army generalship.

For example, on page 13 (Kindle edition), the author claims the Army is trying to compensate for the fact that it does not relieve officers (for incompetence) by micromanagement. In my opinion, the author has it exactly backward on that point, because a lack of strategic thoughtfulness and creativity at the general officer level is a symptom of a personnel system that values and rewards micromanagement.

In another example, in chapter 23 the author discusses efforts taken by Huba Wass de Czege to transform CGSC (Command and General Staff College, the school to prepare majors to be future battalion commanders and staff officers at the brigade and division level) to teach officers "how to think and not only what to think about war". That is certainly a good goal, but in my opinion, the single most potent influence on the behavior of an officer aspiring to promotion to senior levels is not CGSC or any other school. It is watching what happens to older officers; e.g., did they succeed or fail to get promoted at various levels, and why?

The author gives much weight to the personalities of a few key generals in developing future generals. Yet he barely mentions the personnel system, and fails to tie the personnel system in any meaningful way to the "building" of a general officer. A modern Army general does not just suddenly spring up; he started as a second lieutenant and was developed over 2 ½ decades and 6 promotions to enter the general officer ranks.

The role of DOPMA is also neglected. DOPMA, and its predecessors, are public laws that standardize officer personnel management. These laws instituted the "up or out" policy, in which officers in a year-group cohort have to be promoted by a timeline or they are removed from service. DOPMA has many positive consequences, but an unintended consequence is that in the Army's officer career model there it is very difficult for officers with highly unusual career paths to reach senior ranks. (Fortunately, GEN Petraeus was one of these outliers.)

In periods of defense drawdowns, such as the 1990's, Army officers operating in a culture of micromanagement under a personnel management system of "up or out" end up quickly and ruthlessly sorted and selected for micromanaging characteristics. One cannot expect that such as system can reliably breed strategic creativity, candor, or risk-taking.

In summary, I think the author is correct to criticize the Army's reluctance to relieve (or at least to recommend relief to the SecDef) failing general officers. As Paul Yingling so rightly pointed out, a private who loses his rifle suffers worse consequences than a general who loses a war.

However, I don't think that the author's suggestions will completely fix the problems - firing a modern Army general is like the old production management system of inspecting a car are the end of the production line and sending it back for rework if it isn't right, instead of creating a production line that produces high quality cars. The real question is, "why is the Army and its officer management system producing general officers who are not creative and agile strategic thinkers?"

The commentary does border on ruthlessness, but it appears to be written without personal agenda and in the spirit of shining a light on important examples of leadership failures and successes.

Ricks takes us from the early days of WWII to the middle of Afghanistan - highlighting the leaders, in his opinion, that showed the stuff of greatness. Ricks also take time to exemplify the "wrong way". I was angry to learn of the dilution of integrity and honesty, as portrayed here, of some of the men that I grew up admiring.

I was frustrated by the accounts of self-preservation, and self aggrandizement and the cliquishness that continued to appear. Change continues to come in excruciating increments - but the struggle to create a true meritocracy in the US Army is one worthy of our nation.

I also had cause to review my own behavior, professionally, in comparison to some of the examples cited by Ricks. Ricks shows us that Marshall had qualities that he was looking for in his officers, in order for them to become successful leaders: good common sense, professional study, physical strength, cheerful and optimistic, display marked energy, extreme loyalty & determined. These qualities would eventually be diluted in pursuit of "results" and quantifiable activities (body counts, etc.)

Very informative.....hopefully tells the truth about military generals who were less than perfect indivudals when it came to fighting the enemy and saving American lives......how in the world did they get promoted?
???????

Thomas Rick's latest book is informative on an issue of great importance to national security, entertaining and easy to read, and is well worth the purchase price.

However, the book is also deeply flawed, and so anyone who wants to seriously consider how to fix the problems raised in the book must understand the book's shortcomings.

"The Generals" traces the history of American generalship from World War II to today. Given that the Army is the largest service and historically dominated the command structures of most major land campaigns, the book primarily concentrates on Army generals. The book contends that since the Army stopped firing failing generals at war after World War II, incompetent generals without strategic vision have been promoted and left in power, resulting in lost (or indecisive) wars and unnecessary American casualties. It has also resulted in an environment in which the only firings of Army generals is done at the hands of civilian leadership.

