What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate
ByRobert D. Kaplan★ ★ ★ ★ ★ | |
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆ | |
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ★ ☆ ☆ ☆ | |
★ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ |
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Readers` Reviews
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
pattyh2
If you haven't read anything by Robert Kaplan, then go out & buy on of his books. He knows the subject well & has a delightful writing style. I have read every one of his books & highly recommend them.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
capri
This is a review of The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate [Hardcover]
Mugged by Geography
An old saw has it that a neo-conservative is a liberal mugged by reality. And, to paraphrase, a neo-conservative becomes a realist because he is mugged by geography. When? It happens soon after "the end of history" in the wake of 1989, rendering geography allegedly obsolete with a little help from modern technology. And so the airpower of Gulf War One putatively liberates us from the shackles of distance and terrain. But then the Balkans blow up and the Twin Towers collapse. We are back in Iraq after 9/11 and "it is surely wrong to suggest that physical terrain no longer mattered" (p. 22). Suddenly, geography is back with a vengeance. "Geography constitutes the very facts about international affairs that are so basic we take them for granted" (p. 30). And it is our permanent thing in the battle for power. "Geopolitics and the competition for `space' is eternal" (p. 88). The objective now is therefore "to have an appreciation of the map so that, counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it" (p. 29) for "I wish to argue for a modest acceptance of fate, secured ultimately in the facts of geography, in order to curb excessive zeal in foreign policy, a zeal of which I myself have been guilty" (p. 36).
Thus, the newly minted realist develops a vision. A global "Mittleeuropa writ large" shall arise, "an ideal of tolerance and high civilization," according to a liberal dream of Friedrich List and Timothy Garton Ash (p. 11). This will be apparently a worldwide community of liberal democracy triumphant, not to be confused with an artificial construct like "the super-state of the European Union [which] has only abstract meaning to all but the elite" (p. 48). Meanwhile, the United States shall continue to fade. No longer a hegemonic hyperpower, America can continue to dominate regionally, but only if it "fixes" Mexico. Yet, even if it avoids a calamitous ending, it shall dissolve into a federation of gargantuan city-states, horizontally integrating the union and, thus, maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia. "A world balanced is a world free" (p. 346). Yet, "the world will be both duller and more dangerous than ever before" (p. 128). This, at least, is the latest geopolitical vision of the globetrotting declineist Robert Kaplan. An aspiring master of a "closed system" (p. 73), the author conceptualizes the globe as a single cohesive unit. It is a tempting simplification, but no, thanks, in particular if it leads to the self-fulfilling prophecy of America's collapse.
Granted, all things human end. America will too. But its demise is far off. And so is Kaplan's prediction. Or is it? Ultimately, the Lord only knows. But, perhaps, others can divine with some accuracy. Thus, the author treats us to Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel, Spykman, Strausz-Hupé, and a whole parade of other strategic giants long forgotten, undeservedly, because of the association of their grand schemes with sexy intellectual fashions of yore, now recognized as noxious determinism, militarism, racism, social Darwinism, and so forth. Yet, let us remember that "geography informs, rather than determines. Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on - and instigator of - the actions of states" (p. 29). Both globalization and localism are the context. They influence one another, while the former also triggers both "conflict and cooperation" (p. 102). Further Kaplan ably marries the awesome geostrategists with the encyclopedic scholars of comparative civilizations like Toynbee, Hodgson, Lewis, and Huntington. By clinging fast to his belief in the individual's free will, the author distills their teachings to stress that "of course, geography, history, and ethnic characteristics influence but do not determine future events" (p. 36).
Qualifying his analysis thus, the modern-day neo-geostrategist makes a strong case for the utility of geopolitics in prognostication. This applies both to short and long term predictions. The former, of course, sound more plausible than the latter. It is the present and not the future that Kaplan describes when he paints vividly the menacing specter of global chaos as Third World countries, in Asia in particular, go nuclear and more nationalistic. They suffer from the "crisis of room" (p. 115). Thus, they are prone to push against each other. It is "a world of crowded megacities" and soon "a world of multidimensional brinkmanship" as nuclear crises proliferate profligately (p. 119). These areas already heave with underage males prone to radical ideologies and easily mobilized through the new media for transnational causes, religious (Islamic) fundamentalism in particular. In the future, Kaplan promises more of the same but even more intense. Asia will become a battlefield of the 21st century, just as Europe was until the mid-20th century. And "the megacity will be at the heart of twenty-first-century geography" (p. 120).
