The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda - Not a Good Day to Die

The takeaway for me was how the Military-Industrial Complex conducted the war in Afghanistan exactly the opposite of what was taught to us at US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. We were always taught that the feet-of-clay of the Soviet style of military command and control was the refusal to delegate authority down to the lowest levels of command; down to where the tactical situation was clearest to the officers, non-coms and troops on the ground in the fray of battle. For multi-starred generals at Central Command at McDill Air Force Base, in Florida to be conducting daily teleconferences telling the battlefield commanders how to conduct their operations while allowing all the internecine rivalries of the different branches of service to interfere smacks of resume and glory building, not in "Meeting with and destroying the enemy".
Then again in a war based on the false flag operation of 911, the narrative must be tightly control constantly-this is a business, right?
Bless the memory of General Smedley Butler, USMC who gave us War Is A Racket.

Excellent book, an inside look at a significant US military battle. The book describes the courage and dedication of our armed forces and the gut-wrenching reality of armed conflict. This battle represents a lesson that has had to be relearned to many times: Unity of Command is essential to combat success.

Exquisitely detailed, intense and superbly-written. A real life page-turner. A great read accompanied by Google Earth open on your laptop. You will not regret reading this account of true honor and herosim under fire and the lessons that can be learned.

Very conclusive look at one of the biggest blunders of our modern military and its leaders. Sadly enough the right people were involved but there were too many hands involved in the command and control of this mission and some very fine Americans lost their lives.

Well referenced account of Anaconda. Sometimes difficult to follow the timeline but excellent storytelling. Larger maps with troop movements would also help. Current maps difficult to see detail on the kindle

Very interesting story of what can go right and wrong with planning, leadership and execution. Describes the tenacious attitude and determination of our men and women fighting the global war on terrorism. Should be mandatory reading for military leaders.

Disturbing, unsettling - "Not a Good Day to Die" Operation Anaconda, as depicted by Naylor, is warfare at it most egregious, a large engagement beset by a veritable comedy of errors. In the course of reading the book, I found myself repeatedly shaking my head in disgust and disbelief. The U.S. military's widely hailed success in running joint operations certainly was not evident during Operation Anaconda, a failure that Sean Naylor captures in vivid, searing detail.

Troubling also is the apparent beliefs, by some, that SEALS are the best Spec Ops guys in the world were found to be wanting. While the military declares Anaconda a success, it, like the earlier operation at Tora Bora, appears to have allowed most of the Al Qaida fighters in the Shahikot area to slip away to fight another day. Again the "heavy metal" generals lacked the will to win-We are casualty adverse, reliant on over whelming force and Star Wars technology ( Multi million dollar tanks blown up with a homemade bombs, Apache helicopters shot down by AK47s and no armored Hum Vees...strange ) that we have a hard time with ill-equipped,trained and supplied ,yet dedicated ,ragtag forces (Shades of the VC again). Its hard to believe that the world greatest superpower has a hard time surrounding and obliterating an inferior foe .

God help us against a North Korea or China

The book started off good then went into a slump. I quit reading it for a while because it got boring. When I
started reading it again it got better and finished strong. It is very detailed though. You feel like you are right there in the fight. I won't be reading this one again.

If you are a military history buff you might like all the small details of the behind the scene decision process involved in military campaigns- I just had to wade through it. I like military stories but I even got confused with all the details. Enjoyed the story in general but just too much info I didn't want or need to know. Some spots really bogged down.

I thought this book missed on 2 major points...

1) Waaaaayy too many people/units in the story, and too few pictures, graphs, and maps for us to refer to for reference. Hardly any maps detailing the operational routes as opposed to the changes that weer made "on the fly". It was nearly impossible to keep straight. Detail is a good thing normally, but this was overkill and made the book read like a SITREP.
2) The writer worked too closely with the Generals and shot callers, and didn't seem to spend any time with the boys on the ground fighting the battles. The reader is given SO much background and detail on the Generals and commanders that the troops aren't humanized. It's hard distinguish the names of the boys that died and were wounded from the rest of the people involved. Just too many moving parts to the story (much like Operation Anaconda).