The book's focus on the strategic shortcomings of Army generals is particularly relevant today, when the USMC (the smallest of the services) somehow has 6 four-star generals, with some assigned to land-locked commands that have traditionally been purviews of the Army (USA Today, 24 February, 2013).

The author advances this case through chronicling many of the powerful generals in history and their influence on the current state of American generalship. A prominent theme is that the personality of senior generals set the stage for the future state of generalship. The author holds up GEN George C. Marshall as the ideal for his ability to select promising officers for advancement and his willingness to quickly fire failing generals. The author posits that Army generals tend to be good tacticians but poor strategists. He claims that senior level competence has declined as a result of the unwillingness of senior generals to fire failing subordinate generals, and backs up his position with many interesting vignettes from history.

The sections on the Vietnam War were particularly interesting to me, as the author provides good narratives about the very real impacts of strategic incompetence on losing the war, the impact of general officer credibility with civilian leaders such as the president, and the impacts of the aftermath of the war. One vignette recounted how GEN Westmoreland pulled his commanders into a conference to discuss how to prosecute the Vietnam war, and lectured them on ensuring that their Soldiers change their socks regularly - a general lecturing other generals and colonels on how to be sergeants.

This is very useful stuff, as far as it goes.

My main criticisms are that the author seems to mistake symptoms for root causes and hence proposes some superficial suggestions on how to improve the state of Army generalship.

For example, on page 13 (Kindle edition), the author claims the Army is trying to compensate for the fact that it does not relieve officers (for incompetence) by micromanagement. In my opinion, the author has it exactly backward on that point, because a lack of strategic thoughtfulness and creativity at the general officer level is a symptom of a personnel system that values and rewards micromanagement.

In another example, in chapter 23 the author discusses efforts taken by Huba Wass de Czege to transform CGSC (Command and General Staff College, the school to prepare majors to be future battalion commanders and staff officers at the brigade and division level) to teach officers "how to think and not only what to think about war". That is certainly a good goal, but in my opinion, the single most potent influence on the behavior of an officer aspiring to promotion to senior levels is not CGSC or any other school. It is watching what happens to older officers; e.g., did they succeed or fail to get promoted at various levels, and why?

The author gives much weight to the personalities of a few key generals in developing future generals. Yet he barely mentions the personnel system, and fails to tie the personnel system in any meaningful way to the "building" of a general officer. A modern Army general does not just suddenly spring up; he started as a second lieutenant and was developed over 2 ½ decades and 6 promotions to enter the general officer ranks.

The role of DOPMA is also neglected. DOPMA, and its predecessors, are public laws that standardize officer personnel management. These laws instituted the "up or out" policy, in which officers in a year-group cohort have to be promoted by a timeline or they are removed from service. DOPMA has many positive consequences, but an unintended consequence is that in the Army's officer career model there it is very difficult for officers with highly unusual career paths to reach senior ranks. (Fortunately, GEN Petraeus was one of these outliers.)

In periods of defense drawdowns, such as the 1990's, Army officers operating in a culture of micromanagement under a personnel management system of "up or out" end up quickly and ruthlessly sorted and selected for micromanaging characteristics. One cannot expect that such as system can reliably breed strategic creativity, candor, or risk-taking.

In summary, I think the author is correct to criticize the Army's reluctance to relieve (or at least to recommend relief to the SecDef) failing general officers. As Paul Yingling so rightly pointed out, a private who loses his rifle suffers worse consequences than a general who loses a war.

However, I don't think that the author's suggestions will completely fix the problems - firing a modern Army general is like the old production management system of inspecting a car are the end of the production line and sending it back for rework if it isn't right, instead of creating a production line that produces high quality cars. The real question is, "why is the Army and its officer management system producing general officers who are not creative and agile strategic thinkers?"

The commentary does border on ruthlessness, but it appears to be written without personal agenda and in the spirit of shining a light on important examples of leadership failures and successes.

Ricks takes us from the early days of WWII to the middle of Afghanistan - highlighting the leaders, in his opinion, that showed the stuff of greatness. Ricks also take time to exemplify the "wrong way". I was angry to learn of the dilution of integrity and honesty, as portrayed here, of some of the men that I grew up admiring.