The predictions are vividly grim: "A Eurasia and North Africa of vast, urban concentrations, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational global media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors and half-truth transported at the speed of light by satellite channels across the rimlands and heartland expanse, from one Third World city to another. Conversely, the crowd, empowered by social media like Twitter and Facebook, will also be fed by the very truth that autocratic rulers have denied it... In other words, politics in the mass media age will be more intense than anything we have experienced, because the past and future will have been obliterated... It is in the megacities of Eurasia principally where crowd psychology will have its greatest geopolitical impact" (p. 122-123). Crisis management will be a daily pursuit: "With civilizations densely packed one against the other, and the media a vehicle for constant verbal outrages, as well as for popular pressure from oppressed groups, the need for quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy will never be greater. One crisis will flow into the next, and there will be perennial need for everyone to calm down" (p. 127).
Operating with bold strokes of a global brush, Kaplan is predictably and overly kind to the mighty. China grapples eternally with the dilemma of core vs. periphery; so does Russia. Both are vulnerable to foreign attack. In this telling, Chinese and Russian imperialisms are mere functions of self-defense. All those foreign invasions warrant expansion. Really? How many invasions has "Russia" experienced in the past 800 years in comparison to, say, Poland? A hundred times fewer, Moscow has. "A legacy of depredations against Russia" should be taken with a generous grain of salt, except by the Mongol Empire, Napoleonic France, and the Third Reich (p. 150). That is three serious incursions in 800 years. The same osmotic logic prompts the author to embrace other aspects of imperial propaganda. In particular, Kaplan accepts everything that Moscow dubs "Russia," including historical places like Rus'. Ukraine anyone? It is pivotal only at present as an intended, and inevitable, victim of the reintegrating post-Soviet behemoth operating out of the Kremlin. "Now Russia, greatly reduced in size, tries to reconsolidate that same Heartland - Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia" (p. 78). At least Kaplan got this reintegrating post-Soviet drive precisely right, despite the tendency to take at face value the standard trope of Russian imperialist apologetics.
Unlike Stratfor's George Friedman, Kaplan strangely has no room for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Is it because it would undermine his Moscow-centric paradigm of Eurasia? The Commonwealth is arguably European history's greatest secret and should be listed in the same breath with "the legacies of Prussian, Habsburg, and Byzantine and Ottoman rules [which] are still relevant" (p. 146). At least the author has a soft spot for the western post-Soviet zone. "The degree to which Central and Eastern Europe can develop a belt of prosperous and stable states from the ashes of communism will go a long way to protect Europe from Russia, and, in the process, convert the dream of a revived Mitteleuropa into reality: a dream that liberal intellectuals actually share with Mackinder" (p. 136).
Yet, the Mittleeuropa does not really exist in the Mackinderian scheme of things. Someone must control "the geographic pivot of history" so the barbarians from the East would not pour into Europe. Too bad it has to be Russia, but better the Muscovite state than "the yellow peril." Albeit unattractive, Russia is thus indispensible in Mackinder's geopolitical imagination. "In short, strategically speaking, there is `no space' for Central Europe" (p. 9). It is an artificial construct, a springboard toward a Haushoferian Lebensraum or a causeway from Asia into Europe proper, which, in itself, is just an Asian peninsula jutting toward the Atlantic Ocean. What is Europe then? It is a map in flux. It is constructed on the basis of Charlemagne's ancient realm in the West, encompassing the post-Soviet zone and even North Africa, with power increasingly shifting to Berlin. The mighty rule.
Yet, the dwarves of the world are not helpless. Kaplan rejects geographic determinism and fatalism with this valuable piece of advice: "A small state in the midst of adversaries, such as Israel, has to be particularly passive, or particularly aggressive, in order to survive. It is primarily a matter of geography" (p. 34). Anyone listening between Berlin and Moscow? The same applies to "the power of statelessness" (p. 126). According to the author, "small stateless groups are beneficiaries of this new age of technology" of death (p. 126-127).
Still, one rejoices that this influential neo-conservative realist restores geography to its rightful place of permanence in the global calculus of power. "Geography offers a way to make at least some sense of it all" (p. xxii). And: "Just as geography is not an explanation for everything, neither is it a solution. Geography is merely the unchanging backdrop against which the battle of ideas plays out" (p. 177). Those who ignore geography do so at their peril. But the journalist qualifies this common sense observation by allowing that "the revenge of geography" is balanced by "the defeat of geography" by technology (transport and communication revolutions in particular). Geography remains relevant but not omnipotent. Thus, in this telling, geography serves as a reality check on our designs and actions, rather than a fatalistic determinant. Impersonal forces of geography rule. But they do not rule supreme.
It is a pleasure to read Kaplan if only to revisit thinkers too long out of favor. Naturally, one cringes at some of his sentiments. For example, "there are things worse than communism," he deadpans, "and in Iraq we brought them about ourselves" (p. 21). This was not the author's preference of Stalin over Saddam, one should hope, but, rather, an awkwardly phrased confession of his appreciation for order over chaos. Yet, if chaos is counter-revolutionary, then it is better than any Communist totalitarian order which is an order of the prison, if not an outright order of the grave, as Angelo Codevilla would remark. This applies to all totalitarian regimes: For a Jew, chaos under Nazism meant hope of survival; order spelled death. One derives such knowledge from a posteriori inquiries, the essence of conservatism. We are delighted that Robert Kaplan's experience has been a corrective on his original liberal ideology. Now that the neo-geopolitician has been mugged by geography, perhaps he can be encouraged to delve into First Things, which are at the root of our understanding of the universe, including geography.
Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012).
Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
Mugged by Geography
An old saw has it that a neo-conservative is a liberal mugged by reality. And, to paraphrase, a neo-conservative becomes a realist because he is mugged by geography. When? It happens soon after "the end of history" in the wake of 1989, rendering geography allegedly obsolete with a little help from modern technology. And so the airpower of Gulf War One putatively liberates us from the shackles of distance and terrain. But then the Balkans blow up and the Twin Towers collapse. We are back in Iraq after 9/11 and "it is surely wrong to suggest that physical terrain no longer mattered" (p. 22). Suddenly, geography is back with a vengeance. "Geography constitutes the very facts about international affairs that are so basic we take them for granted" (p. 30). And it is our permanent thing in the battle for power. "Geopolitics and the competition for `space' is eternal" (p. 88). The objective now is therefore "to have an appreciation of the map so that, counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it" (p. 29) for "I wish to argue for a modest acceptance of fate, secured ultimately in the facts of geography, in order to curb excessive zeal in foreign policy, a zeal of which I myself have been guilty" (p. 36).
Thus, the newly minted realist develops a vision. A global "Mittleeuropa writ large" shall arise, "an ideal of tolerance and high civilization," according to a liberal dream of Friedrich List and Timothy Garton Ash (p. 11). This will be apparently a worldwide community of liberal democracy triumphant, not to be confused with an artificial construct like "the super-state of the European Union [which] has only abstract meaning to all but the elite" (p. 48). Meanwhile, the United States shall continue to fade. No longer a hegemonic hyperpower, America can continue to dominate regionally, but only if it "fixes" Mexico. Yet, even if it avoids a calamitous ending, it shall dissolve into a federation of gargantuan city-states, horizontally integrating the union and, thus, maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia. "A world balanced is a world free" (p. 346). Yet, "the world will be both duller and more dangerous than ever before" (p. 128). This, at least, is the latest geopolitical vision of the globetrotting declineist Robert Kaplan. An aspiring master of a "closed system" (p. 73), the author conceptualizes the globe as a single cohesive unit. It is a tempting simplification, but no, thanks, in particular if it leads to the self-fulfilling prophecy of America's collapse.
Granted, all things human end. America will too. But its demise is far off. And so is Kaplan's prediction. Or is it? Ultimately, the Lord only knows. But, perhaps, others can divine with some accuracy. Thus, the author treats us to Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel, Spykman, Strausz-Hupé, and a whole parade of other strategic giants long forgotten, undeservedly, because of the association of their grand schemes with sexy intellectual fashions of yore, now recognized as noxious determinism, militarism, racism, social Darwinism, and so forth. Yet, let us remember that "geography informs, rather than determines. Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on - and instigator of - the actions of states" (p. 29). Both globalization and localism are the context. They influence one another, while the former also triggers both "conflict and cooperation" (p. 102). Further Kaplan ably marries the awesome geostrategists with the encyclopedic scholars of comparative civilizations like Toynbee, Hodgson, Lewis, and Huntington. By clinging fast to his belief in the individual's free will, the author distills their teachings to stress that "of course, geography, history, and ethnic characteristics influence but do not determine future events" (p. 36).
Qualifying his analysis thus, the modern-day neo-geostrategist makes a strong case for the utility of geopolitics in prognostication. This applies both to short and long term predictions. The former, of course, sound more plausible than the latter. It is the present and not the future that Kaplan describes when he paints vividly the menacing specter of global chaos as Third World countries, in Asia in particular, go nuclear and more nationalistic. They suffer from the "crisis of room" (p. 115). Thus, they are prone to push against each other. It is "a world of crowded megacities" and soon "a world of multidimensional brinkmanship" as nuclear crises proliferate profligately (p. 119). These areas already heave with underage males prone to radical ideologies and easily mobilized through the new media for transnational causes, religious (Islamic) fundamentalism in particular. In the future, Kaplan promises more of the same but even more intense. Asia will become a battlefield of the 21st century, just as Europe was until the mid-20th century. And "the megacity will be at the heart of twenty-first-century geography" (p. 120).
The predictions are vividly grim: "A Eurasia and North Africa of vast, urban concentrations, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational global media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors and half-truth transported at the speed of light by satellite channels across the rimlands and heartland expanse, from one Third World city to another. Conversely, the crowd, empowered by social media like Twitter and Facebook, will also be fed by the very truth that autocratic rulers have denied it... In other words, politics in the mass media age will be more intense than anything we have experienced, because the past and future will have been obliterated... It is in the megacities of Eurasia principally where crowd psychology will have its greatest geopolitical impact" (p. 122-123). Crisis management will be a daily pursuit: "With civilizations densely packed one against the other, and the media a vehicle for constant verbal outrages, as well as for popular pressure from oppressed groups, the need for quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy will never be greater. One crisis will flow into the next, and there will be perennial need for everyone to calm down" (p. 127).