That being said, the story ends very well if you can make it to the last 100 pages. However, "Robert's Ridge" told this same part of the story in much more gripping detail, and actually humanized the men who fought the battle, rather than just the generals and commanders. I wouldn't recommend the book for that reason. Read Robert's Ridge instead.

A disappointing read not for the content but as this was one of my first Kindle purchases it was plagued by irritating spelling mistakes throughout the text.In the end I seemed to be spending more time focusing and bookmarking errors than actually reading the plot.

Book reads slow as there is too much technical information at the start of the book. I have put it down once and read another book , I am now coming back to try and read the rest or I may simple delete it from my Kindle and buy something else. Would not recommend this one .

The SOD micromanaging the war from Washington... Gen. Tommy Franks sending infantry units into battle with no artillary and only a fraction of their unit combat helicopters... and the gross underestimation of the enemy's will to fight nearly caused a disaster for our military in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan. Only the tenacity and valient efforts of our soldiers and a few incredible pilots saved the day. Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne landed in the Shahikot Valley expecting to block escape routes (the "anvil") when the enemy fled the villages it was thought to occupy when special forces and Afghani allies attacked from the other side (the "hammer"). Instead, al Qaeda forces were firmly entrenched along ridge lines and mountain tops, and our soldiers and their helicopters were got in a deadly crossfire coming from every direction.

My son joined the 1/87th infantry of the 10th Mountain Division this year. His squad leader and several NCOs fought in this battle, and all proudly own copies of the book. Sean Naylor did a magnificent job of telling their story.

Sean Naylor's account of Operation Anaconda is an extraordinary work of journalism. I particularly enjoyed the level of detail he applied to dissecting the dysfunctional command groups and miscommunication that marred the execution of the operation. He does a fine job of capturing the fog of war, as well as the long stretches of tedium and frustration that are punctuated by violence.

Despite a similarity in subject matter, it is misleading to compare this book to Black Hawk Down. Mark Bowden's work described an operation of much smaller scale, shorter time span, and (relatively) lesser complexity. Thus, the narrative lent itself much more easily to the full throttled, adrenaline inducing, white knuckled account it is. It must also be noted that, quite frankly, Bowden is a superior writer who seldom writes a poorly chosen word. Naylor throws in his share of awkward sentences and occasionally resorts to some of the jingoistic cliches that are common when describing combat heroics. However, his deep understanding of the events, of causes and effect, and his ability to convey them to the reader who is patient enough to absorb the details, all lead to a very rewarding read.

My only major disappointment, and the main reason this doesn't get 5 stars, is Naylor's lack of a conclusion or epilogue at the end. Surely there were consequences for some of the officers most responsible for the limited success and avoidable disasters of the operation.The author even hints in the text that repercussions followed, but then never articulates what later unfolded. Also, there must have been some really incisive after-action reviews. It would have been nice to glean some of the lessons learned.

Ultimately, I think this will appeal most to those with some military experience because, as some have complained, Nayer wades deep enough into military jargon and concepts, that the uninitiated may have a more difficult time following the nuances of the story. Excellent book!

This book recounts the battle in the Shahikot Valley, in which the US Army and Navy Seals fought the toughest battle they'd seen since the battle of Mogadishu in 1993. The idea was for a newly formed unit of Afghan Military Forces (AMF) soldiers to push into this valley from the west while two battalions of the 101st Airborne (Air Mobile) Division, and one battalion from the 10th Mountain Division, landed on the far slopes of the valley with the hope of blocking the escape of the Al Qaeda forces thought to be hiding in the valley. Special Forces teams would be infiltrated into the valley from various directions, taking up observation posts on positions that gave them good overviews of the surrounding terrain.

The whole thing went wrong from the start. The AMF fell apart while approaching the valley, and never entered it until after the real fighting was over. When the American forces helicoptered into the valley, they discovered that instead of the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces hiding in the villages as expected, they were instead on the slopes of the ridges that surrounded the valley. One of the original groups of soldiers had to move out after the first day, taking too much fire from things such as mortars, which they couldn't counter because they only had their rifles and machineguns. The only heavier weaponry they had was a few mortars of their own, and air support.