I was frustrated by the accounts of self-preservation, and self aggrandizement and the cliquishness that continued to appear. Change continues to come in excruciating increments - but the struggle to create a true meritocracy in the US Army is one worthy of our nation.

I also had cause to review my own behavior, professionally, in comparison to some of the examples cited by Ricks. Ricks shows us that Marshall had qualities that he was looking for in his officers, in order for them to become successful leaders: good common sense, professional study, physical strength, cheerful and optimistic, display marked energy, extreme loyalty & determined. These qualities would eventually be diluted in pursuit of "results" and quantifiable activities (body counts, etc.)

Very informative.....hopefully tells the truth about military generals who were less than perfect indivudals when it came to fighting the enemy and saving American lives......how in the world did they get promoted?
???????

Bottom line one of the most enjoyable and best books I have ever read. If you are a history fanatic like me this should be at the top of your list. IF you are in a position of leadership especailly the military and especially an officer, READ.

This was an excellent dissertation on the military history of generalship in the U.S. Army. For those people who are interested in military history., this is an excellent read.This book challenges the team playing concept that modern government has lambasted us with. It was especially good for me to read this after reading a number of books on Sun Tzu and trying to understand where a lot of our generals have gone wrong in their generalship roles.

Very depressing but so true how incompetent most of our generals were. Having served six years in the military (1965-1971) with a regular commission I was on Division staffs and observed first hand everything exposed in this book. Thinking outside of the box was frowned upon and most senior officers were more concerned about their careers than ever accomplishing the mission. Our present day politicians reflect this unhealthy and destructive quality.

Someone once said that defining genius is how much one agrees with your point of view. If that is true, I would maintain that THE GENERALS is a work of near-genius. Thomas Ricks' coverage of Army flag officers from World War II to the contemporary period is fascinating reading. He does an excellent job of covering World War II through Desert Storm, and I found his criticisms of Powell and Schwarzkopf to be an eminently justifiable position.

Ricks maintains that the civilian leadership (SecDef Cheney) found the original ground plan to lack imagination (page 364), and required a reworking rather than a "hey diddle-diddle, straight up the middle." He does not give a date for the meeting, but it may well explain something I could never understand. I had deployed to Bahrain as a lieutenant colonel (USAR) on 11 Dec 90. On 02 Jan 91, I attended a Top Secret conference in Dhahran in which the "operations plan" was first revealed to us -- it was a standard amphibious assault at Al-Shauiba coupled with a Marine frontal assault against the Saddam line. Is this what was changed by the civilian leadership? The timeline still does not seem to fit but the TS meeting may well have been disinfoirmation passed down to the field grade staffs rather than the general officer concept of operations.

While I did agree with most of what the author wrote, I wonder if the Petraeus chapter would need to be rewritten somewhat. I am of the school that does grant him kudos for the surge in Iraq, but would also note that he was "lucky" in that the Sunni-Shiite internecine conflict materially aided his efforts, and that when a similar situation did not occur in Afghanistan, he quickly left without the same succes.

Ricks rightly criticizes the leadership of Mark Clark in Italy; what he does not answer is why Clark (a Marshall acolyte) was allowed to remain in command, while Clark himslf fired several subordinate general officers. Marshall may have been good, but this shows he was not perfect. The author's criticism of Maxwell Taylor is justifiable, but deserves more exposition than the caption which states that he was "the most destructive general in American history" (was he worse than Benedict Arnold? Gideon Pillow?)

What I most disagreed with was the author's support of Gen Starry's proposal to make ALL command positions (from platoon leader to four star general) a six-month probationary period. I do not see how a 180-day tour of walking on eggshells will materially aid in the selection and retention of combat leaders. The DePuy-Cushman controversy has not been resolved, and it will be interesting to see how history resolves the issue.

Based on my personal experience in the Gulf War, I felt that the conflict did not last long enough to weed out the incompetent. I was aware of a full colonel in Riyadh who refused to move forward. He was left in Riyadh to supervise the mail room of a unit, and since the war ended so quickly, he was able to resume his "career" without difficulty.

In twenty-eight years of military service, I encountered one general officer who I felt was a decent human being. Of course, human decency is not necessarily a trait that one values in a general officer.