Operating with bold strokes of a global brush, Kaplan is predictably and overly kind to the mighty. China grapples eternally with the dilemma of core vs. periphery; so does Russia. Both are vulnerable to foreign attack. In this telling, Chinese and Russian imperialisms are mere functions of self-defense. All those foreign invasions warrant expansion. Really? How many invasions has "Russia" experienced in the past 800 years in comparison to, say, Poland? A hundred times fewer, Moscow has. "A legacy of depredations against Russia" should be taken with a generous grain of salt, except by the Mongol Empire, Napoleonic France, and the Third Reich (p. 150). That is three serious incursions in 800 years. The same osmotic logic prompts the author to embrace other aspects of imperial propaganda. In particular, Kaplan accepts everything that Moscow dubs "Russia," including historical places like Rus'. Ukraine anyone? It is pivotal only at present as an intended, and inevitable, victim of the reintegrating post-Soviet behemoth operating out of the Kremlin. "Now Russia, greatly reduced in size, tries to reconsolidate that same Heartland - Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia" (p. 78). At least Kaplan got this reintegrating post-Soviet drive precisely right, despite the tendency to take at face value the standard trope of Russian imperialist apologetics.
Unlike Stratfor's George Friedman, Kaplan strangely has no room for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Is it because it would undermine his Moscow-centric paradigm of Eurasia? The Commonwealth is arguably European history's greatest secret and should be listed in the same breath with "the legacies of Prussian, Habsburg, and Byzantine and Ottoman rules [which] are still relevant" (p. 146). At least the author has a soft spot for the western post-Soviet zone. "The degree to which Central and Eastern Europe can develop a belt of prosperous and stable states from the ashes of communism will go a long way to protect Europe from Russia, and, in the process, convert the dream of a revived Mitteleuropa into reality: a dream that liberal intellectuals actually share with Mackinder" (p. 136).
Yet, the Mittleeuropa does not really exist in the Mackinderian scheme of things. Someone must control "the geographic pivot of history" so the barbarians from the East would not pour into Europe. Too bad it has to be Russia, but better the Muscovite state than "the yellow peril." Albeit unattractive, Russia is thus indispensible in Mackinder's geopolitical imagination. "In short, strategically speaking, there is `no space' for Central Europe" (p. 9). It is an artificial construct, a springboard toward a Haushoferian Lebensraum or a causeway from Asia into Europe proper, which, in itself, is just an Asian peninsula jutting toward the Atlantic Ocean. What is Europe then? It is a map in flux. It is constructed on the basis of Charlemagne's ancient realm in the West, encompassing the post-Soviet zone and even North Africa, with power increasingly shifting to Berlin. The mighty rule.
Yet, the dwarves of the world are not helpless. Kaplan rejects geographic determinism and fatalism with this valuable piece of advice: "A small state in the midst of adversaries, such as Israel, has to be particularly passive, or particularly aggressive, in order to survive. It is primarily a matter of geography" (p. 34). Anyone listening between Berlin and Moscow? The same applies to "the power of statelessness" (p. 126). According to the author, "small stateless groups are beneficiaries of this new age of technology" of death (p. 126-127).
Still, one rejoices that this influential neo-conservative realist restores geography to its rightful place of permanence in the global calculus of power. "Geography offers a way to make at least some sense of it all" (p. xxii). And: "Just as geography is not an explanation for everything, neither is it a solution. Geography is merely the unchanging backdrop against which the battle of ideas plays out" (p. 177). Those who ignore geography do so at their peril. But the journalist qualifies this common sense observation by allowing that "the revenge of geography" is balanced by "the defeat of geography" by technology (transport and communication revolutions in particular). Geography remains relevant but not omnipotent. Thus, in this telling, geography serves as a reality check on our designs and actions, rather than a fatalistic determinant. Impersonal forces of geography rule. But they do not rule supreme.
It is a pleasure to read Kaplan if only to revisit thinkers too long out of favor. Naturally, one cringes at some of his sentiments. For example, "there are things worse than communism," he deadpans, "and in Iraq we brought them about ourselves" (p. 21). This was not the author's preference of Stalin over Saddam, one should hope, but, rather, an awkwardly phrased confession of his appreciation for order over chaos. Yet, if chaos is counter-revolutionary, then it is better than any Communist totalitarian order which is an order of the prison, if not an outright order of the grave, as Angelo Codevilla would remark. This applies to all totalitarian regimes: For a Jew, chaos under Nazism meant hope of survival; order spelled death. One derives such knowledge from a posteriori inquiries, the essence of conservatism. We are delighted that Robert Kaplan's experience has been a corrective on his original liberal ideology. Now that the neo-geopolitician has been mugged by geography, perhaps he can be encouraged to delve into First Things, which are at the root of our understanding of the universe, including geography.
Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012).
Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dubin
Kaplan is one of the more informative writers covering the subject of geopolitics. The Revenge of Geography is important in that it enables the reader to understand many of the complex issues which occurred in the past, and which are occurring today.
Reading Kaplan's books - and this is the second of his I have read, the first being 'Monsoon...', is like taking a graduate course in international political science, but a course with a teacher who actually knows about what he teaches. The book is a 1 1/2 pack post-it note tab work, extremely interesting, and a great addition to your library for future reference.
JC
Reading Kaplan's books - and this is the second of his I have read, the first being 'Monsoon...', is like taking a graduate course in international political science, but a course with a teacher who actually knows about what he teaches. The book is a 1 1/2 pack post-it note tab work, extremely interesting, and a great addition to your library for future reference.
JC
Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History :: Dimitri (Immortals of New Orleans Book 6) :: Tristan's Lyceum Wolves (Immortals of New Orleans Book 3) :: A Scottish Time Travel Romance - Immortal Highlander :: The World's Masterpieces Explored and Explained (Dk Smithsonian)
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
pei pei
This is an interesting read. The title is misleading. People see the title and they will think it is nothing but a geography book. This book is much more than that. It has a mix of several different fields.
This book is different. It blends information from many different fields. It is unlike so much in the field today. The book has an outlook like what use to be taught. The book takes the reader back in the past in many different ways. Mr. Kaplan sort of ignores globalization in a way and explain events as products of geography. At first you hear that you won't believe that. However once you read this book you will see his point of view.
Mr. Kaplan takes the reader around the world in 346 pages. He merges history, demographic data, economics, a little military science, geography to produce a lesson. Each of the sections does have some current events information mixed in. That makes the chapters come alive. This methodology does turn on some lights in each reader. Factors in one field then effects developments in another field. For example he cites China. The geography of their Northern borders tends to restrict development and sort of hems them in. That has pushed them south and once could see that would continue. Mr. Kaplan then points the reader to what might happen in the future. You will start to see the why behind the things you see on the news.
This book will be loved for those who work on the national political or military fields or are academics. However I am not sure the average reader will like it.
This book is different. It blends information from many different fields. It is unlike so much in the field today. The book has an outlook like what use to be taught. The book takes the reader back in the past in many different ways. Mr. Kaplan sort of ignores globalization in a way and explain events as products of geography. At first you hear that you won't believe that. However once you read this book you will see his point of view.
Mr. Kaplan takes the reader around the world in 346 pages. He merges history, demographic data, economics, a little military science, geography to produce a lesson. Each of the sections does have some current events information mixed in. That makes the chapters come alive. This methodology does turn on some lights in each reader. Factors in one field then effects developments in another field. For example he cites China. The geography of their Northern borders tends to restrict development and sort of hems them in. That has pushed them south and once could see that would continue. Mr. Kaplan then points the reader to what might happen in the future. You will start to see the why behind the things you see on the news.
This book will be loved for those who work on the national political or military fields or are academics. However I am not sure the average reader will like it.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
justin govier
This is a very interesting and current historical book. I've traveled in many parts of the world and this gives a whole new perspective on how geography has played such an important and critical role in the history of many countries.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
julian
Without a handbook of geography in hand to match the historical account in the other,
the reader is cheated. Geography is one subject that professors of history in college or university, or in high school or in seminary courses often omit. The omission is a lost for the students under their guidance.
A map and geography and reading a history of Yemen today ]2015] would enable the reader to understand what is at stake in Yemen today. The U.S. has written of Yemen, os so ity appears, but it stands at a critical juncture in the oil rich region. Who controls Yemen also
controls the Red Sea.
the reader is cheated. Geography is one subject that professors of history in college or university, or in high school or in seminary courses often omit. The omission is a lost for the students under their guidance.
A map and geography and reading a history of Yemen today ]2015] would enable the reader to understand what is at stake in Yemen today. The U.S. has written of Yemen, os so ity appears, but it stands at a critical juncture in the oil rich region. Who controls Yemen also
controls the Red Sea.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
prajjwal bhandari
I absolutely love this book. I'm aquaited with the author's previous works - excellent. It is up-to-date and provides excellent geographic and historical information about exactly what the title indicates. Well done!!!
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
rubyusvi
Good and relevant information, but the writing "style" leaves a bit to be desired. It seems many of the paragraphs are comprised of one long sentence, or so it seems. I believe the author had researched the data but when it came time to put it on paper he ate too much sugar. Probably just me, but maybe he needs a ghostwriter.