The fighting went reasonably well at first. One Special Forces operator (as a soldier member of this elite unit is typically known) was killed in a friendly fire incident by an Air Force gunship, and a number of soldiers were wounded, but generally casualties were light. Unfortunately, halfway through the battle the higher-ups decided to change who was in command of the Special Forces involved. The new commander was a Seal determined to get his guys into the fight, and in a tragedy (you can't call this a comedy) of errors, the Seals tried to land on top of one of the highest local hills, where apparently pretty much everyone knew there were a lot of enemy soldiers and weaponry. The result was predictable: helicopters were shot down, men killed, and utter confusion reigned. After the Seals got into trouble on top of the mountain, the Army's Quick Reaction Force, a platoon of Rangers, was sent onto the same hilltop, and of course things just got worse. By the time things were sorted out 9 men were dead, more wounded, and three helicopters had been shot down, one not even leaving the hill itself.

Author Naylor obviously knows whereof he speaks. An Army Times reporter, he was embedded with troops who participated in the fighting, sat in on conferences where the operational plan wsa discussed, and interviewed a large number of participants at both the command level, and among the "trigger-pullers". Naylor spends a lot of time discussing the planning of the operation, from the composition of the task force involved to the chain of command to the presence (or absence) of various types of unit during the battle. Just about exactly half of the book is devoted to the planning and recconniasance of the valley. While the author takes issue with some of the decions made by the commanders, he is (contrary to some of the other reviewers on the store) pretty even-handed in his treatment of the Navy Seals who participated in the battle. He makes the point that they don't train for exactly the same sort of combat as the Army's Special Forces do, and that this somewhat weakened them, but he also gives credit where credit is due: one of the Seal teams started the fighting by knocking out an enemy DshK heavy machinegun which was in position to shoot down the helicopters full of troops entering the valley.

The author makes several good points about the way the fight was managed. First, the command structure was completely ad hoc, with a stripped down brigade staff controlling one battalion of its own and two from another division, groups from two services (Army and Navy Seals) attempting to coordinate with the regular soldiers, and everyone trying to coordinate their actions with the Air Force and the AMF, who were unused to fighting in the American style. The result was at times a complete disaster when it came to coordination and control, and left everyone frustrated.

A lot has been made of the comparison between this book and Mark Bowden's book Blackhawk Down. Frankly I think the comparison a disservice to both books. Bowden's book is a gripping you-are-there sort of thriler, with little on the larger aspects of the fighting. Bowden's a reporter for a civilian publication, and while he's a good writer, his understanding of the military isn't that much more than superficial. Naylor, by contrast, isn't quite the writer that Bowden is, but his understanding of the military and especially the army is much better. This gives him, and therefore his readers, a good understanding of the intricacies of Army and Pentagon politics, and how they effect what happees in the field.

For those as well as many others, this is a valuable book on Operation Anaconda, and the things that went wrong in it. I would recommend it.

After 9/11, the US attacked Afghanistan to knock out the Taliban - which they did very quickly with US Special Forces and an alliance to Afghani tribes that hated the Taliban. This operation takes place in March 2002, the bad guys are on the run and we are ready to deliver the knock out blow.

What starts off as a promising and conclusive finish ends up in being a laundry list of Murphy's laws - what can go wrong will. Too many different branches of the US were involved - the CIA, SEALs, US Army to name a few and everyone had their own agenda. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, managing the war from the Pentagon put limits on the troops involved (Vietnam vets - that sound familiar?) Compromises were made in the planning that would later come back to haunt the operation and cost US lives.

This is a tough book to read, it unfolds like a horror story. You want to scream - NO, haven't you learned your history? Don't do that, but like a snowball going downhill, no one can stop it once it is in action. And action there was. We walked into a hornets nest, killed a lot of bad guys, but ultimately failed in the main objective. The author puts you there at every step and makes you feel the pain and frustration of the guys who had to execute this operation.

A must read for all military planners, anyone with the responsibility of sending our men and women into harms way - learn from the mistakes of others. An excellent read for all those who are interested in seeing what is going on in this war torn country, the reasons why we are where we are now.

The book is an excellent reading material-the author was "on the ground" and was first witness to Operation Anaconda.