Overall, I would highly recommend this book.

This is yet another barometer to gauge the fall of the U.S. into a Corporate Empire. Right up there with the dumbing down of the education system. The dumber people (and generals) are, the easier they are to rule.

Great book, Well researched and full of interesting facts and information concerning those who fought the 2nd World War. Author has an engrossing style which makes reading this book and absorbing its content very easy.

This book left me feeling somewhat unsettled concerning the quality and readiness of our top military commanders, They seem to be strongly educated in tactics but not much in the way of common sense and sense of duty to their troops,

It is fascinating reading. It sheds quite a bit of light on our success in WW II, our difficulties in Korea, our failure in Vietnam, and our present difficulties in the Near East. It is the bare beginning of the textbooks written for the byzantine empire on warfare.
At the moment, we have 2 great challenges: the chinese/Russian quasi alliance and the mohammedan revival of jihad. It is a very difficult question both of policy and of military requirements. If we achieve more clarity on these questions, we will gather more courage

The book provides fascinating insights into issues critical to commanding our troops in battle, and while it covers a long period of time, it does so in an interesting and efficient way. It struck me as thoughtful, well researched, and unbiased in its analysis of key generals. While the book evaluates many different wars and numerous generals, it never failed to hold my interest, and after each chapter I felt "a light had been turned on" about a part of U.S. military history. I thoroughly enjoyed the entire book.

Enjoyed reading. A very well researched and written book. A comprehensive narrative of American art of generalship from World War Two to present. It also provides some very useful insights on civil military relations. Tom Rick shows us the importance of accountability and the responsibilities of senior leadership. An exceptional book about some of the great generals in the US history and we all can draw some useful lessons from their successes and failures. Happy Reading.

I think Ricks is one of the best military journalists alive today. His book “Fiasco” was a spot on analysis of the Iraq war before most of America understood how horribly wrong we were to be there in the first place.

This book is an analysis of US Military leadership from World War II to the present. Ricks begins with George Marshall and ends with General David Petraeus. Marshall is the gold standard. Under Marshall if a General was not performing, that general was relieved. Today if a general is not performing he is given the Presidential Medal of Honor.

This is a scathing analysis of how hidebound the military’s culture of cover your ass at all costs has become. We all pay for this failure.

The author has done an outstanding job researching and writing this book. As a combat veteran of Vietnam, I found it depressing yet confirming the seemingly poor leadership we had, and continue to have; for example the Joint Chiefs of Staff being unable, or perhaps not interested, to rectify the sexual abuse in the military. Bravo Mr. Ricks!!

In addition to showing how our military has been mismanaged for many years, It shows the brilliance of General George Marshall as commander. He built our armed forces. He was also an extraordinary Secretary of State. He was singularly responsible for the rebuilding of the European economy after World War II. In fact, he was probably one of the most significant contributors to our history in the 20th century.

Havinfg served as a Marine Junior Infrantry Officer,in Japan, and Okinawa, fortunately bewtween Korea and Vietnam, I had exppsure to both outstanding and wanting commanders,... in the latter cases, fortunately ,they then caused no loss of life.

"The Generals" is a revealing chronological journey through our nations's recent conflicts, constantly reminding the reader of the dangers of poor leadership, both military and political, individual and structural. Also important is the the illumination of carreer officer self protection and attention to 'promotion at all costs' that too often permeates the military establishment, stifeling creativity,,causing loss of life and lost battles.

Personally for me,,I was troubled, reading he dilemma of the junior Army officer in Vietman, on a 6 month's rotation,, in fear of being "fragged" unable to discipline or rid their unit of the trouble.makers, with no support from their commanding officer.. Now, since serving some 56 years ago, I wonder what I would have done had I been in their leadership shoes..

In 1958, serving then in a Batallion G-2 section, I witnessed the brusk relief of an incompetant Batallion commander by the Regimental XO on a mountain top command post in the Phillipines during a joint operation with the Phillipino Marines, That experience, then and today, gives me comfort knowing that the Corps, knew how to get rid of dead wood.

A well researched, thorough analysis of top level military leadership, which also examines the civilian component of oversight of the military. The author pulls no punches, and rather than just critiquing the army's problems in its general officer ranks, he lays out a process for correcting the inadequcies.