Hal
Hal
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
mahya
I'm an undergraduate student of International Relations (an eclectic mix of economics, political science, history, regional area studies and foreign language learning for those who are unfamiliar with the field of study) and all I can say is that Kaplan has convinced me to begin post-graduate work in Geography. It's not a new field, on the contrary it is one being rediscovered as the essence of the process of foreign policy formulation. Perhaps I was simply overjoyed that, with Geography, I am now able to refute an old History professor's assertion that History was "the master science" as it takes into account everything in hindsight, the only time anything can be "properly analyzed." Kaplan's probabilistic determinism is a definition everyone should come to learn so that the next time they are asked where the origin of The United States' liberal and democratic institutions originates from, the answer shall not be "God, the West, the ancient Greeks, etc..." but rather two oceans and a pacifistic and culturally similar polity to our north for most of the polity's existence.
If you have an interest in foreign policy, diplomacy, power, economics, culture, or fortune telling (probabilistic determinism) then this book is for you. I would also recommend that you visit the website of the company that Mr. Kaplan now writes and is Chief Geopolitical Analyst for: STRATFOR. He and Mr. Friedman are influencing a whole generation of young thinkers itching to involve themselves in The Great Game.
If you do not enjoy researching and familiarizing yourself with topics and places that are unfamiliar, strange, frightening, or simply too starkly realistic for you outside of the immediate realities of your urban middle class existence, this book is not for you.
If you have an interest in foreign policy, diplomacy, power, economics, culture, or fortune telling (probabilistic determinism) then this book is for you. I would also recommend that you visit the website of the company that Mr. Kaplan now writes and is Chief Geopolitical Analyst for: STRATFOR. He and Mr. Friedman are influencing a whole generation of young thinkers itching to involve themselves in The Great Game.
If you do not enjoy researching and familiarizing yourself with topics and places that are unfamiliar, strange, frightening, or simply too starkly realistic for you outside of the immediate realities of your urban middle class existence, this book is not for you.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
ltbisesi
The book, The Revenge of Geography was very interesting and offered a different view of world civilizations and power struggles. I would have liked a more detailed map with locations of cities, both ancient and today. I will use this book in Forums for Bible Studies, as well as other classes.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
trisha wood
The book, The Revenge of Geography was very interesting and offered a different view of world civilizations and power struggles. I would have liked a more detailed map with locations of cities, both ancient and today. I will use this book in Forums for Bible Studies, as well as other classes.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
aya hesham
The Revenge of Geography takes geopolitics to an entirely new level. Robert Kaplan splits the book into essentially three parts. The first part looks at geopolitics in general and specifically looks at the theories of well respected intellectuals of the past. The second part of the book looks at the various areas of the world (Russia, China, India, Iran, etc.) where there is potential for conflict with neighboring countries or political unrest within. The last third of the book deals primarily with the United States and what our future might hold if we continue with current involvement abroad and what that might mean at home. I have always enjoyed the writings of Robert Kaplan and this book did not disappoint. If you are looking for an easy read, this book is not for you. This book actually created more questions for me than answers and I had to stop reading several times to research events and people Kaplan referenced. The Kaplan quote I thought summed up this book the best was, "...we must never give in to geography, but must be fundamentally aware of it in our quest for a better world."
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
grigory ryzhakov
If you want to know everything about geopolitics and the whys and wherefores of world dynamics, this is your go to book. I am not yet finished reading it and find it totally fascinating. I am reading it with my globe and my dictionary close at hand and learning more about our world geography influences and its peoples than I ever thought I would. If you are up for a great tour of the world and its inhabitants, you will surely love this trip!
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
dmitri
Brings back the important consideration of geography in viewing past and current foreign policy decisions. US foreign policy decisions of late appear to ignore history and make little or no reference to geographical realities. Author gives a comprehensive treatment of nation states' past actions as discussed by many geography experts. Eye-opening view of history from a perspective we rarely hear about.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
rasha
.
I believe the autor brings back an element of analysis of the international Relations that had been underestimate in recent years. Without taking geography on board any study of a case in the international comunity could be incomplete
I believe the autor brings back an element of analysis of the international Relations that had been underestimate in recent years. Without taking geography on board any study of a case in the international comunity could be incomplete
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
rachel stern
A discussion with much that was fresh and well thought out. Starting with geographic relationships, Kaplan achieves fresh insights with constructive and supported ways of dealing with the next several decades of foreign affare.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
luciana
Unlike most of Kaplan's earlier work (examples include Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea or Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Vintage Departures)) which relied on Kaplan's first-hand impressions and a lot of 'man in the street' perspectives, "The Revenge of Geography" takes a relatively detached and scholarly approach to illustrating Kaplan's view of the world we live in. Using a very broad definition of geography to include a lot of what might otherwise be called social science, Kaplan seeks to describe real constraints on how nations and populations can and will act in order to chart a middle course between an overly idealistic liberal internationalism (or its close cousin, neoconservatism) or an excessively pessimistic and ethnically/geographically deterministic IR realism. The net effect is an attempt to, as he approvingly quotes Braudel, make us more aware of our limits in order to have "more power to affect outcomes within them".