Having worked in and around Gardez and into Khwost in early 2003, most of us were aware of Operation Anaconda;perhaps the last opportunity to kill high value targets (HVT) prior to escaping to Pakistan. Many migrated down from Tora Bora previously and were awaiting spring weather to move back into the tribal areas of Pakistan.

That said, the presumption the "bad guys" would flee once US forces attacked the Shahikot Valley. This was a totally incorrect assumption. The bad guys had secured the high ground with overwatch allowing for indirect fire (both mortar and arty) into the attacking US forces. The tactical employment of US used the "hammer and anvil" operational plan with the ANA as the "hammer" and a mix of the 101st & 82nd ABN as the anvil.

The other fatal flaw in the assumptive planning was the Afghan National Army (ANA) would be the attacking force with units of the 10th MTN(L) and 101st ABN (Air Assault) as the blocking or anvil component to the operation. The entire operation was dependent on the ANA in its leadership and tactical audacit.

The movement of the ANA under the leadership of 3rd SFG (Special Forces Group) CWO Harriman commenced; shortly thereafter into the operation moving into the valley, an AC-130 Gunship fired on Harriman's convoy of Afgh troops in truck (commonly called "jingle trucks"); Harriman was evacuated and died at Bagram hours later. Therefore, the main effort of Operation Anaconda was already compromised to "friendly fire" incident killing a US Special Forces WO plus wounding a number of ANA soldiers. The main effort was already compromised. The bad guys now knew what was coming and prepared for a sustained engagement.

But, perhaps the most troublesome of the operation was the insertion of a SEAL team atop Takur Ghar, a mountain top with ideal observation of the entire valley-this was key terrain. The intelligence personnel at Bagram AB told the commanders this terrain was most likely held by the Taliban or foreign fighters-the recommendation to NOT insert was neglected onto this mountaintop proved to be an horrific mistake.

As such, and as the book indicates, a QRF of Rangers inserted atop Takur Ghar with the thought of rescue of the SEAL team, yet the team had ex filled down the mountain with their wounded.

The Rangers landed in the mist of very heavy automatic crew served weapons (12.7mm), RPG and AK direct fire weapons. The Chinook helicopter took direct fire and the pilots executed a "controlled crash", whereupon the Rangers (2nd Rangers) exited the back with two of the Rangers killed prior to touching the ground. A total of seven (7) US personnel were killed including US Army Rangers and US Air Force personnel.

One would ask the following questions:

(1) Was the assumption the bad guys would attempt to escape the incorrect assumption? Did the US planners and intelligence personnel incorrectly make the fatal mistake, as in Para 1: enemy course of action and composition?

(2) How could it be that the AC-130 Gunship could fire on Harriman's convoy of the US's main effort? With state of the art communication, "glint" panels for identification, maps and GPS result in the question of How and Why did this happen.

(3) At the top of Takur Ghar where seven (7) US died was a donkey tied to a pine tree (about 16 inches in diameter). The AC-130 was asked to "thermally", using high tech thermal imaging equipment to "see" if anything was atop the Takur Ghar. How did the crew miss the fact, not only heavily armed bad guys but a 1400 lb donkey in full view was atop Takur Ghar. Had the Air Force crew or perhaps a UAV seen the donkey..is it possible another COA in lieu of inserting US personnel would of saved seven (7) very brave Americans. Perhaps!

(4) Why did the commander of the 101st ABN soldiers not continue to demand the use of arty; the only indirect fire was provided on the second lift (60mm, 81mm & 120mm). Had the infantry been supported by artillery as is tactically mandated, the condition on the ground and the eventual outcome would of been much different.

Many fundamental issues with command and control plus unity of effort resulted in less than expected results. Hopefully, in future actions the After Action Report/AAR from Operation Anaconda will lay the corrective foundations to avoid many issues as noted above.

I saw in doing research for this review that the store has 103 reviews of this book already so I am probably not going to break any new ground here by writing a Von Clausewitz style tactical and strategic analysis cum book review. I'll provide instead my impressions of the book and the writing style and leave the deep military and political questions to those more capable of it than myself.

Impression 1:
A reader could safely skim or even skip the first hundred pages. They are a contextual build-up for the actual story of combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan and the war stories of the men who fought them. A detailed description of the CentCom command structure or how night vision goggles work, or the difference between Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and CIA jargon and slang wasn't all that interesting to me.