I thought the author provided an excellent history of types of the generals that have succeeded and those who have not. He provides great insight into the familiar quote we have heard about Vietnam that it was all the "politician's fault". Unfortunately it appears that our military is following the rest of the nation into failing to hold people accountable.

Enjoyed the historical prespective of WWII General Officers, especially using General Marshall as a focal point for establishing the basis for developing the class of officers for the future, but I was not completely convinced that the faults of the current General Officer corp was made in this book. I agree with the authors assertions, but more research and details are needed. Information on how officers are rated, rotation through various duty positions (ticket punching), career interests over the individual soldiers, etc...

A study of Army "Command Climate Surveys" and their results on a suitable test population, statistics of individual offer resignations over court marshall proceeding would help.

Although the author at times characterize the subjects in his book as either walking on water or completely incompetent; I would argue that his assessment accurately describes the current shortcoming within senior leadership seen in each of the services.

What happens when you move from the Generals of WW2 whose dedication to winning the war was focused on "Duty, Honor, Country" to a post-war system that promotes the timid careerism of "Me, My Rear-end, My Career"? Read Thomas Ricks' excellent history to find out.

Much of post-WW2 American history has been influenced or even controlled by our wars. Their successes and failures have greatly influenced American society and politics. Thus, the generals who create and lead the organization that fights our wars have huge influence on our collective fate. Yet few of us understand how those men (and increasingly now women) are trained, selected, or operate. How do they think? Why are they not held accountable for their professional failures? This book goes deep into analyzing how US army leadership has developed, and why. It is fascinating and offers insights into why the modern world has developed as it has.

I found this an interesting emotional read. Assuming all the facts are true and there is no reason to assume they are not true, I had to put the book down as it made my blood boil over the insane righteousness of the government and the military to commit the lives and the well-being of our men and women and our country's prosperity to their egotistical delusions, cowardice, and lust. They were and are a pitiful group of self-serving commanders, generals, politicians, and presidents responsible for the Korean, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars! I felt ashamed thinking of the hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian lives lost and damaged due to our leaders, their hair brained tactics, and selfish misguided policies.

My husband heard this on a cartridge from the Library for the Blind. He promptly told a number of friends about it and ordered books as gifts for two others. I have to order a 3rd book...and better do so today as he keeps nagging! Any one interested in military history will find this a fascinating book. Dick highly recommends it.

A view of the importance of calculated risk in military success. It ties in nicely with the book, "The Battle for Midway". It made me reevaluate some of Generals who were military successful in the field but failures at implementing policies which would lead to post war success. This can't be blamed entirely on the Generals, however, because in a democracy the civilian leaders bear part of the responsibility. I think WWII was an excellent example of U.S. civilian and military leaders working effectively together. Another aspect of the book was how the Generals were handled when they failed so they could be recycled back into successful positions at a later time.

First, a short background. I am a retired Air National Guard general who dealt extensively with senior active duty Army leadership throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. After 9/11 as we prepared for conflict I was shocked to observe how shallow most Army leaders seemed to be. My impression of Army generals came from studying the likes of Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Patton, etc. who all had a strategic sense. Many of the generals I worked with lacked intellectual depth and seemed locked into applying established processes without regard for if they would work effectively or not. I could never reconcile expectation against reality--until now, thanks to Tom Ricks.

He describes the transition of American military leadership in the Army from WWII to present perfectly. The basic theme is how the Army moved from a system where relieving a commander was common, and not necessarily career ending, to one where firing generals is seldom done. Along the way the advancement system has rewarded risk aversion and conformism. Generals are no longer fired; instead, they are moved to new positions (sometimes considered promotions), and sometimes allowed to finish out scheduled rotations. Failing operations continue causing unnecessary loss of lives continue until a new leader arrives.

Anyone who has worked on senior staffs around stars will readily recognize what Ricks describes so well. We can only hope that senior civilian leaders read his book and force the Army to pursue leadership model improvements.

I knew or served under some of the generals - book is a frank description of them and I fould it to be accurate to my memory of them. Thanks to the great soldiers who overcome some of the generals' mistakes. oooorah