Divided into three parts, the first draws upon a range of mainly western thinkers (including Mackinder, Braudel, Spengler and Mahan) to explain various IR streams of thought with particular reference to the impact and constraints of (broadly defined) geography, while the second focuses on the history, geography and constraints of six key regions or powers (Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran and Turkey) and surrounding nations. A previous reviewer has pointed out that Kaplan tends to approach his subject in an eclectic manner and digress from his theme, but (while I don't agree with all of Kaplan's assertions) I consider this a strength rather than a weakness - if the number of 'clippings' I have made in my Kindle editions of unconventional or little-known observations to research and think about later is any guide, there is a lot here to interest the reader, provoke thought and look at the previously familiar from a slightly different perspective.
The final section of the book deals with Kaplan's assessment of the future prospects of the USA and the wider North/Central Americas - while Kaplan draws upon the views of Samuel P. Huntington's Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity to illustrate the way demography is likely to change the USA's sense of identity and role in the world, he is (while noting some real risks) far more optimistic and paints an interesting picture of a vibrant North/Central American community with a slightly reduced but still pivotal - and positive - role in the world. His perspective on this issue is one I had not considered in this way before and I will be very interested to see the views of US, Mexican and other Central American/Caribbean readers.
Overall, "The Revenge of Geography" offers an approachable, thought-provoking read that offers some interesting and unconventional - and largely optimistic - perspectives on the world we live in. While I doubt that every reader will agree with all of Kaplan's observations and arguments, this is a distinctly original look at our world and a book I highly recommend.
Divided into three parts, the first draws upon a range of mainly western thinkers (including Mackinder, Braudel, Spengler and Mahan) to explain various IR streams of thought with particular reference to the impact and constraints of (broadly defined) geography, while the second focuses on the history, geography and constraints of six key regions or powers (Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran and Turkey) and surrounding nations. A previous reviewer has pointed out that Kaplan tends to approach his subject in an eclectic manner and digress from his theme, but (while I don't agree with all of Kaplan's assertions) I consider this a strength rather than a weakness - if the number of 'clippings' I have made in my Kindle editions of unconventional or little-known observations to research and think about later is any guide, there is a lot here to interest the reader, provoke thought and look at the previously familiar from a slightly different perspective.
The final section of the book deals with Kaplan's assessment of the future prospects of the USA and the wider North/Central Americas - while Kaplan draws upon the views of Samuel P. Huntington's Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity to illustrate the way demography is likely to change the USA's sense of identity and role in the world, he is (while noting some real risks) far more optimistic and paints an interesting picture of a vibrant North/Central American community with a slightly reduced but still pivotal - and positive - role in the world. His perspective on this issue is one I had not considered in this way before and I will be very interested to see the views of US, Mexican and other Central American/Caribbean readers.
Overall, "The Revenge of Geography" offers an approachable, thought-provoking read that offers some interesting and unconventional - and largely optimistic - perspectives on the world we live in. While I doubt that every reader will agree with all of Kaplan's observations and arguments, this is a distinctly original look at our world and a book I highly recommend.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
melissa b
I have been living 60 years in Bohemia (the Czech Republic). What Robert Kaplan writes about Europe after WWII, I lived, and I am thinking of it. The book is true and reflects what happened in Europe. It is not deterministic and not even ideological. It is a book of Big theories but for a reader it is important to live through to understand the book. Thanks, Robert.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
remy
Kaplan is a journalist, and this book disappoints in the way that much of journalism does. It is a mishmash of op-eds and travel articles, with a nice parade of old historians' names -- Herodotus! -- to paint a slick veneer of learning over it. Your other commentators cover the book well, so I give my personal impression.
Kaplan, like all good journalists, has an agenda. What set off my sensor was his statement that the "intellectual world of Jewry" was endangered "before the ravages of Nazism and communism" (p.6). Then he proceeds to state that communism was "an extension of the totalitarian tendencies within Eastern Orthodox Christianity" (p. 46). Huh? Also, I didn't much care for his insistent insinuation that people who opposed the American occupation of Iraq were knuckle-dragging isolationists. In short, Kaplan is a neo-con propagandist who is selling a particular brand of Beltway snake oil.
Kaplan clearly has it in for the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese. The book is worth reading because it sets forth in a readable, journalistic style the agenda of an influential clique of American policy-makers. Otherwise, I have trouble taking it seriously.
Kaplan, like all good journalists, has an agenda. What set off my sensor was his statement that the "intellectual world of Jewry" was endangered "before the ravages of Nazism and communism" (p.6). Then he proceeds to state that communism was "an extension of the totalitarian tendencies within Eastern Orthodox Christianity" (p. 46). Huh? Also, I didn't much care for his insistent insinuation that people who opposed the American occupation of Iraq were knuckle-dragging isolationists. In short, Kaplan is a neo-con propagandist who is selling a particular brand of Beltway snake oil.