Impression 2:
Unity of command is vital. Ignore it at your peril.

Impression 3:
The Navy SEALs don't come out of this looking very good.

Impression 4:
The Army lost two helicopters and half a dozen Airmen, Army Rangers and Navy SEALs killed and many more injured in order to "rescue" one guy who they knew or should have known was already way beyond help and probably dead. The "no man left behind " idea needs some rethinking and context applied to it IMHO.

Impression 5:
This is a good 300-page book that goes to over 400 pages. Brevity is the soul of journalism in my opinion. The book should have been more concise and better edited.

With all that said I would recommend this book as the definitive story of Operation Anaconda.

In every war there are specific battles we come to remember, game-changers that cause those involved to question their assumptions, tactics and strategy. "Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda" gives us a glimpse into one of those battles. In March of 2002, after several decisive victories over the Taliban, American forces narrowly escaped disaster in Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley fighting a severely underestimated Al Qaida. Author Sean Naylor, a senior writer for the Army Times, goes into great detail revealing both the incredible heroism of many young soldiers, as well as, the shocking breakdowns in planning and execution among the highest levels of military leadership.

He describes a battle that showed the deadly limits of technology when operating in unfamiliar terrain, against an unconventional force, and under the watch of military commanders who had been lulled into a false sense of battlefield awareness. As an eyewitness, Naylor's account provides the type of scrutiny and on-the-scene reporting that makes generals queasy. But, don't get this confused with a sterile news story, "Not A Good Day to Die" has all the hallmarks of a, "Black Hawk Down"-style narrative with plenty of intense action.

Initially stymied by a deal struck between U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command that banned personnel from discussing Operation Anaconda with media, the author had to maneuver one bureaucratic roadblock after another, admitting in the forward that this book was not an easy one to report.

"Researching and explaining a complex and controversial operation fought by a dozen task forces was always going to be a challenge, despite the advantage I enjoyed having been present at the rehearsals for and some of the combat during Operation Anaconda. But even I, after thirteen years of covering the military, had not expected to find so many obstacles placed in my path by a handful of individuals with reputations to protect." pg. xi

What happened in the Shahikot Valley that made leaders so unwilling to talk? That's exactly what Naylor sets out to explain. First, was the huge intelligence gap that no one grasped until it was too late. Despite constant UAV coverage, hi-tech signals reconnaissance and multiple NSA resources being directed towards piecing together an accurate picture of the enemy and battlefield, the soldiers went in extremely blind to the realities of what they would be facing. The big takeaway, a glaring lack of reliable human intelligence and a terribly inefficient system to share intelligence among the various services and branches involved.

Second, the people making most of the decisions where the ones furthest away from the battlefield. Rather than trusting the men on the ground to lead the fight, generals glued to live predator feeds thousands of miles away felt qualified to direct various forces of which they had very little contact or understanding. A centralized command structure trying to keep up with a constantly changing enemy spelled disaster from the beginning. Take for example an episode on the eve of battle where Major General Franklin "Buster" Hagenback, 10th Mtn Division commander requested additional air strikes based on new intelligence from the field.

"General Hagenback said, `Hey, bomb these frickin' things,' recalled Mikolashek, who was also in the VTC. This request provoked what Mikolshek described as `a little consternation' on the part of CENTCOM participants in general..."Hey, you guys said you wanted this many targets bombed, and not it's all of a sudden this many. What are you doing?' was how Mikolshek characterized Renuart's response...In the end Renuart and Central Command said they would try to arrange the additional air strikes. But Renuart's initial reaction suggested that Central Command was not postured to quickly adapt to changing battlefield circumstances." pg. 187

As often happens in war, the Captains and Sergeants were called upon to not only defeat the enemy, but overcome the lackluster planning of their superiors. And to this end they did remarkably well. If half of this book is about the failures of those at the top, the other half is a glowing report of the courageous and cool-headed conduct of those on the front lines.

Between various Spec Ops recon teams that climbed thousands of feet into "unpassable" mountains to gain critical intel, to CIA members stationed in-country who impressed everyone with their intricate knowledge of the area, to Air Force Pararescuemen like Senior Airman Jason Cunningham who was posthumously awarded the Air Force Cross for his exemplary conduct in helping save the lives of 10 wounded soldiers, to members of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division that acted with lethal professionalism as they were flown into clouds of bullets - this book shows the best of our military as well. It is a fitting toast to those who risk their lives on a daily basis and a story that will be told for many years to come.

Mark Naylor, a reporter for "The Army Times," has written good and interesting account of Operation: ANACONDA, an offensive into the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan that took place in 2002. The mission was to drive al Qaeda fighters out of the region and into areas where they could easily be captured. Problem was a major assumption that the enemy would flee when the Americans showed up turned out to be wrong, very wrong. The al Qaeda defenders were in entrenched positions and were eager for a fight.

Much like the operation in Somalia that Mark Bowden depicted in "Black Hawk Down" the combat that followed was a success for the United States but not really. One of the biggest problems with the ANACONDA was its command and control structure. Students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, where I currently teach, have a lesson on the organization of this fight where they study this structure as something not to do again. Naylor spends a lot of time on this subject, probably too much, but you can also see problems coming miles and miles away. Micromanagement and confusion were the order of the day.

Readers will have something of a "get on with it" attitude, but the book comes alive when it gets to the actual shooting and is worth the wait. Naylor is quite sympathetic in his coverage of the Americans serving "downrange." The absence of heavy firepower--there were limits to what airpower could do--and the army had no artillery in Afghanistan out of a fear that it would make them look like the Soviets. As a result, al Qaeda was able to do what they wanted to do: stand and fight. There were a number of problems in the fight including a friendly fire incident and one and possible two Americans being left behind, but the high degree of training that Americans receive showed as they fought an enemy that was far more tenacious than expected. Naylor's account is gripping and does right by the "trigger-pullers."

[...] have complained that Naylor is biased against the Navy SEALS. This criticism is exaggerated. The book is Army-centric--no question about that--but that is by product of two things: 1) the SEALS did not talk with him, so he could only write about what he knew and had; and 2) the SEALS honestly did not do as well in this battle as others. There are many in the Special Operations Command that feel this book went to far and gave away too much information. That was one of the reasons I bought this book. Naylor certainly discusses more than these soldiers are used to seeing in public about their actions and that gives it a little bit more of an eye opening feel, but he crossed no lines.

In short, an interesting and compelling book.

Although this book has its limitations, for example, maps showing unit positions and an organization chart which would have been very helpful are missing, reading it provides a good picture of the strengths and weaknesses of how the USA conducts its asymmetric military operations. It is clear from this description of Operation Anaconda that although US ground forces are well trained and courageous, they are committed in inadequate numbers and are not supplied with adequate heavy weapons (why no equivalent of an RPG?). This book shows that is is assumed that airpower will provide the heavy firepower required. There are three implications of this approach that have disconcerting implications. First, this approach is utterly reliant on adequate radio communications. If means of jamming become widely available, it will have very serious implications for US tactics. Second, it must be incredibly expensive. I can't imagine how much it costs to have 2 or 3 aircraft flying support for 2 or 3 men on the ground. Will we be able to continue in this manner in an era of budget cutting? Finally, this approach does not appear to value closing with the enemy, which in Operation Anaconda meant that we didn't get a good idea of the size of the enemy forces, their casualties, the nature of the base they had developed, and so on.

In early March 2002, operation Anaconda in the Shah-i-Khot mountains in Afghanistan became a clusterf*ck before the first shot was fired thanks to Mr. Donald Rumsfeld's reductionist philosophy of warfare.

Most people know Anaconda from the fate of Navy SEAL Neil Roberts, who was reported to have fallen from a Chinook helicopter on top of Takur Ghar. Roberts either willingly or unwillingly disembarked, only to find himself alone fighting a group of Al Qaeda/Taliban fighters, and was ultimately captured and executed.

The first section of the book was filled with detailed operation plans which can easily confuse any reader like a blind lesbian in a fish market. There are too many characters from the various divisions of the military and too many acronyms to follow. Perhaps the Author's intent was to demonstrate the confusion that led to the unclear chain of command resulting in numerous blunders and unnecessary casualties during Operation Anaconda.

Most of the rest of the book was focused on what happened on the Takur Ghar peak and the rescue operation that followed, reading like a novel.