Kaplan clearly has it in for the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese. The book is worth reading because it sets forth in a readable, journalistic style the agenda of an influential clique of American policy-makers. Otherwise, I have trouble taking it seriously.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
bruce
Kaplan's a valuable contributor. But while loaded with good insights, the writing style in this one is painfully dense and professorial--makes it a tough read. Not like is usual style. Balkan Ghosts was a little this way, but this one sets the curve for convoluted sentences. Don't try reading it at your kid's baseball game.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
avril somerville
Mr. Kaplan masterfully takes you on a journey of discovery of things you thought you knew about but shows you the view through a unique and informed window of intellect. I thoroughly enjoyed it and recommend it to thinking people who want a leg up on possible futures.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
hon3yb33
Geography shapes perspectives and forms world-views. Much of what is happening today, in Geo-Politics, can be better understood after reading this book. Russia's need for Space, the inevitable Rise of Iran, the strategic importance of the Old Silk Route and the Central Asian Republics, the dysfunction of splintered Arabian and Indian Peninsulas, the Hispanic "reconquesta" of the US ----- and China, the World's Superpower for 2000 years, which missed the Industrial Revolution, but is now ready to resume it's ancient role
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
teresa ryan skidmore
This read like a textbook..and maybe that was the intent. However previous publications have been much better in the insight and development. There were a couple of bright spots, but for the most part blah....
★ ★ ☆ ☆ ☆
evans mcgowan
I've enjoyed several other Kaplan books but this one was a real chore to get through. Unfortunately the only thing positive I can say is I bought the paperback and not the hard cover. Save your time and money and look elsewhere, even if you, like I, enjoyed some of the author's other works.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
ragdoll306
The importance of physical geography in world events is often overlooked or misunderstood by those who make foriegn policy decisions. Historically the location of mountain ranges, large rivers or deserts, widths of oceans and climate had to be considered. They were important in the devolopment of trade, possibility of military action, and the types of diplomatic relations that were possible. Geography nutured or limited economic development, civilizations, cultures and religions. It still does.
Published in 2012, this book looks at the role of Geography in the age where war is conducted by missles, drones and satellites, news travels around the world instantly by cell phones, and unverified propaganda blankets the world on the internet.
Demographically, there are now 25 cities with populations over 10 million. In three (3) years there will be 15 more, 13 will be in the third world where the majorities will live in severe poverty without adequate water or food,and no sewage treatment. What will the first world do to protect themselves from mass immigrations?
The continent of No. America is a series of zones divided by mountain ranges and rivers running north and south, not east and west; NAFTA reflects this reality. The question arises; if the U.S. had invested the trillions of dollars they put into Iraq and Afganistan into the economic development of Mexico,instead; would there be an immigration problem, or a drug problem?
The first pages are historic references laying the foundation for this book. The meat starts on page 163 in the chapters titled, "The Early 21st Century Map;" and "America's Destiny."
Published in 2012, this book looks at the role of Geography in the age where war is conducted by missles, drones and satellites, news travels around the world instantly by cell phones, and unverified propaganda blankets the world on the internet.
Demographically, there are now 25 cities with populations over 10 million. In three (3) years there will be 15 more, 13 will be in the third world where the majorities will live in severe poverty without adequate water or food,and no sewage treatment. What will the first world do to protect themselves from mass immigrations?
The continent of No. America is a series of zones divided by mountain ranges and rivers running north and south, not east and west; NAFTA reflects this reality. The question arises; if the U.S. had invested the trillions of dollars they put into Iraq and Afganistan into the economic development of Mexico,instead; would there be an immigration problem, or a drug problem?
The first pages are historic references laying the foundation for this book. The meat starts on page 163 in the chapters titled, "The Early 21st Century Map;" and "America's Destiny."
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
babak vandad
Just another attempt by the PC to denigrate western civilization, a sort of snarky attempt to reposition the west as the villain and the recipient of undeserved bounty. More like a Jared Diamond attempt to unseat the west for what it has accomplished with a dark vision of the future tacked on to boot.
★ ★ ★ ☆ ☆
susan hartman
I found this often too detailed for my taste. It's a fascinating subject, but in my view the author did not make the most of it. I ended up feeling that he had compiled oceans of fascinating research, but that his writing skills are not of the same caliber.
★ ★ ★ ★ ☆
aimee sinamban
Excellent thinking and research into geography and its influence behind happenings in history. You can change politics, you can fight wars, you can advance science, but you can't escape geography. You will enjoy it if you are a history buff like my husband and I.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★
jasmin
This is an excellent book and should be required reading for those that work in Reconstruction, Development, or Stability Operations. Also invaluable are the sources and notes that the author references.
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