Anaconda was badly mismanaged because of too many cooks in the kitchen, and a chef in Mr. Rumsfeld who was too focused on the preparations to attack Iraq.

Mr. Sean Naylor, a senior writer for the Army Times and a veteran journalist having covered the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, spent many months in Afghanistan and a few days in the Shahikot Valley during the run-up to Operation Anaconda (source: Mr. Naylor's web site). Mr. Naylor's impressive credentials and his firsthand experience in the planning phase of Anaconda qualified him as a supreme candidate in piecing together the story of this operation, and "Not A Good Day To Die" is nothing short of a masterpiece.

This book is most tedious and boring--my goodness, what a waste of good money and time. The book goes on and on, endlessly about every single person who was ever in the military, plus their dogs and all their family histories--you need a computer just to keep them straight. Politics and more politics, and then some more. And the obligatory passages about how tough and how skilled everyone is. I'm not really sure where the book discusses the "untold story of Operation Aconda" since I keep falling asleep whenever I try to read it. This is the worst book and I am very disappointed, and a little angry about the sales pitch. Don't buy this--you can have my copy!

Very good account of how and why the most advanced technology in the world will never win a land war in East Asia. The book was a little heavy on the chain-of-command stuff for those unfamiliar with military terminology but necessary to show want happens when you have too many cooks in too many kitchens. The U.S. managed to turn an unmitigated disaster into an insignificant "victory". This should have ended the careers of Donald Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks but it didn't. They were allowed to go on and prove just how incompetent they were in Iraq.

Billed as the equivalent of 'Blackhawk Down' for its gripping battle narrative, I decided to give this book a read. I wish I could have given it 3.5 stars instead of just 3, but the store does not work that way. The first half of the book (I have the paperback edition) mostly concerns itself with the events leading up to how different forces were sent to and dispersed in Afghanistan. Though this is very valuable background information into how events transpired, it is not very exciting.
The latter half of the book, dealing with the actual battle and how it unfolded, is certainly much more exhilarating. Operation Anaconda was a major battle, but I think the impression that many of here back in the States got was that it was just a few teams of SEALS or other Special Forces guys who went in, had a mishap and got shot up a little bit. So from that standpoint, the book does an excellent job of clearly showing what a massive operation it was. I came away with a much better understanding.
My only other criticism is with the number of typos in the book. Most of the time I am surprised to find one or two in a professionally published book, there are more like 20-30 in this one.

Without a doubt, this is the most definitive account of Operation Anaconda and the firefight on Takur Ghar (aka Roberts Ridge). The author was in Afghanistan and attached to the units that conducted the operation. He interviewed dozens and dozens of people who were there from the top generals to the basic squad leaders.

The author does not throw politics (anti-Bush/anti-War) issues into the book. He does lay out a clear sequence of how and why things went the way they did during this battle. He offers critical comments by one source and then allows another source to counter the criticism.

My only minor issue is that there are so many important people mentioned in this book that I sometimes found it hard to keep track of who was who even with the help of a printed list in the beginning of the book. It also takes about the first 1/3 of the book to cover all the issues that developed during the planning stage, but it is key in helping the reader understand the flow and confusion that resulted in the battle.

There is a line in the book that sums it up in that sometimes no matter how well intended all the planners were for this operation, tragedy still resulted. This book helps to show that the military is not a machine, but rather a human entity that is capable of making mistakes.

Sean Naylor should be applauded for his candid account of Operation Anaconda! However, if you are looking for a feel-good description of America's finest in combat or are a staff officer responsible for the supervisory gaffs in this battle, you might not agree with me. This "no holds barred" narrative account of this battle cannot be told simply. It takes 377 pages to layout the entire scenario in detail and to provide the necessary insight to understand how egos interfere with battle execution and how the fog of war develops when least desired. If your choice of reading material is this book or Malcolm MacPherson's Robert's Ridge, this book is my clear favorite. It is not the easiest book to read, but it is the best and I suspect the most accurate portayal of the battle on Robert's Ridge. BTW, a good corollary to this book is Pete Blaber's book, The Mission, The Men, And Me in which he provides a first hand perspective on the planning of Operation Anaconda.